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HISTORY
OF THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

AND OF THE
NINETEENTH
TILL THE OVERTHROW OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE.

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO
MENTAL CULTIVATION AND PROGRESS.

By F. C. SCHLOSSER,

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TRANSLATED

By D. DAVISON, M.A.

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AUTHOR'S DEDICATION

TO THE

DOWAGER GRAND DUCHESS OF BADEN.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS AND GRACIOUS LADY,

THE first dedication of this work to your Royal Highness was written under feelings of great anxiety with regard to the nature of its reception by the public ; I trust I may venture to renew the dedication of this new edition to your Royal Highness with greater confidence. The reception which has been given to the work leads me to conclude, either that it has been considered to possess some value, or its Author some merit ; and the only object of this address is humbly to beg your Royal Highness most graciously to accept of that value or that merit, however small it may be, as a testimony of my deep sense of gratitude for the numerous instances of kindness and favour bestowed upon me for so many years.

Dare I cherish the expectation, which I can scarcely venture to do, that this work would not be wholly carried

away by the stream of time without leaving some traces of its existence, it would cheer the evening of my life, because I might then indulge the hope, that this proof of my gratitude and attachment, which are too well known to your Royal Highness to allow me to dwell upon them, would prove more enduring than the short period of my life which yet remains.

With the hope that your Royal Highness will receive this improved edition with the same goodness and condescension as the earlier one,

I remain,

Your Royal Highness's

Most obedient Servant,

F. C. SCHLOSSER.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

INSTEAD of reprinting the preface to the second edition, which, like every preface written by the author, merely contains thoughts applicable to and calculated for the moment of publication, it appears to him better to premise some remarks upon two points, which refer to this third edition in particular and to the method followed in the work in general.

His remarks upon the former of these two points, viz. the relation of the third edition to the second, may be comprised in a very few words: the second, viz. the connexion of the History of the Eighteenth Century with the author's studies and earlier labours, will require to be noticed at greater length.

The improvements in the third edition only affect the less important parts of the work: in essentials nothing has been altered or changed, with the exception of the silent correction of a few mistakes. The emendations affect the form. Both the volumes now published have been improved in many places, not in reference to ornament or magnificence of language, but only in distinctness, clearness of exposition and accuracy of expression. All excrescences have been lopped off, all transitions abbreviated or replaced by particles, every obscure or

involved period divided into parts, or at least made more explicit, every harsh construction better rounded, and every indefinite exchanged for a more pertinent expression. In order to show how and where this has been done, the author would be obliged to place the two volumes side by side and to go through them line by line, and thus point out the alterations by particular examples. He leaves it to the reader who has any doubt of his good intention and of his assurance, to make this comparison for himself; and whoever does so will assuredly find that the author has spared no labour or pains to accomplish these objects. Whether the improving hand has always been fortunate is another question; but the reader has in no case lost by the emendations, since neither has anything new been added to the contents, nor even a single fact been omitted, although here and there a sentence, an opinion, or a decision may have been modified or omitted, as not bearing upon the subject.

The allegation, that nothing new has been added, can however only be regarded as absolutely true with respect to the second part; for in the first some additions have been made, to which the author will here direct attention, in order that the possessor of the previous edition may be able to find them more readily in this.

The introduction to the first part is entirely new: the author was desirous of following the connexion of the literature of the eighteenth century further backward, and showing in what manner the eighteenth century and its culture stand in connexion with the civilization of antiquity, as revived in Italy at the end of the fourteenth century. He began therefore with the history of civilization, and was obliged to give an-

other form and position to the sections upon the connexion of the political history of the seventeenth century with that of the eighteenth, in order that the whole might form an introduction to the first part of the work*. The second addition will be found in the chapter on the war carried on by the emperor Charles VI. with the Turks, which was brought to a close by the peace of Belgrade. The addition relates to the leader and conduct of the war on the part of the Austrians: this is less important and comprises only a few leaves.

The second point, on which the author has promised to give some explanations in this preface, is closely connected with the history of his own training and education, because he was only led to the idea of combining the history of literature with that of politics by the course of his own studies, undertaken for his individual improvement. This idea is merely his own property, in so far as he wished to embrace certain views and relations of the subject only, because in other respects the history of literature, properly so called, and accounts of its authorities and sources, are to be found in all works of history, and given much more extensively than he either attempted or was able to teach them. As he merely wished to inform himself upon many points of the internal history of mankind, and only sought out what contributed to his design without regarding the rest, he could not expect that the public in general would feel an interest in his studies; he therefore for years wrote nothing upon the subject, and scarcely hoped for that

* The reader will find the first three sections, which relate to literature and civilization, prefixed to the portion of the History already published, and the two concluding sections, upon politics, form the introduction to the present volume.—[TRANS.]

degree of interest in his academical lectures which he nevertheless found. In his earlier years his attention had been occupied with studies of various descriptions in the most different departments of literature,—with theology, philosophy and mathematics, without adopting a particular department, and in both his earliest works literary and theological points were treated, before he at length chose history as his peculiar study and profession. He was then appointed professor in a philosophical faculty, which the prince primate instituted in connexion with the medical school in Frankfort, and since that time has sought to make his earlier studies profitable in his historical researches. Traces of these studies in reference to theology, philosophy and Grecian antiquities will be readily recognised in the *History of the Iconoclast Emperors*, written in the years 1810–11. When he afterwards prepared a regular course in Heidelberg upon ancient, middle and modern history (for on the latest, or the ‘*History of the Eighteenth Century*,’ he did not at first read), he lectured during the same number of hours weekly, alternately upon the history of literature and civilization and upon political history. This gave him opportunity for many years through, of consulting and reading all the original sources which appeared to him important for his particular object, for the investigation of the influence of certain portions of literature upon social life and upon the civilization of the leading nations of the world. He carefully noted down much, and his extracts and observations therefore accumulated in his papers; and the ever-returning duty of exposition called upon him repeatedly to consider and reconsider the whole of his materials, and to look at them from the most different points of view; still the

combination of politics and literature appeared to him too problematical to lead him to declare himself upon the subject otherwise than verbally.

When he became desirous of rendering some service to the public as a writer, he preferred merely giving some account of his study of the sources of political history, to venturing on the publication of his ideas on the mutual influences between the phænomena of the internal and external history of mankind. This was the object of his 'History of the World*', written in the form of continuous narrative.' This work, whose object has been often mistaken, and to whose form in the first two volumes the author himself had not sufficiently directed attention, was only intended to lead the friends of history to its proper sources, that they might see with their own eyes and be able to form their own judgment. By the hints given in the text, the author wished quietly and unobserved to lead students of history to be independent of those compends and prejudices of schools and rhetoricians which have been current for centuries. This object did not demand peculiar attention to form, for the book was only designed to be of use to the learned and to inquirers, whose number is always small. It was only intended to refer to those passages out of the extraordinary mass and unreadable abundance of sources which the author regarded as suitable for his object. In such a work everything depended upon the author's tact in selection, and of this no one could judge who did not himself possess tact and experience. The text contained only accessory materials, intended to give hints upon the notes, which were designed to be the chief object. The author after-

* Weltgeschichte in zusammenhängender Erzählung.

wards deviated from this extreme severity with regard to the notes, when the 'History of the World' found a more numerous and different class of readers from that upon which he had calculated. He continued notwithstanding, even in the third volume, which was somewhat more accommodated to the public in reference to form, always to keep a strictly learned tendency in view; and the work continued to be merely a guiding thread through the labyrinth of chronicles and records, and through the theological rubbish of the middle ages. The reception of the book, however, and the more extended class of its readers, excited a desire in the author to give a new form to its earlier parts; and on this occasion the author first adopted the thought suggested by his lectures upon the history of civilization and literature in the remotest and in ancient times, of endeavouring to combine the history of literature with that of political usages. He carried out this idea because he contemplated an early retirement from his official duties, and therefore no longer delivered his regular and extended lectures upon the history of civilization.

In this way his work originated, upon the history of the progressive internal and external development of mankind from the beginning of historical times till the fall of the kingdom of the Ostrogoths in Italy, which appeared under the title of a 'Universal Historical Summary of Ancient History*,' in nine parts†. It is there shown in what manner the architecture of the

* Universal-historisches Abriss der alten Geschichte.

† In the last two parts of this work, the origin of all the institutions, opinions, arts and sciences of the middle ages, and of every part and portion of the middle ages, as they were modified and developed by the incursion of the barbarians, are accurately pointed out and illustrated by examples, with a view to the complete understanding of the history of that period.

middle ages became complete, when the whole scaffolding of the ancient architecture of the Roman empire still stood firm.

The author ventured to make the attempt at combining the literary and political parts of history rather in his treatment of ancient history than in that of the middle ages, notwithstanding the copiousness of his collected materials, because for five hundred years the most distinguished men of all nations have been exclusively occupied with ancient literature, and at the same time treated the political history of the ancients. It was only necessary for him, therefore, to arrange his materials to accommodate them to the chief thought according to which his work was to be regulated, and to follow his path with courage through the multitude of all those who have wished to show their superiority in the whole range of antiquity, or in particular parts of it, without having adopted or treated their subject with impartiality*. In this course the author felt himself strengthened by the conviction, that not a day had passed since his boyhood and his earliest school years, without his having taken into his hands one or other writer of antiquity, or at a later period a church historian. Having by this work turned to a very different public from that of the exclusively learned, the author no longer wished to undertake the continuation of his

* The author's remark may be illustrated by the examples of Creuzer, Müller, Niebuhr and others, each of whom has adopted his own peculiar views with respect to Greek and Roman history, or may rather have been said to have invented and devised a history wholly unknown to all the writers of antiquity upon their respective subjects. Each of these has had his day, his party and his fashion, especially in Germany; and, like the various speculations in the departments of philosophical research, has been, or will be, supplanted by new inventions of successive candidates for classical renown. See Creuzer's 'Symbolic Mythology,' Müller's 'Dorians,' Niebuhr's 'History of Rome.'—[TRANS.]

'History of the World,' to which he received abundant encouragement, but to carry on his 'Summary of Universal History'; that is, his internal and external history through the period of the middle ages; he soon, however, relinquished the plan. It was not merely its great difficulty which deterred him from the undertaking, but his advanced age did not allow him to hope that he could bring to a conclusion an immense work upon the middle ages and another upon the last three centuries, for which last he had collected abundant and copious materials, and he had always promised his friends to treat those three centuries after the manner of his 'Universal Historical Summary.' Accidental circumstances, however, led him back to his 'History of the World,' and compelled him to limit his labours to a new and complete 'History of the Eighteenth Century.' The two works were to be executed in a different manner, because he would venture to do in the 'History of the Eighteenth Century' what he would not venture to have done in his 'History of the World,' although he had altered his manner in this also. He therefore gave to this continuation the title of a 'History of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries'; of this history the first two volumes have appeared, which contain the complete history of the fourteenth century. The author chose a middle way for these two volumes, since they were to be the continuation of an old work, and also in themselves a new one; by his manner of exposition he made them accessible and useful to every educated man, learned or unlearned, and the text now became the principal object instead of the notes, as had previously been the case. In order not completely to change the character of the work, the author merely selected hints from his papers upon the

history of civilization and the spirit of the age, and offered no literary remarks, properly so called, upon individual writers and works. This last-mentioned course he has adopted in the new 'History of the Eighteenth Century' with so much the greater confidence, as he had long previously ascertained the feeling of the public with respect to his views and method. In the first edition of a work now completely altered in form and dimensions, he had given some brief indications of the manner in which he had directed his historical studies, then for ten, but now for two-and-thirty years. All those to whose opinions and judgment he attached importance at that time approved of his method, and upon the whole (and no reasonable man could expect more) of his views and opinions also; he nevertheless continued his lectures for twenty years, without thinking of a new edition of his work; he had long devoted his attention to a single century and collected much, when he at last resolved upon a second edition, which was to be an entirely new work. It will be seen from these remarks upon the origin of his history, that its imperfections, whatever they be, do not result from any failure in the author in weighing and examining his materials, or from any want of time and labour bestowed on its preparation. Thirty years' study and twenty years' teaching ought to have placed him in a position to form a judgment upon this portion of history; and if he has not succeeded, his want of success attaches to his personal characteristics, which no man can change: he has assuredly honestly done his best. It must not therefore be attributed to vanity, which he is far from feeling, if he expresses his honest feeling of rejoicing, that the work has found so many readers even among the general

public. From a sentiment of gratitude to this portion of the public in particular, he has taken all possible pains to send forth this new edition with such improvements as his unceasing industry and care could suggest.

F. C. SCHLOSSER.

Heidelberg, April 17, 1843.

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HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

INTRODUCTION.

§ I.

SUMMARY OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

WITH respect to the political history, the author cannot follow its thread and connexion so far back as has been done in that of the literature of the eighteenth century to the borders of the middle ages. In the following sections he will very briefly delineate the condition of Europe at the end of the seventeenth century; first premising a hasty view of the eighteenth, in order to show the bearing of individual facts upon the general results.

For the sake of distinctness of conception, the whole history of the century may be divided into four parts, and from the events of each a definite result be drawn. This may be done in the following manner:—In the first period France became great and powerful through the instrumentality of a system which oppressed the people, whilst the court and government were in full splendour. This system was soon received and imitated by all the European governments, even in those countries in which the form of the state was not military and monarchical, as was the case in most. An attention to ceremony and stiffness, and a love of frivolity and extravagance ruled in the courts, in which

principles were followed and announced in confidential circles that must necessarily prove destructive to the artificial social condition, and to the privileges of certain classes and castes, as soon as they passed over into the literature, and were spread from the courts among the people. Louis XIV. had reigned in this military-monarchical style, and fully carried out what Richelieu and Mazarin had commenced. He had humbled the aristocracy of the ecclesiastical nobles of the middle ages. He had formed the military discipline of the modern times so as to destroy the remnants of knighthood, and had favoured and promoted those arts and sciences which had no need of freedom or of inspiration for truth, and which at the same time were admirably calculated to administer to the splendour of the exalted and the vanity of the rich. Whilst the higher and middle classes in France, and soon after in the whole of Europe, where the French tone was universally aped, became more and more removed from the sound and honest training of the people, and set up entirely new pretensions and claims, a radical revolutionary and even democratic tendency began to prevail in the tone and fashionable reading of the same classes, together with the use of indecent and often shameless language. This revolution had been already prepared under the reign of Louis XIV. by Bayle, and a society of Parisian scoffers, among whom Voltaire shone when yet a boy, and it took place under the regency. It soon became quite impossible to maintain a system by force which was undermined even by those for whose advantage it was calculated. That boldness of thought and temerity of genius in the consideration of divine and human things, which it was necessary for every one to possess or affect who aimed at influencing society, shattered the foundations of the European states, so far as they were built upon christian-monarchical or aristocratic and hierarchical principles.

What was commenced in the first period was completed in the second. States were universally to be maintained by force; and those who governed did not hesitate publicly to prefer subtlety and corruption to morality and justice, when the former answered their purpose better than the latter. The new dynasty in England, as well as the Regent and his Dubois in France, did not shrink from the adoption of any immoral means which might promote their interests, and boasted of such conduct as genuine statesmanship. Hence a struggle arose in all states with prin-

ciples which became more and more diffused, and ruled in the higher classes in spite of the police, barbarous laws and hierarchical dominion, whilst their originators and promoters persecuted and cruelly punished their spread among the people. There was only a single prince of the century (Frederick II.) who when yet a youth did homage to the new theory of progress, of rapid development, of industry and enlightenment, as the dawn of a new day of completely changed customs and morals. He placed himself at the head of that opposition which was so much to be dreaded in France by the government and clergy. He was hated by the old parties as antichrist, whilst he was greeted by the new as a messiah. As a king he followed the same course as Buonaparte afterwards did—he acted in the sense of the people without consulting them, and did homage to public opinion, which paved the way for its influence, without however allowing it greater scope than was favourable to his designs. The history of Frederick, his glory and popularity, sufficiently prove that it became impossible outwardly to maintain the system of the middle ages as soon as its spirit had disappeared, and that therefore the European governments only yielded to the law of necessity when they adopted Frederick as a model. France alone for a long time neither could nor would become unfaithful to its former system, and only resolved upon a change when the change was too late. Paris at this very time became, what Italy had formerly been, the school of all Europe. The court of Versailles completely lost its influence, and the circles of the capital, along with the preachers of the new wisdom, became the instructors of all the highly educated and refined in Europe.

In the third period the new principles of progress with the age, of industry, and the improvement of the condition of all classes, even of prisoners and criminals, became universally victorious. Even in Germany, where the government of the middle ages was more easily maintained in consequence of the yielding disposition of the people, the form of the state, protestant orthodoxy and catholic hierarchy, all was overthrown, because a completely new literature penetrated into life, and the whole mode of thinking was changed. This period continued till the first forebodings of the French revolution; and in the midst of peace, whilst the people were rejoicing in their prosperity and the pleasures of repose, there everywhere appeared

traces of dissolution, of separation, of an inward struggle, of a contest between inclination and disinclination, action and reaction, till at length the new principle in many states obtained the victory. The christian-knightly pomp disappeared of the middle ages, and an entirely new condition sprung up, which according to appearances changed the dreams of philosophers into reality, and withdrew the new generation from the influence of the Greeks and the Romans, as well as from that of the middle ages. Feudality and hierarchy, and along with them everything which was founded merely on tradition and usage, were to give way to the light of reason; the higher demands and necessities of noble and pious minds were ridiculed; and the real and practical alone, the requirements of a refined sensuality and sickly sensibility, were esteemed and promoted.

The last or fourth period reaches to the end of the century, and embraces the whole time till our own days: this we shall treat in three divisions.

The first division will comprise the time of the fall of the old system in France, and in which it was more or less threatened in other states. In the revolution one part of mankind thought they saw the return of the golden age; and another strove against the spirit of the new age with the old and rude weapons of force, whose inefficiency are first clearly shown when they are tried in a completely new species of struggle. Presently disorganization and strife, confusion and subversion, universally appeared, and a new order nowhere established or a new bond cemented. This was the period of the overthrow and fall of French literature and of the highest bloom of the German, especially of poetry.

The second division of this period is wholly military. A new order was formed from the chaos of anarchy hostile to those ideas, to which the misfortunes of the previous period are ascribed. Material interests, sensible and real advantages alone were sought after; and those sciences and qualities alone required which were immediately applicable to the practical purposes of life. The changes brought about in the foregoing period by means of the revolution were profited by in order to promote centralization, and for the destruction of individuality and nationality. All the smaller states and republics sunk; and Europe, or rather the whole world, was threatened with being divided between the absolute governments of Russia and France, or

the covetous and immoral aristocracy and plutocracy of England. During this period a mysticism and visionary enthusiasm of a peculiar kind sprung up in Germany, connected with and in some measure founded upon the scholastics which sprung from the philosophy of Kant, influenced the whole literature, and were earnestly recommended in England and France by William Taylor, Madame de Staël and their friends in both countries, at the same time as the French government, on political grounds, proved itself hostile to what it called ideology, and thereby especially promoted its diffusion.

The last division of this period embraces the vain attempts again to restore the old ways and even their external forms; the history of the alternating destinies of the friends of the people and their opponents,—of the struggle of egotism, obstinacy and superstition against visionary philanthropy,—of true inspiration for the advancement and progress of the human race against infidelity, vanity, presumption and meanness, which conceal all their plans under the veil of splendid projects and magniloquent phrases. At this time scholasticism in Germany loses the greatest part of its influence and importance, in spite of the exertions of individual word-makers, whilst it is transferred to France and recommended by splendid declamation, because the ruling doctrinaires find the wisdom of the German schools suited to their views. In Germany, however, religious cant upon the one hand and superficiality on the other threaten to become prevailing: physics and the sciences connected with it, politics and finance, political economy and its subtilties, are in demand, poetry and eloquence are treated with disfavour, and even novels lose a portion of their influence upon life.

§ II.

GENERAL REMARKS UPON THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND RELATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT STATES OF EUROPE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

In order to point out the connexion of the history of the seventeenth century with that of the eighteenth, we shall now proceed to premise some remarks upon the situation of the

European states at the time of the negotiations, with respect to the succession and inheritance of Charles II. of Spain. We begin with the Turkish empire, because a completely new relation between the Christian powers and the empire of the Osmons resulted from the last victories of the Austrians, and from the complete expulsion of the Turks from Hungary and Transylvania.

After the last siege of Vienna the Turks had completely lost the military importance which they previously possessed: for that reason they became, what they have since remained, a political machine, which may be used against Austria or the waxing power of the Russians. This importance of Turkey, which might be called diplomatic, grew proportionably greater as Peter of Russia became desirous of possessing the coasts of the Black Sea for the carrying out of his plans; and the more dangerous the European powers became to the Tatars, who at that time maintained an independent sway in the Crimea and on the coasts of the Black Sea, under the protection of the Turks.

At the close of the seventeenth century, the Austrians, supported by Brandenburg and Saxon troops, first under Louis of Baden and then under prince Eugene, had gained splendid victories over the Turks, and by the peace of Carlowitz (July 1698) had obtained back the whole of Hungary and Transylvania as far as the fortress of Temeswar, and had even compelled the Turks to restore the fortress of Kaminieck to the Poles. For the first time since the days of Wallenstein there then stood a man at the head of the Austrian forces who was able to conceive and carry out magnificent plans, in spite of all the obstacles which the internal administration threw in his way. Had the Austrian finances been in a better condition—had the council of war and its president not possessed so great weight, Austria might at that time have increased its territorial dominions at the expense of Turkey, and been able to show itself more yielding in the affair of the Spanish succession. At the end of the seventeenth century, Peter had begun to introduce those changes which were to make Russia a European instead of an Asiatic state. These changes were indeed carried through in a dictatorial and violent manner, and often accompanied with great cruelty, but altogether in the spirit of his people and to their real advantage*. He had

* The spirit of the whole Slavonian race, accustomed to slavery and despotism, and demanding the exercise of tyranny even for the promotion of their own advantages.—TRANS.

already taken his first journey through Europe, from which he had been recalled by news of the disorders excited by the janissaries (Strelitzen), whom he wished to abolish. The annihilation of the Russian Strelitzen was accomplished by the same violence as that of the Turkish janissaries has been effected in our own times. Peter however founded military and engineering schools, after the scientific principles of the French, English, Germans and Dutch, and endeavoured to create an army which was to be commanded by Scotch, German and Walloon officers, and to serve as a model to the Russians. For the carrying out of his plans of creating a new naval power, he had need of the Swedish possessions of Ingria, Esthonia and Livonia, and therefore on his return to Russia he had an interview with king Augustus of Poland, and proposed schemes of conquest which were most immediately ruinous to Poland, and afterwards to the unfortunate Saxons, who had not even the slightest advantage to hope for. Russia might at least hope that her armies would be formed and trained by experience in the war, which was agreed upon; whereas Saxony had nothing to expect from a war but to be completely impoverished.

The king of Denmark and Augustus of Poland wished to take advantage of the youth, the thoughtlessness and levity of the king of Sweden, who had undertaken the government as a boy; and they thought themselves the safer in the course which they proposed to pursue, as the chief powers of Europe were in a situation of embarrassment and eager expectation, in consequence of the antagonist claims of France and Austria to the inheritance of Charles II. of Spain. Denmark wished to oppress the duke of Holstein-Gottorp, the protégé, brother-in-law and friend of the young king of Sweden, and king Augustus, relying upon the spirit of discontent prevailing in the Baltic provinces, cherished the hope of again uniting Livonia and Esthonia to Poland. Christian V. had already entered into a secret alliance with king Augustus in Copenhagen, in March 1698, but he was too cautious, and placed too little confidence in the Elector, who was not less distinguished for his looseness and gallantry than for his bodily strength, to expose his kingdom to a war with Sweden, or with the powers which had guaranteed the last peace with Holstein-Gottorp. Upon the death of Christian, Frederick IV., his son and successor, had no sooner undertaken the government than an offensive and defensive alliance against

Sweden was agreed upon. Frederick IV., who ascended the throne in August (1699), was as much addicted to gallantries, pomp and travelling as the elector of Saxony, and entertained the same preference for Italy and Italians as he did; in September the new alliance was formed, and in November Peter sent in his adhesion to the union. Denmark now sought for a quarrel with Holstein-Gottorp, and king Augustus maintained an understanding with the city of Riga by means of Patkul, who had escaped from confinement in Sweden, had great influence in Livonia, and hoped for an insurrection of the nobles, which however never took place. The Saxon army, fitted out with Saxon money, appeared on the frontiers of Livonia, but the Poles refused all participation in the adventurous undertakings of their king and his minister Flemming. Poland, moreover, was at that time in possession of all those districts which had been wrested from Russia at the time of the civil wars, and had even lately recovered the province of Podolia and the fortress of Kamienieck; the Polish kingdom, however, was more distracted by internal dissensions than it had ever previously been, for Augustus and his friend Flemming treated all principle with ridicule, never thought of the fulfilment of any of the duties of a regent either in Saxony or Poland, but were wholly occupied with their pleasures, and with unexampled audacity wasted the scandalous fruits of their injustice and extortion.

Sweden, under Charles XI., had just recovered from a long train of sufferings. It was in possession of the provinces on the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic, and ruled over Ingria, Carelia, Esthonia and Livonia. In Germany it possessed the whole of Pomerania, with the fortresses of Stettin and Stralsund; in Mecklenburg the fortified harbour of Wismar, as well as the duchies of Bremen and Verden; and was intimately connected with Holstein by the bands of double relationship and alliances. The duke of Holstein, relying upon and with the aid of the Swedish troops, which had advanced into Sleswick and Holstein, erected trenches and caused Tönningen to be fortified. This was the circumstance which gave occasion to the first hostilities, and eventually led to the Northern war. The recollection of the military glories of the seventeenth century was still lively in Sweden, and Swedish and German officers of great ability, whose services Charles XI. had employed for the organization of his army, burned with an eager desire to blot out the

stain which the Swedish arms had contracted at Fehrbellin (1675). At this time the Swedish people had recourse to the protection of an unlimited regal power, as a safeguard against the evils of an oligarchy, to which all the misfortunes of late times were ascribed ; they did not, however, cast away everything which was old, and alter their constitution like the Danes (1660), but rather held fast at least by the ancient forms. Charles had scarcely reached his majority when the estates of the realm, terrified by the voice of the people, entrusted him with the exercise of unlimited power. He used this power to bring about a revolution by the instrumentality of the estates, and to rob the high nobility, who by their administration had ruined the country and the people, of all importance and distinction by the recall of the crown lands. The crown lands, which had now been alienated for above a hundred years, but especially since the times of Gustavus Adolphus and Christina, constituted the richest possessions of the nobles ; these, as well as the incomes derived from those lands, which had been presented to their present possessors, or which they enjoyed from long possession, were given over to the crown by the estates, on the principle that previous kings had had no right to alienate or pledge the property of the crown, certainly at least not beyond their lifetime. By this act the rich Swedish nobility was at once impoverished, and the poor king enriched. The measure was revolutionary and violent ; but it was used by the king, not for the promotion of his own advantage, but for that of the realm. Charles XI. became the avenger of the people, he inflicted retribution upon the oligarchy for the offences of which they had been guilty during his minority ; but he restored Sweden again to her station. As a ruler he was a severe despot and a niggardly master, but at the same time an admirable steward ; he saved the shattered kingdom, and collected the money and troops, which made his son for years afterwards the commander of the North. Charles acted with cruelty in Sweden, with injustice and arbitrary power in Livonia and Esthonia, because these provinces had their own rights and their own provincial assemblies. Like the men of terror in the time of the French revolution, he acted in the name of the people ; but he did not abuse his tyrannical power like the French democrats, for the promotion of the meanest ends. The most considerable properties of the most distinguished families came into the power

and possession of the king, and he was thereby enabled to re-establish the finances, the army and the fleet, on an entirely new footing, and to found institutions for the education of officers and for the creation of a corps of artillery and engineers, which excited and deserved the admiration of all Europe. Sweden had then a German army, recruited in its German provinces, and commanded by the most distinguished officers ; in Sweden itself there existed a national army, which might at any moment be reinforced by a regular system of levy. In Germany and in the Baltic provinces, there was therefore an admirable and well-trained army ; and in Sweden a militia such as no other country, except Switzerland, then possessed. Soldiers and officers were settled upon real estates, and regular periods for practice and review were established, in order that they might not become altogether peasants. The whole Swedish nobility became military. Charles XI. was altogether free from that ridiculous etiquette which wished to excel the court of Louis XIV. in splendour and extravagance, and which proved so ruinous to the elector Frederick, afterwards the first king of Prussia, as well as to the kings of Denmark and Poland : his son Charles XII. opposed mere force to the rotten system of the courts, and would have triumphed, had he not been destined to find in Peter a man who attacked him with the same weapons. Charles XII. appeared born to bring back the times of Gustavus Adolphus and of Charles X., although he was neither a statesman nor a general, but merely a good soldier and a bold adventurer. He was not quite fifteen when he undertook the government, with the help of the nobles released himself from the guardianship appointed by the other estates, and came forth (9th November 1697) as an absolute king. The alliance between Denmark and Saxony, already referred to, awaked in him the sleeping lion, and his heroic deeds fall within the very first years of the eighteenth century.

The revolution of 1688 in England had brought the Prince of Orange, William III., to the throne ; but James II. had been no sooner completely driven out, and the new order of things established, than he was equally harassed by the Tories and Whigs, the aristocracy and plutocracy, which have been continued down to the present day. He only succeeded at first in obtaining the kingly dignity by a threat of leaving England altogether, and by the refusal of his wife to accept the crown for herself alone.

At a later period, in the last war with Louis XIV., he found less zeal and devotion to his cause in England than in Holland, and at length after the peace (1697) he found himself in no condition, in the war of the Spanish succession, to set limits to the growing superiority of France upon the Continent, because the necessary means were denied him. He was obliged to have recourse to negotiations, although he knew well that at last force of arms must decide. William's opponents in England became so powerful at the close of the century, that they would no longer suffer his Dutch guards to remain in the country, to whom they were indebted for the expulsion of James; and at the moment when a new war broke out, and France maintained 200,000 men, they would only allow 7000 men in England and 12,000 in Ireland. The king was finally denied all means of rewarding his friends. The confiscated estates were declared to be the property of the realm, and a resolution was adopted, to the great annoyance of the king, that no foreigner should be suffered to remain in the English service except the prince of Denmark, the husband of Anne, the heiress to the crown. What William however as king of England could not effect, he accomplished as chief of the republic of the Low Countries, where he was regarded as the deliverer of the country, and the defender of its freedom against the ambitious designs of Louis XIV. We find him at the end of the seventeenth century, and in the first two years of the eighteenth, indefatigably active to maintain the balance of power in Europe, because he confidently relied, that sooner or later the repugnance of the English nation to Louis XIV. and the French would furnish him with the means for his object. This was really the case after September 1701.

At the end of the century France had reached the summit of her power and greatness, which, according to the eternal law of human things, was the immediate precursor of her decline and fall. This decline becomes proportionably more certain, the more firmly individuals and whole states rely upon the appearances of greatness and the acknowledgment of others, and neglect that self-knowledge and activity to which they have been indebted for their pre-eminence. France had now been engaged for more than a hundred years in a perpetual war with her ancient aristocracy, and at the same time with Spain and Austria, and both these empires were governed according to one and the same system, if the name may be used with respect to such

governments—both were ruled by jesuits and by the high nobility. Under Louis XIV. the aristocracy of France was changed into a court nobility; the splendour of the court was augmented by the barons, counts and dukes who formed a part of its servile and crouching retinue, and those who had formerly stood with pride and independence in the presence of their king now waited upon the favour and grace of their master. The nobles therefore shared with the court the plunder of the people, which the rapacious and tyrannous officers of taxation, by their arts, brought into the royal treasury.

Spain was so weakened by bad administration, the indolence of its inhabitants, and by fanaticism, and Germany by the division of her princes and nobles, and religious and political party-spirit, that France had wrested one province after another from the territories of both states. It contributed in no small degree to the weakness of Spain, that it was obliged to defend provinces which lay remote, and were connected with the governing state by no natural bond. Besides its immense territories in both the Indies, it possessed Naples and Sicily, and maintained its dominion over the Netherlands, Burgundy (Franche Comté), and Milan, till its wars with Louis XIV. Germany had lost Alsace by the diplomacy of Richelieu and Mazarin, and in the midst of peace, Louis robbed the empire of Strasburg and other small districts and towns. This robbery was effected by the instrumentality of the miserable sophistry of lawyers; the same sophistry was employed in the first place to wrest from Spain that double row of fortresses which now constitute the northern barrier of France, and afterwards the province of Burgundy. In order to effect these great conquests, and at the same time to be able to dazzle the whole of Europe, and especially his own nobles, by pomp, splendour and extravagant expenditure, as well as to deliver his opinion in an authoritative tone in all European affairs, Louis was obliged to maintain an immense army, to keep up spies in all countries, and to expend considerable sums in bribery in Sweden, Poland, Turkey, Hungary, and especially in Germany. In the first years of his government, it was easy for the king to raise from the people the immense sums which he needed for his objects, because industry, trade, and the art of navigation had made great progress in France as well as in Holland at the termination of the thirty-years' war; all this, however, was changed in the last decennium

of the seventeenth century. Louis was extremely hostile to the reformed churches. In their members he oppressed or banished the most industrious portion of the nation, left the finances to the administration of usurious blood-suckers, and the poverty and destitution of the people reached such a pitch, that he became at length convinced that a new war would prove ruinous to himself and the country. When therefore he embraced the hope of appropriating the Spanish monarchy to himself, he especially dreaded the money of the naval powers, and eagerly sought to ward off a war by diplomatic stratagems. There can be no doubt that some of the greatest men in their department which are known to modern history were amongst the number of Louis' generals, such as Catinat, Villars, and Vendome, but they had no longer that influence in military affairs which had been possessed by Turenne and Condé. It was no longer merit, but court favour, and the partiality of Madame de Maintenon, which decided places and promotions, at a time when Eugene was first placed at the head of the Austrian forces, and Marlborough received the command of the armies of England and the Netherlands.

The seven united provinces of the Netherlands, like France, had reached their highest pitch of prosperity in the seventeenth century, but towards its close, continued wars, and the growing industry and foreign traffic of England, proved destructive to the prosperity of this industrious and frugal people. War had brought the burden of an immense debt upon the country, which was also distracted by the increasing contests of two hostile parties, laid to rest only for a brief season under William III. The rich and distinguished families were favourable to the form of an aristocratic republic, and were intimately connected with the English Whigs, whereas the mass of the people wished for a stadtholder with monarchical power, as a protection against the family connexions of those who had long been in complete possession of the government of the realm. Under the rule of William, this division produced no effect on their outward operations, but after his death party strifes became more vehement than ever.

At the end of the century, the German empire was a more powerless alliance than it had ever been since the times of Rudolph of Hapsburg. Sometimes Austria and sometimes France profited by its weakness for the promotion of their own designs,

and its weaker parts were always threatened, and occasionally swallowed up by the stronger. Since the peace of Westphalia, France and Sweden had gained a legal influence in its internal affairs along with Austria, and since that time a new power had been formed on the Baltic, which with German resources and means raised up a new state independent of Germany. Since the time of Charles X.'s campaign in Poland, and the independence of Prussia, which was established on that occasion, the great Elector had raised finances, formed an army, reduced the nobles to subjection, and founded that military unity of government of which France was a model. Frederick William, like Charles XI. of Sweden, used the power which he arrogated and assumed in the sense and for the advantage of the people, who required to be roused by force from their torpid slumber, and whose phlegmatic indolence needed to be stimulated by the lash of a driver. The means were willingly forgotten for the sake of the end, and his military severity was overlooked because it promoted the well-being of the people and the renown of the state. By the defeat of the Swedes at Fehrbellin, Frederick William founded the reputation of the Prussian army. He was the only one of all the princes of Germany in whom Louis XIV. put no confidence, because he was obliged to respect him. Frederick William, but still more his successor Frederick, who afterwards became the first king of Prussia, attached himself closely to the cause of Austria, and even Frederick's ridiculous vanity, folly, love of titles and ceremony promoted the increasing greatness of the house of Brandenburg.

Whilst Brandenburg rose in the scale, and the industry and prosperity of its inhabitants increased with the assumed power of its rulers and ministers, and the true advantages and well-being of the subjects were only sacrificed for a short time to the empty splendour of a foolish prince, Saxony sunk deeper and deeper, till the end of the seven-years' war, under four rulers, each of whom vied with the other in forgetfulness of all duties to the people, and in the promotion of their own selfish views. The two predecessors of the elector Frederick Augustus, who at the end of the century became king of Poland, had sacrificed the best interests of the country to their passions, their favourites and mistresses. Frederick Augustus not only sacrificed them to his vanity, his passions and his favourites, but he allowed himself to be made the tool of Russian state policy,

which was directed to the downfall of Sweden and Poland. He carried his indifference to every serious duty so far, that whilst the Brandenburg and Prussian army was laying the foundation of its military renown, the Saxons utterly lost theirs by the bad conduct and neglect of their military affairs.

In Hanover, the elector Ernest Augustus, father of the future king of England, ruled till the year 1698, and in the wars which were carried on with Louis XIV., made considerable efforts and many sacrifices, partly from patriotism and partly to obtain from the emperor the electoral dignity. Ernest Augustus was married to the daughter of Frederick V., prince palatine of the Rhine, and granddaughter of James I. His son George, who was to unite the duchy of Zelle with Hanover, was also heir to the throne of England. William III. died without male heirs. Under his successor Anne, the succession to the throne was secured to the house of Hanover by law, James II. and his son having been excluded from the throne and government by a formal declaration of the nation. George, both before and after his accession, was much more occupied with German than with English affairs, and never even learned to speak the English language with ease or correctness. Always intent upon the augmentation of their hereditary states, Ernest Augustus and George I. attached themselves to the cause of the empire in the war of the succession, even when Zelle, Wolfenbittel and Gotha were won by Louis XIV. to his cause, so that troops were recruited for his armies after he had declared and begun the war with Austria, and when therefore an imperial war was imminent. Among the other electors, the ruler of the palatinate and the electors of Mayence and Trèves were favourable to the emperor; whilst the elector of Cologne, and his brother the elector of Bavaria, were so intimately connected with France, that both brought the greatest evils upon their country, and quarreled with their nobles because they had united with the enemy of their country against both emperor and empire.

Naples, Milan, and the larger islands of the Mediterranean were bound up with the fate of the Spanish monarchy; the house of the Medici, as well as that of the dukes of Parma, were approaching their extinction, and the German empire regarded Tuscany as well as Parma as escheated fiefs. These states were altogether unimportant for the history of Europe, and they, as well as the Pope (as head of the states of the Church), were

obliged to conform to circumstances and the fortune of policy or war.

The counts, afterwards dukes of Savoy, by prudent management and taking advantage of every favourable conjuncture of events, had contrived to augment their little state; Piedmont, in the seventeenth century, had become a state of the second order, and gained new provinces under the rule of Victor Amadeus II., who, in 1730, voluntarily laid down his office as king. In the war which he had carried on in alliance with the emperor, the empire, the naval powers, and Spain, against Louis XIV., Victor Amadeus received subsidies from the naval powers: he however lost all his provinces and fortresses to France, and profited by the circumstances, in order to escape from his difficulties. The friendship of Savoy seemed so important to the king of France for the promotion of his views on the Spanish monarchy, that he tried every possible means to secure it. Whoever was in possession of the fortresses of Piedmont could open Italy to the French or close it against them: for this reason, during the last war Louis eagerly sought for a reconciliation with Victor Amadeus, and secured him so great advantages that all Europe was filled with astonishment when the peace between France and Savoy was proclaimed (August 1696). The whole of his territories and fortresses were restored by the French; even Pignerol, which had been ceded to France in 1631. Louis' eldest grandson and future successor, the Duke of Burgundy, was married to the eldest daughter of the duke; and at a later period, Louis' second grandson, the first king of Spain of the house of Bourbon, was united in marriage with his second daughter. We shall afterwards see that the duke, notwithstanding all this, separated from France as soon as Austria and England offered him advantages which he could not hope to obtain from France.

Switzerland and Portugal were too inconsiderable to call for, or deserve a particular notice. Portugal indeed afterwards played a part among the powers which opposed Louis XIV. after he obtained the inheritance of Spain for his house.

FIRST PERIOD OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CENTURY TILL THE
AUSTRIAN WAR OF SUCCESSION.

FIRST DIVISION.

HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL
AND DOMESTIC LIFE OF THAT PERIOD.

CHAPTER I.

WAR OF SUCCESSION IN SPAIN.

§ I.

CAUSES OF THE WAR.—CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CHIEF
POWERS WHICH ENGAGED IN IT, AUSTRIA, SPAIN, FRANCE,
ENGLAND, THE UNITED PROVINCES.

FRANCE and Austria entered upon a contest with respect to the succession to the Spanish monarchy, without any reference to the fact, that it lay with the Spanish nation and its king wholly and alone to determine in what manner they wished the future administration and government to be conducted. This was a consequence of the principle of legitimacy, which was at that time universally acknowledged, except in England alone. Philip II., Philip III. and Philip IV. had left no legitimate male heirs, except their respective immediate successors; Charles II. had no son, and was moreover of a weak and sickly constitution; Austria therefore laid claim to the inheritance of Charles V., for the second son of Leopold I. Charles V.'s son Philip II. had founded the Spanish and his brother Ferdinand I. the Austrian dynasty. Louis XIV. laid claim to the inheritance, because he was the son of one Spanish princess and the husband of another.

Both his mother and his wife had indeed, for themselves and their heirs, relinquished all claim to the Spanish succession; Louis and his parliament however alleged, that this renunciation was invalid, because no one had a right to alienate or prejudice the rights of his or her descendants. Austria, moreover, founded its claims to the inheritance, not merely upon descent from Philip I., but also upon the fact that Ferdinand III., as well as Leopold I., had been married to Spanish princesses, whose rights of inheritance had been expressly reserved. In order to remove all fears of disturbing the balance of power in Europe, the emperor Leopold declared that he sought the Spanish crown only for his younger son Charles; whilst Louis on his part destined it for his younger grandson, Philip duke of Anjou. The negotiations of these powers with respect to Spain, in which the Spanish nation was neither considered nor consulted, and the conclusion of two treaties of partition so embittered the Spanish people and their king, that the latter took measures, with the approval and consent of the great naval powers, to transmit the whole dominions of the monarchy to the elector of Bavaria. The elector was grandson of the emperor Leopold, son of a daughter who was married to the elector of Bavaria, which daughter was the issue of his first marriage with the Spanish princess Margareta (both his sons Joseph and Charles were the issue of his second marriage); and all claims which her mother might have upon the inheritance to the Spanish monarchy were expressly reserved to the electress in her marriage contract. Charles determined the succession in favour of the elector by a testamentary disposition, and a fleet of the great naval powers was immediately to convey him to Spain, where he was to be educated. King Louis XIV., it is true, quietly protested against this arrangement; but the cause of the young prince (only seven years old) was adopted by the wisest, justest and most honourable of the princes, William III., the only defender of legal freedom, at a time when it was equally threatened by bayonets and diplomats, and by the tricks and schemes of the Jesuits.

The unexpected death of the elector (Feb. 1699) opened up a new field for cabals, and the weak king was beset on all hands to induce him to make a will in favour of France or of Austria, whilst both had concluded treaties with the naval powers for a partition of the monarchy. The wife of Charles II., who was a sister of the empress, used all her endeavours in Madrid to pro-

mote the cause of Austria, whilst the marquis of Harcourt, the French ambassador, employed his interest and his money, which had great influence, to forward that of France. Accusations and calumnies were circulated against the queen, by means of letters from Vienna full of reproaches, and her confidante, Madame de Berlepsch, was bribed* with a sum of 25,000 pistoles. She therefore yielded to the views of Harcourt, changed sides, and aided in effecting the banishment from the court of Amirante and Oropeza, the two chief enemies of the French. The old count Harrach, as imperial ambassador, had had no inconsiderable influence at the Spanish court, where everything was governed by personal interests and by mean cabals; but after having deeply offended the pride of the Spaniards by three demands which he made before his departure, he left his son behind him as his representative†, who by niggardliness, contracting debts, and thoughtless behaviour, embittered the minds of the Spaniards against the Germans. Notwithstanding this, the Austrian party was for a time powerful enough to induce the weak king of Spain to make a will in favour of the archduke, to which he was greatly influenced by a knowledge of the fact, that the foreign powers had already concluded a new treaty of partition. The imperial court however did not fulfil the conditions imposed upon it by this second will, and thereby furnished the French party with an opportunity of again gaining a preponderating influence over the sickly king.

The king's will required that the archduke should be brought to Spain, accompanied by Austrian troops, in order to protect

* We here follow with the necessary caution the manuscript, well-written, and ornamentally-bound folios of the *Bibliothèque Royale* in Paris, *MSS. Français*, Hist. de France, Mortemar, No. 71, which contains all the minutes, dispatches, letters, and the fullest official though one-sided report of these transactions, under the title, 'Relation des causes de la guerre de 1701—1713.'

† *MSS. Mortem.* No. 71. 1. The king must agree to settle the succession before his death; 2. to give up in his lifetime the province of Milan to the archduke; 3. renew the treaty of Ryswick. In this collection of French official documents (a book such as Bignon's *History from 1800—1807*), it is further stated, that the marquis de Harcourt was said to have sanctioned the new partition-treaty of 1700, and given his advice to treat with respect to the matter with England and Holland only, and to say nothing of it in Spain. Long extracts are given from his dispatches and the answers to them, where it is expressly denied that he had either negotiated or entered into any cabals about a will. He here demands his recall, before the will was made. The miserable cabals which were afterwards carried on at the Spanish court, and the particular steps which were taken, are detailed with wearisome minuteness. These however will be found in Coxe, Torcy and all other historians.

the country against an attack on the side of France, or that at least a division of the Austrian army should be sent into the Milanese. Austria however had as little money, and as few disposable troops, as Spain herself; she therefore hesitated and delayed, because, according to her custom, she waited for some favourable turn of events, and did not venture to send troops into Italy, because the great naval powers, on the occasion of the treaty between Louis and Savoy, had declared that if any foreign powers should permit their troops to advance into Italy, they would regard it as an act of hostility.

Whilst Austria hesitated, Portocarrero, who stood at the head of the French party, and the jesuit Cienfuegos, who was afterwards created a cardinal, conjured the sick king, by making a new will in favour of the French prince, to save the monarchy from partition, to which it was evident Austria had consented. In order to quiet the conscience of the weak king, who was troubled with the idea of depriving his family of their inheritance in order to bestow it upon the French, they brought him a judgement of the pope, and made it a condition, that in case the two French princes should die without heirs, the succession should come to Charles*. This will was drawn up by Ubilla (afterwards marquis de Rivas), who took it with him into the king's cabinet, caused it to be signed by him before he recovered from his surprise, and burned the one which had been made in favour of the archduke before his eyes, whilst no one knew anything of the destruction of the one or the contents of the other; the Austrian minister never entertained any other idea than that the archduke was heir to the throne.

A new treaty of partition however had been signed by the naval powers, just about the time when the death of Charles was every week expected. Harcourt, who stood with an army on the Spanish borders, recommended the observance of this treaty, and the opinion of Louis' minister, whose account we follow, shows that it was well known how dangerous the acceptance of this will might be†; we have our doubts nevertheless

* The dauphin had three sons: the second, Philip of Anjou, was to succeed to the throne of Spain; in case he died without heirs, then the youngest son, the duke of Berry, was to be his successor; and if he also died without heirs, then came the archduke Charles.

† In the Mortemar MSS. the reasons against the acceptance of the will, and the statement of the circumstances of France, are briefly and well stated, pp. 97, 98:—"Le roi s'étoit engagé a rejeter toute disposition que le roi d'Espagne pourroit faire de sa monarchie en faveur d'un prince de France à

whether Louis felt those difficulties in coming to a resolution, which are commonly alleged. He knew the contents of the will in September (1700), and Charles did not die till the month of November following; he had therefore time enough to form his conclusion; and he had previously gone to an immense expense, in order to obtain the will. When the will was first opened on the first of November, after the death of Charles II., and the news was brought to Paris that the succession had been bequeathed to Philip of Anjou, Louis declared, on the 12th of November, his acceptance of the inheritance in the name of his grandson Philip, although opinions were divided in his council upon the subject. Among all the various and varying reports which have been given of the debates and opinions which were held in the French cabinet, it seems to us safest to follow* the extracts from the minutes of the cabinet, even in opposition to Louville and other writers of memoirs.

A regency was in the mean time appointed in Spain, composed of eight members, at whose head, in order to preserve the appearance of respect, the widowed queen was placed, who however was removed from Madrid before the entrance of the new king into the city. Cardinal Portocarrero possessed the real power and guidance of the state, which was carried on quite according to the traditionary Spanish manner. The naval powers, or more properly speaking William III., by whom the treaty

quelque titre que l'acte en serait fait, testament, donation, &c. Toute forme que ce fût souffroit une exclusion. S. M. contravenant à ses engagements s'attiroit le reproche de violer la parole sacrée des rois et encore en y manquant la guerre étoit inévitable. L'objet principal que le roi s'étoit proposé en pressant la conclusion de la paix signée à Ryswyk avoit été de laisser à ses peuples le tems de se rétablir après une longue suite de guerres. Lorsqu'ils commençoient à peine à jouir de quelque repos, ils se verroient encore obligés de soutenir le poids d'une nouvelle guerre qui deviendrait incessamment universelle," &c.

* MSS. Mortem. No. 71. pp. 101, 102. The ministers were, Pontchartrain, the chancellor; duc de Beauvilliers, chief of the board of finance; Torcy, minister of foreign affairs; Chamillard, minister of war; Desmarets, controller of finance. Torcy is reported to have declared himself unconditionally for the acceptance of the will; the duc de Beauvilliers recommended the acceptance of the treaty of partition, "persuadé que la guerre, suite nécessaire de l'acceptation, causeroit la ruine de la France." The chancellor Pontchartrain, after the fashion of other celebrated jurists, weighed and presented the arguments for and against, without coming to any conclusion; the dauphin was in favour of acceptance. The document then runs thus: "Le roi décida et voulut que la résolution qu'il prit d'accepter le testament fût tenue secrète pendant quelques jours. Les écrivains des derniers tems," it continues, "ont avancé faussement que *Mad. de Maintenon avoit assisté à ce conseil, et qu'elle avoit donné son avis.*"

of partition had been projected, meanwhile resolved to avenge the violation of these treaties on France. William was at first obliged to conceal his views, because the Dutch must first have their troops back from the fortresses in the Low Countries, and because the English ministry and parliament were opposed to his plans. The duke of Savoy had been gained over by Louis since 1696, and was now still more closely connected with Spain and France; the elector of Bavaria, as governor of the Netherlands, acknowledged Philip and opened the Belgian fortresses to the French. Austria alone, which was wholly independent of France, immediately declared its views of having recourse to arms in defence of its rights.

Whilst all Europe was arming, and France was trembling at the prospect of a war, in which not only no help was to be expected from Spain, but during which the Spanish king and his court must be maintained by the resources of the French nation, Louis took delight in all sorts of magnificent spectacles and festivities, which the French understood so admirably well how to get up. From the 12th of November till January the new king of Spain was exhibited at the French court in all the pomp of royal splendour, sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, with a laughable degree of etiquette, which did not permit the honour of the arm-chair to his elder brother. He first entered his royal palace in Madrid in February (1701).

Spain at that time presented a singular spectacle, and exhibited a surprising contrast with France. The one country had more and more fallen back into the usages of the middle ages, whilst Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV., by means of an artificial system of finance and a standing army, had introduced into France an entirely new age of luxury, splendour and ministerial despotism. In the last years of Charles II. the whole Spanish army was not more than twenty thousand strong, and these without provisions or pay: even the soldiers of the royal guard whilst on service were obliged to pursue some trade in order to get a living. A single regiment of dragoons, consisting of 700 men, which was owned by the prince of Darmstadt, was to maintain peace and quiet in the capital. The prince of Darmstadt was at the same time governor of Catalonia, and a cousin of the countess palatine, Maria of Neuburg, wife of Charles II.; and he was therefore also removed from the city through the instrumentality of cardinal Portocarrero. After this event the popu-

lace kept the court in a continual state of alarm, and the king himself was hooted after by women and boys whenever he went out of his palace. The condition of the Spanish kingdom and the state of morals at the court and in the capital were moreover undoubtedly peculiarly favourable to the promotion of an exclusive nationality, to the perfect equality of all Spaniards in the intercourse of life, in the midst of an inequality in rank which was pushed to a ridiculous extreme; and the general poverty caused a feeling of indifference even with respect to destitution. The new king on his arrival found his palace wholly destitute of the most usual articles of furniture, not to say of the conveniences to be found in the houses of rich private individuals. He was in want of everything which even ordinary citizens in France possessed. Should any one ask what became of all the money, how the revenues were squandered, which were the proceeds of the most beautiful and at the same time the richest countries of the world, the Indies, the Netherlands, Milan, Naples and Spain, the answer is easy, when it is known that the regency appropriated a thousand pistoles for the king's journey from the boundary of the kingdom to Madrid, and on the other hand, twelve thousand for the embassy of the constable to Paris. The manner in which the Spaniards combined the greatest pomp of language, and display of the remnants of ancient splendour, with the deep poverty of their present condition, will be best learned by comparing the letters of the companion and attendant of the new king (Louville) with the description given by Ubilla (Rivas) of the first journey of Philip V., in his diary of the first three years of this king's government.

The new king soon adopted the character and disposition of the Spanish people; nor was he wanting in implicit faith and a sort of mechanical piety, which are peculiar to the Spanish nature in all countries. His attendant and former tutor, the marquis de Louville, on the other hand, looked at everything from the limited point of view of a clever French courtier. There had been no want of instructions given to the new king and his companion about things of all kinds; and Louville (who in his memoirs has given an account of these instructions, which are also spoken of by Noailles), without any reference to the differences of the Spanish character or the peculiarities of the people, pours out a torrent of ridicule upon persons, the nature of the court and of their court receptions, and upon the whole arrangements

of the state. No thought therefore could be entertained of military arming, or of new and radical improvements in the management of state affairs, so long as he was the councillor of a hypochondriac king, and there were only Spanish regents.

The naval powers, who felt themselves injured by the violation of the treaties of partition which had been concluded between them and Louis, by no means concealed their determination of taking part with the emperor in case of a war, although William III., who was accustomed in his own person to direct all affairs in Holland and England, did not consider the time favourable for provoking a commencement of hostilities. Since the conclusion of the last peace, and in consequence of the miserable condition of the Spanish military force, the Dutch had obtained permission, for their own security, to station and maintain 15,000 men in the Belgian fortresses: the elector of Bavaria having suddenly opened up a way for the entrance of the French, these troops were obliged to swear allegiance to the new king. What could Holland now do but acknowledge the new king, in order to be able to withdraw its troops from the power of the French? King William had found little gratitude in England, and had now come to a rupture with the Whigs as well as with the Tories. The new constitution of the kingdom and William's elevation to the throne were the work of the Whigs, who were enemies to that abuse of the monarchical power in which the Stuarts had allowed themselves to indulge. The Whigs wished to confine themselves wholly to the politics of their island and to the promotion of its trade and manufactures, and they were therefore altogether indisposed to support and aid in carrying out the plans of the king. William regarded it as an honour to England to make the politics of Europe dependent on its decisions, whilst the Whigs thought that the nation would be obliged to pay too dear for playing that character in European politics which the king wished to adopt; William therefore took the Tories into the ministry. He consented that the new parliament, which assembled about the time in which Philip entered Madrid (Feb. 1701), should be chosen under the influence of the Tories. Till something could be done in England, William was meanwhile obliged to let the quarrel be commenced in Holland, for there he could reckon with greater certainty upon the states-general and the grand pensionary; and the English were bound by treaties to render assistance to the Dutch in case they should be attacked

by France. Without expressly declaring war against France, the emperor armed, made preparations for taking forcible possession of the Milanese, and required England and Holland, in terms of the treaty, to lend him aid.

William, who was neither supported by his ministry nor by parliament, reckoned upon the English people themselves, and the result showed that he had reckoned right. His new ministry besides, as well as the parliament, insisted upon a diminution of the standing army and of the guards, and the circumstances were so threatening, that the parliament was obliged to be compelled by the voice of the popular will, to consent that ten thousand Irish and twenty ships of war, according to the terms of the treaty, should be sent to the aid of Holland, if France broke the peace. First of all, William found it advisable to have the new king of Spain acknowledged on the part of England also. Philip V. was in like manner proclaimed as king in all the provinces of the Spanish empire, although the duke of Pepoli, viceroy of Naples, and the prince of Baudemont, governor of Milan, were esteemed as partisans of the archduke Charles. Just at this time, the duke of Savoy was more closely connected with the interests and wishes of France by the concerted marriage of his daughter with the new king of Spain, and by the promise that, in case of a war, he should receive the chief command of the French army in Italy. The duke of Mantua accepted a sum of money, and admitted the French into the principal Italian fortresses; king William however followed his own course.

William at that time fully developed and explained the whole grounds of his politics to the states-general in a document addressed to the grand pensionary, which is to be found among the Hardwicke papers, printed in the present century. He succeeded in rousing the spirit of the people in opposition to the parliament and the ministry, and raised a suspicion in their minds against the Tories in particular, of being favourable to the former king and his protectors, the French. The public opinion in England against France soon became so strong and loud, that both ministers and parliament, as early as the month of May, before the parliament was prorogued, voluntarily declared themselves ready to support the views of the king.

The whole burthen of a European war must fall upon France, for when the emperor collected and fitted out an army, in order

to maintain and make good the rights of his son in Italy, Louis was obliged to send thither both money and troops. Immense sums were lavished in all directions upon spies and bribery, and even in England many members of parliament had yielded to the temptation, and were bribed with French money. The king of Spain played a melancholy part, and what was to be expected of him, may be gathered from the circumstance, that his nurse, whom he had brought with him from Paris, was obliged to be sent back again, because she appeared to exercise too great an influence over him. He vacillated besides between his French Mentor and his Spanish advisers, and received admonitions and directions sometimes from Louis, sometimes from Maintenon, and sometimes also from the French ministers, who very foolishly allowed themselves to imagine, that Spain would submit to be governed (from Paris) like a French province. Portocarrero, at the head of a secret Spanish council (*dispacho*), for a long time conducted everything upon the old footing, and pushed ecclesiastics into all offices of trust and authority, wherever and however he possibly could. Frenchmen had not at first come to Spain, nor were they admitted into public offices till the time in which at length the whole maintenance and protection of the king, even in Spain itself, was thrown upon France alone, and then Orri was sent by king Louis to undertake the management and direction of the Spanish finances.

As early as March (1701) the Netherlands issued a very vehement declaration against France, and the address of the English parliament in May was also plainly indicative of war; the Spaniards nevertheless remained perfectly quiet. All the old causes of disquiet in Spain still continued to exist, and it is evident from Louville's letters, that the Spaniards and French mutually despised and insulted one another. Orri, whose duty it was to regulate the finances, was in a continual state of strife with Portocarrero, and the party opposed to the French gained new strength every day. Count d'Aguilar and the admiral of Castile stood at the head of the party in Spain who were favourable to the archduke Charles; and the whole of Catalonia was ready to declare for his cause. The king of Portugal as well as the naval powers had indeed recognised the claims of Philip and acknowledged him as king, but it was nevertheless well known, that he would attach himself to England as soon as it declared war against France.

The Austrians, under the able leading of prince Eugene, commenced hostilities in Italy as early as June, pushed forward from the limits of the Venetian territory into the Milanese, whither Louis had sent Villeroi and Catinat, who were however obliged to wait a long time before the duke of Savoy allowed the troops promised by treaty to join them, and he himself took the command. In the beginning of September Eugene was to be attacked by a force which was double his own, and yet, in spite of all the protestations of the Venetians, he occupied Chiari, and in this impregnable position compelled the French to raise the siege, after having lost some thousands, while he lost only some forty men. This commencement of the war was looked upon as so much the more favourable, because in the same month of September the great league against France was concluded.

About this time a change took place in Spain, together with the entrance of the Savoyard princess into Madrid and her marriage with Philip V., and a new government was formed, which was as much an object of hatred to cardinal Portocarrero and his friends as to those Frenchmen who had hitherto had the guidance of the weak king. Louis sought in vain, by means of new instructions, to warn his grandson (Oct. 1701) not to allow his wife too great an influence in the affairs of government, because her father had once before inspired him with distrust. Philip however was now completely under the dominion of his wife, who was still almost a child (fourteen years old), and subject to the rule of her governess, the princess Orsini. The king of France had himself chosen this lady as her preceptress, but he was deceived in her character. She was recommended to the king by her birth and the position of her first husband, as being a lady of condition. By her second marriage she was an Italian and wife of a Spanish grandee. She was attractive, clever, and even at an advanced period of life not destitute of grace and charms. She became the friend of the young queen, ruled the weak-minded Philip in an inconceivable manner, corresponded with Maintenon, showed the greatest degree of respect towards Louis XIV., but, nevertheless, ruled in Spain entirely after her own way, and not unfrequently, when it pleased her, counteracted the French ministers and generals in questions of peace and war. The pitiful concerns of the private life of such a man as Philip V., the petty and ridiculous etiquette of which he was the slave in every transaction, occupied

all the French historians of that time, and fill the letters of Orsini. These letters contain the same bitter wit, the same wantonness, the same irony about everything sacred and profane, which may be seen in the memoirs of a St. Simon, Noailles, and St. Phelippe, and learned from the letters of a Louville; and yet Orsini at the same time preserved and maintained the stiff court etiquette which she ridiculed, supported by every means in her power the gross superstition which she despised, and oppressed instead of elevating or cheering the childish, melancholy, but selfish king. In order to give a just description of the Spanish government, it is only needful to know that a court lady stood at the head of the whole state, who, however intellectual and clever she might be, was guided wholly by personal views and selfish considerations. The fruits of such a mode of government speedily appeared.

William III., although he was very ill in this the last year of his life, showed himself greater than ever amongst traders and Englishmen proud of their birth and their money. By means of the popular voice, he had compelled his English ministry and its parliament to send money and troops to the support of the Dutch, who according to his advice had assumed a hostile position towards France. William conferred the chief command of the troops sent to Holland upon a Whig, the earl and afterwards duke of Marlborough, whose talents as a future military hero and commander could not have escaped the notice of a general like the king: he himself, almost in a dying condition, went over to Holland in order to complete his work. The king was now suffering severely from an incurable disease; his feet were swollen, his voice almost gone, and he could allow no one to come into his presence; his mind however always remained unsubdued. Apart from all the world, he guided the destinies of Europe from his cabinet in his castle at Loo. As soon as hostilities were commenced in Italy, the Dutch as early as July declared themselves very vehemently against France; the count d'Arvaux even left his post at the Hague, and Louis threatened. William and Marlborough, who had equal presence of mind, equal prudence and capacity of concealing their views, and who were equally sharp-sighted and cold, took all their measures quietly upon the frontiers; and the king himself, who was labouring under the sickness of death, went over and examined the best fortified places. The fleets of England were already

sent out. The insolent tone which Louis assumed towards the Dutch was retorted by the latter with the same bitterness; and as early as the 7th of September (1701) the *triple alliance* was concluded between England, Holland, and the emperor. The object of this treaty was to confer the possession of the whole Spanish monarchy upon the archduke Charles, to give the Dutch the Belgian fortresses as a bulwark against France, and to secure to the two naval powers important advantages for their trade in both the Indies: the treaty, however, would have met with great opposition in England, had not Louis at the same time given the deepest offence to the powerful friends of freedom in that country. Louis, influenced by magnanimity and sympathy, at this very time publicly declared himself in favour of the rights of the banished Stuarts, when the English nation for the first time had legally transferred the throne to another family. Immediately on the expulsion of James II., the parliament had resolved, that in case of William's dying without heirs, Anne, his sister-in-law and wife of the prince of Denmark, should succeed to the throne: just before its last prorogation in June 1701, it came to the further resolution, that in case Anne also died without heirs, the succession should descend to Sophia electress of Hanover, and that her heirs should be called to the throne of Great Britain, but only on condition of their being and remaining Protestants. James II. was now in St. Germain, where great sums were expended for his support by Louis, who had magnanimously adopted his cause. The king of France visited him there upon his death-bed, and promised to acknowledge his son as king of England. This promise he faithfully fulfilled after the death of James II., which took place on the 16th of September (1701). When news was brought to England that a James III., who had never been acknowledged in England, was proclaimed king of Great Britain in St. Germain and Paris, William was urged by the whole nation to revenge this insult and injury on France. The French agent in London, who had made known the declaration of his king, was banished the country; and immediately after William's return in November a new parliament was called, which first assembled on the January of the following year (1702). In this parliament the Whigs, to whom the king now again leaned, had the majority; he had however retained his Tory ministry, and the consequence was that Robert Harley was chosen as speaker,

and not Littleton, whom the king wished to be appointed. The king's speech was nevertheless in full accordance with the public opinion, and the parliament heartily responded to its spirit. The speech was a violent complaint against France, and the parliament showed its entire concurrence in its sentiments by approving of the grand alliance into which the king had entered, and by voting him such new supplies as should enable him to raise forty thousand additional land-troops and as many sailors. Denmark and Sweden were subsidized, and had promised troops; the treaties for this purpose were approved of by parliament, and the money was voted for their fulfilment; and the language constantly employed was, that England was going to war, not for herself, but in aid and defence of her ally Holland.

William's death took place on the 19th of March (1702); the Whigs were then at the helm of the state, and England, as the chief enemy of France, took an immediate part in the war, although the contrary was universally expected from the well-known opinions of queen Anne, who was attached to her father and her brother, as well as an admirer of monarchical power and the hierarchy. The queen was under the unrestrained control and guidance of her first court lady, the wife of the duke of Marlborough; and Marlborough wished for war, not merely as a general and Whig; but his mean avarice, which stained his great qualities, urged him not to neglect the best means of enriching himself. Marlborough was not merely a general, but also the most refined courtier of his age; master of every description of dissimulation, and of all those little acts which have so much influence at court. He was on the most friendly terms with the Republicans, and at the same time corresponded with the duke of Berwick, the half-brother of James III., to whom he proffered his willing service. In order to drive the Tories from the cabinet, he and his son-in-law pretended to form a middle party, and required that, if he was to take the command of the auxiliary troops to be furnished by the Dutch, men should be taken into the cabinet who were quite agreed with him in opinion. The men whose advancement he thus sought were his sons-in-law Godolphin and Sunderland; the former of whom was appointed first lord of the treasury, and the latter one of the secretaries of state; some Tories, however, still continued in the cabinet. The Whigs, under the then existing circumstances, were so much the more powerful in England,

as the Republicans alone after William's death were at the helm of the state in Holland. It was pretended that the governor of Friesland and Groningen, whom William had destined for the office of hereditary stadtholder, was too young; but the real fact was, that the grand pensionary Heinsius and the Republicans wished for no monarchical head*. Rochester, who had been the opponent of the Whigs in the cabinet, had altogether withdrawn on the 15th of May (1702), when England, Holland, and the emperor declared a united war; but the last of the Tories was not removed till 1708.

§ II.

THE WAR OF SUCCESSION IN SPAIN.

The declaration of war in May 1702 was a mere matter of form, for the powers had already carried on the war as allies of Philip V. and Charles III., which they now began for themselves. The emperor and the naval powers had already taken great pains to involve Germany in a cause with which it had no connexion. Recourse was had to the associations of circles, and Austria won over Brandenburg by conferring the title of king of Prussia upon the elector Frederic, who was a great admirer of titles and ceremonies, and a man of most lavish and extravagant expenditure: all however that could be at first obtained was permission for the Austrian troops to march over the possessions of the empire into the Breisgau, and that Gotha and Wolfenbüttel should be forcibly prevented from recruiting troops for the service of France. The clever Anthony Ulrich had raised 12,000 men in Wolfenbüttel for the French cause, although his own brother and co-regent Adolphus Augustus was by no means satisfied with the favour which was thus shown to the enemies of the empire. In March (1702) troops from Hanover and Zell advanced into the territory of Wolfenbüttel,

* William III. had solicited the seven provinces to acknowledge his cousin Johann Wilhelm Friso, then ten years old, and son of Henry Casimir, governor of Friesland and Groningen, as his successor in the other states. The five other provinces refused to comply with his wish, because the hereditary stadtholdership which had been granted to him was to go to sons only and not to cousins. This was the only point in which the Dutch did not follow the will of William III.

and Anthony Ulrich was obliged to allow his brother, in their joint names, to yield to the will of the Hanoverians. By the interposition of Hesse and Brandenburg, it was finally arranged that the troops which had been recruited for France should be transferred to the service of the emperor. Bavaria and Cologne continued to persevere in the French alliance. The elector of Bavaria recruited an army with French money, and wished to admit French troops into his electorate with a view to march against Vienna; Cologne had previously done the same thing, altogether despising the importunate representations of the chapter and the nobility*.

The empire wished besides only to defend and preserve its own territories. This was the earnest advice of Louis of Baden, who was present at the first conference in Vienna (January 1701), and he was thereupon immediately named by the emperor commander-in-chief of all his armies in the empire†. Louis, as imperial commander-in-chief, afterwards directed the construction of the lines at Philipsburg and St. Louis, where better measures than those which had been previously pursued had been adopted upon the importunate advice of the elector of Mayence.

The two heroes of the allies had in the mean time begun their career; Marlborough with the occupation of the territory of Liège and the taking of Venloo, and Eugene with a campaign which we have already mentioned, but to which we must again return, because it was as much and as generally admired in his day as a hundred years afterwards the march of the Corsican

* The chapter publicly and very energetically declared that they felt themselves bound to say to his electoral highness, that the case was quite different with him and with the other ecclesiastical electors and princes—with those who did not maintain troops above their strength or the highest necessity, and less with foreign moneys than with their own means. Then the members of the chapter at last declared that they expressly reserved to themselves all the means of law and justice, and that in the mean time they would in secret place themselves before the Almighty and await the issue with the deepest anxiety; but at the same time with the feeling of consolation that they had taken no part, and had consequently no responsibility in this destructive affair, in the evil consequences which would result to all his subjects, and in that ruin which would befall many from poverty and misery.

† In the official document it runs thus:—“(1.) The emperor confers upon his highness and his heirs male the lordship of Ortenau. (2.) He promises to the same, as pay in time of war, when engaged as lieutenant-general of the armies, 50,000 gulden monthly; but in time of peace, as governor-general of the imperial fortresses on the Rhine, 25,000. (3.) That speedy justice shall be rendered in the decision of the claims of his highness's wife with respect to her pretensions to the district of Hadeln in Lauenburg.”

hero. Eugene's march from the Tyrol to the Lake of Garda through La Chiusa* into the territory of Verona was masterly: the difficulties however increased with every step. The enemy was double his number, was supported in its rear by the impregnable fortress of Mantua, and was under the command of marshal Catinat, who was a master of the whole science of war, and one of the noblest and most independent of men, the Cato of a slavish age†. As early as July the French had been repulsed at Carpi, and the French court, being informed of the differences in opinion between Catinat and the duke of Savoy, recalled the former, and appointed marshal Villeroi, the friend of Maintenon, in his stead. The courtiers affirmed that Catinat was to blame for having allowed Eugene to force the passes, to cross the Adda, to reach the Mincio and Oglio, and to take up a strong position in the territory of Mantua and in the Milanese; and yet Catinat was the man, who, having delayed till the end of the year, ventured to make the bold attack which has been already referred to in the month of September near Chiari, and at least prevented the imperial troops from passing the Oglio. After his removal they immediately effected the passage of the Po, blockaded Mantua, took Guastalla and Mirandola, surprised marshal Villeroi in Cremona and took him prisoner‡,

* In the official reports of the day, it is stated that the line of march was along the banks of the river Leogra towards Motta, through Malo and St. Vio, and thus onward to Montebello, in order to approach the pass over the Adige near Legnano. The cavalry and dragoons were obliged to dismount and lead their horses after them. The artillery was brought over by means of ropes, and in many places it was found necessary to raise the cannon by pulleys over elevations, and in the same way to let them down on the other side. The artillery and baggage-wagons were obliged to be taken asunder, and to be carried piecemeal over the mountains. The inhabitants of these districts never remembered an example of cars of any description whatsoever having been transported over these passes; and those well acquainted with the subject have declared that Hannibal's march over the Alps, which has been so universally celebrated, was nothing in comparison with this march of the imperial army. This passage is merely a newspaper article.

† The emperor behaved towards the duke of Mantua as a vassal of the empire. He summoned him, as it is called in legal language, as an outlaw, and afterwards really condemned him.

‡ Among the manuscripts of the Royal Library in Paris, there exists a whole series of volumes which contain the correspondence of the first president of the parliament, Du Harlay, chronologically arranged. The president kept up an uninterrupted correspondence with Villeroi. The vol. from 1701 contains the letters written from the camp, from October 1701 till the time of his capture; then the letters from the time of his being taken prisoner till he announces from Gratz, on the 27th of September 1702, that he had again obtained his freedom. This volume is No. 1304. In an earlier letter of the date

but were unable to reduce and keep possession of the city (February 1702). On this occasion the capture of the general was no doubt an advantage to the army, for Louis now sent the duke of Vendome, who adopted much better measures; and in the following year (1702) a severe struggle took place for the possession of Mantua, which was accompanied by a great loss in men, but ended without any positive results.

In Germany, according to the traditionary manner, protests were one while made against the war on account of the Spanish inheritance, and another while the circles were associated in its favour: the war had been carried on with the French on the Upper and Lower Rhine since April, and yet it was only first openly declared by the empire in September. The imperial process against the elector of Cologne was urged on with much less than the usual delay. The 5th of April was the extreme limit which was granted him for submission to the court and the removal of foreigners from the bounds of the empire; as however he did not yield submission, an army composed of troops from the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and the Netherlands, under the name of imperial auxiliaries, and an army for executing the imperial decrees, was sent on the 15th of April against Kaiserswerth. The town was however defended by Tallard, who commanded the French till the middle of June, when it was taken possession of by the troops of the Palatinate. On the Upper Rhine they marched against Landau; and Louis sent Catinat, who had come from Italy, into Alsace. He did not however possess a sufficient number of troops to obstruct or prevent the siege at which Joseph king of the Romans himself appeared in order to encourage the besieging army.

The journey of the future emperor from Vienna to the camp furnishes too important an illustration of the customs and manners of the age, of the union of the greatest pitifulness and meanness with the most absurd expenditure and pomp in the life of the higher classes and at the courts of that time, to allow us to pass it over in silence. When we see from the account which is given, that in the Austrian monarchy, the whole income of the state was in the hands of an ostentatious nobility, and was spent upon an army of retainers and servants with baggage,

of the 11th of August 1699, Villeroy, although more a courtier than a general, writes, "*Les princes sont d'étranger gens; heureux qui ne les voit guère! plus heureux qui ne les voit jamais!*"

it will be readily comprehended that Austria, like Spain and the pope, depended for its existence upon the stupidity and indolence of masses of ignorant and superstitious men; and that those states have continued to exist without any peculiar efforts on their own part, having been upheld merely by circumstances, proves clearly that custom and blind belief have more influence and power in human affairs than reason and a lively feeling.

The retinue of the king, who was to direct a siege, consisted of no less than two hundred and thirty-two persons, of whom no single individual was intended or calculated to be of any use in the field. This retinue consisted of persons taken from all ranks of life, and there were among them people such as master fishermen, three ornamental gardeners with their assistants, a keeper of the poultry and two maids, three cellarmen, two cellar-assistants, a baker to the person and his apprentice, a deputy-cook to the royal table, and twenty master and assistant-cooks*. The queen, who accompanied her husband, had a hundred and seventy persons in her suite; and the sixty-three carriages and fourteen calèches, in which all these court attendants and their servants were conveyed from Vienna to the Rhine, required a supply of a hundred and ninety-two carriage and fourteen courier horses at every station. We may remark in passing, that the queen took up her residence in Heidelberg during the siege. But if we are surprised when we read an account of the extraordinary number of court retainers which followed the army like a swarm of locusts, we are doubly astonished when we learn that the feudal nobility of Austria contributed only 40,000

* We are afraid of tiring our readers by details; the facts are however important for a knowledge of the usages of the age and of the condition of Austria, —of the nature and arrangements of court life, when the maintenance of the household swallowed up the income of the state. Before the enumeration and second division of the court retinue begins, which is superscribed "Officers and attendants," we find in the programme, the lord steward of the king, his excellency count Trautmansdorf, his royal highness prince Dietrichstein grand chamberlain, twelve royal chamberlains, an under silver-stick in waiting, a cup-bearer, carver and server, a confessor with his *socio*, a court preacher, two court chaplains, a chapel-attendant and his assistant. In order to show what sort of people it was thought necessary to bring from Vienna to the Rhine, we may just add, that amongst a number of others, there occur four persons to set on the dishes, four bearers, three scullions, eight ordinarii and three extra-ordinarii assistants. Among the carriages are two double carriages, tent-carriages for the chamber-heaters, for the butlers, for the cooks, two great wagons with kitchen utensils, with field dining-tables, with gardening-tools; six wagons laden with wine, and twenty-one wagons with arms and ammunition, each drawn by six oxen.

gulden as an extraordinary contribution towards the expense of this campaign, and those of Hungary 100,000.

Catinat did not venture to make an attack ; he remained behind the lines of Strasburg during the siege of Landau, which was protected by the Germans by those of Weissenburg, and contented himself with collecting an army which was afterwards sent over the Rhine under Villars and Guiscard. The elector of Bavaria, with French money, had recruited an army of 20,000 men in the rear of the imperialists ; but he unluckily mistook himself for a great general because he had been often in the field. He had fought against the Turks in Hungary, had served in the last war against France at the conquest of Mayence and in the Netherlands ; and on the present occasion also opened his campaign against his native land not altogether without success. He surprised and took possession of the imperial city and fortress of Ulm on the same day on which the contending parties entered upon negotiations for the surrender of Landau (September 9, 1702). The occupation of Ulm, and the movements of the elector towards the Rhine, for the purpose of forming a union with the French, compelled Joseph to return to Vienna through Bohemia. The margrave Louis was obliged to direct a portion of his army against the Bavarians ; and finally, in October, to retreat with the whole of his forces, because Catinat had sent Villars to the right bank of the Rhine in order to form a junction with the Bavarians.

Blinded by their hatred to Austria, the electors of Bavaria and Cologne forgot on this occasion that they were Germans, although Joseph Clemens was indebted to the house of Austria for the electorate of Cologne. The elector of Cologne moreover dishonoured himself by an incendiary attack, which was still more disgraceful in an archbishop than it would have been in any other man. Joseph Clemens placed himself at the head of those bands which Tallard had lent him, in order to take revenge on the unhappy inhabitants of the mountain country, on account of the occupation of Kaiserswerth by the troops of the Palatinate. He had the shamelessness to boast that he had so wasted the country, that not a peasant was to be seen for twenty miles round. In consequence of this wanton and cruel act, the imperial council indeed declared him a traitor to his office, government, country and people, and transferred the administration and government of the electorate to the chapter. The

sentence of outlawry against the two brothers was first formally pronounced four years afterwards.

On the Upper Rhine, Louis of Baden employed all his military tactics to prevent the junction of the Bavarians with the French army under Villars, after having first compelled the elector to retrace his steps at Pfullendorf and to turn towards Schaffhausen, through which the Swiss would suffer no one to pass. On the failure of the Bavarians to form a junction with the French by breaking through Baden, Villars took possession of Neuburg in the Breisgau, in order that the occupation of Breisach might not prevent him from passing over the Rhine; and he afterwards gave battle to the German army near Friedlingen, on the thirteenth of October.

Both parties boasted a victory in this engagement, and king Louis created Villars a marshal as the reward of his success. The Germans however maintained themselves around Freiburg, and for the whole of this year effectually prevented the junction of the troops over the Black Forest. The poor German peasants suffered equally from the friendship and the enmity of their rulers towards France. The French, as enemies, oppressed the country of Baden by exorbitant imposts, and out of friendship for the French, the elector of Bavaria daily strengthened his army, and called out every tenth man in the country into active service, without paying any attention to the representations of his nobles. In the mean time the German empire suffered Louis of Baden to be in all sorts of want, and did not send him the fifth part of the troops which had been promised: he had no other course to pursue than to remain within the lines of Stollhofen, and to prevent the junction of the Bavarians and French.

Fortune was also favourable to the French in Italy, and Vendôme's army had been strengthened till it amounted to 50,000 men. Eugene was compelled to relinquish the siege of Mantua, and when Philip V. himself came to Italy in August, the imperialists were confined to the district of Seraglio, between Mantua and the Po. Eugene wished to fall upon his enemies by surprise near Luzzara, but an accident frustrated the attempt in the very moment of success. In the engagement, which was brought on in consequence of the failure of his scheme (August 15, 1702), Eugene kept possession of the field of battle, but the substantial advantages remained with his enemies; and

before the return of Philip to Spain, they obtained possession of Luzzara, Borgoforte and Guastalla. The year 1703 would have been destructive to the prospects of the imperialists if the Bavarians and French had succeeded in forming a junction and opening up a communication with Italy through the Tyrol.

When Villars passed the Rhine (1703) and took possession of Kehl, the margrave Louis had fifteen battalions of Netherland troops, under general von Goor, united with his own army; but the pedantry and routine of the Germans and Austrians obstructed every step which he contemplated. The latter had placed the count von Styrum with the Saxons and imperial troops on the Danube, in the rear of the Bavarians: but from the correspondence which the brave Schulenberg, who commanded the Saxons, carried on with Eugene, we are made acquainted with Styrum's incapacity to command an army; he was notwithstanding always jealous of Louis of Baden, and so mean in his contests with him, that he intentionally neglected or foiled the arrangements of the commander-in-chief*. The margrave bitterly complains in a public document of the miserable institutions of the empire, of the tediousness of their councils, and of the unintelligible conclusions with respect to military affairs which were arrived at and composed by pedantic jurists†. Bad consequences must speedily follow, seeing that the margrave was opposed by a general like Villars; nevertheless he repulsed the French in their attack upon his lines, and frustrated their first attempt to force a passage through the Kingizthal. Villars, however, did not suffer himself to be deterred, and ultimately succeeded in passing over the heights of Villingen, reached Donauschingen, and formed a junction with the Bavarians near Tuttlingen, because Styrum neglected the favourable

* Schulenberg's Memoirs, Leipz. 1834, part 1, pp. 120–134. At p. 125, in a letter to Eugene, it runs thus:—"L'on (this is the diplomatic expression for Styrum) se plaint ici, que l'on n'a pas sçu la moindre chose du dessin, qu'on a formé d'aller à Augsbourg, et *par représailles on ne veut rien faire ici*, et on dit, qu'on craint de croiser les projets, qu'on pourroit avoir et l'on ne veut rien faire sans un ordre positif; on attendant nous perdons le tems ici inutilement."

† The margrave writes—"I now lament heartily that I have been in this case a true prophet, for had I not opposed almost with force the opinion of most of the nobles to march their troops towards Bavaria and to leave the Rhine open, not only the fortress of Kehl, but the whole district would have been in the hands of the enemy. * * I have also been obliged, from want of an army, to leave the post before Offenburg, and to withdraw towards Bühl and Stollhofen; and nothing is more certain than that if the enemy had passed on with a little more resolution on the nineteenth, all must have been thrown into confusion."

opportunity of attacking the latter with advantage. The time appeared now to have arrived in which the immense efforts, from which France had suffered so much, were to be crowned with splendid success; but events proved then as they have always done, that the ambition of a despot and his helpers may devise gigantic plans, and may be able to carry them forward by means of money and soldiers, but that a single unlucky accident for the most part utterly destroys such phantoms of artificial greatness.

Louis, by means of his money, had also set Hungary in motion; prince Ragotzky, supported by great sums from France, although very ill-suited to be the leader and founder of disturbances, had collected 30,000 men, and at their head advanced to Pressburg. Eugene was compelled in consequence to send a part of his army from Italy into Hungary, and afterwards to proceed thither in person. Even Eugene had great reason at that time to complain of the bad arrangements of the supreme council of war in Vienna, with whose president Louis of Baden was also very ill-contented. He at last obtained for himself the whole direction of the military affairs of the state in this time of stern necessity, and gave proofs of what Austria was capable of effecting when her resources were properly employed. Eugene moreover did not immediately leave Italy, but first assumed the chief command in Hungary, at the end of the year (1703), when everything had been previously well prepared for the quick restoration of order.

The German diet showed at this time, that it had as little notion of police regulations and political economy as it had of the nature of war, by the ridiculous vengeance which it took on account of the severe oppression which the French had exercised in Southern Germany. Instead of putting an end to their tedious discoursing and writing, and by an unusually vigorous effort driving the enemy from the soil of the empire, they continued to occupy themselves with disputes about a whole or half a man whom this or that baron of the empire was bound to furnish, forbade not only all trade, but even all correspondence with France for a year, and held fast by this determination in spite of the very sensible and urgent remonstrances of the various colleges of the cities*.

* An account of this may be read in the 'Theatrum Europæum,' part xvi., in an appendix, from p. 56-61. There it is stated that Augsburg, Nürnberg, Ulm and Lindau had at first and most vehemently complained against these regulations, which were more injurious to the Germans than to the French.

Vendome had availed himself of Eugene's absence from Italy in order to form a junction with the Bavarians through the Tyrol, but he was unable to reduce Trent, and durst not venture over the Brenner Alps, when the elector of Bavaria undertook a bold expedition to the Tyrol. Villars and the elector of Bavaria were as much at variance in opinion as Louis of Baden and Styrum. Villars complained that the French money had been squandered away upon mistresses and ostentation, and the elector, that Villars required of him to march with his whole force against Vienna, which would have been an act of the greatest imprudence and madness; he therefore separated from Villars with his army and marched towards the Tyrol, where he awaited Vendome on the passes of the Brenner. He thought himself perfectly secure by being in possession of the passes, scattered his army about through the whole of the Tyrol, and upon the heights of the Brenner awaited the arrival of the French, to whom he had sent messenger upon messenger. The messengers had been seized and imprisoned, and all the preparations for a general rising through the whole of the Tyrol been quietly made. The Bavarians had been in the Tyrol from the middle of June; they were utterly ruined by the end of July, and the elector was suddenly surprised with the news, that the Tyrolese had risen in all directions against his troops, that their sharp-shooters lay in ambush in the most favourable places, and that whole bands of the Bavarians and French were annihilated. The passes in his rear—Zirl, Schwatz, Scharnitz, and Hall—were occupied, and Innsbruck itself was threatened, whilst the elector, with the main army, sought to reach Vendome from the Brenner, and pushed forward as far as Murray. Here the Bavarians were repulsed and driven into the valley of Stabach; general Arco was shot by the side of the elector, and all the passes from the Tyrol into Bavaria were blocked up. The elector finally collected the whole of the army for a retreat, reached Innsbruck on the 22nd of July, and paved a way for his return by the dear-bought reoccupation of the post and bridges of Zirl and the fortress of Scharnitz. Pressed on all sides at the same time by the imperial troops and by the Tyrolese, the elector marched with such haste out of the Tyrol, on the 27th of July, that he sacrificed all the bands of his army which were separated from the main body*. The French in the mean time

* The newspapers of the day, speaking of the retreat of the elector from the Tyrol, state, that he came to Munich on the 21st of August; the remnant

were more fortunate in their struggle with the imperial general than the Bavarians had been in the Tyrol. Breisach had been taken in August. The speedy surrender of this important fortress caused universal astonishment, and was a subject of reproach to the Germans. Tallard invested Landau, and, as the king of the Romans had formerly done, the heir to the throne of France, the duke of Burgundy, now appeared, in order to be present at the siege.

At the end of this year (1703), the undertakings of the partisans of prince Ragotzky in Hungary appeared to be of such serious importance, that Eugene felt himself obliged to go with all speed from Italy into Hungary. Happily, Stahremberg, to whom he left the command in Italy, was the most worthy successor whom Eugene could possibly have selected; and besides, Vendome had turned his arms against the duke of Savoy, because the latter had found it advantageous to give up the alliance with his son-in-law and with the grandfather of his second son-in-law. The emperor profited by the circumstances, recalled the Danes and twelve thousand Prussians who were in Italy back to Austria, and at the same time reinforced general Styrum, who however failed this year also, as he had done in the previous one, in supporting Louis of Baden. As he had formerly embarrassed and incensed Schulenbergh by his perverse plans and arrangements, he now reduced the duke of Wirtemberg and other generals to a state of despair. After the return of the Bavarians from the Tyrol, he utterly ruined the best design which Louis of Baden had ever projected.

The margrave knew that the supplies of the enemy depended upon the possession of Augsburg, and that if he were fortunate enough to obtain possession of that city, he could completely shut up the Bavarians and the French. By a masterly and universally admired march, the margrave reached and got possession of the city before the enemy, who were twenty miles nearer, and commanded general Styrum to occupy Donauwörth in order to compel Villars either wholly to break up, or to risk a battle of his people arrived immediately after, and it was confidently affirmed, that of 16,000 who had marched into the Tyrol, not more than 5000 returned. On this occasion he complained heavily of the delay and hesitation of the French, who should have advanced from Italy to his aid; saying, that they had thus given the imperialists time to collect reinforcements, and the peasants opportunity of stirring up rebellion. On the contrary, the French, and especially Villars, complained of the elector, that he undertook too much at once, and more than he could accomplish.

under the most unfavourable circumstances. The margrave was not assailable, and his watchfulness was well known ; Styrum, however, in this decisive moment proved so remiss, that he was suddenly surprised on the 20th of September near Höchstadt, in the same place at which in the following year the decisive victory was gained. He lost his artillery and baggage together with 4000 men before even a shot had been fired. Styrum himself admits that his scattered army had not lost 1000 men killed, and others state the numbers at 500 only ; it however afterwards appeared that three Prussian regiments alone had above 1000 killed and wounded, and the other auxiliary and imperial troops above 3000. From the fact of this imperial count of Styrum Limburg, whose incapacity was known to everybody, and even to prince Eugene, remaining at the head of the again united army, which had been so disgracefully sacrificed by his incapacity*, it would appear that no heroic deeds could ever be performed by German or imperial armies, in which some simpleton or blockhead of distinguished family always laid claim to the highest position. The margrave Louis was obliged to leave Augsburg to its fate, of which he had taken possession with so much glory ; and this city, as well as Kempten, fell in the same year into the hands of the enemy. In order to show distinctly and fully in what manner German armies were commanded, we may add, that the army which advanced to the succour of Landau had suffered itself to be surprised and beaten in November at Speierbach as disgracefully as Styrum's had previously been. Landau was surrendered by capitulation. The troops under Marlborough, which had been hired out by their princes to the Dutch and the English, gained quite a different reputation from those which Louis of Baden had the misfortune to command ;

* All reports, even those of the French, agree in stating that the officers from Styrum's camp gave the following account of the transactions :—That there was an unforeseen alarm on the morning of the 20th of September, about six o'clock, as if the French wished to break into the head quarters, near which they already stood ; that their general knew nothing of the matter until a corporal of the guard gave him notice of the attack. Styrum gave no credit to the report, although it proved to be too true ; and the general had scarcely time to take to horse and to let the soldiers march out, because the enemy had already attacked one of the castles occupied by our men, and was advancing rapidly with his squadrons, whilst his infantry had penetrated into the wood. Our men therefore retired, sometimes facing about and showing front to the enemy in retreating, till the enemy came upon them in the rear, and then the cavalry fell into disorder, took to flight into the wood, and there remained till the infantry came up, when all marched off towards Nördlingen.

for the French were hardly pressed in Belgium and Spain, whilst they were victorious on the Upper Rhine. In the very first year Boufflers and the duke of Burgundy at the head of a superior force had proved unable to prevent Marlborough from conquering Kaiserswerth, Venloo, Ruremonde, Stevenswerth, Masyk and Liège. In the following year Bonn was taken, the French were completely driven out of the territory of Cologne, and had taken up a position on the Moselle. Marlborough then went into the Netherlands and aided the Dutch in the conquest of several places of strength, among which were Limburg and Gueldres. In Spain the court left the whole care and cost of the war to the king of France, and engaged in miserable cabals, in a course of calumnies and persecutions which we entirely pass over; they are repeated and detailed in all the French works upon the history of the reign of Louis XIV., and are sufficiently well known from the letters and memoirs of the time, of which we possess whole libraries. Whilst Philip was visiting his Italian states, the English had embarked an army and attempted to get possession of Cadiz, and to win over Andalusia to the cause of Charles III. This expedition failed, but the English had succeeded in capturing the Silver fleet in the bay of Vigo, whose great treasures partly indeed belonged to their own countrymen. The king of Portugal and the duke of Savoy were now added to the number of the enemies of Spain, and some finance regulations which had been adopted by the new government gave no great confidence in internal affairs. By the advice of the Frenchman Orri, the small remains of the precious metals which had been saved from the Silver fleet were taken away from the merchants to whom it rightfully belonged, and the king was at the same time obliged to declare the alienation of the domains to be invalid which had been suffered by his predecessors. The chiefs of the Spanish malcontents, the count Melgar, admiral of Castille, the duc de Moles, and the marquis of Corzena, fled to Portugal as soon as the king of that country, at the end of the year, declared in favour of the archduke Charles. Portugal had joined the grand alliance, and Marlborough had had an interview with the archduke Charles in Düsseldorf; the whole year 1703 was therefore spent in the preparation of armaments and a fleet, in order to convey the archduke into Spain, to take advantage of the declaration of the Catalonians in his favour, and at the same time to invade the country from the side of Portu-

gal. The duke of Savoy had been compelled by the French to throw away the mask.

Louis XIV. had never put confidence in a man such as Victor Amadeus, however much his daughter, the wife of his grandson the duke of Burgundy, and the only person who durst speak with him without restraint, enjoyed his favour. The duke was treating with Austria and England and Holland even whilst he was in command of the French armies in Lombardy, where his troops were more numerous than those of the Spaniards, which never amounted to 4000 men. During the presence of his son-in-law he had exhausted all the arts of a courtier, and had had recourse to every stratagem which little men are accustomed to employ in order to win the favour of great ones; but all his arts failed to take effect on Louville, who was in this department as much distinguished as himself; and he availed himself of the miserable pretence, that an arm-chair was denied him in the presence of the king of Spain, to withdraw from the alliance*. His negotiations with the allies were speedily brought to a close, as soon as the naval powers promised to give him money, and the emperor to cede to him Alessandria, Montferrat, and the rich tract of land lying between the Tanaro and the Po.

The duke's negotiations were no secret to Louis; however, he concealed his vexation as long as Vendome and his army were in the Tyrol, and he even sought for his aid at this very time against the Protestants in Languedoc, or against the so-called Camisards, with whom he carried on a cruel war. As soon as Vendome had returned from the Tyrol, and it was known that count Auersberg, under a false name, was residing in Turin as imperial ambassador, France immediately required the duke to deliver up Nice, Susa and Vercelli into the hands of the French as pledges of his fidelity to their cause, and when he refused to comply with the demand, they commenced hostilities

* We shall explain the connexion of the affair by the quotation of a passage from Louville's 'Memoirs,' vol. i. p. 284:—"Le duc de Savoie, qui n'était point couronné, ne pouvoit donc souper avec son gendre, ni s'asseoir devant lui autrement que sur un pliant. Cependant il pretendoit aux honneurs du festin et du fauteuil si ouvertement que le despache se laissoit déjà fléchir, quand Louville représenta que la question était déjà jugée contre Mr. de Savoie, puisque ni Monseigneur, ni Mr. le duc de Bourgogne à Versailles n'avoient obtenu ces honneurs malgré leur qualité de père et de frère aîné du roi d'Espagne. Le duc ayant été repoussé par ce raisonnement sans réplique se trouva bientôt si constipé (ce fut son expression) qu'il retourna presque sur le champ à Turin en s'excusant de ne pouvoir faire la campagne, ce qui combla les vœux du marquis."

against him in September. Vendome, who was with some justice accused of a certain geniuslike contempt for traditionary customs, and of an inclination to the comforts and pleasures of the table, did not proceed so quickly in disarming the Savoyard troops as he should have done, whilst the duke, on the other hand, called upon the whole country to arm, and as an ally of the emperor and the naval powers declared war against Spain and France in October (1703). The fate of the duke depended at that moment upon his junction with Stahremberg and the Imperialists, and Stahremberg won for himself a reputation which might be compared with that of Eugene, by effecting this junction, by means of a bold and well-directed movement in the midst of winter (January 1804). This Vendome was unable to prevent; but on the one hand Tessé sought to take possession of Savoy, and Vendome on the other to occupy Piedmont. Vendome had taken Ivrea, Vercelli and Susa, and was engaged in besieging Verona and Chiavasso, when the unexpected issue of affairs in Germany in September (1704) began to produce an unfavourable effect in Italy.

As long as Villars was in Bavaria, Louis XIV. had not only that country completely in his power, but Franconia and Swabia also were forced to pay contributions, because the margrave was obliged to content himself with the defence of his lines and with partial reinforcements, whilst the German empire decreed armies, and there was no lack of deliberations, protocols, and of travelling ministers of state, to get them on foot*. The discord between the elector and marshal Villars began to fill Louis with anxiety, lest affairs should take the same course in Bavaria which they had done in Piedmont; and he therefore recalled Villars. Marsin, who was a better courtier and of a more conciliating and yielding disposition, remained behind in Bavaria, and Tallard was ordered to lead a new army into that country.

At the very time when Tallard was appointed to march into Bavaria, Eugene had brought the war in Hungary so far towards a close, that he was able to leave its further conduct to general

* The journals of that time were so much more honest than in our days, that we venture to quote them sometimes as authorities. They report, there was no want of deliberations and councils here and there, and the whole body of generals met at the beginning of this year in Frankfort-on-the-Maine, at which meeting those of the electorate of Mayence and the Palatinate were also present, in order to come to some good determination as to their operations against the common enemy, who began to move early enough in their quarters in Franconia and Swabia.

Heister, and Marlborough, moved by his importunate entreaties, consented, by a bold and rapid march, to make it possible to bring the enemy to a decisive engagement in Bavaria. As Louis XIV. had transferred the chief command of the armies in the Low Countries to marshal Villeroy, the favourite of Maintenon, he hoped that the march of his army from the Lower Rhine to the Danube might altogether escape the notice of his enemies. Marlborough and Eugene alone were in possession of the secret; the former had gone to England, and received the consent and approbation of the queen; the latter had the command of a special army on the Danube, which Marlborough was to reinforce with thirty thousand English, Dutch, Luneburgers and Hessians.

By uniting his army near Coblenz on pretence of making a new attack upon Trarbach, Marlborough deceived Villeroy in the Low Countries, and suddenly left his position in May (1704) and directed his march towards Mayence. From the Maine he hastened forward to the Neckar, and from Esslingen he formed a junction with Eugene. At the end of June he stood in Bavaria. Villeroy had followed him too late, for he did not succeed in uniting his troops with those under Tallard at Strasburg, till the very day on which the elector of Bavaria had suffered a considerable loss at Schellenberg. On this occasion Eugene gave a splendid proof of a great soul elevated above all petty vanity and influenced wholly by the good of the cause. He undertook to watch Tallard on the Rhine, and left the margrave the honourable post of cooperating with Marlborough in attacking the Bavarians and French in their fortifications on the Danube. Louis, who was accustomed to quite a different mode of warfare, was with difficulty persuaded by Marlborough to venture the boldest, without any reference to the consequent and necessary loss of men. The English and Germans emulated each other in bravery, patience and perseverance, as soon as the measures had been finally resolved on. The position of the Bavarians and their fortifications were stormed, Donauwörth taken, the enemy driven out of their camps at Lauingen and Dillingen, and finally Höchstadt also was won. Marlborough was eagerly desirous of following up their advantages, whilst the margrave, partly from the cautiousness of his nature, and partly because, as a prince of the empire, he looked upon the elector of Bavaria as another prince of the empire, whom, to please the emperor, he did not wish utterly to destroy, hesitated and treated, till Tallard,

for the second time, came up with great speed. In this way a month of very precious time passed away without coming to any definite conclusion.

Tallard had succeeded in reaching Bavaria through the Kinzigthal and over Villingen, Villeroy was already on the right bank of the Rhine, the margrave was immovable, and Marlborough had no time to lose, he therefore called Eugene into his camp, and the plan of a battle was formed: all this however was concealed from the margrave, and he was induced to march towards Ingoldstadt with a view to cover the siege of that fortress. Eugene now united his army at Donauwörth with that of Marlborough, whom the emperor had previously named the deliverer of his monarchy and had honoured as such*; and the two heroes happily succeeded in concealing from the knowledge of the enemy the various preparations for the engagement, which were made from the 9th till the 13th of August.

The enemy then occupied a position near Höchstadt, Lauingen and Dillingen; the wing commanded by Tallard was attacked by the English, the elector and Marsin by Eugene. The English bore the brunt of the day and won a most splendid victory at the village of Blenheim, after which they name that celebrated battle, whilst the Germans designate it by the name of Höchstadt, at which Eugene was victorious. Tallard himself was taken prisoner, and twenty-seven battalions of infantry and thirteen squadrons of cavalry were so completely cut off from the rest of the troops in the village of Blenheim, that they were obliged to surrender at eight o'clock on the evening of the battle. On the other wing, the victory remained long doubtful; at length however Eugene also was victorious, so that scarcely 20,000 reached the Rhine of an army which was estimated at 60,000 men. Villeroy used every possible means to facilitate their retreat. The baggage and artillery, as well as all Bavaria, was the spoil of the conqueror†. The elector, however, before his departure from the country, had ceded the government to his wife.

* After the battle of Schellenberg the emperor created Marlborough a prince of the empire.

† The number of slain was reckoned at 9000, and 15,000 prisoners were taken, together with 5000 provision wagons, 34 carriages with French ladies, 330 loaded mules, 127 cannon, 24 mortars, 129 stands of colours, 15 standards, 17 pair of kettle-drums, the military chest, the chancery, medical stores, 3600 tents, 2 bridges of boats and 18 pontoons.

The margrave was now also recalled from Ingolstadt, and the three united generals marched against Villeroy, who however prudently avoided a battle and recrossed the Rhine into the Low Countries, whither the elector followed him. Marlborough was in the highest degree dissatisfied that the united armies did not immediately push forward into France; he remained, however, behind at the siege of Landau, where the king of the Romans at this time was again present. During Marlborough's absence from the Netherlands, general Overkerke, with the Dutch army, had taken some forts on the Scheldt and cannonaded Namur; the French however were still in possession of Trèves, Trarbach and the districts on the Saar and Moselle, which Tallard had taken possession of in 1702; thither Marlborough directed his march after the taking of Landau. Trarbach and Trèves were reduced, and the frontiers of France reached, whilst Eugene compelled the fortresses of Landshut and Ingolstadt to acquiesce in the terms of capitulation which the electress had concluded with the king of the Romans in the camp at Ilbesheim before Landau. By virtue of this treaty, all fortresses, munitions of war and artillery, and the whole government were ceded to the emperor, with the exception of the revenues of Munich and four hundred guards which were reserved for the electress; differences however soon arose, she went to Venice, and not to her husband, with whom however there was at least no lack of female companions in the Low Countries.

Fortune was less unfavourable to the French in Spain and Italy than on the Rhine and in the Low Countries, although the English made one conquest which they have never restored. The archduke Charles, supported by English and Dutch troops, had arrived in Lisbon in March (1704); but his attack upon Spain from the side of Portugal failed of success. Portugal possessed neither government nor administration, neither troops nor provisions, neither horses nor leaders; the priests and courtiers looked with an evil eye upon the English and Dutch, and wished to have nothing to do with heretics. Fagel and Schomberg, the one the leader of the English and the other of the Dutch, quarrelled about the command, and the king of Portugal was suffering under a species of mental debility similar to that which affected the new French king of Spain. On the invasion of the allies Philip himself appeared in Palencia, and if we may give credence to the trivial letters and reports of the French by

whom he was surrounded, public affairs were at that time managed with a degree of bold effrontery, of which every sensible man would be ashamed in his private concerns*. The French were obliged to do their best; at their head, as a French marshal, stood the duke of Berwick, who was a natural son of James II. of England. Both parties were busy in taking places which they were afterwards obliged again to cede to their opponents. Schomberg finally left the army, and the prince of Darmstadt, who then became its general, encouraged them to make an attempt upon Catalonia. A small number of troops was embarked, but because the prince of Darmstadt appeared without Charles, the Catalonians were not disposed to desert the cause of Philip V.; the prince therefore returned to Portugal in the same English ships which had conveyed him to Catalonia, although he had besides many connexions in Spain. By means of his correspondents he learned that the impregnable rock fortress of Gibraltar was guarded with an inconceivable degree of remissness, and had neither provisions, artillery, nor garrison; he therefore landed as he passed by on his return, and without experiencing any opposition whatever, took possession (4th of August 1704) of the most important fortress in Europe, which has ever since remained in the hands of the English. During this time the Spanish government was wholly occupied with the disputes of women and courtiers. An active and lively correspondence was carried on with France about the removal of the princess Orsini and the recal of cardinal d'Etrées as French ambassador, and yet if the affairs of the state were to be carried

* Louville's Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 139, 140.—“ Aussitôt après l'arrivée du courier de Lisbonne milord Berwick et Puysegur quittèrent le roi et parcoururent toute la ligne pour inspecter et réunir les régimens qu'Orry avoit éparpillés (Berwick in his memoirs on the contrary praises Orry) faute de pouvoir les nourrir ensemble. Orry de son côté se mit à galopper en tout sens, ce qu'il fit très bien car il étoit grand coureur et ce fut un mouvement universel. Pour Philippe ou l'avoit laissé à Palencia sous la tutèle du père d'Aubenton qui étoit revenu sur l'eau par le secours d'Emilie, et du père La Chaise, et sous celle de Vazet, l'homme de confiance de la reine. Cette princesse vouloit d'abord suivre son époux, mais la grande camériste ayant enfin compris qu'elle ferait mieux de rester à Madrid pour exciter les peuples à la défense que de multiplier sans profit les embarras de l'armée, la reine s'étoit résignée.” The following quite agrees with this tone; from D'Etrées to Louville:—“ Nous sommes ici sous les ordres de Vazet et du confesseur. Le premier va nous laisser respirer pendant quelques jours, parcequ'il s'est chargé de porter à la reine la nouvelle de débarquement de l'archiduc.—Il parle à son maître avec une insolence qui scandalise tous les Espagnols. Sa majesté est esclave ici de même qu'à Madrid,” &c. &c.

on, they were soon obliged to recal Orsini, and the new ambassador Grammont was unable to deliver Gibraltar*.

The two brothers Vendome, the marshal and the grand prior, carried on the war in Italy in the years 1704 and 1705, quite according to their own convenience, and both might be found in bed long after noon; at length, however, after the conquest of Verrua and Chivasso, the duke of Savoy was shut up in his capital. The duc de Feuillade blocked up Stahremberg and the duke of Savoy, and the latter negotiated anew with France, whilst Vendome hastened to the Po, where Eugene had again assumed the chief command. Eugene had succeeded in having the Prussians, who had been previously withdrawn from Italy, sent back again through the Tyrol; but he was nevertheless far from being in a condition of equality in numbers with the enemy: his campaign therefore in this year is doubly worthy of admiration. He pushed forward on the lake of Guarda into the Milanese, fell in with the enemy in August at Cassano, and offered him battle, on which occasion both parties claimed the victory. In the following year (1706) Louis XIV. resolved by a great effort at once to bring the war in Italy to a close, in order to be able to employ all his forces in Spain and the Low Countries. Berwick collected a very considerable army before Nice, and Feuillade before Turin, whilst Vendome was reinforced, and in April 1706 gained some advantages over the German forces at Gavardo and drove them back to the lake of Guarda. Eugene however had resolved to force his way into the country from another side, in order to relieve Daun, who was defending Turin with admirable skill.

Leopold had died in the preceding year (1705), and Joseph succeeded to the throne. The latter was differently brought up from the last three emperors, who were trained to the adoption of blind faith and Spanish etiquette. Joseph immediately assumed quite another tone towards the Pope from that which Leopold had ever ventured to use. He tried by all the means

* *Memoires de Louville*, vol. ii. pp. 154, 155.—“Avec cela une indolence, une incurie pour les premiers intérêts de cette patrie dont on se montrait si jaloux, que les esprits les plus prévenus pour la grandeur Castillane ne pouvaient que gémir à ce spectacle ou s'indigner. La perte de Gibraltar fut un effet de cette orgueilleuse paresse. Gibraltar, la clef des deux mers, ce redoutable rempart qui faisait respecter l'Espagne des deux mondes, n'était pas gardé par cent hommes. Le duc de Grammont sut que les Anglais en méditaient l'attaque; il en prévient le conseil de Madrid, qui ne tint aucun compte de l'avertissement.”

in his power to pacify the Hungarians, and with unconditional confidence left the whole management of military and foreign affairs to Eugene. Eugene had joined the army immediately after the affair at Gavardo or Montechiari; but the tediousness of the march of the troops which he ordered to join him, compelled him to linger till May; then he turned towards the Adige. The enemy put forth all their strength to dispute his passage over this river, but in July he succeeded in frustrating all their exertions, and reached the Po without loss. Louis had then recalled Vendome from Italy, and sent him to the Low Countries, where he needed his services to oppose Marlborough. The king had conferred the chief command of the extraordinary force destined to act against the duke of Savoy, upon his nephew, the young duke of Orleans, afterwards regent of France; he had however unfortunately associated with him marshal de Marsin, one of his diplomatists and courtiers. Marsin, by the production of a royal command, restrained the duke in the most decisive moment from a bold resolution, which was calculated to work upon the French national character, as Feuillade had correctly seen. The latter, at the head of the besieging army, had previously driven the duke of Savoy into the valleys of Lucerna, but had again returned to his camp before Turin in July. In the meantime the duke of Savoy had heard that Eugene had passed the Po, eluded the enemy, and was pushing forward through the territory of Parma in order to form a junction with him; he therefore again came forth from the valleys, took possession of Chieri, Castiglione, Moncagliero, Cherasco, Alba, Mondovi and Asti, places which he had previously lost, and reached Carmagnola; whilst Eugene, who kept open his communications with the Venetian territory, gave the slip to the enemy, whom he left behind at Guastalla, and was marching over Mirandola through the Duchy of Parma. He reached Piedmont at Isola, passed the rivers Scrivia, Bormida and Tanaro without mischance, and formed a junction with the duke at Carmagnola. The three French leaders were now united before Turin, the citadel of which was being attacked with an unheard of expenditure of means*. In September a grand

* There were employed in this siege 24 battalions and 62 squadrons, together amounting to 38,000 men, 250 artillery officers, 800 artillery men, 250 bombardiers and miners, 4000 pioneers, 160 pieces of heavy artillery, 80 mortars, 100,000 balls, 27,000 bombs, 1,100,000 pounds of powder, 300,000

council of war was held, in which the question was discussed, whether they should await the attack of the enemy in their fortified camp, or should seek them out and attack them. Feuilleade and Philip of Orleans favoured the latter opinion, but Marsin, supported by Louis XIV's letter of authority, decided in favour of the former. The Germans and Piedmontese, 40,000 strong, had already passed the Po in sight of the enemy, and had embraced the bold resolution of storming their fortified camp, although, reckoning the besieged garrison of Turin, they were scarcely equal to them in number. The result of this bold undertaking was splendid; before noon on the 7th of September the victory of the allies was complete, Marsin had fallen, and along with him a great number of the general staff. Above 5000 men were taken prisoners, some thousands deserted, 3000 slain, and as many wounded; the whole of the valuable baggage, all the artillery and munitions of war were captured. The remnant of the defeated army saved itself by retiring to Pignerol, and Italy was lost by this battle, as Bavaria had been by that of Blenheim.

The chief share of the victory was due to the Prussians and their general, Leopold of Dessau: the chief cause of the defeat of the French was the great extent of the lines, which they were obliged to defend, and the consequent necessary dispersion of their force, whilst the enemy could direct the whole of theirs upon a single point. Two days after the defeat at Turin, the French under Medavi gained some advantage (Sept. 9) over the division of the army which had been left behind at Castiglione, under the crown prince of Hesse and general Metzel. Medavi still kept his ground in the following year (with 12,000 men) in the territory of Mantua, when the Milanese and the whole of upper Italy had been lost. The citadels of Milan, Cremona, Mantua, Mirandola, Sabionetta, Valenza and Finale were first ceded to the imperialists, by virtue of a treaty concluded in Milan on the 13th of March 1707. The undisturbed withdrawal of the French troops, who were cut off from France, was conceded, and Louis thus gained a considerable army, of whose services he stood in the utmost need in Spain and the Low Countries. After the battles of Blenheim and Turin, great doubts began to be

pounds of lead, 80,000 grenades, &c. Feuilleade had approached the city within cannon shot on the 13th of May, and the trenches had been opened since the beginning of June.

entertained, even at the French court, whether it would be possible to secure for Philip V. full and undivided possession of the Spanish monarchy. The whole trade and industry of France were in a state of the greatest depression ; above 700,000,000 had been spent upon Italian affairs, and all was now irrecoverably lost.

Even in Spain fortune proved unfavourable to Philip, although the Castilians were far more favourably disposed towards him than towards the archduke. The queen of Spain and her cabal never rested till they had accomplished the recal of the duke of Berwick, who was cold and unimpassioned, and went on his way unconcerned about intrigues and women, and Tessé, one of the favourites of Maintenon, who kept up a constant correspondence with Orsini, was appointed in his stead. The new commander continued without success the attempt of reconquering Gibraltar, till the squadron of Admiral Pontis was beaten in the very harbour of Gibraltar itself (April 1705). About this time the appointment of a regency had become necessary in Portugal, in consequence of the king's state of health ; the admiral of Castille, whose efforts had been unfavourable to the cause of Charles, was dead, and the naval powers therefore sent 15,000 men for a new undertaking against Spain, and the prince of Darmstadt came expressly from Gibraltar to Portugal, in order to consult with the archduke, and to embark with him for Catalonia. This took place, notwithstanding lord Peterborough's great opposition to the scheme. The latter was the general of the English division, and on this occasion the prince of Darmstadt was present only as a volunteer. A manifesto was published from the bay of Altea, near Valencia ; the troops were landed before Barcelona, but the impossibility was soon perceived of capturing such a city and fortress with the means at their disposal, and it was resolved immediately to re-embark the force. The brave, self-willed, clever, and sometimes wonderful Peterborough, however, changed his mind once more : hitherto he had disapproved of the whole undertaking, and in his new plan he did not put confidence in his friend Stanhope, whose descendant, lord Mahon, has lately written and published an account of this war, from the papers left behind by his ancestor, but in his rival the prince of Darmstadt. The prince, who was as eccentric as Lord Peterborough himself, approved of the mad scheme of taking fort Montjuich (which commanded the city and

fortress of Barcelona) by storm with 1400 men, whilst the enemy were lulled into security by the raising of the siege and the embarkation of the troops*. The undertaking was successful: the prince of Darmstadt was killed, it is true; but Peterborough kept possession of the fort, because the leader of the troops which were sent against him from the city, waited for reinforcements, instead of immediately attacking, and thereby lost the favourable moment. Thousands of discontented Catalonians were now assembled in and around Montjuich; the city of Barcelona was in a state of commotion, and the brave governor, unable to contend at the same time with the malcontents, the fort, the troops which had been again landed, and the citizens of Barcelona, capitulated, and Charles made his entrance into the city on the 23rd of October (1705).

The disputes of the women, courtiers and monks continued incessantly in Madrid, whilst Catalonia was being lost, Arragon and Valencia threatened with desertion, and Philip was obliged to set out for Catalonia. It was something very singular that both the kings of this very high-spirited nation, which possessed the richest mines in the world, were obliged to live on the alms of the allies. Philip's commanders sold the places entrusted to them, the soldiers forsook their colours for want of pay, the new guards suffered all sorts of privations, as the old ones had formerly done; they even dispersed themselves abroad, and the king, in order to be able to meet his daily expenditure, was obliged to receive a contribution of two millions of livres from Louis XIV. Charles III. left Vienna, 1703, with a poor retinue, and when he had accepted the title of king of Spain, which was ceded to him by his father, he was supported and supplied with the means necessary to his rank by the Dutch, and afterwards in England. Queen Anne had obtained 250,000*l.* from her parliament, in order to enable her to fit out the new king, who was conveyed to Lisbon, in somewhat of a becoming manner. Charles was afterwards not much more comfortable in Barcelona than Philip in Madrid. On the approach of Philip and the army, which was led by marshal Tessé, Charles courageously

* The undertaking against Barcelona is very differently stated and judged in the earlier and in the later English histories. In the '*Memoirs of Captain Carleton*,' in the '*History of the War of Succession*,' by lord Mahon, London, 1832-8, and in Coxe's '*Memoirs of Spain*,' the singular history of the capture of Montjuich is most particularly related and supported by reasons of internal probability and external credibility.

awaited their attack in the spring (1705), but like his father Leopold, he relied most for his safety upon the saints and their intercession, and made the fact publicly known, although in the end it was his friends the heretics who helped him this time also out of his need. Two armies, one of which was advancing under Noailles and the second under Tessé, encamped around Barcelona, and already in possession of Montjuich, threatened Peterborough and Charles, when the allied fleet appeared, drove off the French fleet, and threw supplies and relief into the city. Marshal de Tessé now raised the siege, notwithstanding Philip's most importunate representations in opposition to this determination, because from that moment forward Tessé was opposed not only by the allies, but by the people who were in insurrection in Catalonia, and the partisans of Charles in Arragon and Valencia, and could only escape from the enemy by forcing his way through the frightful passes of the Pyrenees to Perpignan. The army was so completely disbanded on this occasion, that Philip again entered Madrid on the 6th of June (1706) without any troops, where there was reason daily to expect the arrival of the allies, who had entered Spain on the side of Portugal, and were pushing forward towards the capital. On this account Philip left Madrid on the day after his arrival, and hastened to Burgos. The duke of Berwick, whose services had been again eagerly sought for in the hour of need, collected together all the French troops which were scattered throughout Spain into this city, and found it advisable not to attempt resisting the march of Portuguese, English and Dutch troops, which were led on by the marquis of Las Minas and the earl of Galway. They might have reached Madrid in April, had they not turned aside from their route in order to besiege Ciudad Rodrigo and to occupy Salamanca, and they did not in reality enter the capital till ten days after the departure of Philip and all his partisans (17th June 1706). The jealousy of the Castilians towards the Portuguese and foreigners was in the meanwhile awakened, and there was a general rising and preparation on all sides in Castille for carrying on an irregular struggle, and they sought altogether to dissolve the connexion with Portugal. The declaration of the widow of Charles II. and of cardinal Portocarrero, who had been offended by Philip, profited the allies but little, whilst their errors furnished the duke of Berwick with opportunities of supporting the Spaniards with regular troops in their predatory

guerilla warfare. The archduke Charles, instead of advancing with all haste to Madrid, travelled first to Saragossa, and Peterborough separated his army under pretence of occupying Valencia, so that Las Minas became weakened in Madrid through sickness and excess, whilst king Charles celebrated festivities, exhibited spectacles, headed processions and appointed days of fasting and prayer in Saragossa.

The allies had suffered considerable loss before Berwick offered them battle. He cut off the communication of the Portuguese army with their own country, and took possession of Ciudad Real, Salamanca, and even Toledo; whilst Galway led his army to Guadalaxara to meet Charles. Philip availed himself of this favourable moment, marched again to Madrid (the 11th of August), and Galway, cut off from Portugal, was obliged to save himself by marching on Catalonia or Valencia. Lord Peterborough was blamed for having delayed the junction of the Portuguese and Catalonian armies, and had besides offended Galway by assuming the title of generalissimo of king Charles; still there was reason to rejoice, that he had not departed with all his troops to Italy, as he had threatened to do. The two united armies, supported by the fleet of admiral Lake, took Valencia, Majorca, Minorca, and Iviça; Berwick however pressed on their rear. Philip had been treated with great treachery, and on his arrival in Madrid, he prosecuted and punished those who had been faithless to his cause; still it must be admitted, that he was not forgetful of a prudent moderation. Cardinal Portocarrero, who had conducted himself in the most surprising manner, above all others experienced Philip's generous forgiveness; in other respects, the penalties which were levied, and the estates which were confiscated, were highly seasonable for the supply of the exhausted treasury of the king.

Berwick strengthened and reinforced his army, just in the same proportion as the allies divided and weakened theirs; after Murcia had done homage to Charles, and the English had conquered the chief places of strength, he again mastered these fortresses in the autumn (1706), extended his sphere of operations beyond Cuença, and soon drove the allies from every part of Castille. About this time the French troops were no longer needed in Italy, the imperial army had got possession of Naples, and Louis XIV., by the cession of the fortresses, had got back a considerable army: this army was destined for Spain, and there-

fore the generals of the allies sought an opportunity for a decisive engagement before its arrival. Berwick awaited the forces of the allies on the borders of Castille, Murcia and Valencia, on the plain of Almanza (April 1707); and he fought and carried the day with so much the greater ease, as both the generals of the allies were wounded in the very beginning of the battle. The victory at Almanza was complete; scarcely 6000 of the allies again reached Tortosa, because Galway on evacuating Valencia was obliged to leave garrisons in Xativa, Alcira, Denia and Alicante. At this most seasonable time the duke of Orleans, with the army of Italy, entered Spain. After having taken possession of Valencia, he again reduced Arragon, and advantage was taken of the occasion to treat it as a conquered country, wholly to abolish its ancient constitution, and to change the system of legislation.

When Marlborough returned from the siege of Landau, he had formed the mighty project, for the following year (1705), of penetrating at once into the heart of France, and of bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. Louis of Baden was neither willing to support this bold undertaking, nor had he it in his power so to do from the then existing arrangements of the German empire and the constitution* of the imperial army. Marlborough was no less able in diplomacy than in the field; as soon as his presence was not absolutely necessary with the army, he travelled to the German courts, and had so much the greater influence as a courtier and diplomatist, as he, although an English duke and imperial prince, was very yielding and complaisant in all those petty points of etiquette, which appeared more important to German stiffness and pedantry than the most serious affairs of state. He went to Vienna and Berlin, produced a great effect as a courtier, and roused the princes to renewed exertions. In the Hague he was as powerful as at his own court. Heinsius was his confidential adviser, Eugene his friend, and all three were quite united in their views and plans. In order, however, to be truthful and just, we must not overlook or con-

* The imperial armies were formed by the contingents supplied by the various members of the empire, and destined for specific purposes; so that commanders were not at liberty to employ them in services different from those for which they were raised, without consulting the diet, and their inefficiency was from this circumstance so great, as well as the powers of the commander so limited, that no great designs could be undertaken with such motley troops serving on such conditions.—[TRANS.]

ceal the fact, that Marlborough introduced into Europe the practice of dealing in national paper money, which has proved the ruin of modern civilization, a practice on which that moneyed interest of our time was founded, which contends against every thing noble by the basest means, and which, in connexion with rude and well-paid power, has bound modern humanity in the indissoluble chains of selfishness. Marlborough made the same use of the Jew Medina, as Buonaparte did of Ouvrard and his fellows, except that the latter was not mean enough to enter into a formal connexion with the usurers, as Marlborough did, in order to diminish the sustenance of his own people. Medina was not only the instrument of effecting the most scandalous deductions and discounts upon the payments made to the foreign troops in the English service, but he speculated at the same time in state securities, and became thereby the founder of the new trade of stock-jobbing and of the stock exchange, on which the destinies of Europe are now daily bought and sold in its great cities.

As to Marlborough's plans, not one of the numerous counts and princes, bishops and free cities (as they were called) in the German empire, as is well known, thought for a moment of the national honour, but of their own palpable and substantial advantage*, and it must therefore have been extremely difficult to bring an imperial army to undertake any such plans as those which Marlborough wished to accomplish. In conjunction with Louis of Baden, he wished to attack Villars on the Moselle and in Lorraine, whilst the Dutch were carrying on the war in the Low Countries with Villeroi and the elector of Bavaria. On this occasion, Marlborough showed himself great. The margrave had promised to come to Creuznach in order to discuss

* In reference to the towns, their magistrates, and the trading spirit of their citizens, the copious paper which was prepared for the city of Frankfort by one of its jurists, and presented to the emperor and empire in 1705, is well worthy of attention. About what? Because they were too highly taxed in the matriculation book of the empire. The paper is couched in a tone which might lead the reader to suppose that the town had been burnt down, or that all the citizens had been reduced to beggary. And to how much did the question amount?—Eight hundred florins. The council and empire were earnestly entreated “to remit 500 florins, although the city was of opinion, that it would not be too much if the two-thirds, or 553 fl. 20 kr., were written off.” Prussia took advantage of the debate upon this point, and of the resistance of the counts of Wetterau, to offer its mediation on account of the few hundred gulden, if the public practice of religion was granted to the reformed churches in the Lutheran Zion, as the Rev. Mel. Götze was accustomed to call Frankfort. In this manner the affairs of the empire were managed!!

and arrange the necessary preliminaries, but he failed in his promise; and Marlborough did not hesitate to go to him to Rastatt, in order to persuade him to engage in the campaign. The German troops then indeed put themselves in motion, but they were so weak, and their march so tedious, that Marlborough relinquished his plan, and hastened to the aid of the Dutch on the Meuse, whilst Louis of Baden went to Schlagenbad, and the scattered German army was hard pressed by the French. Marlborough was no sooner in the Netherlands, than he reconquered all the places which the Dutch had lost, and freely spoke out his discontent, which was not less than he felt with the Germans.

In the meantime the new emperor Joseph in Germany, who had adopted very severe measures in Bavaria, very zealously urged on the declaration of outlawry by the electoral college, against the elector of Bavaria, and obstructed the electress in her return from Italy. Among the electors, the elector palatine was most vehement against his brother of Bavaria. The sentence of outlawry against the electors of Bavaria and Cologne was at last pronounced in April (1706), and was published in Ratisbon, although the electoral college was very much dissatisfied, that it was neither consulted, nor its approbation of the publication waited for. Whilst this strife about words and forms was being carried on in Ratisbon, the contingents to the imperial army came in very slowly, and were in many cases deficient, and Villars was not the man to wait in listless inactivity till they had all joined; he took the scattered German army by surprise, and passed over their lines at Hagenau and Bischweiler, which were very carelessly watched. In order to avoid being entirely cut off, the army was obliged to leave all* its artillery and accumulated stores in the hands of the enemy, to evacuate the whole of the left bank of the Rhine, and to retire within their lines at Stollhofen. They would not have been secure even in these, had not the king of France, luckily for the German army, found it necessary to use and put forth all his strength in this year (1706), in order to save Spain, and had he not suffered such a defeat in the Low Countries, as led to the apprehension of the loss of the whole of Belgium. The army destined against Germany was weakened,

* Whilst disputes were being carried on in the diet about a few florins of contribution, and whole masses of minutes and instruments were written about the division of the command, 80 cannon were lost on this occasion, 10 large and small mortars, 4000 bombs, 64 horse wagons, 800 cwt. powder, 26,000 balls, along with the necessary supply of flour and forage.

the French kept within their lines behind the Lauter, and the bitterest enemy of the French among the German generals, count von Thüngen, who at the baptism of his children, in addition to the usual formula of “renouncing the devil and all his works,” wished also to subjoin a denunciation of the French and of all their ways, again passed over the Rhine, where he remained for some time; still, however, the army took up its winter quarters in the lines from Bruchsal to Kehl.

The results were quite different in the Netherlands. General Slangenburg and the deputies of the aristocratic government had hampered and embarrassed Marlborough in the previous year, when he had broken through the lines between Namur and Antwerp, afterwards taken Tirlemont, encamped before Louvain, and wished to pass over the Dyle; but in this year (1706), the loud expression of public opinion compelled the government again to give the complete direction of the Dutch army to the bold English general. The duke returned in April (1706) with the fixed determination to risk a decisive engagement with marshal Villeroi and the elector of Bavaria, and these generals uncommonly facilitated his victory by the position which they took at Ramillies, not far from Tirlemont. The battle of Ramillies, fought on the 23rd of May, determined the fate of an army of 60,000 Frenchmen in three hours, and compelled them to give up the whole of the Low Countries. Between 15,000 and 20,000 French either fell in the battle or were taken prisoners, the greatest part of the artillery was taken, Louvain, Brussels and Ghent were immediately occupied, Ostend besieged by land and by sea, and captured on the 4th of July. Menin was forced to capitulate at the end of August, and Denendermonde in September. Louis perceived, that Villeroi had not the confidence of the army, although he himself had unlimited confidence in him, and pleaded always in his favour; he gave the command to Vendome. When the allied army passed the Scheldt (9th Sept.), Vendome lay encamped in the neighbourhood of Tournay, but was unable to prevent the conquest of that city. Marlborough quickly followed up his victories without any regard to the loss and sacrifice of men, and Mons or Bergen would have been taken, had not the states-general, in their true tradesmanlike spirit, wished to spare their armies which they had bought so dearly. They demanded, therefore, that the campaign for this year (1706) should be brought to a close.

In the commencement of the following year, before the battle of Almanza, the first attempts were made by the French to negotiate; but it plainly appears from the official reports (of the French) with respect to all the negotiations which were carried on till the peace of Rastadt, that at that time neither Louis nor his ministry were in earnest*.

The emperor was first consulted about a treaty, and then the elector of Bavaria made proposals to Marlborough and the Dutch. A peace was talked of, founded on the conditions of the treaty of partition of 1700, or of the alliance of 1701. When fortune had again deceived the expectations of the French in Spain also, Louis tried in the following year, by means of Swedish mediation, to separate the German empire from the emperor; he offered Strasburg and even the whole of Alsace. The emperor altogether declined the Swedish mediation, as well as that of the pope, although there existed in the empire, as well as in England and Holland, a very strong party opposed to the continuance of the war. When Louis had at length exhausted all his resources, 1709, he rested his hopes of breaking up this fearful alliance upon the interest and wishes of the peace party in Holland; and we must therefore afterwards treat the subject at length.

This time was in all respects ill chosen for proposals of peace, because the family of Marlborough ruled with unlimited sway in England; and, after the battles of Turin and Ramillies, succeeded in carrying through a measure which Cromwell indeed had attempted, but had not established by law. The union of the English and Scottish parliaments had been again revoked under the restoration. It was impossible, however, for England to maintain the position amongst the European powers which it had assumed under William, as well as under Cromwell, if it did not accomplish this point. The union of the government and parliaments of England and Scotland was now effected in the year 1706; the conditions were prepared by thirty commissioners, and confirmed by a formal law in January 1707.

* In the MSS. of the Paris Lib. already quoted (Mortemar, No. 71), the whole events of the war are scarcely touched upon. The history of the negotiations, however, from 1707–1709, are given at greater length than in any book with which we are acquainted. We do not, however, consider what is there said about these negotiations as important, but point out in the text the events which occurred, drawn from the usual and well-known sources. We again resume our extracts and hints from these MSS. after 1709.

This was an event of the greatest importance at this time ; William had laboured in vain to bring about the union, and a separation of the two kingdoms was greatly to be feared on the death of queen Anne, because the Hanoverian heir to the kingdom, even after he had been made an English peer under the title of duke of Cambridge and acknowledged as successor to the throne, had few friends in Scotland, where the oldest and most powerful families looked upon James III. as the true and rightful heir of their ancient kings. The terms of the union were indeed so contrived that the smaller country was placed in a complete state of political subordination to the greater ; but it gained so materially in other respects, that ever since that time complaints have been made in England about the number of poor Scotchmen who have enriched themselves at the expense of England. The union was destructive to the still-existing feudal system in Scotland, especially after the two rebellions, which took place in the reigns of the first two Hanoverian kings. That indeed was in no respects injurious to European civilization, but it gave rise to that systematic management of estates which is only possible to be carried on by great capitalists, and to that usurious letting which since that time has become prevalent in Scotland ; and thousands of free countrymen, who did not wish to become manufacturers or to be exposed to all the harassing fluctuations of trade, have been thereby driven to America.

After the capitulation, which secured to the French a safe withdrawal from the fortresses of Lombardy with all their materials of war, Eugene in Italy had reduced the whole kingdom of Naples, and Sicily alone now remained to the Spaniards ; but the undertakings of the duke of Savoy, on the other hand, were attended with ill success ; Villars also on the Rhine, as well as Berwick and the duke of Orleans in Spain, fought with success against the allies.

As to the duke of Savoy, he had passed over the Var, and prince Eugene had gone to his army, in order to make an attack upon Toulon, in connexion with an English fleet, and especially with a view to carry off the ships of war and provisions which were lying in that city ; but the cunning duke probably did not wish altogether to break with the French, nor yet to lose the English subsidies ; at least he certainly took no very lively participation in the siege. Eugene and the English besieged the

city from June till September (1707) with a great expenditure of men, but they were obliged to return to Piedmont in the autumn, without having accomplished their object.

On the death of Louis of Baden a contest arose in Germany, by which we are fully made acquainted with the condition and administration of a country in which hundreds of courts and thousands of chanceries, armies of pedants and courtiers are supported. They disputed whether it was now the turn for a catholic or a protestant general to be appointed to take the command of the hard-pressed German army. We must however admit, that all were unanimous when prince Eugene was proposed. The prince was obliged to continue some time longer in Italy on account of the above-mentioned undertakings against Naples and Toulon, and could not himself assume the chief command. Custom, therefore, brought it into the hands of the oldest field-marshal, the margrave Christian Ernest of Anspach Bayreuth; although the emperor, upon the earnest advice of Eugene, used all his influence to have the count von Thüngen appointed to that important post. It was only now that the world knew what Louis of Baden, who was well acquainted with his army and the nature of the German empire, and who was an experienced general, had done during his life for his country and for its honour. Seven years long, under circumstances of the greatest difficulty, he had defended the lines of Stollhofen and Buhl, but he was no sooner dead than his successor suffered Villars to break through; and the artillery, which was still in their possession, as well as all their munitions of war, were lost*. The immediate consequence of the taking of the lines was the wasting and plundering of the whole country, from the interior of Swabia to the Bergstrasse, for even Heidelberg was at this period, for some time, occupied by the French. The margrave was with great difficulty induced to lay down the command, which the elector of Hanover from patriotism undertook. The want of money and stores compelled the elector to confine himself to the protection of some parts of the country against the devastations of the French, by whom the land was overrun; he drove them back as far as Ettlingen, and caused new lines to be erected there from the mountains to Dachslan-

* Villars boasts that he had in a few days taken 166 pieces of cannon, 1000 cwt. of powder, balls, uniforms, provisions, and bridges of boats; and all while they were disputing in the diet about their few guilders of contribution.

den on the Rhine. The elector complained in letters which were made public not only of the bad arrangements and preparations of the empire, but also of their total want of patriotism*, and finally (November) he had a meeting in Frankfort with the imperial ambassador and Marlborough, in order to raise a loan for the empire, and to agree upon better measures for the next year.

After the battle of Almanza the Spanish-French army in Spain had completely repulsed the Portuguese and forced them to give up Ciudad Rodrigo; the allies had been obliged to evacuate to Philip the whole of Arragon, Valencia and Murcia, as far as Denia and Alicante; even in Catalonia, Lerida had fallen, and the duke of Orleans would have attacked Tortosa had not his army suffered too severely at the siege of Lerida. The duke of Berwick, as has been above remarked, had been recalled when Eugene threatened Toulon. The commanders of the allies for the following year were changed. Lord Stanhope was to take the command of the English, and the emperor sent his brother a reinforcement of troops under the leading of the brave Stahremberg.

In the Low Countries Vendome had uniformly avoided coming to an engagement, but had also succeeded in obstructing every siege which had been undertaken by the allies; more favourable things were expected for 1708; this year, however, disappointed all the hopes which had been conceived in France. Eugene and Marlborough, of whom the one possessed the complete confidence of the English, and the other that of the Austrian court, and both had unlimited influence, held a consultation with the deputies of the states-general in the Hague (1708), at which Stanhope was also present, who was to command the armies in Spain. A plan was drawn up, whose execution Marlborough endeavoured to promote, by taking a journey to Ha-

* On the 6th of November the elector writes from his head-quarters to the diet, that he had given up the command during the winter to the count von Thüngen. Then he continues, it were much to be desired that matters might be so arranged in the imperial army which had been placed under his command, that the next campaign might be concluded with greater advantage to the country, and the transference of the war into the enemy's; and that he hoped the electors, princes and nobles of the empire would unite with a common feeling of patriotism to bring together an army such as would be for the honour, safety and well-being of the whole empire, and of each of its members, and that in the next spring they might make head against the enemy, who was devoting all possible attention to the reinforcement of his army, and be able to drive him again within suitable limits.

nover and Vienna before the opening of the campaign. Marlborough returned in May, and placed himself at the head of the army which was to allure the French out of their positions, who were nominally commanded by the Dauphin, but in reality by Vendome, whilst Eugene hastened with the imperial troops to the Moselle. The elector of Hanover had been persuaded once more to undertake the command of the imperial army. But what complaints did not the elector loudly utter immediately on his arrival, and how melancholy was the condition of the imperial army, at a time when the enemy was levying contributions upon all the states in the neighbourhood of the Rhine! Millions were wasted in foolish and tasteless pomp, upon festivities and ceremonies, whilst the elector was obliged to complain that he could neither obtain the 200,000 dollars (what a miserable sum!) which had been appropriated for the imperial army in the previous year, nor the million which had been destined for the present (1708)! The German nation lost the respect of all Europe, and their deliberations were ridiculous. All the public journals and papers in England and Holland bitterly exclaimed not only against the tediousness and immoveableness of the diet, but of the trade which the princes carried on with the health and lives of their subjects; and in a note from the Dutch plenipotentiary to the diet, it was plainly and strongly alleged, that the German princes thought more of their money than their honour.

Eugene was opposed on the Moselle by the duke of Berwick and the elector of Bavaria. The duke of Vendome in the Low Countries not only frustrated all Marlborough's endeavours to bring him to an engagement, but he even took possession of Bruges and Ghent without his being able to prevent him. It was resolved therefore to assail and overwhelm Vendome with their united forces, if he could possibly be forced to an engagement. For this purpose Eugene was to form a junction with Marlborough in the same way as Marlborough had formed a junction with him in 1704; but this was at present much more difficult to be accomplished, because he was not opposed by a Villeroi as Marlborough had been, but had the duke of Berwick against him. Eugene reached Marlborough's quarters with two regiments as early as the 5th of June, leaving his army to follow him by hasty marches over Maestricht, and expecting their arrival on the 10th. Marlborough had been making dispositions for

the attack since the 5th, but Vendome did not await the assault. He knew that Berwick with the army of the Moselle was following close upon Eugene's traces, and he therefore attacked the enemy at Oudenarde before their reinforcements had completely arrived. Notwithstanding the admirable measures which were adopted by Vendome, the victory remained with the allies; the French lost the field of battle and some thousand prisoners, among whom were several generals. The only advantage which Marlborough derived from this victory was, that he was now able to undertake the siege of single towns; whilst Eugene watched the movements of the duke of Berwick and the elector of Bavaria, Lille and Ghent were taken. The French army in Spain suffered from the same evils which were destructive to the German army on the Rhine, for the duke of Orleans was withheld from carrying out his design of besieging Tortosa by the want of money and the most ordinary necessities, till Stanhope and Stahremberg arrived with reinforcements. It is incredible and yet undeniable, that the whole Spanish monarchy did not pay in this year six millions into the royal treasury. Louis had completely exhausted all his resources and his credit, and nothing remained but to wait for the seventeen ships of the Spanish silver fleet, which were laden with immense treasures, and were expected to arrive in July. These ships were attacked by the English in the neighbourhood of Carthagen; three with all their treasures were captured and the others destroyed. Stahremberg indeed could not afterwards prevent the capture of Tortosa, but Stanhope took possession of the Balearic isles, and Sardinia was also won for Charles. At the end of the year 1708 and in the beginning of that following, all the means of France appeared to be exhausted, and the ministers ventured for the first time to disclose to the king the true condition of affairs; and even the duke of Burgundy was amongst the number of those who insisted, that important sacrifices ought to be made in order to obtain a peace.

The history of the negotiations which were commenced and carried on in the year 1709, as appears from the French official reports, proves more clearly than the most eloquent description could do the completely exhausted condition of France, even admitting that Torcy was not in earnest with the conclusion which was come to in the Hague. A correspondence was first opened with the Dutch by means of a Holstein baron, Von Pet-

tekum, whom we shall afterwards meet with on several future occasions (even in Vienna in 1727), trying to better his miserable fortunes by availing himself of favourable and critical opportunities: and then count von Bergheyk, who administered the Low Countries in the name of the king of Spain, tried to induce the Dutch to enter into a separate treaty of peace*; and finally negotiations were entered into with this view in Moerdyk and Bodengrave by a French deputy, Rouillé, notwithstanding the first stern refusal of the Dutch. The matter could not remain concealed. The duke of Savoy sent a spy to keep a watch upon and discover the plans of Rouillé; then Savoy, Portugal and Prussia complained, the imperial ambassador in Holland protested, Eugene in Brussels threatened, and Cadogan in Marlborough's name urged them all on: the negotiations however were continued, and the new campaign was obstructed by every possible means. We are given to understand in the French reports, that the duchess of Burgundy gave information to her father of all that took place in the French cabinet†; and that the king, when required to relinquish the whole Spanish monarchy and to give up Lille, only resolved to continue the negotiations‡ after a most affecting scene in the privy council. He however finally sent his minister of foreign affairs to the

* We here follow as closely as possible the French MS. no. 71, with which the Dutch and English reports strictly agree. It states that Von der Düßen immediately answered, "Qu'à moins qu'on ne fasse les mêmes offres faites ci-devant, des Espagnes et des Indes, du Milanais et des Pays Bas, et ce qui a été ajouté comme aussi un traité favorable de commerce, on ne pourra parler confidemment sur les autres articles préliminaires." As soon as it had been resolved to treat, the king wished to send Voisin; but he had the courage, which astonished every one, firmly and perseveringly to decline the office; whereupon the duty devolved upon Rouillé. The minutes of the negotiation are to be found as above, as well as in 'Les Mémoires de Torcy'; we therefore pass them over, because we only wish occasionally to give an opportunity for comparison.

† Von der Düßen had a secret meeting with Rouillé, and told him that the grand pensionary had spies in Paris who informed him of all that took place there: that he and his friends wished earnestly for peace, but that they could take no step which was not betrayed, because all the despatches which the French deputy prepared,—the character which he had drawn of the Dutch ambassador,—all their propositions were known in Turin and debated in the council there.

‡ When it was insisted upon that Philip should give up every portion of the Spanish monarchy and should cede Lille, and that these must be preliminaries to all negotiation, then followed the scene in the French cabinet alluded to in the text, an account of which is given in the manuscript: "Une scène si triste seroit difficile à décrire, quand même il seroit permis de révéler le secret de ce qu'elle eut de plus touchant."

Hague*. The French minister allowed himself to be taken to the grand pensionary (at the Hague) by his banker in Rotterdam, and found Heinsius not the less disposed to sacrifice his personal dislikes to the benefit of his country, although he had been treated with the greatest rudeness when he had been sent to Paris at the time of the peace of Nimeguen. The French report draws an admirable picture of the men who at that time, in conjunction with Marlborough and Eugene, governed the whole of Europe†. The negotiations were carried on with various interruptions through the whole month of May, till at length a preliminary treaty, consisting of fourteen articles, was agreed upon on the 28th. By the fourth article Louis agreed that his grandson should give up Spain, the Low Countries, Naples, Sicily and Milan; and in the fifth he even promises to withdraw his troops from the support of this same grandson, the king of Spain, and to send no fresh ones. By the eighth he surrenders Strasburg, Breisach and Landau, and agrees that all the fortresses on the Upper Rhine should be razed: Furnes, Cenock, Menin, Ypres, Lille, Tournay, Maubeuge, Condé, fell to Charles III.; and Exilles, Fenestrelles, Chaumont, and all the country on the further side of Mont Genève, to Savoy. In a letter which he wrote from the Hague shortly before his departure, Torcy de-

* In the MS. above quoted it runs thus: "La crise étoit telle, qu'il étoit à souhaiter pour le bien des affaires que le négociateur eût été assez particulièrement instruit de leur état véritable pour prendre sur lui de passer ses pouvoirs s'il trouvoit un moment heureux mais inespéré de conclure." Torcy then offered to travel, after which it continues: "S. M. goûta la proposition qui lui fait son ministre demeuré seul auprès d'elle après que les autres ministres furent sortis du cabinet où le conseil se tenoit ordinairement. Elle ne vouloit pas cependant décider encore. Elle rémit la décision au lendemain, qu'elle assembleroit le conseil." Then all the disagreeable circumstances are related connected with the duty which Torcy undertook. Then p. 228: "La proposition du voyage exposé peu le roi dans le conseil tenu le lendemain 29 Avril fut louée et approuvée unanimement." Under the despatch to Rouillé the king wrote with his own hand, "J'approuve ce qui est contenu dans cette dépêche, et mon intention est que Torcy l'exécute."

† It runs thus: Heinsius on his journey to Paris had "essuyé la mauvaise humeur d'un ministre plus accoutumé à parler durement aux officiers de guerre qu'à traiter avec les étrangers. Il n'avoit pas oublié que le ministre l'avoit menacé de le faire mettre à la Bastille." Then follows a description of Heinsius: "Le pensionnaire n'étoit pas accusé de se complaire assez dans la considération que lui donnoit la continuation de la guerre pour la vouloir prolonger, ni d'aucunes vues d'intérêt personnel. Son extérieur étoit simple, nul faste dans sa maison, son domestique composé d'un secrétaire, un cocher, un laquais, une servante, n'indiquoit pas le crédit dans le premier ministre. Les appointments qu'il recevoit de la république étoient de vingt-quatre mille florins, la plus grande partie comme garde du sceau. Son abord étoit froid, mais n'avoit rien de rude, sa conversation s'échauffoit rarement dans la dispute."

clares plainly enough that he only wished to obtain from Marlborough and Eugene a suspension of arms till the 4th of June, by which the French would not have been bound, as he had no authority to promise such a suspension in the name of his master. He left Rouillé behind him, under the pretence that the latter would sign what he had some scruples about completing. The king upon Torcy's report had already resolved not to agree to the conditions; and after having had a personal communication with his minister, his refusal was announced to Rouillé on the 2nd of June. Louis, who had probably only gone so far in order afterwards to be able with good reason to recommend the cause of the king to the nation as its own, declared to the Dutch, that he refused the acceptance of the preliminaries because they required the razing of all those fortresses which he had built in Alsace, and because the electors of Cologne and Bavaria were not included in the treaty. He awakened the national pride of the French, and called forth new efforts by an appeal to the people, which the king published, signed by himself and countersigned by his minister, in the form of a letter to the governors of his provinces*. He was not however indebted for the breaking up of this fearful alliance in the following year, which he had in vain attempted to accomplish by the instrumentality of the Dutch, to the efforts which were made in France, but to the disputes between the queen of England and those by whom she was surrounded, and the miserable cabals of Harley.

The imperial army, in the year 1709 and the following one, drew upon itself the same reproaches with which it had been loaded in the previous years. The inactivity of the German nobility in the field was made so much the more a matter of ridicule and abuse, as they were among the most active in the cabinet, made the most absurd demands in the course of their negotiations, and prepared the most lengthy deductions and articles with respect to portions of the empire which had been dismembered, and their reunion with the main body.

* What was called the PEOPLE, and how Louis consulted them, may be learnt from this document. When the preliminary conditions were communicated to him, he caused all the princes of the blood, together with all the nobles of his court, to be assembled, and those conditions to be read to them. All of them of course voted for their rejection. In addition to this he caused to be printed the "*Lettre du roi aux gouverneurs des provinces du royaume*," which is to be found at p. 7 of the appendix to vol. i. of the MS. no. 71.

The opening of the campaign in the Low Countries had been delayed by negotiations. Marlborough was afterwards kept back by the siege of Tournay, and was opposed by Villars, who sought by every possible means to obstruct him in the siege of Mons. He finally resolved to take advantage of the absence of the prudent Dutch commissioners, of whom only one (Goslinga) was accidentally present, and with Goslinga's consent to employ the Dutch army, in order to enable him, in conjunction with Eugene, to drive the French force out of their position. On the 11th of September he risked an engagement near Malplaquet, which proved the most bloody that had been fought in the eighteenth century, because the allies were compelled on the 11th to storm the enemy in their trenches, whom they might have attacked on the 10th in the open field. For this reason Villars and Boufflers gained more glory by the defence than Marlborough and Eugene by the dear-bought victory, and the loss of the victors was more considerable than that of the conquered. The loss in dead and wounded on both sides has been estimated at 42,000 men: Villars himself was wounded, and retired for a long time from the command. The fruit of the victory to the allies was the conquest of Mons.

At this time the pope, who was more hardly dealt with by Joseph than he had previously been by his father, or was afterwards by his brother, had been compelled to acknowledge Charles as king of Spain, and thereby gave such serious offence to Louis XIV. that he recalled his ambassador from Rome. The French army in Spain was greatly weakened in this year, because Louis needed the service of his troops in the Low Countries, in order to defend his own frontiers. Stahremberg in consequence made great advances, and Alicante was reduced. Louis was at the same time also obliged to remove the elector of Bavaria from his command, because the latter began to fear that he should be entirely sacrificed in the course of the negotiations, and had therefore entered into some very suspicious connexions, with a view to the recovery of his own territories. Starvation, unexampled cold, and general want swept away such great multitudes in France, and particularly in Paris, during the winter of 1709–10, that nothing was to be heard of but lamentation and misery; whilst contractors, usurers, tax-gatherers, and farmers of the revenue heaped together enormous masses of wealth. This general need compelled Louis once more (March 1710) to propose terms of

negotiation to the Dutch, because nothing was to be hoped for from England as long as Marlborough and his wife retained their influence over the queen, and his son-in-law and the Whigs preserved their sway in the parliament. The extent of the famine upon the continent in this year of general want may be judged of from the fact, that corn was imported from England; and the exportation proceeded to such an extent, that the movements of the people compelled the parliament to forbid its continuance, and by a prohibition, to prevent the landowners from enriching themselves at the expense of the working classes.

The busy Pettekum was again in requisition, in order to commence new negotiations, which this time did not even secure the advantage of a suspension of arms. D'Uxelles and Polignac appeared in Getruydenberg, in order to treat with Von der Düssen about the execution of the fourth and thirty-seventh articles of the preliminary treaty which Louis had previously rejected, but now unconditionally accepted. Those articles related to the removal of Philip from the Spanish throne, and the compensation he was to receive. It was now demanded that the grandfather himself should assist in driving his grandson from the throne, to whom every sort of indemnification was altogether denied. The obstinacy and delay of the Dutchman Von der Düssen gave rise to the most vehement scenes among the plenipotentiaries; the Dutch however were not to blame, but the imperial ambassador Sinzendorf, together with the Prussian and Savoyard ambassadors, that Louis' offer of assisting by subsidies to expel his grandson from the throne was not at once accepted, and his demand agreed to, of ceding Sicily and Sardinia as a compensation for his loss*. The Dutch demanded that the king of France himself should compel his grandson to accept conditions, about which neither he nor the Spaniards had been consulted. Louis wished, at whatever cost, to save Douay, Arras and Cambray, although Marlborough had already written

* It is said that Polignac once seized Von der Düssen by the breast, and that the latter returned the assault. An account of these events will be found in the 'Theatrum Europæum,' s.h.a., and in Van Kampen's 'History of the Netherlands,' 2nd part, p. 363, in a note. In the text indeed another view of the negotiations is given, in which the German empire played a very ridiculous part, because it did nothing and demanded everything possible. When we cannot moreover with a full conviction follow the MS. which we have already quoted, we are disposed to prefer the testimony of St. Phelipe about those transactions, and Coxe's 'Memoirs,' 4to edit., vol. i. pp. 290-293, to what Van Kampen has given on the subject.

to Berwick, with whom he kept up a continual correspondence, that his wife had fallen into disfavour with the queen. Louis made new proposals*; negotiations were broken off and again renewed till the 23rd of July (1710), when all further treating became impossible, in consequence of the Dutch insisting that Louis should deliver up to them the whole Spanish monarchy, whether he brought about the affair by good-will or by force. Louis now published a new declaration to his people, and made them acquainted with the last letter to the Dutch: the states-general, however, approved of the conduct of the grand pensionary and of the deputies.

Whilst negotiations were being carried on in Getruydenberg, the German armies on the Upper Rhine remained in their usual state of inactivity, and the frontiers of the empire were scarcely covered; but just so much the more active were Eugene and Marlborough. They once again took the lines of the enemy, which Villars, who had again assumed the chief command, did not think it advisable to defend; and they captured Douay, Aire, and Bethune. Villars strove to save Arras, according to the military tactics of that time, by placing his army in security behind an extensive series of field-fortifications, called lines.

In Spain, Philip remained with his army in the mountains of Catalonia, over against that of the allies, who undertook nothing decisive till the month of July. In this month Charles also at length joined the army, which was under the command of Stahremberg and Stanhope. Both armies wished to bring about something decisive by a battle in their positions near Lerida, and they ultimately met at the end of July near the small town of Almenara. The Spanish army was beaten with great loss, driven from all its positions, and obliged to retreat to Arragon. The allies followed the Spaniards and French with great rapidity, till they forced the enemy anew to another engagement on the 19th of August, in the neighbourhood of Saragossa. The battle was fought on the heights of Toralva, and was commenced by Philip's army under such unfavourable circumstances that it was

* The king offered, if Philip and the Spaniards refused to accept the conditions, to sanction the commencement of hostilities against them—to pay monthly contributions, which should be secured by the credit of the first bankers in London and Amsterdam: he even offered to cede Alsace, and in the words of the MS. no. 71, “S. M. donna pouvoir d'ajouter encore à ces offres celles de céder Valenciennes, s'il étoit possible de supprimer à cette condition et de faire cesser absolument toutes demandes ultérieures.”

completely routed ; and the pursuit was so hot, that Philip himself and the courts of law were obliged, on the 7th of September, for the second time, to remove from Madrid. On this occasion Valladolid was selected for the seat of the government and the courts. If we would listen to the English, they all agree in assigning the chief part in these glorious undertakings to Stanhope. King Charles however, in a letter to his wife, complains that Stanhope was the cause of their marching with too much haste to Madrid. He complains that in opposition to the advice of Stahremberg, he had been compelled by Stanhope to leave Saragossa and Arragon. In these provinces everything depended on him, and the people waited for the restoration of the constitution which had been destroyed by Philip. In Madrid, as well as in the whole of Castille, Philip was preferred to the archduke ; and it soon appeared, that all hope of being able to form a junction with the Portuguese army was vain. Just at that time Vendome had entered Spain, united the ruins of the army which had been dispersed at Saragossa with the troops which were in Estremadura, and availed himself of the enthusiasm of the Castilians in order incessantly to harass and disquiet the enemy, and to make all communication with Portugal impossible. King Charles had arrived at Madrid in September, and he found himself compelled, as soon after as November, to leave the city with all speed, because Vendome was approaching on the one side, and on the other an inroad had been made into Catalonia from France. Philip was brought back to his palace in December. The allied armies, through imprudence, became so widely separated in their retreat, that Stanhope, whose division of 6000 men brought up the rear, was fallen upon and beaten between Guadalaxara and Brihuega, before Stahremberg could hasten to his relief. The English army was lost and Stanhope taken prisoner, when Stahremberg appeared, and fought a new battle near Villaviciosa. This battle was won ; but Stahremberg, although he retained possession of the field, was only able to save his 7000 men by the sacrifice of his artillery and heavy baggage. Stahremberg's victory, and his retreat to Barcelona with only 7000 men, without artillery and heavy baggage, are with great justice related as among the most honourable and warlike deeds of the Spanish war of the succession. Philip appeared to be secure upon the throne after the unfortunate campaign of the

allies in Castille, Arragon was again completely reduced to obedience, and Charles maintained his ground in Catalonia by the strenuous efforts of the Catalonians alone. This resistance of the Catalonians was encouraged and aided by the English; they were, however, immediately afterwards given up by the new English ministry, and having been forsaken by the allies, they proudly and fiercely continued to maintain the struggle against the Castilians, and were left exposed to the cruel vengeance of their enemies.

The altered condition of affairs in England, the wrangling and disputes of the court ladies, and the dishonest, selfish and crafty policy of Harley and St. John, freed Philip and Louis XIV. from the bitter necessity of seeing the preliminaries, which had been twice accepted, made the foundation of a treaty of peace. These events occurred just as Vendome gained his victory at Brihuega. In the new election of 1705, the Whigs had completely gained the upper hand in England. After the union of Scotland with England in 1709, they were still further strengthened; Godolphin had become one of their party since 1705; and Buckingham and Wright had retired from the cabinet. In order to excite and rouse the minds of the people, the partisans of Buckingham raised an outcry about the danger to which the church was exposed from the Whigs. Harley and St. John—the former a man of that kind which the nature of party needs and produces; the latter the cleverest, ablest, but at the same time the most dishonest man of his age,—maintained for a long time a considerable influence, and formed an intermediate party between the Whigs and the Tories, which was so much the more necessary, as the people began to feel the pressure which is the necessary consequence of military glory. The prosperity of the people, its trade and manufactures, progressively increased during the war, till it reached an incredible extent: the people nevertheless had already at that time begun to feel the bitter consequences of repeated loans and the accumulating national debt, which made its aristocracy great. In the year 1689, this debt amounted to little more than half a million sterling; in 1697, it had grown to twenty millions; and at the end of the war of succession, it reached the sum of fifty-three millions. The queen was little acquainted with the opinions of the people, or with the direction and tendencies of her own ministry; she was attached

to her brothers; to the principles of strict legitimacy and of the Anglican church (in Oxford almost wholly Catholic*), which was often hardly treated by her parliament. A dispute amongst the ladies of the court furnished the occasion of opening her eyes to the true state of affairs, and of securing her approbation of Harley's views. The duchess of Marlborough was not so skilful as her husband in the arts of flattery; she did not understand, as he did, how to maintain the favour which had been won, and at the same time to avoid the appearance of presumption. The duchess' manner and tone were intolerable to the queen, and the latter began to make a confidante of Miss Hill, who was shortly afterwards married to Mr. Masham (afterwards created lord Masham), and as lady Masham has acquired a species of immortality. Through this lady, the queen began to enter into communication with Harley and St. John. In order to please the queen, both of them afterwards, and that sometimes publicly, resisted the plans of their colleagues; and when the Dutch were engaged in negotiations, went so far as to make all sorts of propositions to France. The cabals of Harley and St. John were however discovered: they admitted that during the war they could not be retained in the ministry, even by the greatest favour of the queen, and that they therefore retired at a time (1708) when, according to all appearances, their opponents would not be able to hold their ground.

Things also came to light which in the eyes of the people were in the highest degree disgraceful to the ministry†; and the English clergy, particularly that portion of them who had been educated in Oxford, thundered from their pulpits against those who were dangerous to the church and the kingdom. This caused the queen to become altogether alienated from her

* [The present condition of Oxford—its tracts and divines, prove how true the university and its theologians have steadfastly remained to the Popish principle of authority, and to the pretensions of ecclesiastical supremacy in matters of faith.—TRANS.]

† From the reports concerning the battle of Almanza, it appears that parliament had voted money for the maintenance of 29,395 English troops in Spain and Portugal; that however 12,600 only had been under arms. The immense sum therefore for the maintenance of the remainder had been intercepted. The answer to parliament shows how contemptible the German princes made themselves and their nation by their trade in soldiers. The reply contains this sentence:—"As soon as your majesty received news of the battle of Almanza, they took all possible pains to repair the loss which had been suffered by the purchase of 7000 troops of the palatinate, 3000 other Germans, and 1200 Italians."

ministry. Sacheverell, a clergyman, who was neither distinguished for talents, learning, nor any other good quality except great boldness, had preached a sermon in November (1709), in which he vehemently attacked the reigning system, and the principle of excluding the legitimate line from the throne. He had allowed this sermon to be printed, confidently relying upon the support of the lord mayor of London, but he was arraigned by the Whigs as guilty of high crimes and misdemeanours. In the beginning of the following year (1710), the lower house began the prosecution against Sacheverell, which continued to be carried on before the upper house for two whole months, during which time his cause occupied the minds of the whole nation, and kept them in a state of expectation and suspense, because it involved the question of the doctrine of the Oxford divines,—whether passive obedience to princes was a christian duty. The queen was prevailed upon to be present at the debates, and on this occasion learned, to her great astonishment, that the parliament and her ministry were prosecuting a doctrine, which she, the clergy, and the mass of old Englishmen and squires regarded as salutary and evangelical. The trial of the insignificant Sacheverell caused almost more excitement than that of Charles I. had done: the parson and the doctrine of passive obedience were indeed legally condemned, but the people and the queen acknowledged the principle as the true faith, and regarded Sacheverell as a martyr. This occurred at the very time at which the misunderstandings between the queen and the duchess of Marlborough had degenerated into a quarrel, the consequences of which were the removal of the duchess and the triumph of Mrs. Masham. By means of Mrs. Masham's influence with the queen, Colonel Hill, who had distinguished himself in the battle of Almanza, obtained a regiment from her majesty. The duke and duchess, and particularly Sunderland, the secretary of state, opposed Hill's promotion from a feeling of hatred to his sister, but the queen did not yield to their wishes. This first led to the removal of the duchess from court; then to the negotiations of the queen with Harley, through the instrumentality of Hill; to the addresses against the ministry, which were promoted and worked out by Harley; and finally to Sunderland's dismissal*. The allied powers made

* Sunderland was most vehement in the case of Colonel Hill, because his opinions were altogether republican. He went so far as to propose a meeting of the members of the lower house, in order formally to address the queen, and

representations on the subject, and the majority in the lower house complained; Godolphin therefore at first remained along with Marlborough in the cabinet; but on the 18th of August, when the minds of the people seemed to have become completely changed, and more numerous addresses were presented, Godolphin also was removed. Marlborough began already to suspect that which really happened a year afterwards, and communicated it to Schulenberg*. Harley was appointed chancellor of the exchequer, the whole ministry was changed, and the parliament dissolved in October. Henry St. John, afterwards lord Bolingbroke, was appointed secretary of state. The new parliament which met in December was more favourable to the Tories than to the Whigs, and relying upon possessing the confidence of parliament, the new ministry began to limit Marlborough in his former practice of filling up places in the army, and to hamper him in his military undertakings. The triumph with which the duke was received by the people on his return, and the moderation and prudence which he displayed in his conduct, did not allow them to venture to remove him from the command till peace was finally concluded, about which a long secret correspondence had been carried on. The French marshal Tallard was in England as a prisoner of war, and a French priest named Gaultier, who staid with him, acted as a spy for Louis; people such as Harley and St. John made no difficulties of entering into secret alliances through the instrumentality of such a man, and in January 1711 they even sent Gaultier secretly to France with formal instructions†. At pre-

to request the removal of Mrs. Masham. In order to put an end to the strife, Colonel Hill begged her majesty to give the regiment to another person, and on this account he afterwards played a very considerable part when Ormond held the chief command in 1712.

* In the appendix to Schulenberg's 'Memoirs,' part 1, art. xxxiv., no. 4, p. 473, there is an extract from a report of Schulenberg's to king Augustus, of the date of August 31st, 1710, in which are found these words:—"My lord duc me dit avant-hier que selon les apparences tout se renverserait en Angleterre, qu'il ne comptait pas de revenir à l'armée, qu'on jettait les yeux sur le duc d'Ormond pour général en chef, et que l'on verrait que l'argent manquerait et que la France profiterait de cette brouillerie."

† With respect to this transaction, the MS. Mortem. no. 71. contains the following passage:—"Les Whigs avoient fortement traversé la conclusion de la paix, il sembloit que la Hollande se fût emparé des négociations pour les faire échouer, et que l'Angleterre se fût fermé les voies de traiter. Il falloit alors en trouver quelqu'une assez sûre pour faire secrètement connoître au roi l'état de l'Angleterre, les dispositions de la reine Anne et de son conseil, et cette voie devoit être si obscure qu'il n'y eût lieu ni de la pénétrer, ni même d'en avoir le moindre soupçon." For this reason Gaultier was selected.

sent the advantage was altogether on the side of France. The French were invited to make proposals to the Dutch, and the English promised to compel the latter to accede to them. The French knew the position of the English minister too well not to assume an attitude of pride towards Holland, and refused to treat except with England alone; the first very general proposals however were communicated by the English ministers to the states-general, and declined* by them on account of their generality. This the English cabinet had expected, for they wished to carry on the negotiation wholly with a view to obtain advantages for the English shipping and trade, and to leave the allies to their fate. It was very fortunate for the plans of the Tories that the emperor Joseph died in April (1711), and that his brother was his only heir. When Charles became emperor, no one could possibly any longer entertain the notion of desiring to wrest the whole Spanish monarchy from Philip, because the future emperor would possess it in addition to all the states of the Austrian empire. The first negotiations were carried on with ability and to the private advantage of England, as was to be expected from such men as Harley and St. John; but in other respects they were conducted throughout like a common cabal; this even continued to be the case after Menager was sent to London in August (1711) by Louis XIV., who remained there till October of the same year, and carried on an official negotiation†.

The war indeed was in the mean time continued, because the English could not publicly admit that they were about to betray their allies and to forsake them; but Marlborough as well as Villars had received intimations from their respective courts, to which Marlborough paid no regard. In the previous year the duke of Savoy had been far from realizing the expectations of

* The earl of Jersey gave instructions to Gaultier to obtain a letter couched in the most general terms. This letter he received, with the declaration that no further negotiations would be carried on *directly* with the Dutch: Gaultier first brought over proposals in April, which were to be communicated to the Dutch, accompanied by the offer of the king of Spain to cede Gibraltar and Port Mahon in Minorca to England.

† Prior, the poet and creature of the ministry, brought the first answer to Philip, in which the question of the slave-trade was referred to and special advantages for England in India. Advantages in trade were the chief point. For this reason, Menager, who understood such subjects the best, was sent to England in order to negotiate with St. John. The latter told him on the 28th of August, that their business was particularly with the private advantages which should be reserved for France and especially for England, and that other matters would be arranged at a later period in the congress.

the powers who paid his army; he had ventured on nothing in opposition to Berwick, who was his antagonist, and appeared in this year not to be more zealous in his designs. In Germany, after long and useless complaints, the elector of Hanover had at last (1710) laid down the command of a miserable, ill-provided army. Eugene, it is true, had assumed the chief command, but had remained with the army in the Netherlands, and so little thought could possibly be entertained of an attack upon the French, that the latter, on the contrary, crossed the Rhine and wasted the country on this side the river. In the following year Eugene spent some time in Vienna, then in the Hague, or with the army in the Low Countries. The French availed themselves of his absence, and threatened the territory of the empire, not only in the Breisgau, where they maintained an understanding and kept up a correspondence, but also in many other places. At last Eugene appeared on the Upper Rhine in July, but he neither could nor would undertake anything of importance, because he would have been obliged to attack the French in their lines; he contented himself with protecting the frontiers, because he had expressly appeared on the Rhine on account of the election of Charles VI., and in October the new emperor was at length chosen.

Villars had weakened his forces considerably by sending troops to the Rhine, and awaited Marlborough's attack within his lines, which he regarded as impregnable. On this occasion Marlborough gained an advantage over the enemy without making a great sacrifice of hare-brained men, as had been previously too common; for, by a masterly movement and the passage of the Scheldt, he compelled Villars to relinquish his lines in the beginning of August, and proceeded to besiege Bouchain, Valenciennes and Cambray: the progress of negotiations however retarded him in his conquests. Bouchain alone was taken. Harley, now lord Oxford, and St. John, soon afterwards created lord Bolingbroke, conducted the negotiations, although the duty properly devolved upon lord Dartmouth*. Neither paid any attention to the emperor, to the Dutch, nor to the protestations of the electress of Hanover, who was the appointed successor of queen

* When we think of the present education of the English, who travel round the world with their children in order that the latter may acquire the use of foreign languages, it will appear very surprising that lord Dartmouth, the English minister for foreign affairs, was obliged to leave the negotiations with France to St. John because *he did not understand French*.

Anne. Bolingbroke was a declared friend of French principles and of French politics, and he therefore signed preliminaries, by which he and his colleagues sacrificed the allies, and gave the French an opportunity of making short work with the Dutch* and treating them contemptuously, whilst the war was still being carried on, and the English troops stood in the field along with those of Holland. The audience which Menager had of the queen after the signing of the preliminaries, the secret manner in which he was conducted to and from this audience, and the words of the queen herself, all point to a secret understanding with France against her former allies and against the succession of the house of Hanover, although Louis, for the sake of appearances, was bound to banish the queen's brother to Lorraine†. The report of the French minister, with respect to the conduct and language of the English negotiators, entirely corresponds with this view‡.

* We must here return to MS. no. 71.—“ En vertu d'ordre de la reine, les ministres Anglois signèrent le huitième Octobre trois actes avec Menager. Le premier écrit sur deux colonnes contenoit d'un côté les conditions que demandoit l'Angleterre, et l'autre les réponses du roi. Les deux secrétaires d'état déclarèrent au bas de l'acte que c'étoit en vertu d'un ordre exprès de la reine leur maîtresse, qu'ils acceptoient les dits articles comme articles préliminaires. Le second acte regardoit le duc de Savoie, article demandé avec tant d'instance par les ministres de la Grande Bretagne. Les articles proposés par la France pour parvenir à la paix générale étoient compris dans le troisième acte. Ainsi on convint du premier fondement d'une paix équitable, bien différente de ces préliminaires odieux, que le démon de la discorde et de la guerre sembloit avoir enfantés.”

† Mortem. MS. no. 71.—“ St. Jean le conduisit en secret à l'appartement de la reine; à huit heures du soir ils y montèrent par un degré dérobé sans rencontrer personne que deux gardes, et dans l'antichambre une femme dans la confidence de la reine.” The queen is stated to have said, “*Je n'aime point la guerre et je contribuera en tout ce que dépendra de moi pour la faire finir, ou plutôt, je souhaite de bien vivre avec un roi à qui je suis tant alliée par la proximité du sang, et j'espère que les liens de notre union se fortifieront de plus en plus entre nous et nos sujets après la paix par une correspondance et une amitié parfaite.*” It continues, “Le même secret observé pour introduire Menager à l'audience de la reine, le fût encore, lorsqu'il en sortit. La même femme de chambre étoit au dehors du cabinet, il retrouva les deux mêmes gardes.” Then Prior says to him, he did not wish to return again to Windsor, as the Whigs had innumerable spies about the queen.

‡ We shall not here quote from the French records all his private conversations with Menager; a few hints will suffice. He pours out the most vehement abuse of the Dutch, and declares that he has expressly appointed an ambassador to the congress in Utrecht along with the phlegmatic earl of Strafford, “un seigneur propre à brusquer une entreprise comme un colonel de dragons.” Then follows MS. no. 71, ii. p. 95, that the grand trésorier and St. John had carried on secret correspondence with the French minister of foreign affairs; “une correspondance secrète pendant le cours de la négociation de la paix.”

As soon as Menager had returned to France, the news of the preliminaries being signed was sent to the grand pensionary, and the Dutch were obliged to yield to the calling of a congress in Utrecht in the commencement of the following year (1712). The imperial ministry and Marlborough used every possible means, in the last months of the year 1711, to increase the difficulties to the English ministry of concluding a peace. For this purpose they profited by the fermentation in England and stimulated the anxiety of the people, because it was reported that the ministers, and even the queen herself, had entered into a secret agreement in opposition to the Protestant succession to the throne. Count Gallas, imperial ambassador in London, ventured to appeal to the people, even before the negotiations were commenced or the preliminaries made known. He caused his disputes with the English ministers to be printed, and when he was forbidden the court, he threatened to publish an account of the sums of money which each of the ministers had received from France*. The ministers worked upon and roused the female sensibility of the queen, who was sometimes too much addicted to strong drinks, and the latter did not wait till the emperor recalled his ambassador according to her wish, but insisted upon his immediate departure. When Gallas was driven away from England, prince Eugene was to make a new attempt to change the opinions of the queen, or stir up a commotion among the people, and entered the Hague on the same day (17th November) as that on which Gallas arrived there on his journey back from England. Marlborough was also present at the conference which was held at the Hague, professedly upon the subject of the next campaign, although the ministry had raised a bitter feeling of indignation against him in the parliament and amongst a considerable portion of the people in order to accomplish his removal from

* Gallas had first caused the preliminaries, which were sent to him in secret, to be printed and commented on in the newspapers; he afterwards wrote a very vehement letter to lord Dartmouth, the head of the department with which he had to do, and also published it. In order to secure the queen's approbation to a surprising and injurious step which the ministers proposed to take against Gallas, they told her that Gallas had said of her in company, that she was a weak old woman, who allowed herself to be gulled. This enraged the queen so much that she forbade him the court, and St. John, who was a master of style and wit, wrote an answer to the letter to lord Dartmouth. Gallas's recall had been long demanded; Charles had scarcely come from Spain to Milan, when he promised to concede the request; all connexion with the ambassador however had been earlier broken off, and the imperial court was offended by the manner of his treatment.

the army. The same Solomon Medina, whose services he had so long used for the purposes of fraud and usury, was brought forward as a witness against him, and parliament declared the duke guilty of embezzlement. This furnished the queen with an opportunity of dismissing him, and the ministers, in order to please the queen's concealed desire, gave the command to a zealous jacobite, the duke of Ormond. Marlborough received his dismissal by a note* from the queen, dated the 1st January 1712: on the sixteenth of the month Eugene entered London and produced his credentials as a plenipotentiary from the emperor. By the attention which he excited, the admiration which he won, and the general respect which he enjoyed, Eugene placed the ministers who had received him coldly in no small difficulty, whereas the duke of Marlborough by his avarice had put weapons into their hands against himself. He was proved to have deducted a per centage from the money appropriated to the troops who were in English pay, and to have divided the advantage with the usurers and contractors which they derived from a diminution of the supplies of the army. Robert Walpole, who had been secretary of war under the Whigs, and the same who afterwards guided the helm of state under the following government, and had the majority of parliament always at his command, was arrested and even expelled from parliament†; but he employed every means against Eugene, which such a skilful, crafty and dishonest man as St. John alone could discover and allow himself to put in practice. The populace was inflamed against him by the most discreditable means; his entertainment by the corporation of London prevented by cabals; and he indeed tried to fight the ministry with similar weapons.

* She wrote to him briefly, that she was satisfied with the services which he had rendered, but found it her duty to remove him from the offices of confidence which he filled. She had however previously declared in the privy council, that since she had been informed that the committee of parliament, who were charged with the investigation of accounts, had desired an examination of the matters connected with the duke in the lower house, she had thought good to remove him from all his offices, in order that the investigation of the affair might be conducted without any feeling of party. She complained besides, in her note to Marlborough, of the bad treatment which she had experienced at the hands of the former ministry.

† On this occasion a circumstance occurred similar to that which again took place in the reign of George III., on the expulsion of Wilkes from parliament, and which made so great a noise. On Walpole's arrest, the parliament ordered a new election to take place; the electors of Lyme Regis, however, chose Walpole anew, whereupon the commons declared him incapable of sitting in that parliament.

Between the 26th of January and the 20th of March, Eugene handed in five remonstrances and statements, and did not avoid giving them the greatest publicity, in order to bring the ministry into discredit with the people. His attempts to rouse the people proved vain, and the ministers secured to themselves the necessary majority in the upper house by the nomination of twelve new peers all at the same time.

On Eugene's return to the Low Countries, and again assuming the command of the army, he could no longer reckon upon the English, for they were fettered by secret orders, and a public announcement of the preliminaries of the treaty of peace, negotiated at Utrecht by the plenipotentiaries of England, Holland, Savoy and France, was every moment expected. The formal announcement was however delayed, and the English still remained with the army in the Netherlands during April and May (1712): it was however manifest that the duke of Ormond designedly restrained the subordinate commanders from supporting Eugene in any of his undertakings. When at last Eugene, at the end of May, proposed a plan for a grand undertaking, the duke distinctly and publicly declared, that he had received positive commands not to allow the troops which were in English pay to be employed in any attack upon the enemy. He went still further; for on the 17th of July the preliminaries of the suspension of arms with England and Holland were first publicly proclaimed, but the duke had already separated from Eugene on the 15th; the allied troops in English pay however remained for some time longer. Eugene had at that time all his magazines and stores in Marchiennes, and had given the charge of their protection and defence, as well as that of protecting one of his wings, to the division under the earl of Albemarle; Villars and Montesquieu availed themselves of the retirement of the English and the weakening of the division for protecting the magazine, in order to surprise and fall upon Eugene on the 24th of July. The plan succeeded: only one part of the English troops obeyed Eugene's commands; he was obliged to give up his magazines, his lines were passed, the earl of Albemarle and several generals taken prisoners, and at a later period Quesnay, Douay and Bouchain conquered by the French. From this time forward, the war of the succession continued to be carried on in Catalonia and the Upper Rhine alone, because the Germans were proud and foolish enough to despise the conditions

of peace offered them by the congress at Utrecht, without any adequate means of carrying on the war.

§ III.

TREATIES OF PEACE OF UTRECHT, RASTATT, BADEN, AND THE CHANGES IN THE SOUTH-WEST OF EUROPE CONNECTED WITH THEM.

The negotiations for peace were carried on between the allies of England and Louis XIV., who had conducted the war for Spain, and now concluded the peace, because the selfish Philip V., with childish obstinacy, opposed every possible concession to Austria. The preliminaries were brought by Menager from London to Paris, slightly altered in Utrecht, and all prepared before a formal truce was announced. The ill-success of the Catalonians, and Eugene's defeat near Denain, with which the English were chargeable, awakened a violent spirit of dislike in England itself; and the English ministers, like all those who have recourse to intrigues, treachery and cunning, were obliged to invent some new and crooked devices. New difficulties had arisen, which made it necessary to require a pledge from France that Spain and France should never be united under one head.

The negotiations in Utrecht were commenced at the end of January 1712, and in February the duke of Burgundy, grandson of Louis XIV. and eldest brother of Philip of Spain, died. This prince, from his character and training, had been the hope and joy of the French nation: his eldest son had died when an infant, and the second a few months after his father, and now the succession in a direct line devolved upon a child of only two years old, afterwards Louis XV. In case of the death of this child, the French crown would fall to Philip V. of Spain, as eldest surviving brother of the deceased duke of Burgundy, and in this event the two crowns would become united in one person. The English ministers saw, that if they did not guard against this casualty in the treaty of peace, they would be accused and condemned as traitors by parliament, and they therefore required Louis to give them a pledge that his grandson would bind himself to cede the Spanish monarchy to his younger brother, the duke of Berry, in case he himself became king of France. These demands of the English created some difficul-

ties, and the ministers did not venture, as they had promised to Louis to do, to name the poet Prior, the instrument of all former cabals, as the third commissioner to Utrecht; on the contrary, they sent the chaplain Gaultier anew with secret proposals to Paris. The latter brought over a document, which professed an acquiescence in the demands of the English plenipotentiaries in Utrecht, but in secret he possessed very different proposals. The English ambassadors in Utrecht had refused to agree to a suspension of hostilities in March, if Louis did not consent to evacuate a fortress and put it into their hands as a pledge for the fulfilment of the required promise. The ministers therefore were regarded by the people as traitors, when Ormond, without any suspension of hostilities being proclaimed, refused his assistance to the allies. Louis at length yielded, and gave up Dunkirk to the English as a pledge: other difficulties however soon presented themselves. The English sought to procure Sicily for the duke of Savoy, whom they wished to employ against the emperor, and to compel the emperor and the empire to make some cessions to France: these however insisted upon their protest against all concessions, and the Dutch also continually raised new difficulties. St. John (Bolingbroke) resolved to have recourse to a new piece of diplomatic skill. As an English secretary of state, he ventured to take upon himself the negotiations which were to have been carried on in Utrecht: he himself travelled to Paris in company with Prior and Gaultier, who were known in England as promoters of the union between the two countries, and were hated by all the friends of freedom in Europe. On this occasion the secretary of state drew up those celebrated secret instructions, which, under the following government, Robert Walpole caused to be printed and accompanied by a comment, in which it was proved that they were treasonable, at the time when a prosecution was carried on against the ministers on account of the peace of Utrecht. We shall quote a passage with respect to them in a note borrowed from the Paris MS., already so often mentioned. By the order of the king, Torcy came from Fontainebleau to Paris, in order to meet and have a consultation with St. John respecting the peace, whilst the negotiations were at a complete stand in Utrecht, and to consider the possibility of assisting the brother of queen Anne to gain possession of the crown and government. The French have only taken that part of St. John's instructions which

relates to the former point into their report, and wholly passed over the second, relating to James*.

St. John (Bolingbroke) took up his residence in the house of Torcy's mother, the marchioness of Croissy: here the negotiations were carried on between him and Torcy, and when they had come to a mutual understanding, they travelled together to Fontainebleau, where the English secretary received apartments in the palace. At Fontainebleau all those matters were arranged which queen Anne had so much at heart, and the suspension of hostilities was prolonged till the end of December (1712). Polignac and d'Uxelles retaliated with severity at this time upon the Dutch at the Hague what they had suffered from them in Getruydenberg, often it is true under very miserable pretences, as for example on the occasion of the disreputable quarrel of the count von Rechtern's servants, &c. The conference had, properly speaking, nothing else to do than to protocol the conditions of the Paris peace, to alter them a little, and reduce them to the form of a treaty, after the chief points had been previously agreed upon between St. John and Torcy. Prior travelled backwards and forwards between Paris and Holland, and Louis prevailed upon the English and Dutch to give up their demands with respect to the freedom and national rights of the Catalonians, and the barrier-fortresses which the emperor and the empire sought to gain on the Rhine. The treaty, concluded in Utrecht in April 1713, between England, Holland, Spain, France and Sardinia, embraced at the same time, the emperor, the empire and Prussia, and the electors of Cologne and Bavaria were completely restored to their former rights and dominions. The emperor and the empire hoped to

* Mortem. MS. no. 71.—“Le premier point étoit de témoigner au roi le déplaisir que la reine de la Grande Bretagne ressentoit des difficultés et du retardement d'une négociation, qu'elle croyait prête à conclure. 2. Il devoit dire que pleinement instruit des intentions de cette princesse elle avoit jugé à propos de l'autoriser à traiter et régler les conditions capables d'applanir toutes les difficultés apportés à la suspension d'armes. 3. La reine lui préservoit d'y ajouter les assurances d'un désir sincère de sa part de rétablir une intelligence partielle entre les deux nations. 4. Il devoit à-peu-près tenir les mêmes discours aux ministres du roi en les assurant du pouvoir qu'il avoit de concilier la suspension d'hostilités par mer et par terre entre la France, l'Espagne et l'Angleterre. Il lui étoit permis d'en fixer la durée à trois ou quatre mois ou l'étendu même jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix. Mais ce pouvoir étoit attaché à la condition fatale d'obtenir le royaume de Sicile demandé pour le duc de Savoie, et de plus la reine d'Angleterre prétendoit qu'autant qu'il seroit possible on réglât les formes des différentes renonciations à faire,” &c. &c.

gain better conditions for themselves than those which England had secured for them, and no one pitied them therefore when, by continuing the struggle, they only brought new disgraces upon themselves; but the whole of Europe sympathized in the unhappy fate of the Catalonians, and was filled with sorrow and indignation. The Catalonians were sincerely devoted to Charles III., from attachment to his person and dislike to the Castilians. When he took his departure from Spain to assume the imperial dignity, he left his wife behind him in Barcelona, and the bravest general of the allies, after Eugene, count von Stahremberg, remained along with her (1711). At the same time as Ormond refused his aid in the Low Countries, the English subsidies, which had been hitherto paid to the Catalonians, were withheld, and in September (1712) the English troops also were recalled. The emperor also about this time, with great prudence and wisdom, separated the cause of Austria from that of Germany in general, and agreed to a general suspension of hostilities for his armies in Italy, Spain and the Low Countries, with the exception of the places on the Rhine, where, as head of the empire, he continued to carry on the war. Stahremberg was therefore obliged in May to depart from Barcelona, and the Catalonians were wholly left to their own resources.

The emperor and the English tried in vain to induce the brave Catalonians to do homage to Philip; this they firmly refused, and they would have been able to maintain their independence against Philip and his Castilians had they not been made a sacrifice to the diplomatic arts of the English and French. The English ministers, after having obliged the emperor to refrain from interfering in their cause, afterwards permitted the French to lend their aid to the Castilians. No bravery, no attachment to their traditionary usages and laws which were threatened by Philip, and no perseverance or courage were sufficient to withstand such a superiority in force*.

Vendome was dead; the empress had long inspired the Catalonians with courage, and had remained with them till March (1713); in May the imperial troops under Stahremberg left Barcelona, but, notwithstanding, the people courageously defended the city for a whole year after their departure. Spain

* Coxe, in his 'Memoirs of the Kings of Spain,' has devoted the whole of the twenty-first chapter to the heroic struggles and deeds of the Catalonians. Compare especially vol. ii, pp. 64-74.

and France were obliged to send a new army to reduce them by force in the following year. Marshal Berwick appeared before the city in May (1714), at the head of a combined force of Spaniards and French. He offered the Catalonians, it is true, the king's pardon, but the conditions by which the pardon was to be accompanied made them rather disposed to risk their lives and properties than accept it. During the war the Castilian constitution had been forcibly imposed upon Arragon, and now the Catalonians were also to yield up their hereditary privileges and acquiesce in its restraints. Though shamefully forsaken by those who had encouraged and excited them to the contest, they preferred defending themselves to the last against a superior force and the greatest general of the day to surrendering upon such conditions. Berwick, with 20,000 men, in vain attempted to storm the city; they drove him back and maintained their ground, till George I. and the Whigs obtained the government in England. Some weeks later and Robert Walpole would most probably have adopted their cause, but unhappily all their provisions were exhausted just five days before George I.'s arrival in England, and the intercession of the new English ministry came too late. The trenches had been opened on the 12th of July (1714), and in August everything was prepared for storming the city, and yet their resistance was prolonged till September. The city of Barcelona at length fell on the 11th of September, and the whole of Europe took a similar interest in the capture of the city, in the cruel persecutions inflicted upon the brave Catalonians who had been the sacrifices of diplomatic cunning, and in the loss of their constitution, which, in our times, has been felt with respect to the fate of the Poles and the last capture of Warsaw.

The war was in the mean time carried on by the empire in the usual manner. The imperial army had been commanded in the year 1712 by the duke of Wirtemberg, after the departure of prince Eugene. He had not only defended the frontiers of the empire, but even undertaken a short predatory expedition to Weissenburg: Eugene himself afterwards found the arrangements so bad, that he was neither able to prevent the wasting of the Breisgau and the districts on the Rhine, nor to save the fortresses which were threatened by the French. The princes, cities, nobles and gentlemen were to have raised 4,000,000 of florins; a whole year had been spent in negotiations on the sub-

ject, and the emperor had in vain made repeated and importunate representations with respect to the strengthening and maintenance of the border fortresses; Villars stood at the head of the enemy, and the empire was therefore at the discretion of the French*. Louis had sent considerable reinforcements to Villars, and Eugene, when he assumed the command, was obliged to limit himself to the defence of the frontiers. He could not prevent one fortress after another from falling into the hands of the enemy, nor the territory of the empire, on both sides of the Rhine, from being wasted and plundered. As early as the middle of June the French had taken a position on one side of Landau, occupied Spires, and taken possession of the fortifications of Mannheim, and were making the necessary preparations to march into the Breisgau and to press forward through the Black Forest into Bavaria, where the people were vehemently embittered by the oppression of the Austrian rule. Eugene covered Bavaria by maintaining his position; but Landau was taken by the French, who then passed the Rhine, occupied the mountains as far as Villingen, and besieged Freiburg. In the midst of so many disgraces which befell the Germans and their leaders, general von Harsch gained for himself immortal honour by his defence of this fortress against a superior force, and by the perseverance with which he held out and maintained the citadel long after the town was taken. This nobleman redeemed the honour of German bravery, whilst the whole empire brought dishonour upon itself by its inactivity and niggardliness; and the citizens and clergy of Freiburg, by their weakness and want of all sense of national honour and regard for the judgment of posterity, enormously aggravated the difficulties of his position. Von Harsch was not contented with the permission which he had received to surrender the citadel; before he yielded he required an express command to that effect from prince Eugene, which the latter honourably gave.

The condition of the imperial army was now altogether piti-

* On the 30th of January the emperor wrote to the diet as follows:—That the general staff had represented to him the dangerous condition not only of the fortresses of Landau and Philippsburg, but also of the Wettesheim dam, and that in other places the most necessary repairs were urgently demanded. That the necessary materials and means for their supply were wanting. That therefore he earnestly besought them to give heed to the representation, and seasonably to supply the means; otherwise the general staff, in case of any casualty, must regard themselves as free from all responsibility as to the consequences.

able. It is true, it had been decreed in a most praiseworthy manner, that an imperial chest for military operations should be provided; but it unhappily contained nothing, and never had*. Eugene was to compensate, for the want of troops and money, by his presence. He indeed maintained his position in his lines, and in the mean time earnestly advised the acceptance of the peace of Utrecht. It has been already remarked, that by the preliminaries Philip V. was to retain possession of Spain and the Indies, but that Naples and Sardinia, together with the Milanese and Netherlands, without the consent of Spain however, were to be ceded to Austria, and Sicily to the duke of Savoy. England had secured for herself the profitable trade in slaves with the Spanish colonies, the possession of Minorca, Gibraltar and St. Christopher, and required the fortifications of Dunkirk to be razed: Holland was to be allowed to keep garrisons in the fortresses in the Low Countries, which were regarded as a firm barrier against the encroachments of France. As the singular king of Spain refused to enter into any negotiations with the emperor, and would not acknowledge the cession of any portion of the Spanish monarchy, but reserved all his rights and privileges over the ceded provinces, the negotiations between France and the emperor only related to those things in which the naval powers took no concern. The conditions of peace between France and the empire were to be arranged and agreed upon in Rastatt by Eugene and Villars, who enjoyed the confidence of their respective sovereigns, and were entrusted with full powers. The Dutch also compelled the emperor at that time to make a sacrifice of the natural rights of the Spanish Netherlands, highly disadvantageous to Belgium. In addition to the preliminaries already agreed upon in Utrecht, they had obtained an advantage in the highest degree unjust, viz. the closing of the navigation of the Scheldt, as well as some other conditions equally burthensome. They did not withdraw their troops from the Low Countries till these burthensome conditions, the closing of the Scheldt and the barrier-treaty, by virtue of which the Belgian fortresses were to be garrisoned with Dutch troops paid with Belgian money, were acknowledged by Austria. Besides Sicily, Savoy was also secured in the possession of that portion of the Milanese which had been previously ceded by Austria, in addition to the fortresses of Exilles,

* *Theatrum Europæum*, year 1714, pp. 9, 10.

Fenestrelles, and Château Dauphin. The duke, moreover, was permitted (on September 1713) to assume the kingly dignity. All gained: Austria alone lost as much in internal and true power as she gained in the extension of her foreign possessions. By the peace of Utrecht, Prussia gained the district of Upper Gueldres, and a general acknowledgement of its rank and dignity as a kingdom; the English the proscription of the Pretender, Nova Scotia, Hudson's Bay, St. Christopher, and Newfoundland from France; and Gibraltar, Minorca, and the rights of the slave-trade (*asiento*) from Spain. The later conclusion of peace between the empire and France in Baden was an empty form. All that was essential rested wholly upon the negotiations between Eugene and Villars in Rastatt.

The French, supported by the peace of Utrecht, prescribed very hard conditions to the empire in Rastatt; they not only authoritatively required the unconditional restoration to all their dominions of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, as had been agreed to in the peace of Utrecht, but they insisted that the empire itself should dismantle every bulwark on the Upper Rhine: fort Louis and Landau were to be ceded, and Old Breisach to be razed. To these conditions the emperor was finally obliged to accede, at least in order to recover Freiburg. He gave himself no concern about the outcry raised by the nobles of the empire, because they in truth had made no efforts to sustain their demands by force of arms. It was finally arranged that Freiburg, Breisach and Kehl, fortified as they were, should be restored, and everything besides was yielded to the French. France and Austria, both under the influence and rule of the Jesuits, were united in one point,—a feeling of fanatical opposition to the freer doctrines of the Protestants: by the influence of the intolerant clergy of Austria and France, the English and Dutch ambassadors, as Protestants, were altogether excluded from being present at the negotiations in Rastatt and Baden, in order that the imperial commissioners might pay no attention to the demands of the Protestant nobles. They united with the French quietly to slip over what is called the Ryswick clause*, which was so disadvantageous to the Protestants, and

* When the peace of Ryswick had been concluded, and whilst the original draft was in the course of being copied, the French contrived at the last moment, about midnight, to add to the fourth article—which secured to the empire the restoration of all places possessed by it since the peace of Nimeguen, except Alsace—the following clause:—“*The Roman Catholic religion however*

which should have been expunged. Freiburg having been captured during the continuance of the negotiations, France at first was very high in her demands: Eugene and Villars at one time separated and broke off; but at length the German empire was roused to make serious efforts, and Louis found it advisable to be satisfied with the conditions which were granted, and the peace of Rastatt was concluded in the beginning of March (1714). The peace of Rastatt related also to the German empire: but although the whole formalities, with respect to the peace with the empire, were gone through at Baden in Aargau, with the usual attention to ceremonies and contests about etiquette, and with all the usual tedious and pedantic, juridical and diplomatic writings, and thus time and money were wasted, there was, properly speaking, nothing more to arrange. The peace was at length signed in September.

CHAPTER II.

NORTHERN WAR.—FOUNDATION OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY POWER IN EUROPE.

§ I.

RUSSIA, DENMARK, SAXONY, POLAND AND SWEDEN, TILL THE PEACE OF ALTRAHNSTADT.

IN the introduction we have mentioned the grounds of that combination against Sweden which was entered into by Russia, Denmark and Saxony, whose elector was then king of Poland. They had, in fact, entered into an agreement to divide amongst themselves the external provinces of Sweden, entertaining no doubt that little difficulty would be experienced in triumphing

shall remain in its former position in all the places so restored." The Protestants were so incensed by the conduct of the imperial commissioners in Ryswick as well as in Rastatt, that, after several vehement notes had been written by the Dutch in favour of the Protestants, Eugene found it necessary to declare to the diet, on the 5th of January, that the only ground of the delay in concluding the peace was, that France was unwilling to grant any sufficiently well-secured line of frontier to the empire.

over a fool-hardy king, as Charles XII. was represented to be, and who was only seventeen years of age. King Augustus II. however could reckon upon no aid from the Poles, as he and his favourite Flemming well knew, although Poland alone was to profit by the partition of the Swedish provinces; he had therefore ordered his Saxons, of whom he might venture to require anything, to march to Livonia, where he calculated upon the discontent of the nobles and relied upon Russian support.

As to Russia, Peter had need of the Swedish provinces on the Gulf of Finland, in order to carry out his plan of bringing his empire into close connection with the other states of Europe by means of a fleet and navigation in the Baltic, and the incorporation of a considerable number of subjects educated after the European manner; and for this purpose, while he had been deceiving Sweden by assurances of friendship, he had concerted with the Saxon ambassador at his court a sudden attack upon Livonia and Esthonia. The Livonian, Johann Reinhold von Patkul, was particularly active in promoting this union. Patkul had been unjustly and tyrannically persecuted by the court in Sweden under Charles XI., condemned to death and pardoned, but confined in a fortress*. He had made his escape, taken up his abode first in Brandenburg, then in Switzerland, afterwards entered into the service of Saxony, and still later into that of Russia. He thought his fellow-countrymen would lend assistance to the Saxons on their sudden appearance in the country to take possession of Riga, whilst the Danes invaded the territory of the duke of Gottorp, and Russia threatened Revel.

As Frederick IV. of Denmark was equipping his army for an attack upon Holstein-Gottorp, English, Swedish and Dutch ambassadors assembled at the residence of the duke of Zelle, and in connexion with the elector of Hanover, endeavoured to dissuade the Danish king from his meditated purpose. The young duke of Holstein-Gottorp had, it is true, provoked the Danes in various ways. Duke Frederick, who was the brother-in-law of Charles XII., had been the companion of all his wild and fool-hardy tricks, and accompanied him at a later period upon his first campaign in Poland (he fell at Clisson, 1702). The

* As such state-prosecutions are also the order of the day in our times, it will perhaps be interesting to many readers to know that the sentence pronounced by the judge who tried Patkul, with all the reasons on which it was founded, is to be found at full length in the German translation of Nordberg's 'History of Charles XII.' (Leipzig 1745, fol.) p. 106.

duke bounded up a mass of loose boards, as Charles also did, rode madly upon a stag at bay, shared in all Charles's terrific hunts, and emulated him in his rash attempts at hunting up stairs, and leaping over hedges, ditches and piles of wood. In recent times he had brought a battalion of Swedes into his duchy, and raised fortifications which could be of no shadow of advantage to him, but were a constant subject of displeasure to the Danes*. The contract between Russia, Denmark and Poland (*i. e.* Saxony) had been carefully concealed from the Swedish ambassador in Warsaw, as these nations wished to make an unexpected and contemporaneous attack†. Peter was not in a condition to declare himself till he was able to recall his army from the Turkish frontiers, and this did not happen till August (1700).

When Peter had concluded his affairs with the Turks, and at length advanced towards Esthonia, both his allies had already made shipwreck of their undertaking. The Saxon army had advanced into Polish Prussia in the last year of the seventeenth century, but the Poles, who were jealous of the sojourn of Saxon troops on the soil of their kingdom, importunately demanded their removal, and Augustus was therefore obliged to be precipitate in his attempt upon Riga. His plan of assault was badly formed and quite as badly executed. The Saxons suddenly

* In this and what follows we shall make great use of a work written in 1732, but lately published in a new edition by councillor Falk of Kiel, 'König Friedrich des Vierten glorwürdigstes Leben von Andreas Hojer,' Tondern, 1829. 8vo. In reference to the building of the fortifications, it is there said, pp. 14, 15, duke Frederick admitted to his own engineer, Zacharias Wolf, who wished to dissuade him from his design in consequence of the cost and uselessness of the trenches, that *he knew it, but that he built them for no other reason than that the Danes should sometime come and pull them down.*

† Hojer states the matter so briefly and well, that we adopt his own words : " Schon 1698 den 24 Martii ein defensiv-Bündniss mit könig Augusto geschlossen, einander contra quoscunque mit 8000 mann zu assistiren. Solches aber ward in diesem 1699sten Jahre den 25 Sept. in eine vollkomene off- und Defensiv-Allianz wider Schweden verwandelt, welcher der Czar den 11 Nov., hernach beigetreten ist. Bei dieser Handlung bestand das grösste Kunststück, in der Verschwiegenheit, und dass Niemand ihre wahre intention errathen möchte. Herein erwies der Graf Reventlov (der das werk in Dresden negociirte) mit dem Grafen Flemming und Pattkuhl ein Meisterstück, indem sie dem schwedischen daseyenden ministro, Baron Melling, einbildeten, dass Dänemark auf seine negotiationes jaloux und nur bemüht sey in die von Melling gesuchte Defensiv-Allianz mit eingenommen zu werden....Inzwischen war die Haupt absicht der geschlossenen triple-allianz : 1. König Friedrich, könig August und der Czar sollten zugleich mit Schweden brechen ; 2. einander zur Recuperirung der Avulsorum ; 3. auch dem Czar zu einem Hafen an der Ostsee helfen ; 4. endlich Chur-Brandenburg gelegentlich mit in diese alliance ziehen. Welche beiden letzten stücke könig August in specie ausdrücklich versprochen hat."

appeared before Riga at the end of February (1700), and Patkul marched through Livonia, but neither the inhabitants of Riga nor the nobles of Livonia responded to their expectations, and king Augustus tried in vain to palliate this treacherous violation of peace by means of ill-considered evasions.

The hostile inroad of the Danes upon Holstein-Gottorp was as precipitately undertaken as the march of the Saxons into Livonia. The Danes advanced into Sleswick in order to besiege Tönningen and destroy the fortifications. The undertaking against Tönningen proved a disgraceful failure after a very ill-directed cannonade, whilst Denmark was threatened on three sides, in consequence of this invasion of Sleswick. The Saxon auxiliaries which had been promised partly failed to reach their destination, and partly consisted of a predatory mob, which were easily annihilated by the troops of the duke of Zelle. Denmark was first threatened by the naval powers, who were interested in sparing the German forces for the French war, and who sent a fleet into the Baltic; secondly by the princes who in the treaty of Altona had guaranteed the rights of the duke of Holstein, who collected an army on the Elbe; and finally Charles XII. appeared with the quickness of lightning, in order to avenge on Copenhagen the injuries inflicted on his brother-in-law. Charles's appearance before the capital of Denmark took the Danes wholly by surprise; he disembarked his troops with such rapidity, and made such good preparations for bombarding the city, that not only king Frederick, but also the commanders of the allied fleets in the Baltic were astonished. Copenhagen would have been lost if the fleets of the naval powers had been willing to support Charles's bold undertaking. The guarantees of the Altona treaty, in order to save the king of Denmark and his capital, endeavoured to bring about the conclusion of a peace before the arrival of the Swedish heavy artillery. A congress was held at Travendahl, a country-seat belonging to the duke of Ploen, and a reconciliation was so much the more easily effected by the allied princes, as the cause of Sweden was not immediately concerned, and the king of Denmark would probably have been obliged to submit to still harder conditions than those which were imposed upon him*. In these negotiations the English were

* Hojer, p. 32. It is not to be denied that the king had resolved, at all events, to cede the district of Segeberg, in order to get rid of the enemy from Holstein, Zealand and Oldenburg. Lente and Liliencron, however, wisely

more favourable to the Swedes than to the Danes; only the French ambassador could not be altogether excluded; and through his mediation some of the hard conditions imposed upon Denmark were somewhat modified*. The king of Sweden was by no means pleased at the acceptance of the treaty of Travendahl by the duke of Holstein, who had expressly promised in one of the articles that he would pledge himself for the evacuation of Zealand by Charles†. Charles withdrew slowly and with hesitation, the duke of Holstein having already, without awaiting his commands, upon the expressed desire of the mediating princes, led back the Swedish troops into Germany. Neither king Augustus nor Peter had calculated that the Danish war would be choked in its birth. The Saxons had withdrawn from Riga; then in summer commenced hostilities anew; again foregone their attempt, and a third time renewed their operations, and committed no small devastation in Livonia: just twelve days after the conclusion of the peace of Travendahl, (20th Aug. 1700), Peter, who neither knew nor could know anything of the subject, published his declaration of war against Sweden.

The miserable grounds deserve no notice or mention which Peter assigned for his invasion of Esthonia, and for the cruelties which were exercised by his rude barbarians, under the command of foreign officers, who were objects of deadly hatred to those whom they commanded. Every one took the part of Sweden, and Charles hastened to avenge himself on the Russians as he had already done on the Danes. After his return from Copenhagen he only delayed a very short time in Sweden, landed in a fool-hardy manner with a small army in Pernau, and could

recommended him not to be too hasty, but rather to endeavour to come to terms with the house of Luneburg in an underhand way, and the Holstein affair would be quickly arranged. This plan succeeded through the negotiation of the old duke of Plön.

* William of England was not the best friend of his sister-in-law Anne, who was married to George prince of Denmark; on the contrary, he favoured the elector of Hanover, the ally of Holstein, against whose electoral dignity Denmark as well as Wolfenbuttle protested. The French minister was allowed to interfere at Travendahl as a mediator, and therefore, as Hojer expresses it, p. 34, "Die von dem Englischen envoyé Cresset prärendirte Rasirung der Hittler Schanze und die von Holstein verlangte Demolirung der Festung Christianpriis nebst anderen Artikeln wegfielen."

† On account of what follows (about 1710-1714) it must be remembered, that in addition to Sweden, the emperor, England, Holland, electoral Brandenburg, Hanover, Zelle and Wolfenbuttle undertook the guarantee of the Travendahl treaty.

not be induced by the repeated representations of the very able and experienced men in his service to wait for the rest of his troops. He hastened with fifteen thousand men to attack the Russian army in its camp before Narva*. Peter's army, reckoned at 40,000 men, was composed partly of foreigners, partly of barbarous Russians: foreigners commanded this army; and general Allard conducted the siege of Narva, in the midst of continual disputes between the Russians and the officers who were to organize them. Charles's army had practice, experience and courage. Rhenschiöld, who commanded along with Charles, was born and bred to be a general; and Dahlberg, the old governor of Riga, was the same engineer who had accompanied Charles X. in his wonderful marches over the Belt. Peter anticipated the fate of his army, and departed together with Golownin and Menzikoff, leaving it to the prince Von Croy to do the best he could with his Russians on the one hand and the Swedes on the other.

Charles's temerity was on this occasion better for the Swedes than the coolest and soberest consideration would have been; for he immediately stormed the Russian fortifications, whose weakness had been betrayed by a foreign subaltern (Johann Grummert) in the Russian service. The Russians within the trenches were unable to profit by their superiority of numbers: still a brave defence was made, till the Russians raised a cry of treachery, slew some of the officers, and obliged others to save themselves by taking refuge among the Swedes. The right wing of the Russians first capitulated; and on the next morning the left, commanded by general Weide, followed the example. According to the terms of the capitulation, the officers became prisoners of war; the baggage and artillery were to be given up to the Swedes, and the common soldiers were dismissed to their homes (21 Nov. 1700).

This victory brought the whole body of generals, above 150 pieces of cannon, and immediately afterwards 120 Russian transports, which lay in a small harbour near Narva, into the hands of

* The accounts of the number of his army are so various that some estimate it only at 7000, whilst others reckon 23,000. The number assigned in the text is a mean between these two, and is founded upon the following circumstances. 25,000 men were collected in Sweden, of whom 15,000 afterwards came into Livonia, whilst Welling had previously a small army there, which immediately joined Charles. This army is too highly estimated at 8000 men: it must not however be wholly overlooked, because Welling commanded one of the wings on the occasion of the attack upon the Russian camp.

the Swedes, and the war with Russia would have been brought to a conclusion as soon as that with Denmark had been, had not Charles wished to avenge himself on king Augustus, whose Saxons were posted on the left bank of the Dwina. By this course his chief enemy and the most favourable opportunity were neglected, for Charles would have made very light work with king Augustus and his favourite Flemming. Augustus II., as well as Frederick of Denmark and Frederick of Prussia, was merely king of his court and nobility, and ruined himself by foolish ostentation, as they did. Frederick Augustus was distinguished for his knightly gallantry, and all three were indefatigable in the preparation and celebration of festivals and ceremonies, which were got up with great pomp and at great expense; the science of ceremonials and etiquette was their highest aim. In reference to the modes of thinking and customs of the Germans in the eighteenth century, we cannot pass by the fact without remark, that the two most distinguished German poets of the age (Von König and Von Besser) were successively chief masters of ceremonies to Frederick of Prussia, and that Von König selected king Augustus in his camp, where he was most pitiable, as the subject of a heroic poem. None of the three rulers failed in gaining the applause of the ladies and of the higher nobility, who are only too much inclined to take all for gold which glitters. Their courts were filled with Italians and French, who made up by assurance, fluency of speech, and outward servility, what they wanted in true merit. These princes were therefore kings of the splendid court retinue by which they were surrounded, but not of the people whose means they exhausted: nevertheless the people at that time had only reached such a degree of civilization as to stare with dreaming and gaping astonishment at these festivals and splendid ceremonies with accounts of which all the newspapers were filled, without ever thinking that they must pay for them by their labour. The case was altogether different with Charles XII.: he was at the head of his army, a pattern of morality, piety and self-restraint, and suffered no other language to be spoken but Swedish or German.

When Charles landed in Zealand he maintained much stricter discipline than the Danes themselves, and paid for supplies with such punctuality, that his wants were much better provided for than theirs. The simplest clothing and food sufficed him; and prayers were offered up twice a day in his camp, at seven o'clock

in the morning and four o'clock in the afternoon, at which he himself was always present. On the field of battle no soldier durst venture to leave his ranks or to spoil the dead till permission was given. He relied wholly upon himself; whereas his enemies, and especially king Augustus, were mere tools in the hands of Peter, who used them for the promotion of his designs. Whilst Charles was collecting his forces in Livonia, in order to go and seek out the Saxons in Poland, king Augustus and the czar held another meeting in Lithuania in order to renew their alliance; and the elector of Brandenburg availed himself of this moment for the promotion of the objects of his laughable etiquette.

For twelve years past the elector had cherished the idea of calling himself king of Prussia: at the moment in which Russia, Poland and Saxony were in no condition to do him injury, and in which the emperor and the naval powers had need of his aid, he occupied himself with nothing else than with ceremonies, court arrangements and diplomatic negotiations, all of which were connected with his assumption of the title and dignity of a king. The emperor not only approved of his design because he obtained a considerable and admirable Prussian army, but also because by accident the negotiation had fallen into the hands of his confessor instead of his minister*. England and Holland acknowledged the title, because they wished to hire Prussian troops; Peter had already declared on his last journey, that he would allow the elector the title of king; Saxony, Poland and Denmark followed, to make up the crowd; Sweden hesitated, and France only first recognised the title at the peace of Utrecht. The long-prepared coronation was at length celebrated in January (1701), and all the journals were filled with descriptions of the ceremonies and festivities. Prints of the ceremony were published, and the good German people bought and studied them; such was the spirit of that age! The following anecdotes prove that such a spirit of the age had a most detrimental influence, not only by means of Augustus and his Flemming, who neither could nor would do any good, but also in Berlin and Vienna.

In Vienna the whole negotiation on the subject of Danish

* It is not known by what accident this happened, but the confessor was so much pleased with the courtesy and respect paid or implied in the message from the Protestant court of Prussia, that he facilitated the king's design.—
[TRANS.]

auxiliaries in the war of succession came to a stand, in consequence of the refusal of the title of excellency and the honour of the first visit to the Danish ambassador. Because these pitiful things were regarded and treated as affairs of the mightiest importance, they had recourse to a ridiculous pretence to get out of their embarrassment. William III. and the Dutch treated matters very differently; they profited, however, by this spirit of trifling which prevailed at the court of Berlin, and used it for the promotion of their ends. The new king made a most astonishing demand: he required that all the foreign ambassadors should stand behind his chair till drink was served to him; and this led to a dispute between him and Denmark. The Danish ambassador Ahlefeld remained upon his estates till Frederick yielded; the English ambassador Maly, and the Dutch ambassador Opdam, on the contrary, appeared behind his chair; the consequence of which was, that the king rewarded them with magnificent presents, and lent some admirable troops to the naval powers as well as to the emperor.

King Augustus had already affronted the Poles, by conferring the freedom and privileges of a Polish citizen upon his favourite Flemming, the companion of his orgies, and he afterwards alienated from his cause the whole family of Sapieha, by naming him master of the horse for Lithuania. Charles therefore had scarcely appeared in Poland when the Sapiehas attached themselves to his fortunes. Peter, who had also concluded a new treaty with Denmark in January (1701), promised king Augustus, on their meeting at Birsen in the territory of Lithuania, twenty thousand Russians and a miserable sum of 200,000 dollars. The czar at the same time took upon himself the provision of a considerable sum for the purpose of bribing the vice-chancellor and some of the senators of Poland, in order to persuade that kingdom to take part in the alliance against Sweden.

Charles XII., who had now reached his nineteenth year, beat the Saxons and Courlanders who had united with them in the months of June and July, took Dünamunde in September, after a masterly passage over the Dwina in sight of the Russians, and pushed forward into Poland without delay. Peter saw with pleasure the whole burthen of the war thrown upon a rival, who, at the very same time as he himself was attacked by the Swedes in Poland (16th January 1702), had agreed by treaty to sell eight thousand Saxons to the grand alliance, in order to

obtain subsidiary money from the naval powers, which he spent on mistresses, festivities and ostentation. Peter in the mean time formed a new army in the rear of the Swedes from the soldiers who had been dismissed at Narva, trained it for future wars in some successful encounters, threatened Livonia and Esthonia and wasted these provinces, while his views were, properly speaking, directed towards Ingria* and Carelia. Whilst Peter established himself there, Charles pushed forward to Warsaw (May 1702), and declined all the advantageous proposals of peace which were made to him by the king of Poland, under the pretence that no peace or reconciliation was possible with such men as Augustus and Flemming, because they regarded a sense of honour as boorish stupidity, and faithlessness as mere state policy. Charles's indignation was so great, that in his very first answer to the cardinal primate of Poland, he already hinted at the deposition of his opponent†.

The brave Saxons suffered at the same time from the Swedes and the Poles, to whom they were burthensome; and their king Augustus, surrounded by mistresses, court ladies, courtiers and pomp, seemed to make a mock of the general misery. He fled at last to Cracow and Sendomir, and after his own fashion proposed terms of peace, which he afterwards publicly denied. Charles followed him to Cracow and beat the Saxon army, which on this occasion was reinforced by the Polish army under field-marshal Lubomirski, near Pintschoff and Clissow (19th July 1702). In this engagement Charles lost his brother-in-law, duke Frederick of Holstein, who had shortly before joined him from Germany. This victory strengthened Charles in his own obstinacy; and his ministers, the Swedish senate and his best generals entreated him in vain not to involve himself in a laby-

* Ingria was the district in which St. Petersburg now stands, and Carelia formed the adjoining province on the northern side of the Gulf of Finland.—
[TRANS.]

† He declared to the Poles, that Augustus had violated his oath, and was aiming at the establishment of absolute dominion. Among other things, he writes to the cardinal primate, under date of the 30th July 1701, as follows: "*Pacta conventa eludere quovis modo et artificio sat egerat, curanque adhibuerat maximam quo inter præcipua regni Polonici membra discordias et internecina odia concitaret et aleret. Dubio enim caret, postquam in animum semel induxerat absolutum regimen sibi vindicare, &c. huic igitur malo mature præscindendo medium accommodatius vix adhiberi potest ullum quam si rex iste throno quamprimum deiciatur, quippe quo se infracta toties legum et juratæ capitulationis fide reddidit indignum.*"

rinth of Polish affairs*. If ever the calamity arising from the arbitrary rule of princes and their ministers was shown on the earth, it appeared at this time in the whole of Europe—in Spain and France, as well as in Sweden, Saxony, Poland and Prussia. The Swedes were led into Poland, were one while in Gallizia and another in Polish Prussia, suffered every description of want, were worn out by useless battles, enjoyed neither quiet nor rest, and were perishing with cold. Sweden, which was poor in men, was robbed of its vigorous citizens and brave peasantry; and, as one of Charles's generals informs us in the Swedish biographies, these came in order to obtain a short-lived glory, and suffered from sickness, unhealthy food, miasma, storms and fatigue, to share in the adventures of their king, which he like a knight-errant sought out in wastes, morasses and forests, whilst he shared all the privations of hunger and the mouldy bread, which was the only food of his troops. King Augustus oppressed his Saxons to the utmost and sold their blood. He hired them for soldiers in the Netherlands. He went so far as to withhold† the half of the pay which England and Holland gave to the common soldiers; and when no man in Saxony would any longer enter into service even for an unheard-of sum of earnest-money, he had recourse to forced levies. The Poles were equally ill-treated by the Saxons, the Swedes, and the allies of their king, the Russians; and besides, they soon after took arms one against another, and mutually wasted and destroyed each other's possessions. The Oginski and Sapiehas, the one

* According to Nordberg, in his 'Life of Charles XII.,' German trans. folio, 1st part, p. 365, he answered Piper's representations in the following remarkable words:—"Be assured, if I could rely upon the word of king Augustus, I would immediately leave him in peace. But if peace were concluded and we marched into Russia, he would instantly accept Russian money and fall upon us in the rear, and then our affairs would be in a greater state of entanglement than at present. What Livonia suffers in the mean time may be made good by conferring privileges and acts of grace when God gives us peace."

† In Schulenburg's Memoirs, part 1st, p. 310, some remarks are made on this subject with regard to the corps which he himself commanded. The deductions of the officers' pay are there stated to have amounted to 11 per cent. What was taken from the common soldiers amounted to much more. The cavalry soldiers, who ought to have received 28 florins for forty days for food and clothing and fodder for their horses, received only 14, and the infantry $4\frac{1}{2}$ instead of 12. The author, however, of these memoirs abuses these *ideologists*, as he calls them, who blame this proceeding. *Practical men*, he observes, *look upon the question quite differently*. Yes, truly! such practical men are but too common and too powerful among us.

united with the Russians and the other with the Swedes, marched through the country, plundering and wasting the towns and forests of Lithuania; but Peter profited by the time which Augustus spent in dalliance and sensuality, and the Poles in holding diets and entering into confederations.

Peter succeeded in again bringing an army together, and accustomed it to warfare and victory by attacking the Swedes in Ingria and Carelia, in Esthonia and Livonia, only when he possessed a decided superiority in numbers, and never otherwise. By the aid of Scheremete, Peter gained a victory over Slippenbach near Dorpat (January 1702), and a second time afterwards (July) near Hummelshof; he himself, at the end of the year (22nd Oct.), captured the fortress of Nöteborg, which he afterwards called Schlüsselburg. In the following year Charles marched about in all directions through Poland, and defeated the Saxons near Pultusk (25th April 1703), whilst Peter (17th May 1703) laid the foundation of his new capital upon Swedish soil, and fortified its approach both by sea and by land. The Poles at that time despised all alliance with the Russians; Augustus, however, concluded a new treaty with them (10th Oct. 1703), and sought to conceal it, according to his usual practice, by a contemptible falsehood; but the patience of the Poles was at length exhausted. The Poles had long refused to consent to Charles's proposals for the deposition of their king as the price of a peace; they at last, however, listened to the proposal, and Charles tried to recommend to them the eldest son of John Sobieski, the conqueror of the Turks and the liberator of Vienna, as their king. This furnished Augustus with an opportunity of committing a piece of outrageous violence and faithlessness, and of inflicting damage upon a foreign territory, which Charles could afterwards quote as an example if he allowed himself to do the like.

The three sons of John Sobieski, James, Constantine and Alexander, were equally destitute of capacities and acquirements; the eldest was crippled in body, and, as the history of his whole life gives evidence, ill-endowed in mind*. King Au-

* This will be best seen from the report, drawn from original sources, given to us by Herr Stengel, of the whole family of Sobieski, and from their melancholy history. Schlosser and Bercht's '*Archiv für Geschichte und Literatur*,' 5r band. s. 319-361. Charles's letter from Heilsberg is there also printed, whose genuineness is disputed by Nordberg, but on insufficient grounds. Nordberg's German translator, in a note to the first part, pp. 494, 495, has

gustus, in order to make sure of his election, had induced this prince, by a promise of 400,000 dollars, which, according to his custom, he never fulfilled, to decline being a competitor with him for the crown of Poland. The three brothers, when they found themselves deceived, afterwards retired to their lordships in Silesia, and resided in Ohlau. From Silesia they entered into communications and a union with Charles, and the latter sent them a public declaration from Heilsberg (January 1704), in which he declared that he would endeavour to promote the election of James Sobieski by every means in his power; and that if he was chosen, he would maintain him on the throne by force of arms. At the head of the party opposed to Augustus stood the cardinal primate Michael Radzieiowsky, one of the most equivocal characters in the whole annals of modern history, and the field-marshal Lubomirski. The latter had gone to Warsaw, and there formed a general confederation, which pronounced the deposition of king Augustus on the 6th of February 1704. Upon receiving the news of the confederation, king Augustus sent thirty officers in disguise to Silesia, in order to carry off Sobieski, by seizing him upon the territory of the empire; and the noble gentlemen of the Saxon army, who were ready to draw their daggers at any moment upon any insult being offered to their honour in their banquets or at the gaming-table, regarded it as no disgrace to lie in ambush in the woods disguised as murderers, till the Sobieskis, James and Constantine, passed through on their way from Breslau to Ohlau. They surprised and seized upon the princes, who were first brought to the castle of Pleissenburg at Leipzig, and afterwards taken to Königstein. Alexander escaped to Poland, but could not be prevailed upon to accept the crown. With Alexander's consent, Charles proposed for their king Stanislaus Leszinski, waywode of Posen, who had made himself very agreeable to him. Stanislaus had neither partisans nor large possessions: the cardinal primate and Lubomirski were both very much dissatisfied with the new choice, but Charles's obstinacy was not to be overcome; he caused the Poles by force and a liberal distribution of strong drink to choose Stanislaus for their king (July 1704). Charles remained in Polish Prussia till the new king was chosen. In the mean time he had besieged and captured Thorn, extorted

ably refuted his reasons; and Weisse, in his 'History of Electoral Saxony,' fully concurs with the translator (6th Part, p. 374).

considerable sums from Elbing and Danzig, and, after the election of the new king, he first went to Gallizia and reduced Lemberg, whilst Augustus was laying a plan for surprising Warsaw. Stanislaus remained behind in Warsaw, where he was defended by no more than 1500 Swedes, under the command of general Horn. He could place no confidence in his Poles, since the cardinal primate had publicly seceded from the Swedes and retired with his friends to Polish Prussia. When Augustus appeared, Horn and his Swedes were made prisoners, and Stanislaus fled to Charles to Lemberg. It was Peter, however, and not king Augustus, who reaped the fruit of the surprise of Warsaw, and the advantage of all those transactions which Charles himself had prepared.

In the previous year Peter had already laid the foundation of the new capital of his empire, named after himself, and had seen the first Dutch ship enter the port; he now declared himself hostile to the Poles, who had dethroned their king, but he gave the latter in his need a very miserable contribution towards his support, which king Augustus afterwards dissipated in pleasures*. Whilst Stanislaus and Augustus were carrying on their contest about Poland, Peter captured Narva and Dorpat, and distributed letters of pardon and grace to all the nobility, as if he had been already in sure possession of the province. Charles's war in Poland having exhausted Sweden, Lewenhaupt, with a weak army without any means of support, was to have protected Courland and Livonia; but his repeated victories over the Russians were all in vain, so long as the war in Poland continued: and in order that Charles might continue to find occupation in Poland, Peter concluded a new treaty with Augustus in Narva (30th August 1704), and made him a new contribution of 200,000 roubles, which were dissipated in the usual manner.

Peter and Augustus at that time resolved again to draw Denmark into the contest, and Flemming himself went to Copenhagen, in order, if possible, to persuade king Frederick to join in the war; the latter, however deeply he was incensed about the affair of Holstein-Gottorp, was the less disposed to commence hostilities, inasmuch as the new king of Prussia, in order to obtain the recognition of his kingly dignity on the part of Sweden, had bound himself to protect Gottorp against all hostile attacks.

* Wichman appeals to Polish receipts in Moscow for above 211,560 dollars and 62,097 roubles, in English and Dutch bills.

As to the warlike undertakings of the year, Patkul, who had now been for three years in the Russian service, played as miserable a part at the head of the Russians whom Peter had sent to the aid of the Saxons, as king Augustus did with the Poles of his party. As soon as Charles appeared in one corner of Poland, king Augustus was obliged to flee to the opposite. Schulenburg alone, at the head of the Saxons, ventured to meet the Swedes; but Steinau and Flemming, higher in rank and especially in favour with their gallant king, destroyed or rendered useless all that Schulenburg had accomplished; and his army was also destitute of money, provisions and artillery. When Steinau was absent for some considerable time, Schulenburg indeed gained some important advantages, but they were again immediately lost. When Charles himself attacked him at Punitz (October 1704) he maintained possession of the field of battle, but was nevertheless afterwards obliged to retreat, and king Augustus himself always most cautiously avoided the Swedes. He lay encamped with the Russians and Poles in Cracow and Sendomir, but nothing could prevail upon him to relinquish the carnival, which he had always been accustomed to celebrate in Dresden with great magnificence and expense, and which was yearly augmented in proportion as his country became poorer. He remained long in Saxony (1705), and Charles marched in all directions in Great Poland and on the Wartha and Lower Vistula, whilst the Saxon army were lying inactive on the banks of the Oder, where they were watched by Rhen-schiöld with 7000 or 8000 Swedes. Charles spent the whole year 1705 in marching about in Poland, whilst Peter was establishing himself in the Baltic provinces of Sweden. At this time Menzikoff appeared in Poland, but could not cooperate with Ogilvy, and therefore rendered little service. Paykul, with the Saxon cavalry and the Poles assembled at Cracow, wished, in the middle of the year and in conjunction with Schulenburg, to surprise the Swedes in Warsaw, as his king had done in the previous year; but three regiments of Swedes (31st July 1705) routed the whole hostile army between Wohla and Warsaw, and took Paykul prisoner. Paykul was a native of Livonia, but had never been in the service of Sweden: Charles, nevertheless, had him tried and condemned as his subject. This judicial murder, as well as the cruelties which at a later period he practised against Patkul, have left an indelible stain upon the name of Charles

XII., and do little honour to that species of religion and orthodoxy of which he was such a zealous protector*. The victory at Wohla moreover made it now possible for the king of Sweden at length to bring Stanislaus to Warsaw (September 1705), and to have him solemnly crowned and anointed.

After the coronation of Stanislaus and the conclusion of a formal treaty between Sweden and Poland, king Augustus had no longer any reason to conceal his connexion with Russia: he now therefore held a new meeting with Peter in Grodno, and completely gave up Poland to all the barbarities of the Russians. At this time, during the absence of the king, the Saxon ministry (19th Dec. 1705) added the most scandalous violation of the rights of nations against a foreign ambassador to the unheard-of oppression of the poor Saxons, of which they were the instruments. Patkul, Peter's ambassador at the Saxon court, had revealed to his master the miserable cabals of the ministers and of the court; he had advised the czar wholly to separate himself from Augustus, his squires, mistresses and pimps. The Saxon minister had seized upon these letters, and now got up a cabal against Patkul: they at length ventured so far as to take possession of his papers, to arrest his person, and to cause him to be sent to Sonnenstein. On this occasion Schulenburg, who was as complete a courtier as the others, suffered himself to be employed as a tool, and hence it comes that the author of his memoirs believes himself to have given a full explanation of his bad conduct towards Patkul, in what he has drawn from the minutes and records of the Dresden archives; as if a man was likely to find, or would be permitted to search for, the explanation of such offences in the archives†!

* Paykul was condemned by a tribunal in Sweden, which acted judicially right but morally wrong. He was executed in 1707, although he proved, in a letter which he wrote immediately after his capture, that he had left Livonia with his parents fifteen years before; that he had served under George III. and George IV. in the electorate of Saxony; and that he had sold his small estate in Livonia eleven years before the commencement of the war. We shall quote a passage with respect to Paykul from Hojer's 'Life of Frederick IV.,' because it will be seen from this passage how common the belief in making gold was at that time. Hojer, p. 106: "Paykul was unfortunately a native of Livonia, but in his tender youth had been brought away from that country; yet Charles XII. caused him to be tried as his subject, and finally beheaded him in Sweden, although the queen-dowager and the whole royal house interceded in his favour, and Paykul offered, nay, gave repeated proofs, that he could make gold, and in order to save his life offered the king to make for him some millions of pieces yearly."

† It is no part of our object to examine the literature of these much-treated

The deeds of Lewenhaupt in Livonia and Courland belong to this period: his exploits have well entitled him to be ranked amongst the most distinguished generals, because the Russians were quadruple his number, and he was almost destitute of all the necessary means of warfare. Peter had raised new excitements among the Lithuanians; he had sent Scheremeteff to Courland, whom he had raised to the rank of a field-marshal in consequence of his victory over Slippenbach. Lewenhaupt from Riga sought him out in his quarters in Courland, and vanquished him near Gemauerthof (26th July 1705). On this occasion he got possession of the whole Russian artillery. This victory, indeed, like so many other brave exploits of the Swedish general, was altogether fruitless, for Lewenhaupt was unable to maintain himself in Courland, and obliged to retreat to Riga. King Augustus had a new meeting (in November) with Peter in Grodno, whither Charles followed him, when Peter was called away to Astrakan in consequence of disturbances in his own empire: Augustus however avoided him and hastened to the Vistula. The Saxons and Poles in Poland had formed a plan for taking advantage of Charles's absence, in order to make an attack from three different sides and of annihilating Rhenschiöld, who had hitherto lain quietly encamped on the frontiers of Poland and Silesia. They were so certain of the success of their plan, that Flemming even went to Berlin in order to effect an arrangement for preventing the fugitives of the Swedish army, in their opinion already routed, from finding a resting-place upon the territory of Brandenburg. The Saxon and Polish cavalry were to advance rapidly from Cracow, and Augustus from the Vistula, in order to meet Schulenburg on the field of battle. The king however, with 10,000 or 12,000 Saxons, Russians and Poles, did not venture to meet the Swedes in the field, and remained at a distance of fifteen miles from the scene of action, whilst Schulenburg, relying with certainty upon his approach, ventured with his 13,000 Saxons to accept the battle which Rhenschiöld offered him. Schulenburg at that time came from Saxony through Silesia: Rhenschiöld had at first entertained the idea of seeking him out there, but had afterwards changed his

materials, or even to quote them; we therefore merely name this extensive work: Patkul's '*Berichte an das Czaar'sche Cabinet*,' Berlin 1792, and the whole of the 10th division of the first part of Schulenburg's *Memoirs*, pp. 213—231.

opinion, and awaited him near Fraustadt in Posen (6th February 1706), not far from the frontiers. The Saxons gave way after a contest of two hours' duration, and their overthrow was so complete, that of 13,000 men not 3000 escaped*. Augustus looked without concern on the overthrow of his troops, and he was too much accustomed to flattery to apply the words of Schulenburg's report, "*that the divine assistance had been wanting to his army,*" to his own disgraceful cowardice and delay, and to his failure in the fulfilment of his promise. On the defeat of his Saxons, the king returned to Warsaw, and when he had ended his festivities, banquets and orgies in that city, he went to Cracow.

In the mean time the Swedes were suffering in Lithuania, notwithstanding all the self-restraint, activity and religiousness of their king, not less than the Saxons from the debaucheries, cowardice and unprincipled corruption of theirs. Charles hurried from place to place in Lithuania, through swamps and forests, from February till July, without accomplishing anything of importance, except driving the Russians out of Courland: Augustus and his mistresses whiled away the time in Cracow. It was not till Charles, from the tower of a church belonging to the Jesuits, obtained a complete view of the unbounded morasses of Volhynia, and was informed by the president of the college of the true nature of the country, that he saw the folly of spending time in these wastes, and hastened back to Poland, in order finally to push forward into Saxony. As soon as Augustus was aware of the departure of his opponent from Lithuania, he fled thither from Cracow, and again formed a union with the Russians.

Charles now drew Rhenschiöld's forces to himself, left Mardefeld in Poland, and with 22,000 men set out towards Saxony. The Swedes were at that time ill-fed, ill-clothed, and partly even in rags; but Charles's army was notwithstanding the best in Europe, whether we consider the soldiers, officers or generals. The march of the Swedes through Silesia caused no small anxiety to the emperor, who formerly, to conciliate Charles and on his mediation, had granted alleviations to the severely oppressed Protestants, and the restoration of rights of which they had been de-

* The Saxons had partly thrown away their guns before they had been once fired, and Dünewald's cavalry fled without even discharging their pistols. That Rhenschiöld suffered a considerable number of disarmed Russians to be hewn down on the field of battle is certain; we doubt however if it amounted to 6000, as has been said.

prived by the Jesuits, but which indeed were soon afterwards wrested with violence from the oppressed. Denmark and Prussia at that time felt great uneasiness; the Saxon government in Dresden gave up every thought of resistance, and immediately opened negotiations. Charles pushed forward to Leipzig, took up his abode first in Taucha, and then upon an estate near Altranstädt: Stanislaus was in his train. When Saxony also appeared to be lost, king Augustus had recourse to two of those instruments of treachery, of whom he and his ministers availed themselves, either to conciliate or to deceive the Swedes. Pfingsten and Imhof were the plenipotentiaries whom he sent from Poland to Saxony, with pretended full powers to negotiate with the Swedes; but he afterwards alleged, that they were only to deceive the Swedes by a treaty, and when this did not succeed, he sacrificed both the negotiators without hesitation. Both of them had been concerned in the capture of Patkul, whom he afterwards, in the most shameful and cowardly manner, surrendered to the dishonourable vengeance of the pious king of Sweden: they had importunately offered their services in the negotiation, and we do not therefore grudge them the fate which their king, Flemming and their companions prepared for them. But this forms no excuse for the king.

As the Swedes, during their sojourn in Saxony, completed the ruin of the country by an intentional and systematic process of oppression, we must avail ourselves of the opportunity of calling the attention of the friends of our German fatherland to what might have been made of such a country as Saxony,—of the intelligence, perseverance, frugality, integrity and industry of its noble race of men,—if only a small part of the money which was uselessly wasted in Poland had been applied to the promotion of objects of general advantage; or what an immortal name the king would have gained for himself, if the lost munitions of war and troops had been sent to the Rhine to oppose the enemies of the empire*. King Augustus moreover played to perfection the character prescribed to him by that much-praised theory,

* Particular and specific accounts of the oppression of the Saxons by the Swedes will be found in Weisse's 'History of Electoral Saxony,' part 6. We only here add, without pledging ourselves for the correctness of the statements, that the reports of that time state the loss which Saxony suffered in the useless Polish war as amounting to 88,000,000 dollars, 800 pieces of cannon, and 36,648 men: in order to form an opinion of king Augustus's character and conduct, compare this with the miserable subsidies which he received from Russia, and immediately wasted.

which had its origin in Italy, was perfected in France, and has been regarded down till our own days as the highest wisdom of the exalted circles of genius and as the completion of the training of a diplomatist, whereby all such characters are distinguished from boorish and uneducated citizens. He gave Imhof and Pfingsten full and unconditional powers to negotiate and conclude a peace, and punished them afterwards when they had concluded it, because they should have known he was not in earnest. He remained with the Russian army whilst it was threatening Mardefeld and the Swedes in Poland, though he himself had entered upon negotiations and had promised a cessation of hostilities. In order to be able to justify himself to Charles, he gave the Swedes a hint of the designs of the Russians, and notwithstanding, in conjunction with the Russians, he afterwards fell upon the Swedes by surprise, in order not to lose the advantage of a victory.

The king's commissioners from Poland had received their commission on the 16th of August; Charles first reached the Saxon frontiers on the 26th, and he therefore had no sooner established his head-quarters in Altranstädt, than they opened the negotiations. King Augustus had previously sent a message to his rival Stanislaus by a French officer, to the effect that he was not indisposed to abdicate the Polish crown. The negotiations were soon brought to a close, since the demands of the Swedes in the then state of affairs were laws; and peace was concluded as early as the 24th of September. Pfingsten went to the king to Petrikow, and true to the character of a courtier in the service of Augustus, he did not venture to announce the truth. This afterwards furnished the king with an excuse for summoning the negotiators before his tribunal, and causing them, by regular process of judgment and law, to be condemned*

* In the 'Theatrum Europæum,' part xvii., 1706, p. 138, it is stated, that king Augustus afterwards complained that Pfingsten had not laid before him the whole contents of the treaty as it had been concluded, but had only communicated single facts, and also intimated that it was not yet completed, and that several hard conditions which it contained might be perhaps alleviated on their return to Saxony. The king pretended that as he had no one with him (what a miserable refuge!) in the haste of the moment to draw up his commission in full form, he had, from full confidence, entrusted so many *carte blanches* to Pfingsten as were necessary to complete the work; in addition to which, he alleged that the peace which had been concluded was not fully communicated to him, nor had its ratification been written out in a fair copy. In Schulenburg's 'Memoirs,' part i., 13th division, pp. 288-294, the affair is explained from the minutes. The author, as a practical man as he calls it, would

by one of those faculties of jurists who are sharp-sighted enough to be able to find out a law and a right for every species of wrong; and all this after the king himself had accepted and published the treaty. The same ambiguity of conduct which was exhibited by king Augustus and his confidential friends in the affairs of the peace, in which they were never in earnest, showed itself also in the undertaking against the division of the Swedish army under Mardefeld, which took place in the waiwodship of Posen. Pfungsten was commissioned to send an account of the conclusion of peace to the Saxon commander, who in conjunction with the Russian army under Menzikoff was to fall upon Mardefeld: he neither executed the commission on his journey to Petrikow nor on his return, but sent the letter from Breslau by post; so that he very well knew that, at the tedious rate of travelling by post, it would undoubtedly come too late.

When Menzikoff insisted upon attacking Mardefeld, king Augustus was almost reduced to despair: he had recourse, however, to his usual means of relief. He first warned Mardefeld twice of the attack, but did not the less hesitate on that account to join Menzikoff with his Saxons, when he gained his victory at Kalisch (October 29, 1706). In consequence of this victory, Menzikoff was raised by the emperor to the dignity of a prince of the empire; but the blood of the Poles and Saxons, and of 3500 who fell in this fight, was all shed in vain. The king of Sweden was only appeased with the greater difficulty, by means of the satisfaction which was solemnly promised him*.

In the insolence of victory, Charles was as forgetful of the duties of humanity as king Augustus and his ministers; for Saxons and Swedes combined in the destruction of the unfortunate Patkul. Charles with cruel obstinacy insisted upon his

have too willingly found everything in order, but he finds that impossible. The person who was *most to blame*, Von Imhof, paid 40,000, and was set at liberty in 1714. The less guilty Von Pfungsten remained in Königstein till his death (1733).

* The memorable Machiavellianism of king Augustus and Flemming was publicly and shamelessly announced after the battle. He excused himself to Charles, on the one hand, for having taken part in the engagement for fear of being obliged by the Prussians, set all the prisoners at liberty, promised satisfaction and the fulfilment of all that his deputies had promised in Saxony: on the other hand, he went to Warsaw, and there published proclamations, appealed to the nobility, expressly encouraged the prosecution of the war, and strictly forbade any one from joining the Swedes.

being delivered up, and on his march to Poland caused him to be tortured in the most cruel manner, in order to satiate the vengeance of his vehement spirit. By the terms of the peace, king Augustus was obliged to relinquish the crown of Poland, to acknowledge Stanislaus, to set the princes Sobieski at liberty, to pay to the eldest the sum which he had promised but had never discharged; and he was also obliged to betray the Russians, who believed themselves safe under his protection in Saxony, into the hands of the Swedes. Both kings imposed the chief burthen of their expenses upon the poor Saxon people. Winter quarters, pay, entertainment, good food, and extra allowances, were secured to the Swedes in Saxony; Saxony, however, proved their Capua, for during their sojourn in that country they fell into habits of violence, and became lax in their discipline*.

§ II.

RUSSIA, POLAND, TURKEY, SAXONY, DENMARK, SWEDEN, PRUSSIA, TILL THE PARTITION OF THE PROVINCES FORCIBLY SEPARATED FROM SWEDEN.

The consequences of the peace of Altranstädt were more injurious to Poland and Saxony than the continuance of the war could possibly have been. Peter roused and stimulated the discontented Poles, and persecuted in the most barbarous manner the partisans of Stanislaus and the friends of Sweden by the instrumentality of his Russians. The Poles, who had been forsaken by Augustus, assembled at Lemberg (February 1707) and declared the throne vacant. Peter immediately offered the throne of Poland to several princes. During all this time, the plundering Russians and the wandering Cosacks carried devastation and murder over the land; the palaces were plundered, and Moscow enriched with every description of Polish

* Several of the inhabitants, it is stated in the representation of the estates, had fallen into melancholy, and were driven to desperation and self-murder by intolerable oppression and want of subsistence, because they were heartlessly robbed of their cattle and furniture, which were sold to usurious Jews for half their value; and the ordinary fare, which was to consist of two pounds of meat with vegetables and two cans of beer for each soldier daily, was often forcibly increased, and food of the value of from eight to ten good groschen, was paid with imperial groschen. [The imperial groschen is about one-third of the value of the good groschen.—TRANS.]

spoil. The Saxons were obliged at the same time to support the Swedes and the troops of Augustus, and to furnish the means of maintaining a splendid court, whose expenditure was in no respect diminished: the estates of the kingdom complained, besides, that the sum of 500,000 dollars, which they were obliged to pay the Swedes, was at least increased by a third, in consequence of the mode in which it was raised*.

Charles XII. was the mere instrument of foreign cunning, whilst he believed himself to be obstinately following out his own designs; and in this he was like all men whose pride or conceit drives every free mind from their society. He was even made the tool of those miserable court cabals, which in the case of Patkul led to a violation of the rights of nations. Patkul's enemies acted as if they wished to save him, and it was made to appear as if Charles alone, like an Ezzelin or Phalaris †, wished to martyr him, and yet they were the very men who called the attention of the king of Sweden to his case, in order that they themselves might get rid of a troublesome prisoner, in whose arrest Imkof had had the greatest share. Whilst Charles remained nearly a whole year in Saxony after the conclusion of the peace, a new thought had occurred to him, which gave no small anxiety to the emperor and the allies; but he also was surrounded by intriguers, of whom Piper was one. Piper contributed to relieve the allies from their difficulties, by persuading the king first to avenge himself on Russia, and this he advised for the promotion of his own selfish views. Charles had offered himself as a mediator, and in conjunction with Denmark, wished to found a third party, which should prescribe conditions to the emperor as well as to the French. The news of this plan induced Marlborough to visit him in Saxony. The duke had been upon a diplomatic journey in Berlin (1707), and had made

* In the representation above quoted, it is said that according to the principle of their imposts, the people were obliged to pay far more than 500,000 dollars monthly to the Swedes, viz. 824,301. Four imperial groschen were required to be paid upon every shock of land, and it would have been much more easy to the people to raise this 500,000 for the Swedes, if it had been collected by the regular institutions of the country. The whole Saxon contribution was founded upon a survey and valuation, in which the country was assessed at 5,810,778 shocks; the estates however alleged that many of these shocks were wholly unproductive, and could only be carried forward in the account as such.

† Ezzelin, tyrant of Padua and Verona, died 1259. Phalaris, the renowned tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily, period uncertain; about 564 A.C.—[TRANS.]

Frederick quite happy, by appearing among the court attendants of the king and handing him a napkin. In Saxony he was as simple as Charles, and the counterpart of himself; he won over Piper, and succeeded in changing the whole plan of founding a third political combination in the empire. It was in Saxony also that the Holstein baron Görz came to Charles, and involved him deeply in the schemes and plans which he had formed, in order to be able to play a political character; and here he laid the foundation of that edifice which he completed after Charles's return from Turkey. Görz had been taken into the privy council of Holstein by means of the duchess of Holstein-Gottorp, after the death of her husband, and in Gottorp had entered into a competition in cabals with a minister who was an arrant knave and deeply versed in all the mean court-trickery of the age. He now came to Charles in order to gain his favour for an unrighteous cause, and to induce him to mix himself up in a judicial contest respecting the earldom of Ranzau. He knew so well how to direct the self-will of the king, that the latter compelled the emperor to put off the law-suit about the earldom till the circumstances had changed, which through Charles's thoughtlessness soon enough came to pass.

Charles had brought Stanislaus and king Augustus together in Saxony; the king visited him several times; and when it is known that all Augustus's virtues consisted in a courtly demeanour and a deep contempt for public opinion, no one will be surprised that he appeared in the presence of his opponent and rival without the shadow of embarrassment. The contrast however between the external appearance of the king of Sweden and his antagonist is usually exaggerated. Charles was not so cynical* as might be supposed from the anecdotes about his neck-handkerchief and boots, which he had not taken off for months, or from Hojer's account of his appearance in Dresden.

* Much of what has been said is clearly fabulous. Hojer, who was by no means attached to the Swede, says, p. 144,—“The administrator of Holstein followed him to the Polish frontiers, and accompanied him along with three noble Swedes on his celebrated ride to Dresden, when king Charles, who was unexpected, paid his departing visit to king Augustus and his mother. Fleming advised Augustus to take advantage of the opportunity and arrest him, which however the king prudently declined. How singular the manners of this guest must have appeared to the gallant Saxon court, appears among others from the following circumstance, that for a long time afterwards the velvet chair was pointed out upon which king Charles had placed his muddy boots, on his visit to the dowager electress, his aunt.”

He certainly wore a coarse cloth coat with metal buttons, but he put on a new one every Sunday, and his vests and shirts were undoubtedly in a far better condition than those of Frederick the Great ; his boots, his gloves and his sword were not a whit less surprising than the tobacco-smoking* of his friend Stanislaus. His visit to Dresden, which appeared to many very imprudent, considering the political philosophy of the Saxon court, was made on the 4th September 1707, when Charles at length, after a year, was about to set out from Saxony to Poland. The Swedish army had been indeed reinforced† in Saxony by recruiting (and therefore by the addition of all sorts of rabble), well equipped, and provided with everything. These new recruits however had lived too well in Saxony to follow the king with zeal and devotedness in want, necessity and danger, like the sons of the Swedish peasants.

Charles's new expedition was intended as a retaliation upon Peter, who already looked upon the Baltic provinces as a certain possession, and reckoned with such security upon king Augustus, that he even overlooked the surrender of his ambassador. Publicly and for appearance sake, Peter took the usual steps for Patkul's deliverance ; but it was believed that he secretly acquiesced, because nothing resulted from his representations. Charles's plan of following the Russians through wastes, morasses and forests into the heart of a barbarous country was approved of by no one ; Rhenschiöld, it is true, suffered himself to feign acquiescence, because he and Piper governed the young king by yielding to his capricious and wilful schemes ; as soon however as he, like an experienced general, wished to execute any judicious plan in a proper military manner, the king no longer listened to him. According to Charles's determination, Lewenhaupt was to march out of Livo-

* Dr. Fassman, the author of 'The Glorious Life and Deeds of Frederick Augustus the Great,' 1793, says, p. 488 :—"We have nothing to add with respect to his other high and good qualities (Stanislaus) ; every one must have regarded his incessant habit of smoking tobacco as an evil ; a cold perspiration ran over his face if he were obliged to refrain from smoking for some hours, and I, as well as many thousand others, have seen him travelling in his carriage through various cities with his great tobacco-pipe in his mouth."

† Recruiting was not only carried on by beat of drum in the imperial cities, but underhand, however discontented the emperor was, in Silesia, Brandenburg, Prussia, and Lower Saxony. The earnest-money of a common dragoon amounted to seventy Convention dollars, in addition to food and lodging, which he received as soon as he was accepted.

nia and Courland, through Lithuania, and to join him at the Beresina, which has once more become celebrated in our own days. He was to give up Livonia, which had now been defended for seven years, and wasted by friends and foes, to take along with him such cattle, horses, stores and artillery as remained, and advance with his king towards Moscow, whilst all was in a state of hostility behind him in Poland and around him in Russia. As Charles was entering Grodno (the 6th and 12th February 1708), he learned that Peter had caused all the inhabitants of Narva and Dorpat to be carried off into the interior of Russia (they were only permitted to return in 1714); but this news made as little impression upon him as the horrors which were put into execution by the Russians in Finland. From this moment forward, his conduct became more and more incomprehensible. He first continued his march through bogs and forests in the most unfavourable season of the year, then remained for the three best months wholly inactive at Rodeskiewicze, and finally liberated the Russian prisoners in May, who immediately reinforced the enemy's troops. He called Lewenhaupt to his councils, who remained with him six weeks, and everything was agreed upon as to their future movements: but when Lewenhaupt returned to Livonia and was advancing with his army, Charles, without any necessity, forgot his promise to meet him at the appointed place. In the mean time the king had set out in June from Rodeskiewicze and passed the Beresina; his delusion was increased by the fruitless victory at Golowtschin on the 4th of July. He afterwards took Mohilew and reached the Dnieper, passed over the river in the midst of an unceasing contest carried on by the Russians, who were around him in swarms, and who had got some experience in warfare from their repeated collisions with himself. They were indeed obliged to pay for their experience by the sacrifice of the greater number of men, whilst the Swedes lost comparatively few; but Peter was easily able to replace his loss, whilst that of Charles was irreparable.

When Charles passed the Dnieper and entered into a close alliance with the Cosacks of the Ukraine, who regarded Peter as the enemy of their independence, the Russian army was separated into three great divisions, in order that every division sent forward by Charles, or any division which might be advancing to form a junction with him, might be overpowered by

a superior force. The consequences of this disposition were first felt by Lagercrona, and next by Lewenhaupt. Lagercrona had received orders to advance with a division of troops into the Ukraine, whilst Charles continued his march towards Smolensko. This division was attacked at Dobro by Menzikoff (20th September 1709) and defeated, and everyone expected that Charles, who was in want of many necessary supplies, would wait the arrival of Lewenhaupt at the appointed place, when he at length halted for a considerable time at the end of September and the beginning of October. Lewenhaupt, on this occasion, gained for himself immortal renown. Surrounded on every side by the enemy, and obliged to march through wastes and forests, he reached the place, with all his baggage and artillery, where he hoped to find Charles : he found him not, but, on the contrary, was attacked near Liesna or Propoisk by a superior Russian force ; he had only 10,000 men against 40,000 : he won the victory, but was obliged to leave behind him his horses, cattle, provisions, and artillery ; in short, all that he was to bring to Charles, in order to save his heroes and their honour by a hasty march. Charles's conduct on this occasion shows how very little idea he had of those principles which ought to guide a commander ; for Lewenhaupt fought this battle on the 9th of October, and on the 11th formed a junction with the army of the king. The march into the Ukraine, which threw Lewenhaupt completely into the hands of the Russians, had been undertaken by Charles, because Mazeppa, the hetman of the Cosacks, now seventy years old, had before supplied him with provisions, and now invited him to join him. Charles was neither acquainted with the unbounded plains of the Ukraine, the relation of the different tribes of Cosacks to one another, nor the influence which Mazeppa had amongst them. Hitherto he had cruelly harassed the Cosacks, and now he appeared among them at once, without having previously concluded any agreement either with them or their hetman. Mazeppa indeed with his army passed over the Desna ; his followers however believed they were being led against Charles, and deserted their hetman as soon as his views were known, because they had more to fear from Peter than to hope from Charles. The hetman joined the Swedes with only 7000 men, but Charles prosecuted his march and despised every warning. He passed the Desna ; the country on the further side became more and more desolate, and appear-

ances more melancholy, for the winter was one of the most severe; hundreds of brave Swedes were frozen to death because Charles insisted upon pursuing his march even in December and January. The civil war in Poland in the mean time raged more violently than ever, and Peter sent divisions of his Russians to harass and persecute the partisans of Stanislaus. The three men who stood in most immediate relation to the Swedish king, Piper, Rhenschiöld and Lewenhaupt, belonged indeed to the greatest men of their century; but they were sometimes disunited in their opinions, and sometimes incensed and harassed by the obstinacy of the king.

Mazeppa fell a sacrifice to his connexion with Charles, his residence (Baturin) was destroyed by Menzikoff, and his faithful Cosacks, upon Peter's demand, were obliged to choose another hetman (Nov. 1708). Neither Piper nor Mazeppa could move the obstinate king to relinquish his march towards the ill-fortified city of Poltawa. Mazeppa represented to him in vain, that by an attack upon Poltawa he would excite the Cosacks of the Falls (Zaporogisch) against him; and Piper entreated him to no purpose to draw nearer to the Poles, who were favourable to his cause, and to march towards the Dnieper; he continued however to sacrifice his men by his march, till in February (1709) a thaw set in. He was successful in gaining the favour of the Cosacks through their hetman Horodenski; but fortune had altogether forsaken the Swedes since January. In January the Swedes were in possession of Moprik; in February, the battles at Goronodek and Raschewka were decided in favour of the Russians; in March Scheremeteff took Gadiatch, which was occupied by the Swedes, and thereby gave a position to the Russian army which must prove destructive to the Swedes, who were obliged to besiege Poltawa without the necessary means, because their intractable king insisted upon the siege. In April and May, the Swedes exerted themselves in vain in throwing up trenches before the miserable fortifications of Poltawa, whilst the Russians were inclosing them in a net. One part of the Russians had already passed the Vorskla in May, and Peter had no sooner arrived in the middle of June, than the whole army passed the river, in order to offer a decisive engagement to the Swedes.

Rhenschiöld made all the arrangements for the battle of Poltawa, because Charles had received a dangerous wound in his

foot*, and was unable to mount his horse. The Swedes on this day performed miracles of bravery, but everything was against them, for the Russians fought this time at least for their country, and had at length gained experience in the field. The defeat of the Swedes is easily explained, when it is known that they were in want of all the munitions of war, even powder and lead, that they were obliged to storm the enemies' fortifications in opposition to an overwhelming numerical force, and that Lewenhaupt and Rhenschiöld were so much disunited in opinion, that the former, in his report of the engagement at Poltawa, makes the bitterest complaints against the commander-in-chief, which have since that time been usually adopted by all historians. Of the whole Swedish army, only 14,000 or 15,000 under Lewenhaupt and Kreuz succeeded in erecting an ill-fortified camp on the Dnieper, where they were shut up by the Russians and the river. This small force might possibly have succeeded in fighting its way into Poland, and Charles had at first adopted this determination; he was however, with great trouble, induced to pass the Dnieper, and, accompanied by a small guard, to take refuge in Turkey. His plan was to reach the Bug over the pasture lands which then belonged to the Tatars on the Black Sea, and aided by the Turks and the Tatars to make his way first to Oczakow and then to Bender, from whence he hoped to persuade the Turks to take part in the Polish affairs. As soon as the king had escaped (10th July 1709), Lewenhaupt, mourning over the sacrifice which the wilfulness of the king had brought upon his Swedes, concluded a capitulation, in virtue of which all the baggage and artillery were surrendered to the Russians, together with the remnant of the Swedish army, which, calculating those who had been taken prisoners in the battle, amounted in all to about 18,000 men.

Charles's flight to Bender and his long residence of five years in Turkey was the most favourable event which could have occurred for the accomplishment of Peter's great plans, the conversion of his barbarian into a civilized empire. He was now master in Poland. In the Swedish, German and French adventurers who had been in Charles's army, he received the very best instructors of his people. Among those who entered into his

* Nordberg has already corrected the error, which represents this wound as having been received the day before the battle. It was in reality more than ten days previous.

service, there were experienced officers, artillerymen, architects and engineers. The Swedes, who for thirteen years long were neither set at liberty nor received from their impoverished country the usual support of prisoners of war, were distributed over the whole of Russia and sent far into Siberia; they founded schools and institutions in order to get a livelihood, and used their knowledge and experience against their will for the promotion of Peter's designs. This was so much the more important, as there was not a man among those many thousand prisoners who was not in a condition to teach the Russian, to whom he came, something of immediate utility, drawn from his experience in his native land. Many never returned to their homes, because they had raised up institutions and commenced undertakings which were as advantageous to themselves as to the Russian empire.

Charles was eagerly pursued by the Russians, but succeeded in reaching the banks of the Bug with about two thousand attendants: he there hoped to find certain assistance with the greater confidence, as upon the order of Jussuff, of Babataghi, the governor of Oczakow had sent deputies to Poland, and there negotiated with him in the name of the Porte. The governor of Oczakow nevertheless refused the boats necessary for the transport of his followers, and thereby gave occasion to the loss of 500 Swedes before the eyes of their king; he was indeed afterwards punished for his conduct by Jussuff, his superior. Charles was kindly received in Bender, whither he sped from Oczakow*; he built himself a house, which at a later period he converted into a species of fortress. The king despised the protection which was promised him in October (1709) if he would return into his own states, because he waited the issue of the cabals carried on by the grand vizier and his own deputy Poniatowski, whom he had sent to Constantinople. Poniatowski employed every species of instrumentality; Jews and women received money and promises in order to lend him their aid; but the sultan was not to be persuaded or influenced to risk a rupture with Russia. The grand vizier and the sultan treated the king with honour, entertained him hospitably as a guest, but they renewed the peace with Russia, and required only that the czar should offer no obstruction to Charles's re-

* In questions of Turkish history, we follow Von Hammer in the seventh volume of his 'History of the Osman Empire,' p. 130.

turn into his dominions; they even sent him a present in money (December 1709), in order that he might immediately undertake his journey. Charles refused the present, and Poniatowski had the boldness to hand to the sultan, as he left the mosque, a complaint against his vizier (February 1710). From this time forward Charles was almost exclusively occupied with the cabals of the Turkish court, and offended the sultan by refusing to negotiate with king Augustus, who was again in Poland, upon any other conditions than those of the peace of Altranstädt. When at last the vizier was removed from his office (June 1710), the Swedes and Poniatowski believed that his removal was owing to their representations and would be advantageous to their cause, but the overthrow of this Ali von Tchorli was only an effect of the usual arts of the seraglio: he was the sacrifice of jealousy, envy and malice. The grandson of the greatest vizier whom the Turkish empire had had in the seventeenth century received the appointment. This was the son of the virtuous Mustapha Köprili, who had himself also been vizier. Numan Köprili was the fifth vizier of the same family; a rare occurrence in the East! It soon appeared, however, that Numan was not equal to the situation or the circumstances. He raised a war-cry, and thereby furnished play-room for the Swedish cabals, and yet he did not wish to undertake the war. After two months' possession he was obliged to abdicate (August 1710), and Charles's hopes of a war with Russia were again revived.

The kingdom of Sweden was at this time completely exhausted by new taxes and imposts, after having previously sacrificed its inhabitants and prosperity to the ambition and obstinacy of its king. The expenditure of the kingdom amounted to 25,000,000 of dollars, whilst the income, notwithstanding all possible oppression and extortion, reached only 24,000,000. It has been calculated that Sweden had already lost 400,000 men; the discontent became great; the fire however only glimmered under the ashes, and no one ventured to speak aloud: king Augustus and Fleming, as we are obliged frequently to repeat, acknowledged (without shame) their adherence to that diplomatic sect which maintains truth and faithfulness to promises to be merely common boorish virtues, by no means suited to the higher circles, and of still less value in the government of states, or in reference to political affairs. Augustus had opened up the way for a violation of the

treaty of peace, by causing Imhof and Pfingsten to be prosecuted. He had never given up his connexions with his friends in Poland, with Denmark, nor with Peter, but had made arrangements for the renewal of the war even before the battle of Poltawa, after which he publicly declared his views.

King Frederick IV. of Denmark, if he did not carry matters quite as far as Frederick Augustus of Saxony, to whom the sister of Frederick the Great, with malicious exaggeration, ascribes a quarter of a hundred of illegitimate children, was however not less known by his scandalous life and his love of splendour than king Augustus. Without any regard to religion, law or custom, he married, as is well known, Miss von Vieregg, the daughter of the Prussian ambassador, in the lifetime of his wife, and when he forsook her, afterwards lived publicly till 1711 with the countess Schindel*. Amours, old and new, gambling and the carnival, attracted him to Italy in 1708–1709. German citizens, and all those besides who took refuge from the misery and degradation of that time in the prevailing pietism, heartily believed that extravagance and dissipation were allotted to the higher classes by God's decree, and it caused no more scandal or offence: the greatest alarm however was excited when king Frederick, after a conversation with a former mistress in a convent and with pope Clement XI., seemed disposed to the adoption of Catholicism†. The matter became the more credible in consequence of the king's appointment of the Italian count Veto, a well-known friend of the Jesuits, as his ambassador in Vienna. The emperor Joseph could not however endure the man, and only acknowledged him officially when he took his leave. Proposals had already been made to Frederick when he was in Italy in reference to a new combination of powers against Sweden, but he would then hear of nothing but pleasures. After the carnival he went to Dresden, in order to concert the measures to be adopted upon the destruction of the Swedish army, which has been already referred to.

* The scandalous history of the countess Schindel, who had been previously in the suite of Vieregg, will be found in Meiners and Spittler's 'Götting. Hist. Magaz.' vol. ii. p. 130, *et seq.*

† See a disquisition by Francesco Cancellieri with respect to Frederick's connexion with Theresa Maria Magdalena Trenta, the daughter of a patrician of Lucca, whom he forsook in 1699, and visited in a convent in Florence in 1709, and of his negotiations in relation to her with Clement XI., who had also loved and forsaken her, in the 'Giornale Arcadico Gennaro,' 1820, p. 100 *et seq.*

After the departure of the Swedes, king Augustus had raised nine thousand Saxon troops, in order to sell them to the naval powers, who had also at that time hired Danish and Prussian troops; he laid on and raised new and oppressive taxes, and among these a property-tax. These monies, the price of the blood of his people and of general misery, were designed to place him in a condition to pay the expenses of a journey to the Netherlands, and of the entertainment of the king of Denmark. In fact, king Augustus exhausted all his ingenuity in the discovery of costly festivities and games when the king of Denmark was with him in Dresden and Leipzig, and the good Germans, who delight in everything solid and systematic, could not find words to express their satisfaction at being permitted to read the elaborate descriptions of these festivities in their newspapers, which were composed quite in a chancery style. It may easily be conceived, that it required a whole volume to contain a full account of these fêtes; but what is really surprising is, that a jurist, an official of the Danish king, who describes everything in the chancery style, should entertain a kind of feeling, that the demands of princes for the purposes of desperate gambling and extravagance*, in a time of such general depression, was in the highest degree ruinous. The same juristical historian moreover reports, as something quite usual, that the queen of Denmark was only informed of her husband's journey at the moment of his departure, and that the countess Reventlow followed him to Italy, although she had been expressly forbidden so to do. In the vulgar eulogies of another historian (Fassman), who has written the life of king Augustus, as well as that of king Frederick William of Prussia, we clearly perceive the irony of a cowardly and pitiful scribe. He describes at length how a so-called procession of the gods was first exhibited in Dresden with extraordinary pomp and expenditure; and then a race among ladies was got up, in which a great number of former and future inamoratas of the king took parts, and all in honour of the countess Cosel, who was at that moment the favoured mistress of

* Hojer, who is elsewhere perfectly silent with respect to these scandalous proceedings, remarks, p. 163: "I will only add, the court in Dresden abounded with an incredible number of foreigners and distinguished people, among whom were many noblemen, some even from Holstein, who however in part paid rather too dear for their pleasure and lavish waste of great sums in play, and were obliged to suffer for many years afterwards, or perhaps their whole lifetimes, for this short pastime."

king Augustus*. But the queen was sometimes merely a spectator, at others she was not permitted to be present.

Peter had already, at an earlier period, endeavoured, through the instrumentality of Dolgorucki, and afterwards in common with king Augustus in Venice, to draw over the king of Denmark to his party; but the negotiations were disturbed†, first by the Italian journey, and secondly by the unlucky choice of an ambassador; but they at length came to an agreement during the festivities in Dresden and Leipzig. Peter was not required this time to pay subsidies, and Frederick concluded a treaty (28th June 1709) in which he promised to take part in the war which had been resolved upon by Augustus; the allied powers however secured themselves against the interference or blame of the guarantees to the peace of Travendahl, by introducing an article, for the sake of appearances, in which neutrality was confirmed to Holstein-Gottorp and the Swedish provinces in Germany. The scene of mad extravagance was afterwards transferred from Dresden to Berlin; the two gallant kings however were not able to persuade the king of Prussia, who had impoverished himself by foolish extravagance, to join in an offensive, but merely in a defensive alliance‡, because, if the neutra-

* A tournament of the four divisions of the earth, in which Frederick represented Europe and Augustus Africa, is characteristic of the taste of the age. The countess Cosel was the only one of Augustus's numerous mistresses who was not dismissed after her first confinement. She had already borne him three children, and first lost favour by offending the Italian, French, and other cavaliers of the chevalier guard. In Leipzig she required some new ornaments; Frederick had no money, but laid hands upon the sum destined for the chevalier guard. The gentlemen of the guards then combined, and allured Augustus by some new beauty. In the mythological tournament, in which Augustus appeared as Apollo, Frederick as Jupiter, and the queen of Poland as Vesta, Cosel was Diana. (Fassman's 'Most Glorious Life and Deeds,' &c. p. 608.) The countess Cosel represented the goddess Diana, and sat upon a lofty chariot adorned beyond the rest, along with many nymphs and a numerous band of musicians. Great honour is attributed to Cosel in the lady races, in which her majesty the queen did not join, but was only a looker-on. Cosel was conducted by the king of Denmark, and his majesty king Augustus was her supporter on her right hand, and the chamberlain von Holzendorf on her left.

† Suhm, counsellor of war, whom Augustus sent, had formerly been in the Danish exchequer. Urbig, Peter's ambassador in Vienna, who came as Russian plenipotentiary, had formerly been Danish ambassador in Vienna. We here deem it necessary to be particularly distinct in our notice of this point, because Rühss, in his 'History of Sweden,' 5th part, § 417, p. 515 of the octavo edit., has fallen into a great error on the point.

‡ Hojer, pp. 176, 177, says,—“The opportunity of gaining something on this occasion was rather wanting in Berlin than the inclination; but it was altogether prevented by the articles of neutrality with respect to the Swedish provinces in Germany,” &c. &c.

lity article was to have any force, they had nothing to offer for his acceptance. Augustus had no sooner received intelligence of the battle of Poltawa than he published a manifesto (8th of August), in which he declares that the peace which had been concluded with Sweden, and in which he had abdicated the Polish throne, had been concluded under restraint and necessity and was therefore invalid, and calls upon the Poles to unite in his cause. Immediately afterwards he set out for Poland with an army of thirteen thousand men. The Swedish general Crassau had collected nine thousand men in Poland destitute of everything, whom he wished to lead into Germany: king Augustus and his well-dressed army prudently avoided the ragged Swedes, and Crassau led them unmolested to Pomerania*. Augustus had sent his best troops under Schulenburg into the Netherlands, and his life-guardsmen, his chevalier guard as he called them, because they consisted of nobles brought together from all parts of Europe, but especially from France and Italy, nay, even his dragoons and cuirassiers, were not of the slightest use in a Polish war. Augustus therefore marched onwards like a theatrical god in ridiculous pomp, accompanied by a splendid retinue of numerous nobles. Peter this time again reaped the whole advantage of the combination against Sweden. He came from Warsaw to meet king Augustus at Thorn, where they entered into a secret alliance (Oct. 1709). In this contract Peter, without any idea of fulfilling his engagement, promised Livonia to the Poles, and Augustus in return agreed that Esthonia and all the other Baltic provinces should be united with Russia. This was kept secret, whilst they spoke publicly merely of a defensive alliance, in which Poland, Prussia, Denmark and Saxony were the contracting parties.

Peter alone was the gainer: Augustus travelled, caroused, gambled, and finally offended the Poles, by placing his favourite Flemming at the head of their army instead of Ogilvy. The

* We cannot better describe the meanness and luxuriousness, the pomp and barbarism of the time, than in the words of a contemporary, whose language is characteristic. The biographer of king Augustus writes as follows, pp. 620 and 624:—"I myself, notwithstanding my insignificance, was at that time in honourable service with the army of his majesty king Augustus, and was happy enough to see him daily upon the march. When he was not on horseback he usually rode with the Russian ambassador, general Pflug, in an open carriage. When the camp was pitched, his majesty took up his quarters sometimes in a tent, sometimes in a barn. When he undressed, he appeared in a dressing-gown made of green stuff, with his hat upon his head, and spoke and conversed sometimes with a German, sometimes with a Pole, and sometimes with a Frenchman or Italian."

king of Denmark suffered a disgraceful defeat in his attack on the southern provinces of Sweden; Prussia became afraid and hesitated, whilst Peter incessantly followed up his plans even in Polish Prussia. He took Elbing by storm, and kept possession of it, although the cession of this country had been promised to the king of Prussia; Russians were scattered about in every part of Poland; Riga was besieged, and after a brave defence captured, June 1710. Even the German possessions of Sweden were threatened, and that at the same time by the Russians, Danes, Prussians and Saxons. The progress of the allies against Sweden was the cause of no inconsiderable uneasiness to the naval powers and the emperor. The Danes, Saxons and Prussians wished to recall their troops out of the Netherlands for their own use, and therefore England, Holland and the emperor proposed to mediate. The mediating powers were in hopes that the Swedish senate, who directed the government in the absence of the king, and among whose members several divisions already existed, would gladly agree to a guaranteed neutrality of the German states, Sleswick and Jutland included. The agreement of the powers for the promotion of this end, which is called the treaty of the Hague, was entered into at the very time in which the Danes were making a predatory incursion into Schonen* (March 1710); and the nature of the mediation was only first more definitely fixed (August 1710) after the defeat of the Danes in Schonen by general Steenbock. The allies, in conjunction with Prussia and some other states of the empire, were to appoint a force of 15,000 men, in case of necessity equally to prevent Russians, Poles, Danes or Swedes from entering upon the soil of the empire. After the death of the dowager duchess of Holstein, Charles's eldest sister, her son, who was yet a minor, and who was presumptive heir to Sweden, was not appointed to be the apparent head of the government, but his younger sister, Ulrica Eleonora. This showed distinctly the views of the great families, and their desire of limiting the kingly power, for all was arranged without asking Charles's opinion or consent; notwithstanding this however everyone trembled for fear of him, and he ruled with the same unlimited sway from Bender as if he had been in Stockholm.

* The ancient province of Schonen constituted the southern extremity of Sweden, and comprised the present governments or provinces of Malmo and Christianstad. — [TRANS.]

The Swedish senate, whose duty it was to carry on the administration of the kingdom in the absence of the king, had called together the estates of the realm, accepted the terms of the convention of the Hague, and forwarded the deeds with respect to the neutrality to the king, but Charles was wholly inaccessible to every kind of diplomatic prudence. He had already forwarded a protest to the respective courts against the first proposal of neutrality, and in November 1710 he renewed his declaration to all the powers who had become parties to the agreement, declining their mediation. When he at length seemed to lend an ear to the representations of the English ambassador, who proposed to him the mediation of the emperor and the naval powers, he gave him an answer quite in unison with the designs which he then entertained and his political prudence, that he would willingly accept of their mediation with Denmark and Poland, but must altogether decline it with respect to Russia. In the short answer which he afterwards sent from Bender (May 1711) he says, that the arrangements had been made without his previous knowledge, and that he could not therefore accept them, because his enemies would have all the advantage, and that he had already made the same declaration twice or thrice through his minister*.

About this time Charles neither could nor ought to have accepted any agreement in which the Russians were included, because he began at length to see his cabals crowned with success and his hopes realized in Constantinople. The Turks were willing to declare war against Russia, and the advantage was altogether on their side. War had been carried on between Peter and the Turks ever since 1704, on the subject of the augmentation of his fleets in the Black Sea and the fortification of Azov and Taganrog; but these disputes had hitherto always been brought to a friendly termination, and the Turks had at last (Sept. 1709) formally renewed their treaty with the Russians. When Numan Köprili (as has been already mentioned) afterwards caused a general war-cry in the country by his imprudence, the new grand vizier, Mehemet Baltadschi, was obliged to make the

* Nordberg, in his 'Life of Charles XII.,' towards the close of the work, treats this point at length, and shows that the neutrality would have been disadvantageous to Charles: the brief answer of Charles to the proposals of the allies is to be found word for word in the work of Fabrice ('A true History of Charles the Twelfth, king in Sweden, during his sojourn in Turkey,' &c. 1759, 8vo. pp. 86, 87.).

necessary preparations for war, and a declaration of hostilities was actually published in November 1710. This occurred about the same time in which Peter had got full possession of Livonia and Esthonia, and by the concession of a constitution and privileges had gained over the nobility of both provinces to his cause; and he was now seeking in like manner to draw over the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to his interests. In a treaty agreed to at Lutzk (April 1711), Demetrius Cantemir promised his aid to the Russians in the Turkish war, and obtained in return an assurance of Russian protection, and of the hereditary descent in his family of the princely dignity of Moldavia. In this year (1711) Peter anticipated the Turks in their attack: he descended the Dniester with his army and appeared to threaten Bender, but allowed himself to be allured to the Pruth by the treacherous invitations of the hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia. Demetrius Cantemir and Brancovan pretended that Peter would be able to seize upon considerable Turkish magazines, situated on the further side of the Pruth, although none had been established there; this led him away from the Dniester to the Pruth, and at length induced him to pass that river. He now appeared to be master of Moldavia and Wallachia, for he himself was received with pomp in Jassy, and Scheremeteff with his army had been in Wallachia since March. His rejoicing however was short. The grand vizier, Mehemet Baltadschi, with an unusually numerous army and 100,000 Tatars, advanced to the Pruth, and threatened altogether to cut off Scheremeteff; Peter hastened to meet the Turks*, in order to keep open the communications and to assist his general. The Turks were in position near Faltschi; Peter was far from his own country and destitute of provisions; he finally encamped (July 1711) on a narrow piece of ground between the Pruth and a morass. In this unfavourable position

* The details will be found in Von Hammer, part vii. pp. 156, 157. Fabrice, to whom we must here sometimes refer, states exactly the number of the Turks and Tatars, and gives a list of the divisions of the army in a note, page 84. According to this list, the mounted Spahis, Sylekfars, Toprakschis and Bosniaks amounted in all to 62,000 men; the infantry to 214,000; and there were 350 pieces of cannon. As to Peter, Fabrice writes (p. 85), with respect to the Russians when yet on their march to Bender:—"The Muscovites on their side made various movements, and it is said with certainty that their infantry was 50,000 strong at Braclau, about 20 miles from Bender; but the greater part of their cavalry, which consisted of 12,000 horse, had gone over the Dniester and Pruth, under the command of young Scheremeteff, to compel the Moldavians and Wallachians to throw off the Turkish yoke; which indeed might have been easily done, but would have been of no consequence."

of the Russians, the whole series of engagements which took place during two days, with single divisions, were entirely adverse to their cause, and the main Russian army was obliged to retire into their camp; Rönne and Janus and their divisions were wholly separated from Peter, who saw himself quickly shut up on all sides. The Russian army had in their rear the khan of the Tatars; around them, the river, the morass, and the Turkish army: the czar himself was prostrated by a fearful attack of disease, and yet his mind never showed itself greater than at this very moment, although it was corrupted by the exercise of despotic power, and seldom appeared noble. His magnanimity on this occasion is proved by his declaration sent to the Russian senate, in which he requires them, in case of his death or of his capture, not to be guided by any reference to him, but wholly by the good of the empire*.

The Russian army and their emperor now seemed utterly lost, when a woman of mean origin and of very equivocal reputation, whom Peter had already made his wife, but to whom he had not given the title or dignity of empress (16th March 1711), was the means of delivering them from their despair, an event which surprised no one more than Charles XII. in Bender. Charles in the most imprudent manner had grievously insulted the grand vizier by his insolent and contemptuous conduct, and especially by declining his invitation to visit him in his camp. Peter's wife, Catharine, knew how to win the vizier's favour by humiliation and presents. The peace concluded on the Pruth, which Catharine effected, still remains a riddle, because the presents which she had it in her power to offer to him and his kiaja, even if we add all that she could collect from the soldiers and officers to her own jewels and furs, seem quite insignificant for such a purpose. Certain it is, however, that these presents paved the way to a peace, and that it was afterwards charged as a crime against the Turkish officials, that the money and valuables were found in their houses and possession†.

* We here refer to the remarkable letter written by Peter at Hussy to the senate on the evening before the peace (11th July 1711). This letter ensures him a place amongst the heroes of antiquity, for he thereby sacrifices himself and his family to the well-being of the empire. The letter and a full account of the circumstances will be found in Stählin's work, '*Anecdotes Originales de Pierre le Grand*,' Strasbourg, 1787, no. 17, pp. 45—48. In the same book, no. 32, pp. 80—82, will be found a fuller notice of the epilepsy with which he was attacked.

† The case has been so often examined, that we do not mean to trouble our

The unexpected news of negotiations for peace at length drew Charles into the Turkish head-quarters, but he was unable to prevent the conclusion of the preliminaries, or the liberation of the Russians from their grievous condition; and in fact the peace was honourable and advantageous for the Turks, as soon as they took the field for themselves and not for Sweden and Poland. In the preamble to the treaty, Peter admitted that he accepted it as an act of grace: this satisfied the pride of the Turks: Azov was to be restored; Camienska, Ssamara, Tighan were to be razed, and the Russian artillery was to be surrendered to the Turks. With respect to Charles, the solitary condition was inserted, for form's sake, that Peter was not to oppose his return to Sweden, nor to obstruct it in any way; he promised also to interfere no further with the affairs of the Poles and Cossacks*.

The czar had no sooner placed Scheremeteff and his chancellor as hostages in the hands of the Turks, as a pledge of the fulfilment of the preliminaries, than he hastened to bring himself and his army into a place of security, to avoid the chances of the vizier's change of opinion. The news of a sudden and favourable peace was at first indeed received in Constantinople with joy, but the representations of the Swedish deputies, and of the enemies of the grand vizier who had been won by them, combined with a report of the presents† which had been brought

readers with an inquiry into the probability or improbability of the bribery. Minute accounts of the circumstances stated above will be found in the 'Hist. Osman.' part vii. p. 157. A full inquiry has also been made by Le Clerc, 'Hist. de la Russie Ancienne' (Versailles, 1784, 4to), vol. iii. p. 324—334. To the many proofs already given we shall add that of a contemporary (the same who had a very singular adventure with Catharine). Villebois (Cabinet des MSS. de la Bibliothèque Royale, Cat. Franc. Hist. de Danemarck, &c., Suppl. 254, sous chiffre 7) relates at page 104 the history of the peace at great length. Catharine, he says, learned from Tolstoy's letters the avarice of the kaimakan and the grand vizier, and she herself gave her instructions in the presence of Peter to an officer of the guard, to whom she had entrusted the delivery of the valuables. Villebois says, that she herself not only gave her jewels and her furs, but that she rode through the ranks and represented that there was now no means of escape but over a golden bridge, and thus moved the soldiers and officers to contribute theirs.

* The treaty will be found complete in the Appendix to La Mottraye's 'Travels,' and in the 13th chapter of the 2nd part of Nordberg's 'Life of Charles XII.' The story of Charles having torn the dress of the grand vizier with his spur should not have been received into serious history by Von Hammer, as well as by many others, on the authority of Voltaire: it is quite in its place in Voltaire.

† The Turkish accounts in Von Hammer prove this, and therefore all the reasons fail which have been deduced from this, that these presents must have

into the camp on the night before the conclusion of the peace, quickly altered the sultan's opinion. His disgrace was not, however, communicated to the grand vizier, so long as he was at the head of the army; but he had no sooner arrived at Adrianople, and the most dangerous portion of the troops been separated from him, than the storm broke out. The sultan deposed Mehemet Baltadschi, and caused all those to be executed, who, under the influence of Russian presents, had either advised the conclusion of a peace, or had proposed its conditions.

Peter in the mean time had fulfilled none of the conditions of the peace. He left his troops in Poland, and relied upon cabals, upon bribery, and the grand vizier and his friends. This last hope was now indeed wholly frustrated by the deposition of the vizier, and a new declaration of war followed in the course of the succeeding month (Dec. 1711), founded especially upon the czar's non-compliance with the conditions of the peace, because he had delayed razing the fortresses, and made no arrangements for declaring that portion of the Ukraine independent which was inhabited by the Cosacks under the protection of the Turks. England and Holland in the mean time tried to work in opposition to the Swedes and French in Constantinople. Russian money flowed into the hands of the avaricious Turkish officials, whilst Charles abused the rights of hospitality in Bender; and in order to obtain loans by his obstinacy he offered opposition by force and arms, when an attempt was made to compel him to return to his kingdom. The English and Dutch were so fortunate in their labours, as to bring about another peace before the opening of the campaign in the next spring (1712), but Peter was as little in earnest about the fulfilment of its conditions with respect to the Ukraine, as he had been in the previous treaty*. Charles and his friends used all their endeavours for seven months to bring about a new war, and to make the sultan suspicious of his ministers. In autumn their efforts appeared to have been crowned with success. The vizier who had concluded the last peace was also degraded, and his successor, seven days after his appointment (19th Nov. 1712), published a third declaration of war against the Russians. Charles

been too insignificant to be compared with the danger which would result from the accusation and proof of bribery.

* The sultan's letter to his governor upon the grounds of the war, and the translation of the articles of the peace, will be found in Fabrice, pp. 125, 150.

however gained nothing by this step, for the new grand vizier and the sultan continually and seriously importuned him to hasten his departure from Turkey.

Mehemet Baltadschi, when vizier, had withdrawn the 500 piastres from the Swedish king which were allotted and paid to him for his daily support, and the king had afterwards demanded 500,000 dollars from the Turks, in order to pay his debts. The sultan gave 100,000 more than was demanded, and was therefore vehemently incensed because Charles made new demands for money and continually put off his journey till his demands should be complied with. Whilst the king of Sweden was insulting, quarrelling and fighting with the Turks in Constantinople in this inconceivable manner, till at length his minister was arrested, the Turkish war against Russia was at a stand. At last the whole divan, together with the mufti, declared that, under existing circumstances, it was their duty at all risks to remove their troublesome guest by force. This led to Charles's wonderful struggle in his fortified house in Bender, when the seraskier and the Tatar khan, with 2000 janissaries, 12,000 Tatars, 12 three-pounders and 2 mortars attacked him, because he refused to attend to their friendly requests and to depart from Bender. The janissaries refrained for two whole days from proceeding to extremities, but on the third they proceeded to the storm, and in the midst of flames, murder and destruction, and at the peril of their own lives, saved that of the king, whom they dragged forth from the midst of the fire. Charles on this occasion sacrificed his noble and brave companions to his obstinacy, for they either lost their lives in his defence or were taken prisoners. The whole property of the Swedes and their king was either plundered or burnt. During his defence, which we should say originated from mad and unnecessary despair, and was carried on from unbecoming pride, Charles gained the respect of the janissaries and the Turks in general: he was therefore first taken prisoner and brought to Demotica, but immediately afterwards sent to the country castle of Demirtasch, not far from Adrianople, and was there* treated with much attention

* These events are most fully related by Fabrice, p. 200—267; by Nordberg, 13th, 14th and 15th books, and in the notes of his translators. But whoever wishes to obtain a complete acquaintance with this labyrinth of diplomatic intrigues, must carefully consult the work of the secretary of the Dutch embassy, Theyl. This work appeared in Leyden in 1722, under the title, '*Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Charles XII.*'

and respect. The resentment of the faithful, and especially of the janissaries, at the treatment of the king, and the influence of the Russians, were so much matters of consideration, that the sultan degraded the mufti who by his fetwa had given permission to the deeds of violence in Bender, the grand vizier who had given the command for their execution, and the seraskier and Tatar khan who had perpetrated them* (March till April 1713). Charles gained nothing by this act of vengeance, for the new vizier, who had formerly been a robber and ferryman, showed himself no more favourable towards him than his predecessor had been. This vizier was indeed, after only three weeks' enjoyment of office, bow-stringed by the command of the sultan; but his successor, the son-in-law of the sultan, was open to the highest bidder: he therefore was bought by the Russians, and under English and Dutch mediation entered upon negotiations, which ended in a new treaty of peace in May (1713).

By this new treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey, every expectation entertained by the king of Sweden of being able to invade Poland with a Turkish army was completely frustrated; nevertheless he continued obstinately to remain in Turkey, and first returned to his states at the close of the following year. He reached Pomerania just at the moment when it was no longer possible to save his German states, and the continually increasing fermentation of the public mind in Sweden began to excite alarm. We now resume the thread of the Swedo-Danish war from the moment in which the attack of the Danes upon the southern provinces of Sweden (1710) terminated in a very disgraceful defeat.

Count Stenbock, however ill he was supported by the senate, however confused was the administration of Sweden, and however completely its finances were exhausted, not only completely triumphed over the Danes, but got together and equipped a new and considerable force, either to ward off new attacks, or, in obedience to the command of the king, to march into Poland. Charles's refusal to accept the guarantee of neutrality for his German provinces gave his undertakings another direction. The enemies of Sweden had then (1711) succeeded in drawing Ha-

* According to Von Hammer: Nordberg expressly remarks, that the seraskier of Bender was not mentioned in the sultan's letter, and that he was not executed till May, when Ali Pascha became vizier.

nover and even Prussia into their alliance, although both states carefully preserved the appearance of friendship. Hanover took Delmenhorst apparently as a pledge for some considerable sums which Denmark received as a loan, but which had been at that time already secured upon Bremen and Verden, principalities which had never been possessed by the Danes*. The accession of Prussia had been already noticed in the treaty which king Augustus had concluded with the king of Denmark†, when both wished to take advantage of the imperial interregnum, in order to take possession of Bremen and Verden, and to besiege Wismar and the Pomeranian fortresses.

Peter alone, before the end of the war, reaped the fruit of his vigorous efforts and his numerous sacrifices. He founded the empire which was to inherit the title and the power of Charles the Great, whilst the Roman empire, which the latter had founded, was become the derision of the world. The kings of Denmark and Poland, and their ministers and generals, who perfectly resembled them, made boundless sacrifices of men and money. The German empire, whose poor inhabitants were scandalously ill-treated by Danes, Swedes, Russians and Poles, either gave itself no concern about evils which could only be remedied or alleviated by some general measures about which its advisers were never united, or it promised to deliberate at Ratisbon, where, as is well known, the interchange of papers

* Hojer, p. 285: “. but especially a loan of about eight tons of gold had been negotiated by electoral Hanover, upon the security of the earldom of Delmenhorst, which was assigned to the elector, but redeemable in twenty years. Afterwards he expresses his opinion that the army of neutrality, which had assembled upon the banks of the Oder in Silesia, about 16,000 strong, under the command of the imperial general Haslinger, would have no doubt prescribed a limit to the further growth of the northern alliance, had not on the one hand the emperor's death, and on the other the peace with Turkey intervened. So early as July (1710), Hanover had concluded a friendly alliance with Peter for twelve years.”

† Hojer, p. 219: “. king Frederick pushed forward on the 29th of August over Dammgarten into Pomerania, formed a junction some days afterwards with king Augustus before Stralsund, and concluded a plan of operations with him on the 18th and 26th of September, as well as a treaty about the partition of the Swedish provinces, by virtue of which king Augustus was to retain Pomerania and Rügen, to satisfy Prussia (if it again entered into the alliance against Sweden), but king Frederick was to receive an equivalent for the half of Rügen in money. Again, Bremen, Verden and Wismar were assigned to his majesty of Denmark only on condition—1.) that Wismar, after the peace, should be ceded as a compensation to Mecklenburg; 2.) that Hanover, if it again declared against Sweden, was to be satisfied out of Bremen; and 3.) that everything possible was to be tried with the czar to induce him, after the future peace, to leave Livonia to king Augustus.”

and protocols was endless. The good but remarkably narrow-minded Charles VI. indeed promised assistance, when he was at length elected emperor; but this aid consisted merely in answers to petitions composed in a barbarous language, half bad Latin and half bad German (May 1712). Peter in the mean time had overrun Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, Carelia, and even a part of Finland; and by the marriage of his niece, as it afterwards appeared, brought Courland into subjection to Russia. His niece Anna was married to Frederick William duke of Courland, on which occasion the life and customs of the time, especially in the north, were exhibited in all their barbarity. The newly-married duke was obliged to indulge to such an extent in immoderate drinking during the festivities consequent upon the marriage, that he brought his life to an early termination (January 1711). The czar availed himself of this unexpected death to exclude the brother of the deceased duke, to claim the province as a settlement on the widow, and to cause the administration to be carried on in the name of the grand duchess. The custom of immoderate drinking which proved fatal to the duke of Courland was taken advantage of by Peter, as well as by diplomatists in general, to promote their political objects. He compelled his guests, according to Russian usage, to drink brandy, that he might the more easily extract the secrets of his nobles and the foreign ambassadors, or destroy them*. This habit of drinking deprived him about this time of the unfortunate Alexis, the son of his first marriage. The Danish ambassador Juel was not equal to such dissipation; he therefore withdrew as much as possible from these requirements, as Bassewitz and the Mecklenburg ambassador afterwards did, whose ‘Altered Russia’ we must often use as a source of authority: he was, however, obliged to visit these drinking-bouts, because business made it necessary. Other views of the manners and usages of

* Villebois (MSS. de la Bibliothèque du Roi, Suppl. 234, sous chiffre 7), who in other respects exaggerates nothing, as well as Weber in his ‘Altered Russia’ and Bassewitz (in Busching’s Magazine), are inexhaustible in anecdotes with respect to immoderate drinking. Villebois informs us how he was sent by Peter to Catharine, who gave him an audience in bed, that he had taken improper liberties with her in drunkenness, was arrested and condemned “pour deux ans à la chaîne,” but was really kept to no labour, and shortly afterwards restored to all his offices, because Peter needed his services. He states expressly that Peter was in the habit of cunningly extracting secrets from his guests when intoxicated, of writing them down in his pocket-book, and removed many a man out of the way who had revealed his mind in this manner.

the courts of this age may be learnt from the practices which prevailed in those of three other rulers. Whilst Peter, who lived in all the rudeness of semi-barbarism, and with the simplicity of a private man, without pomp or pride, was founding a great empire, the haughty rulers of Denmark and Poland, and even Charles XII., were eagerly pursuing the mere shadow of greatness and honour. Augustus of Poland and Frederick of Denmark called Peter's raw bands into Germany. Frederick of Denmark as well as king Augustus accepted alms from Peter, and the former even tried, by humiliation, to gain the favour of Menzikoff. As to Sweden, Stenbock was obliged to accept a present from the king of France, or at least from his court banker, in order to enable him to assist the duchy of Pomerania, as Charles XII. was also obliged to do from the Turks and from an English merchant in Constantinople*. Frederick as well as Charles sought, after a ridiculous fashion, to maintain the majesty of their kingdoms in things which were only matters of appearance. The latter, out of mere pride, lay in bed as long as he was in Demotica and Demirtasch, in order not to be obliged to show courtesy to the grand vizier. Frederick of Denmark, when he had conferred upon Menzikoff the blue riband of the order of the elephant, entered upon a long negotiation as to the manner in which his band was to be worn, together with the Polish, Prussian and Russian orders. It was at last agreed that the Polish and Prussian orders should be banished to the button-hole, and that the Danish and Russian bands should be worn alternately.

Peter would very willingly have established a firm footing in Germany; and the campaign of the two kings of Poland and Denmark, which ended unsuccessfully, as well as the dispute which soon after occurred between the duke of Mecklenburg

* Subsidies were already promised to Denmark in 1710, and in June 1711 the three princes entered into a new alliance against Sweden. On the 2nd of June, Peter and Augustus held a meeting in Jaroslaw, and concluded a treaty on the 9th; another had been signed with Denmark in Copenhagen on the 6th. We call it receiving alms, when, as Hojer reports, the czar at length granted to the king a quantity of hemp, tar and ship-building materials, which were brought from Archangel, together with 300,000 roubles, which however were not delivered sooner than 1711, and when Menzikoff's favour had been gained by sending him the order of the elephant. Or, what the French report of the manner in which Torcy received 200,000 dollars from the baptized Jew, Samuel Bernard, for Stenbock, when France had at length united with Sweden; or, what Nordberg (b. xvi.) relates of the Englishman Cooke and his quarrel with Sutton.

and his nobles, seemed to him to offer a fitting opportunity. Peter had been in Carlsbad in the summer of 1711; he afterwards travelled to Dresden and married his son Alexis, heir to his throne, to a princess of Brunswick; and finally, when the Danes, threatened by the Swedes, retreated to Holstein, he sent a Russian army under Menzikoff, Gallizin, Repnin and Bauer to Pomerania, in order to join and assist the Saxons in the sieges of Stettin and Stralsund. Peter had then still hopes that it would be possible to train Alexis for a ruler, and gave him charge of the campaign. He left Menzikoff with the army as his own substitute, recommended him to provide magazines, to spare the country, and to punish every act of violence with death. This however was all to no purpose, as Menzikoff emulated the common Russians in robbery and destruction. He compelled the inhabitants of Danzig to pay him 400,000 dollars, and Peter extorted 100,000 from Riga; but again in the commencement of the following year offered the emperor of Germany 30,000 Russians to serve against France, if he would confer upon him the rank of a member of the empire, and invest him with Livonia as an imperial fief. This will explain the reason why Louis XIV. or his banker, in the following year, helped Stenbock out of his perplexity, when he had no money to pay his troops, however little Charles XII. concerned himself about France.

Peter returned to Pomerania in the following summer (1712) and arranged with king Augustus the plan of besieging Stettin and Stralsund, but would have been placed in great difficulties had Stenbock carried out the plan which had been agreed upon in Sweden with Stanislaus. The latter had left his asylum in Sweden and followed the army into Pomerania. Stenbock, according to their plan, was to attack the Russians and Saxons in Pomerania, and then to march into Poland; but unfortunately, without first seeking out the Russians and Saxons, he turned aside to assail the Danes, because they had seized upon Stade and the duchy of Bremen, and were just about to invade the territory of Mecklenburg. The troops of the circle, especially the Hanoverians, played on this occasion a very equivocal part. Stenbock escaped the Russians and Saxons in Pomerania and marched from Stralsund towards Mecklenburg: by some skilful manœuvres he gained an advantage over the hostile army which was besieging Stralsund, and which were following close upon

his footsteps. General Duckert forced a very difficult pass at Dammgarten (5th Nov. 1712), which might have easily been disputed and maintained against him, but Stenbock at the very same moment fell into a position of no less danger on that account. The Swedes were now in a district intersected by several small rivers, the Recnitz, Warna and Elne, and among morasses, the Russians were close upon their rear, and the Danes were in Anmarsch with an army which alone was stronger than the whole body of the Swedes by four thousand men. In this condition Stenbock was obliged to have recourse to every expedient to gain time, because, although he had taken possession of Rostock, he was obliged to wait for his artillery before he could offer battle to the enemy. He treated with the Saxons and Russians, and king Augustus and Menzikoff agreed to a suspension of hostilities for fifteen days. On this occasion king Augustus played that part which he was always accustomed to play,—he tried to deceive his opponent by treachery and falsehood. This he afterwards willingly admitted, because he called this species of conduct ingenuity and finesse, and regarded it as a privilege of the great world, whose noblest ornament he undoubtedly was. He pretended to entertain a desire of coming to terms upon the offer of the weak Stanislaus to sacrifice himself and the Polish throne, and the latter, whose effeminate nature we shall fully establish below, from letters in his own handwriting in the French archives, travelled to Bender full of joy, in hopes of bringing about a general reconciliation by his voluntary abdication of the crown of Poland; but Charles was no longer to be found in Bender.

Stenbock did not suffer himself to be deceived by this treachery, but on the last day of the suspension of arms he made a sally with 8400 Swedes against the 20,000 Danes who were lying in Gadebusch. The king of Denmark did not listen to the sensible advice of waiting for the Russians and Saxons, and did not even go to the place where he was to have an interview with Peter. Stenbock therefore reached him by a quick march before his allies had joined. The allies and Stenbock afterwards carried on a long and useless dispute, as to which had first broken the truce. After a masterly march through a difficult and pathless country, undertaken in the middle of December (1712), the Swedes so suddenly surprised the Danes in Gadebusch, at eleven o'clock at night, that the king of Den-

mark was wholly unacquainted with their approach at ten. The Danes were beaten and routed; king Augustus and Flemming arrived on the next morning much too late, and they also were obliged to yield, and, according to their custom, quickly retired; the Russians in like manner retreated when they found that their assistance was not in time. Had not Stenbock, spurred on by national hatred and revenge, followed the Danes across the Elbe, but sought out the Russians, as the latter feared he would have done, and therefore broke down all the bridges behind them on their retreat to Pomerania, the victory of Gadebusch would probably have been as destructive to the allies as it afterwards became to the Swedes. Bremen and Verden would have been easily wrested from the Danes, and everyone except Welling, the governor of Bremen and Verden, who wished to avenge the bombardment of Stade, advised the general not to follow the Danes beyond the Elbe. The Russians and Saxons, when they found they were not pursued, wheeled round and threatened to cut off his communication with Wismar and Pomerania, and to shut in the Swedes.

Stenbock, like Charles XII., was inaccessible to any kind of reasonable advice; he passed the Elbe and retaliated the barbarities and cruelty of the Russians in Pomerania by an incendiary devastation, which can only be compared with the cruelties perpetrated in the Palatinate and on the Rhine by the command of Louvois*. The town of Altona was utterly destroyed by fire at his command, and its inhabitants left houseless in the depth of winter. Hamburg, at that time renowned above all the cities in Germany, even above Frankfort, for piety and Lutheran intolerance, shut its gates against the miserable outcasts, so that it might be almost supposed that the pious merchants had encouraged and excited the Swedes to the destruction of Altona, from jealousy in trade and hatred of their neighbours.

Stenbock paid the penalty of this act by the difficulties in which he was involved when the Saxons and Russians came to the aid of the Danes, who were again advancing, and he was obliged to take refuge behind the morasses of Holstein. He

* I know not why it is always alleged that Stenbock perpetrated these cruelties on account of the bombardment of Stade. In his letter, which is to be found in Lamberty (*Mémoires pour servir, &c.*), vol. viii. p. 291, he says nothing whatever of Stade, but declares the Russians have made Pomerania a desert, and that he would therefore burn as many towns and villages in Holstein as the Russians had burned in Pomerania.

was shut up in the county of Eyderstadt, and occupied a most unfavourable position between the Hever and Eyder, because the Danes had cut the dykes and laid the country under water. Peter himself was now in command of his Russians, and encouraged them by his example: the splendid kings of Denmark and Poland were very far from imitating him. Peter headed his men even through the Trene, and waded up to the middle in the inundation in order to reach the enemy. At this time the Holstein minister Görz began to play the second act of the piece, which he had undertaken in Saxony with Charles, and which he had till then continued to carry on.

Baron, afterwards count Görz, was a man of various talents; he stood indisputably far above all German pedants, and possessed a knowledge of financial affairs, of which all his contemporaries, except Law, fell far short; but he followed the principle, recommended by its adepts, alas! as diplomatic wisdom, that rectitude, honour, and fidelity to promises in great affairs were things not to be maintained, when cunning and deceit alone reaped the advantage. After the death of the duke he had been brought by Swedish influence into the ministry in Holstein, which up to this time, the old, experienced, skilful Wedderkopp had conducted; a man who was besides deeply learned in all the quirks of the German-Roman science of law, covetous, greedy, and accessible to bribes. Görz had not only obtained the favour of the dowager duchess, but also that of her brother-in-law, Christian Augustus, administrator of the duchy, to whom he had rendered some essential services in his dispute about the bishopric of Lubeck, because he had been in Vienna on this affair and had conducted a very successful negotiation with respect to it with the naval powers. Whoever has tasted the delight of exercising diplomatic skill, and of making a splendid figure in the higher circles, will always feel himself, as is well known, dissatisfied with a limited circle of operations. Görz was therefore inexhaustible in inventions to irritate Denmark, or to satisfy the vanity of the administrator. He fomented the ridiculous dispute on the subject of capital letters in the public edicts*; he caballed about the county of Ranzau; he knew how to gain the opinion of some of the officials and subjects in favour of his plans, but fell into vehe-

* A dispute was carried on about the printing of the king's name in a larger character than those which the printer used for the commencement of lines or paragraphs. Till that time no one had thought of the matter.

ment strife with Wedderkopp, who accused him of having caused a loss to his government of more than 300,000 dollars.

One of the main points which Görz pushed was the putting an end to the government of some districts and parts of the duchies which were held in common with Denmark, and he also tried to introduce 3000 Swedes into the country. In order to effect a separation of this common government, he travelled to Charles to Altranstädt (1707), and completely secured his approbation of himself and his plans; but Piper was afraid of a dangerous rival, countermined his project of sending 3000 men, and entered into friendly negotiations respecting the common government. On this subject a congress was afterwards held in Hamburg, which Wedderkopp, who had gone to Hamburg, protracted, in order to keep out of the way of his enemies in Holstein. This pedantic jurist was quite indispensable in all affairs which had any reference to the labyrinth of the then rights of nations, but as the son of a coppersmith, he continued to be a stranger among the barons of the courts, and yet the nobles of Holstein coincided with him in opposing the separation of the governments. Görz, who was a gallant and extravagant cavalier, well acquainted with the courtly language of France and possessed of a ready tongue, had completely gained over the wife of the administrator to his cause, whilst Wedderkopp found support from the dowager duchess, who lived in Stockholm, and exercised the chief rights of guardianship. The administrator and minister, who had thrown the country into confusion by their disputes, were at length summoned to Stockholm; the grounds of these cabals were investigated; Wedderkopp was sustained in his views and conduct, and Gackenholtz, the creature of Görz and the instrument of all his cabals, banished the country. Görz now began to fear the loss of his influence, and made friendly proposals to the king of Denmark, against whom he had previously caballed. The death of the duchess Hedwig Sophia (Dec. 1708) again separated him from Denmark, because he had again recovered his preponderance in Holstein. Wedderkopp, as commissioner in Hamburg, intentionally protracted the negotiations about the separation of the government of the common possessions, and at the same time threw all the responsibility upon his colleagues in the ministry. Görz would willingly have had him in Holstein, because he must first accomplish his ruin, in order to rule undisputed in the name of the administrator; for this purpose he

had recourse to low cunning and resigned his place, upon which Wedderkopp, without further thought, returned to the court. The administrator received him in a friendly manner and entertained him as his guest, but on the same evening caused him to be taken as a prisoner to Tönningen. Görz again became minister, or rather he had never ceased so to be. Wedderkopp's large property was confiscated; his corruption with respect to questions of law and trade, and his traffic in livings were indeed fully established; but Görz was not a whit less selfish than the covetous old minister; the only real difference was, that he spent the fruits of his plunder and Wedderkopp saved it. Wedderkopp's friends and relations were now removed from all places of trust, and Görz's creatures occupied their offices. About this time Fabrice was sent to Bender at the expense of the poor inhabitants of Holstein, because Charles XII., as well as the Swedes in general, was favourable to Wedderkopp. In Bender, Fabrice acted like the splendid minister of a great power, kept open table for numerous guests, maintained a great establishment, won Charles's favour for Görz, hunted out all secrets, and held the king fast bound, whilst Denmark, as well as the Swedish government, had declared themselves in favour of Wedderkopp. On the one hand, Görz, in spite of the representations of all the powers, kept Wedderkopp in prison; on the other, he treated with Denmark and conceded much, in order, by the mediation of Denmark, to have the succession in Sweden settled upon the young duke, who was still a minor, in case Charles XII. should die without heirs. A contemporary historian*, worthy of credit, bears witness, that the Swedish nobles had already entered into a secret combination to exclude the young duke, and to favour the cause of his weak-minded aunt.

When the Danes renewed the war, Görz sacrificed the people of Holstein without hesitation to the maintenance of his own position. The negotiations which had been fruitlessly carried on for years in Hamburg were brought to a close by a treaty with Denmark, and altogether to its advantage. King Frederick received a loan from the proceeds of the Wedderkopp estates, and for that reason Wedderkopp remained in confinement, and

* Hojer, p. 165. The Swedish nobles had long since considered the case, and upon the death of the duchess embraced the resolution of placing the princess Ulrica upon the throne, to the exclusion of the prince of Holstein, and thereby obtaining the best conditions which in the circumstances of the time were to be had.

the commission of inquiry which had been appointed for the investigation of his case continued its proceedings. The vassals of Holstein were made a prey to the king of Denmark, whilst Görz procured money for Fabrice, who had been merely a groom of the chambers, and for baron Pettekum (of whom we shall often afterwards have occasion to speak as a diplomatic adventurer), the one of whom acted as a spy in the Netherlands, and the other in Bender, to promote and push on Görz's cabals. Under these circumstances, Stenbock's victory at Gadebusch placed Görz in great difficulties; for Charles XII. had then written a letter in favour of Wedderkopp, and the wife of the prisoner had offered Stenbock considerable sums of money, of which he stood greatly in need. It appeared impossible to secure the favour of Stenbock without offending the Danes, and offending the Danes was dangerous: Görz however, true to his practice, negotiated with both.

Görz himself went to Flensburg to have an interview with Frederick, whilst two of his colleagues waited upon Stenbock. Görz made the fairest promises to the Danish king, whilst his colleagues concluded a treaty with Stenbock, in which, in case of need, the fortress of Tönningen was to be opened for his reception, if he did not favour the cause of Wedderkopp. But here again deceit was practised. The commandant of Tönningen would have paid no attention to Görz's command to open the fortress, which had been sent to him through Stenbock, because it was only signed by the young duke. The administrator should have signed the order; but he was desirous of shifting the blame upon others, and therefore gave no written consent*, but merely wrote to the commandant that he was unconditionally to follow what he had verbally given in command to Bannier and Reventlow, who should be sent to him.

The two ministers commanded him to admit Stenbock; the administrator, on the contrary, had previously given orders, in a public document addressed to the commandant, not to receive the Swedes into the fortress; he disclaimed all participation in the affair, and at a later period (March) wrote to the commandant that he was to deny everything and take the whole blame upon himself. Görz and the administrator, who pretended that

* The administrator had gone to Hamburg to await the issue. In order to fill up the measure of deceit and lies, Reventlow, when he came from Tönningen, visited king Frederick and promised neutrality.

they had had no participation in the admission of the Swedes into Tönningen, relied upon this. Stenbock moreover gained nothing more by his admission into Tönningen (February 14, 1713) than a short truce, but the unfortunate people of Holstein were obliged to pay the penalty of baron Görz's ambition to play a great diplomatic character. The Danes gladly seized upon this pretence to treat the Holsteiners as enemies, and took possession of Kiel, Gottorp, Sleswick, and other places, whilst Görz was pushing his deceitful arts to the uttermost. He negotiated with his friend Flemming, who was a man precisely of his own character and principles : he travelled to the Danes, and was in a state of continual movement between Husum and Tönningen, in order to gain Stenbock's consent to a capitulation ; but it was soon discovered that he was attempting to create disunion between the Russians and Danes. Görz was obliged to leave the Danish territory, and then travelled to Hanover to procure an interview with Peter. He could neither induce him nor the elector of Hanover to give him an audience, but was more fortunate with Menzikoff, who was in Holstein, because he held out to him great prospective advantages. He however never despaired, and had very soon reason to rejoice in the triumph of his skill. The administrator again came into possession of the bishopric of Lubeck ; whilst Hanover, Prussia, and the queen of England, stormed by Görz's importunity, adopted the cause of Holstein.

Stenbock in the mean time was reduced to a state of famine in Tönningen, and with his 11,000 Swedes surrendered to the Danes (May 19, 1713), on condition that the prisoners should be allowed to return to Sweden after the payment of a ransom on which they had agreed*. Tönningen was now given up to the troops of Holstein, for Görz had induced Stenbock to agree to this proposal, in order that he might be able to keep posses-

* We delay longer upon such events than their intrinsic importance deserves, because they are more instructive with respect to life, morals, and modes of government, than a long dissertation could be ; we shall therefore here add some particulars. Görz promised to furnish 70,000 dollars as a ransom and to provide transports, but he did not perform his promise. The Swedes afterwards raised 84,000 dollars, but the Danes knew how to invent all sorts of pretences. The Swedish senate were now at variance, and willingly allowed the soldiers to remain in imprisonment. Welling, formerly governor of Bremen, was at enmity with Stenbock, and was pleased to see him a prisoner. He employed some part of the 84,000 dollars entrusted to him on negotiations which led to nothing. Stenbock remained a prisoner till his death (1718).

sion of that city with a Holstein army. The Danes continued to carry on the siege against the Holstein part of the garrison, and the Holsteiners were obliged in the following year to evacuate the fortress. The Danes had no sooner got possession than they liberated Wedderkopp, because the commandant had entertained some thoughts of causing the old man to be executed, in compliance with the command he had received from Görz in Berlin, whither he had gone, in order to set on foot and prosecute new cabals.

Holstein was now obliged to endure all the various kinds of oppression, wasting and extortion, which had on several occasions been exercised in Mecklenburg and Pomerania; Russians, Danes and Saxons abused and plundered the inhabitants. Fleming received considerable sums; Menzikoff extorted 200,000 dollars from Hamburg and 100,000 marks from Lubeck; both continued in uninterrupted negotiation with Görz and Welling. Wismar and Stettin, according to the agreement of the parties to the cabal, were to be occupied till a peace; the former by the troops of Holstein-Gottorp, and the latter by those of Holstein and Russia. The Danes indeed protested against this arrangement, but were constrained to submission by the concurrence of Russia in the scheme. The commandant of Wismar paid no attention to Görz's cabals, nor did he acknowledge Welling's authority to treat; he therefore admitted no Holstein troops into the fortress. Görz found Frederick William (I.) upon the throne of Prussia, which he had ascended in February 1713, and the king at length allowed himself to be persuaded by the prince of Anhalt and by Grumkow to acquire possession of a part of Pomerania by a loan to Sweden, which it was foreseen it could never repay. Prussia paid to the allies for Sweden 400,000 dollars, of which Menzikoff received the half for himself; and the Swedish commandant of Stettin, driven to the very last extremity, was glad to be permitted to give up the fortress, not to their enemies, but to the troops of Holstein and Prussia. Peter was enraged against Menzikoff, and would hear nothing of the agreement; Charles was astonished and discontented, on his return from Turkey, to find that part of Pomerania which lay east of the Peene in the hands of the Prussians, and Bremen and Verden in the power of the Hanoverians, although he was neither at war with Prussia nor Hanover.

Charles was at this moment restrained in his operations by

the excitement of the public mind in Sweden, and the melancholy condition into which he had plunged the kingdom. The whole of the Baltic provinces, and a part of Finland, Bremen, Verden, and Pomerania, were in the power of his enemies. Stralsund and Wismar were threatened, above 400,000 of the brave peasantry of a thinly-peopled country were lost, and the taxes doubled. Sweden had neither money nor credit, all business was at a stand, and the silver plate of the citizens was demanded as a loan. The calling of the estates which had been resolved upon without consulting the king, appeared to him of such serious moment, that he dismissed the assembly, and was obliged several times to repeat his command before they separated. The aristocracy had assumed such a position at that time, in opposition to monarchical government, that Charles afterwards, in bitter indignation at the pretensions which they had put forth in his absence, called out to count Arfwed Horn, "You have grown strong during my absence." The senate had not only set aside Charles Frederick of Holstein and placed Ulrica Eleonora at the head of affairs, but had ventured to throw out the question, whether the estates, in case of the longer absence, and even without the consent of the king, might not empower the senate to conclude a peace.

At the time of the king's return, Görz had taken charge of the treasury of Holstein for his diplomatic practices, and conducted the affairs of the administrator as if he were the minister of one of the first powers in Europe. We find him one while in Holstein, at another in Hanover, and again in Berlin, and everywhere carrying on affairs according to the principle which he propounded in a letter to Bassewitz as one of general prevalence and quite indisputable. "Tell the czar Peter," he writes, "if he is disposed to reckon somewhat upon honesty and truth, that all friendship among princes is merely self-interest, and that if one prince solemnly asserts his fidelity to another, the latter, as soon as he does not clearly perceive the advantage which the former derives from the alliance, must always believe that all these asseverations are merely empty words, and that some treachery is concealed behind them." Bassewitz at this time was also a creature of Görz, like Petteken and Fabrice, spent money at his cost, and wove intrigues for his advantage. From the description which he gives of himself, we are able to form some idea of

what was then called a true cavalier, and of the character which the life of the higher classes assumed *.

This Bassewitz had conducted the negotiations with Flemming and Menzikoff, and when Görz had tried all his ingenuity in vain in Hanover, Berlin, and Denmark, he was also to negotiate with Peter; but he was no match for the czar. In Russia, Bassewitz was caught in his own net, driven out of the country, and all the scandalous cabals which Görz had originated and was carrying on were communicated to the Swedish government, the young duke, and the different courts. Görz wished to roll off the blame upon Bassewitz, and instructed a secretary of the embassy to purloin all the papers which were necessary for his justification; but Bassewitz followed him, came up to him, took the papers from him, and published the correspondence to the world, which is very important as a history of the practices of all absolute governments and of their tools†. Charles's return relieved Görz from all the difficulties with which he was surrounded, though the kings of Prussia and Denmark, and even the young duke, had expressed their dissatisfaction at his conduct.

The journey of the king of Sweden, who appeared as suddenly as a ghost in Pomerania, was as adventurous as his sojourn in Bender and Demirtasch had been. On the 23rd of October, Charles was still on the frontiers of Wallachia, and on the 22nd of November, having performed the journey chiefly on horseback, he reached Stralsund. The two deadly enemies, Bassewitz and Görz, each tried to meet him on the way, in order to secure his favour: the former had travelled to Prague in order to meet

* Hojer says of him in his rough manner,—“Because moreover he could drink and carouse as well as the best Russian, Menzikoff appeared to take pleasure in him.” In the extracts from Bassewitz's papers in Busching's Magazine, part 9, p. 279, the following appears:—“A' une physionomie des plus prévenantes Bassewitz joignait un esprit fertile en expédiens, que saisissait et pénétrait les choses du premier coup d'œil, une contenance que rien ne déconcertait, une répartie prompte, spirituelle et naïve, un tempérament à soutenir dans l'occasion vingt quatre heures de travail ou de débauche * * beaucoup d'amour, de la magnificence, des femmes, du jeu, &c.” What is here represented is a delineation of the life of the higher circles, as they were then trained.

† We cannot enter further into particulars, but whoever wishes to examine the question at greater length need only read the ‘Memoirs of the Ambassador in Busching,’ at the place already referred to: there will be found abundant means of forming a judgment with respect to himself, his friends, and all with whom he had any intercourse.

him there, but missed his object; the latter met him in Pomerania and became his favourite. From this moment forward, Görz forsook the service of Holstein and conducted Charles's affairs, whilst Bassewitz, on the contrary, got the young duke of Holstein under his control, and used him for his purposes.

The high Swedish nobility were frightened and awed by Charles's return, the people were inspired with new confidence, and animated by a new spirit in favour of a just, pious and brave prince, whose faults they could readily forgive. Görz devised means of raising money, but found it impossible to induce Charles to depart so far from his own mode of thinking, as was necessary in order to enable him to extricate him from his perplexing situation by diplomatic skill. Charles was not however quite as obstinate as his enemies were accustomed to describe him. He had taken the administrator's troops into his service, who had gained that money in the Low Countries which Görz wasted in his diplomatic undertakings: he wished to induce the landgrave of Hesse Cassel, whose son was suing for the hand of his younger sister, to give him his army, and become a guarantee to Prussia for the repayment of the 400,000 dollars which the latter had lent to Sweden: the plan however made shipwreck, because the landgrave refused his acquiescence, and Charles offended the king of Prussia. Charles required the Prussians to rely upon his word, and to restore the places of which they had been put in possession before the debt which had been contracted was paid, and on their refusing to comply with his request, he wished to drive them out by force (April 1715). He took possession of Usedom and the fortifications of Peenemünde, whilst 10,000 Prussians on the other hand took Wollin; and the allies, strengthened by the adhesion of the elector of Hanover, who shortly before Charles's return had become king of England (August 1714), made preparations for besieging Wismar and Stralsund.

Hanover had carried on negotiations during the whole of the winter with Denmark, because the Danes rather wished to retain Bremen and Verden to themselves, than to cede them to Hanover. Charles's appearance frightened the Danes, who then resolved on making the sacrifice demanded of them in order to obtain the accession of Hanover and the secret aid of England. Denmark received a considerable sum of money; Hanover restored Delmenhorst, which it had retained as a pledge, and pro-

misèd the guarantee of England that Sleswick, which had been wrested from the duke of Holstein, should remain with the Danes, and acceded to the alliance with Russia, Saxony and Denmark, to which Prussia also had just at that time given in its adhesion*.

The treaty between Denmark and Hanover had been concluded as early as July; that between Russia and Hanover was first brought to a close in October (1715), and then Hanover first declared war†. Charles himself was in Stralsund when the Prussians and Danes attacked that fortress; he astonished every one by his bravery, perseverance, efforts, moderation, kindness, and simplicity of life, and enchained the affections of officers and men: but in Stralsund, as in Poltawa and Bender, he sacrificed his brave and attached soldiers without any advantage. The prince of Dessau, born to war like Charles himself (and besides a better general than he), led the Prussians, with whom were united 8000 Saxons, and the Danes besides: how was it possible to hope for a favourable issue in such an unequal struggle? Charles nevertheless maintained his post with his 15,000 Swedes from June till November, and kept off an enemy who were triple his number. On the 9th of October the trenches were opened before Stralsund; in the beginning of November Charles tried in vain to defend the island of Rügen against the Prussians and Danes, who in like manner fought under the eyes of their kings; but he remained in Stralsund, even after the loss of this island, till every thing was prepared for a general storm. The capitulation took place in December, after the French also had offered their mediation in vain. The brother of Torcy the French minister had been sent to mediate a peace, but he, as Pölnitz observes, was quite unfit for the task; he came to Stralsund, and

* George had at first drawn his pen through the word *offensive* in the treaty, but he afterwards sent troops to the Danes before Wismar and published his manifesto in autumn.

† Hojer says, p. 286,—“George had promised to declare war against the Swedes, to pay 600,000 dollars to Frederick, to send major-general Pentz to blockade and capture Wismar, as king of England to aid Denmark in keeping perpetual possession of Sleswick, and finally, to send some English ships of war to reinforce the Danish navy.” In the extracts from Bassewitz’s papers in Busching’s Mag., part ix. p. 327, it is said, “La Grande Bretagne avoit garanti le Slesvic au Danemarck en 1715 et Bremen et Vehrde en furent le prix.” Eight English ships were lent to Hanover and joined the fleet as Hanoverian, because the English and Dutch fleets were only, properly speaking, in the Baltic for the protection of the navigation; they therefore hoisted the Danish flag in 1716, at which the English were greatly enraged.

shortly before the taking of the city departed for Hamburg, having been treated with contempt by Prussia*.

The besiegers of Stralsund were anxious to spare the blood of their people and the property of the citizens, and delayed the assault, till at last Charles XII. left the city on the 20th of December; on the following day a capitulation was agreed to, and eight days afterwards the city was surrendered to the Prussians and Danes. In the course of the next year, Wismar also, the last possession of the Swedes in Germany, was taken by the Danes, Prussians and Hanoverians, before the whole army had arrived which Peter, the year before, had promised to send to Pomerania. Some Russian regiments were at this time in the territory of Mecklenburg, between whom and the allies disputes arose: they wished to occupy Wismar, and on the refusal of the allies to allow them, the Russians drove them out of Pöhl and Neukloster by force. The whole north of Germany appeared then to be the prey of tyrants and barbarians. Charles Leopold, duke of Mecklenburg, was at strife with his cities and nobles, and ill-treated both, whilst they were striving to obtain a tedious relief in the tribunals of the empire. Peter gave his niece in marriage to the tyrant, and the latter had hitherto shown so little feeling or humanity, that he might well be believed capable of bartering his duchy with Russia. The Danes and Germans were unwilling to allow the Russians to hold joint possession of Wismar, but they still remained in the country as protectors of the duchy, and lived at free quarters according to their custom. Gottorp also was plundered by Danes and Russians, and at that time the celebrated globe was taken to Russia, which is still an object of admiration in St. Petersburg. Hamburg and Lubeck had been obliged to pay considerable sums in the previous year, when Peter came with his army to Mecklenburg; Danzig paid several thousand dollars, and was obliged to furnish six ships in addition; whole towns and villages in Pome-

* Count de Croissy had travelled over Berlin and Stettin in the beginning of the year to have an interview with Charles in Stralsund, and in the name of France had made some proposals for the contentment of Frederick William, to which the latter somewhat contemptuously replied, that he knew not how he could make proposals to him without having seen the king of Sweden, and that neither the word of the king of Sweden nor that of the king of France would be to him a sufficient guarantee. Busching should not have printed the later correspondence from the 22nd of May till the 5th of December, for the letters were already to be found in Nordberg's 'Life of Charles XII.' (Germ. Trans. iii. p. 147, &c.) and in Lamberty.

rania were wantonly annihilated, and the Mecklenburgers cruelly tormented.

The Mecklenburg nobles found a support in their Hanoverian brethren, and the emperor disapproved of the duke's conduct; disputes arose among the Russians, Hanoverians and Danes, and Charles, or rather Görz, tried to profit by the misunderstandings of the allies; but in the mean time the misery in Sweden was increased by his new efforts. The Russians were victorious by sea, and made progress by land; they disembarked troops in the neighbourhood of Stockholm, ravaged the country, slaughtered cattle and men, and destroyed the buildings and machinery of the mines which had been erected at great cost. Charles marched over cold pathless mountains to Norway, and collected an army on the coasts of the Frozen Ocean, in order to march from Schonen to Zealand, after the example of his grandfather, and still more boldly than he: his march to Norway however was vain, and his attempt at passing over the ice was frustrated by a thaw. The king of Denmark wished to avenge himself by an attack upon Sweden; his minister Wiben had even concluded a new treaty with Peter, in order to employ the Russian army in the realization of his foolish hope of adding Schonen, Haland, Blekingen and Bahuslehn to Denmark. The Russians marched out of Germany to Denmark, were scattered about amongst the Danish islands, and from these conveyed to Schonen; Peter himself came to Sweden and made himself acquainted with the Swedish coasts, but general surprise was excited when he refused to furnish more than 15,000 men for the expedition against Sweden, although he brought 40,000 with him into Denmark, instead of the 30,000 which he had promised.

The Danes were suspicious of a prince who had not the slightest idea of what the highly educated world call sense of honour; their suspicion was increased by the delay of the Russians, who allowed themselves to be provided for in Denmark till winter, by the very doubtful demands of the czar, and by his suspicious measures. Anxiety was at length felt in Copenhagen for the safety of the city and the person of the king, and all the Danes became alive to the deliverance of the country from its threatened dangers. Military preparations had been already made, the citizens of Copenhagen were armed, admiral Norris offered (in case of need) to seize upon the Russian fleet, and baron Von Holstein was ready with the Danish cavalry to fall

upon the Russian infantry which was scattered about in Zealand, when king Frederick wrote a friendly letter to Peter in which he begged him to remove the Russian army. Under the existing circumstances the czar could not refuse the request, and in October (1716) he caused his Russians to march out of the country. A public breach was indeed in this manner avoided; but Peter felt a grudge against the Danes on account of their suspicion, and against the English and Hanoverians because they would not suffer the sojourn of his Russians in Germany. Hanover, or rather George I. and his nobles expected, what afterwards took place, that the tribunals of the empire would at last deliver their judgement against the tyrant of Mecklenburg, that the troops of the circle, and especially the Hanoverians, would be entrusted with the execution of their decree, and that the costs would be so great as to furnish them with a pretence for keeping possession of the country. The English ministers, who endeavoured to aid the king in all his personal objects, in order that English affairs might be left wholly to their management, rendered George important assistance in these plans. Görz observed with pleasure Peter's disagreement with Denmark, England and Hanover, and tried to profit by the dissensions of the allies in order to set on foot new diplomatic undertakings.

According to the judgement of all those who are acquainted with the subject, Görz rendered important services and gained great credit in Sweden from 1714 by inducing Charles to enter upon negotiations, and introducing into Sweden the new science of finance, the lamentable product of the eighteenth century, *i. e.* the art of quietly drawing the money of the subjects into the treasury of the government, without exciting public clamour or the exercise of force. The practice of this art however incensed the Swedes against foreigners, who, to their great vexation, furnished their king with means of seeking his own glory at their expense. Görz found all the resources of the kingdom exhausted, all the sterling money gone, all classes of the inhabitants ground to the earth by double taxes, and the want of money so great, that people were obliged to pay the taxes in the productions of the soil. His new science procured money by the invention of representatives (bank-notes) for cash, and he forced copper tokens into circulation whose real worth bore no relation to their current value; and in addition he sought loans from Holland, and from Law, who was then playing off his financial schemes in France.

Görz pledged or squandered away Swedish wares in order to relieve the momentary pressure, and whilst he was upon his diplomatic journeys, the king profited by the discoveries of his minister with as much boldness and unsparing exaction as he had used his army. In the midst of the decline of prosperity and on the ruins of the public property, the minister sought to effect a complete change of money, to call in the coin in circulation, and to debase its real value. The people were compelled, under heavy penalties, to exchange their hard cash for the paper of the government, which had long lost all its value, and to deliver up the whole of their coin. Whilst the king lived like a private man, the minister built one costly diplomatic mansion after another; and whilst the people were in want of the necessaries of life in Sweden, he, with his retinue and his lacqueys, squandered money like a prince in Holland*. Görz was a man gifted with the most various talents and capacities, whose activity and services were at this time wholly indispensable. His sojourn in Holland and his journey from thence to Paris are intimately connected with a cabal which he and the Swedish ministers, Sparre in Paris and Gyllenborg in London, hatched with Alberoni in Spain, and particularly with the partisans of the Stuarts in and out of England, to overthrow George I. in England and the duke regent in France, and to bring about an alliance between Peter and Charles.

After his departure from Denmark, Peter had for the first time met and conversed with the king of Prussia in Havelberg, then travelled to Holland, and came to Amsterdam in December (1716). Görz had been already in Holland since May, from whence he spun his threads in Paris and London. The pretence for his prolonged sojourn in Holland was, that he wished to borrow a loan of some millions for king Charles, upon an assignment of Swedish timber, iron and other wares; but he really wished to cherish and blow into a flame the jealousy of the Spanish government at the close alliance between England and

* We have already referred to a work which was written expressly for his defence, and are of opinion that the unjust and cruel treatment which the count suffered in Sweden after the death of the king gained him many defenders, and among others Rühss. The measures of finance which are merely summarily mentioned in the text will be found fully detailed in the 'History of Sweden,' Halle, 1814, 8vo, part v. § 426, p. 565, *et seq.* As to the expression in the text, it is enough to add, that Görz, even in Arnheim, where he was arrested, lived like a prince, and that the daily cost of his table alone was eighty florins.

France. The regent of France was afraid that the king of Spain might avail himself of the aid of the malcontents in France, to drive him from the regency, whilst in England there was a fear that the pretender might seize upon the government. Görz, on his part, promised the Spanish minister and the pretender the assistance of his king, and allured Peter, by the hope and prospect of a separate treaty of peace with Charles, in which the latter would cede the provinces wrested from him by conquest. It is well known that Peter, who was detained for several months in Amsterdam by illness, was acquainted with the plan, which was intimately connected with Görz's journey to Paris, as appears from the letters which passed between Görz and Gyllenborg, a Swedish minister in London, which were seized upon, and are now printed. Besides, it is known that Peter not only negotiated with Görz through prince Kurakin, but that he also kept up communications with the partisans of the pretender in Scotland and England, through his Scotch physician Erskine, and also that he was very much offended with the Dutch for arresting Görz, and was indignant with the English for publishing the intercepted correspondence, in which his name occurred. The czar was so enraged at king George, that he not only loudly and publicly abused him, but they mutually and carefully avoided each other, when George came twice to Holland during Peter's sojourn in that country (1717). Peter expressly excused his conduct towards the Dutch ambassador, whom he caused to be arrested, and whose papers he ordered to be seized, by alleging that the Dutch had arrested Görz. It is clear that Peter took more interest and participated more deeply than Charles XII. in the cabals between Alberoni and Görz, the partisans of the pretender and the malcontents in France, because one of the chief points of the preliminaries of peace agreed upon by Peter (in Lofoe) shortly before Charles's death, relates to the pretender. In addition to this, Coxe states, that at a still later period Alberoni sent the duke of Ormond to Russia, to enter into a close alliance with Peter. No offence can be taken at a modern French historian, for declaring the whole of these cabals to have been a piece of mere roguery* on the part of the scan-

* Lemontey, '*Histoire de la Régence et de la Minorité de Louis XV.*' vol. ii. '*Pièces Justificatives,*' No. 2, pp. 383—394. The sources of the negotiations carried on for the sake of appearance between France, Russia and Prussia, will be found in the so-called '*Mémoires du Maréchal de Tessé,*' printed in 1806.

dalous and extravagant Görz, who was inexhaustible in schemes ; for Görz, Gyllenborg, Sparre and others undoubtedly availed themselves of the credulity of the jacobites, in order to obtain 20,000 guineas in England, and 100,000 livres from the opponents of George in France.

Gyllenborg, the ambassador in London, was the originator of the whole scheme ; upon his hint, Görz, accompanied by Gyllenborg's brother, went to Holland. When the Danes by accident found the letters which related to those cabals in a Swedish ship, the English caused a counterfeit to be made of the Swedish seal, opened all the ambassador's letters, and finally arrested the minister himself (9th February 1717) ; and the Dutch, at their request, seized upon the person of Görz. The printed letters contain nothing of importance, mere contemptible trifles, projects and foolish remarks upon the most important affairs of the suffering nations, made with great audacity ; things alone, which people then, as in our own days, regarded and regard as merely evidences of diplomatic skill and science.

Charles XII. caused the English ambassador Jackson to be arrested, and exchanged him for Gyllenborg. He forbade the Dutch consul the court ; the duke of Holstein interested himself also in favour of Görz, but the states of Gueldres had already set him at liberty and formally promised him their protection. Görz drove from the place of his confinement into Arnheim in a coach drawn by six horses, and threw money amongst the people, who thereupon cheered for the king of Sweden. The czar solemnly denied all participation in the cabals, and even took a journey to Paris (May 1717), where Louis XIV. had refused his visit on his first journey*. The regent would undoubtedly rather not have seen him in his capital, nevertheless he gave him an honourable and ceremonious reception.

The French of that time had no sense of Peter's great qualities or of his efforts, which were all directed to the immediate

* Villebois, MSS. de la Bibl. du Roi, Hist. de Danemarck, Suède, Norvège, Russie, Cat. Franc. Suppl. 254, sous chiffre 7, p. 42, says, Louis XIV. had refused his visits, "et donna pour raison de son refus qu'un voyage du czar en France ne manqueroit de causer de l'ombrage à Charles XII., qui étoit alors éloigné de ses états et détenu à Bender, auquel on ne vouloit pas causer d'inquiétude dans la situation malheureuse, où il se trouvoit." In Lemontey's 'Histoire de la Régence,' vol. i. p. 14, will be found a full account of Peter's sojourn in Paris, and a succinct view and just criticism of the common accounts of that subject.

advantages of life; his peculiarities and barbarism, however, surprised them, and his rude and brutal enjoyments appeared not less to disclose total moral depravity than the unheard-of excesses of their regent, who was the very genius of sin. Nature, vigour, a sense for everything profitable or agreeable, and an unceasing activity for his people and the improvement of their condition, distinguished Peter, notwithstanding all his moral corruption: such qualities could not be at that time so justly estimated in Paris as they were after the revolution. Peter's negotiations with the regent led to a treaty, to which Prussia afterwards acceded, which was composed in the general expressions and technical language of diplomatists, but which had really no contents or significance. As soon, therefore, as he had returned to Holland, Peter was able to renew his connexion with Görz; he even held a personal meeting with him in Loo (August 1717), entered into negotiations with Charles, and a place was appointed for a congress to agree upon a treaty of peace. The Russian troops had been withdrawn from Germany since July, with the exception of 3000, who were nominally in the service of the duke of Mecklenburg, and by whose instrumentality he so oppressed his nobles, and especially the poor city of Rostock, that the empire was at length obliged to afford them aid and protection. Görz had at that time a Russian passport from Peter; he first resided in the neighbourhood of Berlin, then in Dresden; stayed for a short time in Revel, and from thence hastened to Sweden, when he consulted with the king as to the means of satisfying Peter. Peter had united his army on the frontiers of Finland and in Poland, in order to be able, according to circumstances, either to act against king Augustus in favour of Stanislaus, or against Charles XII. The negotiations between Peter's plenipotentiaries and the Swedes, of which no one knew the secret conditions except Görz and his friend Gyllenborg, began in May (1718) at Lofoe, one of the Aland islands, and were entrusted by the czar to his most confidential friends and advisers, Bruce and Ostermann, alone. The whole world was astonished, when Peter once more remained wholly quiet, and Charles directed his whole force against Norway; and still more, when it was understood that preliminaries had been signed between Sweden and Russia, in which the interests of Denmark, Hanover and Saxony had been altogether sacrificed by Russia. Whoever reads these preliminaries cannot

repress a certain degree of admiration of Görz's skill, because it is evident that he was about successfully to extricate his master from those difficulties into which his obstinacy had plunged him*. Charles on this occasion sacrificed all the remaining strength of his brave nation in a thoughtless and wholly useless manner, in the Norwegian mountains; but king George, who had learned from Paris something of the plans which were being forged against him, and of the preliminaries which had been signed by Ostermann and Görz, became seriously alarmed at the cabals of the Swedish king, and sought to win him over to his cause. When, however, all attempts to induce Sweden to enter into negotiations proved vain, king George, supported by his ministers, who were always ready to sacrifice the public interests to those of themselves and their party, drew England into an affair which was merely personal to himself. In May (1718), Admiral Norris, with an English fleet, appeared in the Sound, as Charles was making preparations to invade Norway.

Charles had already made an attempt (1716) to invade Norway and to conquer, or at least to ravage the country; but the attack proved fatal to his own army. The Danes and Norwegians sallied out against the Swedes from the small fortified places in the southern frontiers, which were built around Friedrichshald, harassed the army on its retreat, without danger to themselves, deprived the Swedes of their artillery and baggage, and destroyed their rear-guard. In the year 1717 Charles got on foot an army of 60,000 men in Sweden, which appears almost incredible, and resolved to march at the same time from the north against Drontheim, and along the sea coast on the south against Christiania; but before he could attack Christiania, he was obliged to capture Friedrichshald and the fortifications around it. The whole undertaking was frustrated by the wetness of the year. In the south the Swedes were not masters

* Görz, in order to keep his master in good humour, had also this time inserted among the preliminaries, signed by himself and Ostermann, some conditions which could not possibly be carried out, because the English and Polish nations had not been consulted upon them. The preliminaries were as follows:—1. A separate peace shall be concluded between king Charles, Russia and Prussia, but not with the other allies. 2. Sweden shall lose something on the Prussian side, but receive back all its German possessions. 3. A defensive alliance shall be entered into between Charles and Peter, and Sweden receive compensation from Denmark, England and Poland. 4. Sweden shall obtain Norway, when Peter and Charles with their united forces have established the pretender upon the English throne, and Stanislaus upon that of Poland.

of the sea, whilst in the north, General Armfeld, to whom the whole country was hostile, could only advance over the pathless mountains during frost, and when the ground was deeply covered with snow; and the rivers and brooks, which were unusually swollen from the rain, also obstructed his progress. In the year 1718 the Swedish undertaking was favoured by peculiar drought; Armfeld passed the mountains with 10,000 men, seized upon a rich booty at the celebrated mines of Roraas, and at the end of the summer appeared before Drontheim. Charles, according to his custom, opened his campaign with the boldest exploits*. In order to escape the Danish ships, he caused some transports to be conveyed over mountains and rocks into a bay where he could use them, and did not hesitate to commence the siege of Friederichshald in the beginning of winter, and to carry it on till December†. The fortifications of Güldenlów were taken by storm, and the trenches before Friedrichstein were opened, when Charles was shot in the trenches, probably by the hand of an assassin, about nine o'clock on the evening of the 11th of December. This murder was connected with a revolution which had been long prepared in Sweden, and which was so quickly brought about, that we cannot fail to draw a conclusion, from the whole of the circumstances, that there was a connexion between it and the design upon the king‡.

* On this occasion Charles again showed his love for the extraordinary in a way which would have been more suitable to an English fox-hunter than to an intelligent general and king. Count Leutrum, in Schözer's 'State Papers,' No. xxv., relates, that the king rode thirty-one miles (about 150 English) in twenty-two hours, without being particularly tired; and when he came to Strönstadt in the beginning of July, he caused a command to be given to 1500 men to drag seven boats over the mountains and rocks into the bay of Ulefjöll, where the Danes had some transports, which could only be avoided in this way. The undertaking was successful, but not till the 26th of July; the month of August was only now left, for after that period the weather would necessarily render his designs wholly impracticable.

† Friederichshald itself, although Charles X. had been formerly repulsed there, lies low, and was not even well fortified, but there are several forts upon the neighbouring heights and rocks of Friedrichstein which had been built in 1682. These forts are named Stoor Taarn, i.e. Grossthurm (Great Tower), Oever-Bierget or Oberberg (Upper Mountain), and Güldenlów.

‡ We do not dwell upon this much-discussed and still obscure point. Rühss, whose industry we admire, but whose judgment is worthless, and whose want of tact is well known, declares himself in favour of the opinion that Charles was murdered; he has however, to our surprise, altogether overlooked the documents in Schözer's 'Correspondence,' iii. p. 144, and iv. p. 230; and further, in his 'State Papers,' No. xxiv., art. 6, p. 454, &c. Hojer, part 1. pp. 335, 336, states briefly and convincingly the probabilities in favour of the opinion that the king fell by the hands of an assassin.

§ III.

PARTITION OF THE SWEDISH PROVINCES.—GOVERNMENT AND CONDITION OF LIFE IN THE HIGHER CIRCLES IN RUSSIA, PRUSSIA AND GERMANY, IN WHICH THE PEOPLE IMITATED THE COURT AND THE NOBILITY.

The opinion that Charles XII. fell a sacrifice to a conspiracy, and that his sister, Ulrica Eleonora, who was married to the crown prince of Hesse-Cassel, was not altogether unacquainted with the scheme of the conspirators, appears to be confirmed by the Swedish revolution which immediately followed, and by the manner in which the news of the king's death was conveyed to Stockholm. Adjutant Siggert, who afterwards (1722), in a fit of madness, accused himself of having been guilty of the king's murder, first carried the intelligence to the crown prince of Hesse, who was at a nobleman's house about three-quarters of an hour from the trenches, and the prince sent him secretly forward to his wife, who was in Stockholm; and, singularly enough, sent her at the same time the hat which the king wore, and which was pierced by a ball. Had Charles Frederick duke of Holstein been a young man of courage and resolution, he might have easily frustrated all the plans of the Swedish senate by the help of the army with which he was then present, but he was wholly unfitted for any serious exertion. The brave Dücker, who gained great renown by the defence of Stralsund, offered to have him proclaimed king by the army, but Bassewitz informs us that the duke and his favourite Rebsdorf allowed themselves to place too much confidence on the rights of birth. Dücker then gave up the duke, and a few days afterwards his cause was utterly lost. The conspirators had made themselves masters of the government in Stockholm, and had caused Görz to be arrested as a traitor. The duke of Holstein was without money and enjoyed no respect in the army, without friends and without good qualities of any description; the crown prince of Hesse was indeed neither more worthy nor better adapted for a ruler than he, but he was supported by the oligarchical party and stood at the head of the army, which he led back from Norway to Sweden. The crown prince employed the money (400,000 dollars) which he found in the military chest to advance the views of the party in Stockholm, who wished to use his weak-

mind wife as the instrument of their designs. The Swedish senate did not make the people acquainted with the death of the king till they had fully prepared all their measures for taking complete possession of the government. The senate immediately acknowledged the wife of the crown prince of Hesse as regent of the kingdom, caused the confidential friends of the minister Görz, the Holstein councillor Von der Natt, and the Swedish major-general Eklef to be arrested, and despatched trusty men to seize count von Görz himself, before he should reach the army, on his journey from Lofoe, whither he had gone, to deliver the preliminaries agreed upon with Peter to the king. Görz had just set out from Stromstedt, where he was arrested and brought to Orebro.

It is impossible to disallow the existence of a plan between the leaders in the army and the conspirators in Stockholm. The same council of war which despatched Siggert to Stockholm had already resolved upon the arrest of Görz, without waiting for orders from the capital, and even given directions that he should be shot if he attempted defence or resistance. Baumgard, colonel of the noble guards, and the chamberlain Biörskiöld, who had been sent from Stockholm, by their violent behaviour at the arrest of Görz, exhibited the rude and brutal rage of their party, which had been long held in restraint but was now at length victorious. Neither the good Ulrica Eleonora, nor the crown prince, her husband, were however fully aware of the proper objects of the aristocratic party, who used them as their tools. Moreover, Baumgard and Biörskiöld failed in getting possession of the whole correspondence with respect to the Russian negotiations, as these were in the custody of the Holstein secretary Stambke, and not in that of Görz; and the former escaped by a lucky accident.

The council of government hastened to acknowledge the rights of the new queen, as soon as she had given her promise to consent to a complete alteration of the existing constitution. An assembly of the estates was summoned on the 11th of February 1719 for agreeing upon and drawing up a new constitution. Whilst the elections for members of the assembly were being held through the whole country, the Swedish army, which had been before Drontheim, was utterly lost in a most melancholy manner. Armfeld resolved to march back to Sweden, and to cross the northern mountains, in the midst of an ex-

tremely severe winter (Jan. 1719); and in consequence of his attempt, his whole army, with the exception of 500 men, perished from cold, and he himself with the greatest difficulty and maimed by the frost again reached the inhabited parts of Sweden*. The new revolution in Sweden, in its very commencement, confirmed the result of general experience, that of all despotisms, that of an aristocratic oligarchy is the most terrible and destructive; because it is more certain of its continuance than a democratic one, which according to its nature must be short-lived; because it is less afraid of the people; and because it is more calculated to excite feelings of envy and hatred than a monarchical one.

Peter Ribbing, president of the diet which assembled in February, and as such chairman of the criminal court which tried Görz, has obtained a species of infamous immortality, such as that of the English chief justice Jeffreys, and the French public prosecutor Fouquier Tainville. The history of these three men proves, that no form of constitution in and of itself affords a protection against the malice of passion. The Englishman pursued his mad vengeance under the commission of a monarch; the Frenchman did despite to reason and justice in reliance upon the ruling masses; and the Swede did violence to all the feelings of honour and humanity in the name of an oligarchy of nobles.

The same disregard of justice which was exhibited by this noble court in the case of Görz, was displayed by the estates under the leading of the nobility for all the principles of the constitution. The queen, who was at first acknowledged as sole administratrix of the kingdom, was obliged to relinquish all claims from descent to the sovereignty of Charles XI. and Charles XII. in order to be proclaimed queen by the election of the estates. Sweden, as they declared, was to become an electoral kingdom after the death of the queen, and a completely new form of government was to be instituted. The powers which the kings had possessed fell into the hands of a few noble families. Even before the new constitution was framed or adopted, the assembly of estates, led by the nobles, showed what was to

* The range of mountains which separates Inteland from Norway is extremely rude and inclement even in summer. Armfeld's army perished in the Tydal mountains, where there was a complete destitution of firing. Carriages, cannon and baggage were afterwards found scattered about in this desert; the wagons packed and the horses frozen in harness. The multitude of dead bodies was so great, that they attracted an unusual number of beasts of prey, so that hunters for years afterwards resorted to the neighbourhood.

be expected from men, who, under the name of country, were accustomed to think of their own interests and those of their families and friends alone. The army, whose services were now more than ever necessary, was reduced and most shamefully treated, because it was feared it might prove more favourable to monarchical than to oligarchical rule; and the alteration of the value of the coin was quite suddenly adopted, to the ruin of thousands*. Görz was accused of high treason, on account of his negotiations with Russia, and brought to trial before a kind of revolutionary tribunal: the preliminaries to which he had consented were disallowed, and yet no measures were taken for the defence of the kingdom. From this time forward Peter ventured to make predatory incursions into Sweden Proper, exercised the greatest cruelties, and wasted the country even to the very gates of Stockholm.

Görz, as long as he had been in the service of Sweden, had undertaken nothing except with the approbation or upon the special command of the king; and the tribunal by which he was judged, in his condemnation and sentence, violated all the principles of law and custom, of decency and propriety, as well as all the rules of proceeding and equity: the result was such as always follows the abuse of judicial forms. Görz became an object of universal sympathy, in consequence of his illegal and unjust persecution, although his conduct in Holstein proved him to be a man wholly destitute of all right principles and morality, and the proceedings of his political opponents brought them into universal contempt. The tribunal, of which Ribbing was the president, consisted of a very small committee of the estates, and therefore of enemies of the accused, of persons who had resolved upon excluding the duke of Holstein from the succession in Sweden, and wished to hear nothing of a peace with

* Enough has been said to justify the observations in the text with regard to the prosecution of Görz and those who were concerned in it. In reference to the defence of the country and the sudden debasement of the coin which was in the hands of the poorer classes, we shall quote the two revolutionary decrees of the Swedish diet. It was decreed, that all reserves as well as the full regiments (which alone amounted to more than 20,000 men) should be discharged, and the officers relieved from service, *without payment of the considerable arrears which were due to them*. As to the money, the whole nature of the coinage was at once abolished, and every Lubeck mark was reduced two Lubeck shillings. The possessors of crown obligations were indeed to receive twenty-one shillings Lubeck for every rixdollar, but when might they hope to be paid?

Russia, to which the duke was favourable. Of four hundred counts, which were laid in the pleadings against Görz, not one was sustained by proof: such accusations therefore were not indeed allowed to be considered, but the minister was made responsible for the offences which had been committed by the king. It was Görz alone who was said to have pushed paper money into forced circulation in the kingdom; Görz, as these flatterers expressed themselves, to embitter the minds of the peasants, had caused copper money to be stamped with the images of heathen gods, and made it pass current for a sum which bore no relation to its real value; Görz was the cause and originator of the last campaign, and had been desirous of bringing Peter into the country in order to place the duke of Holstein on the throne. The members of this criminal tribunal took no oath; none of the usual benevolent provisions of the law were permitted to the accused, and no defender was assigned or allowed him; he had only one hearing, and during that hearing was obliged to stand for four hours; the notes of the trial were wholly one-sided, used at pleasure and not read over in his presence, and the grounds of accusation first communicated when the sentence of death was pronounced. The scandalous decision of the criminal tribunal was confirmed* by the majority of the council of state, and Görz was publicly executed on the 13th of March 1719. The courtier Bassewitz, who was the enemy of Görz and a man without heart or principles, had just then come to Sweden, and gained a complete ascendancy over the weak duke of Holstein, whom he afterwards used as an instrument for the promotion of his own views, but he was too cunning to allow himself to be involved in this hateful prosecution carried on by the Swedes†.

The Swedes soon found that an oligarchical despotism was quite as ruinous, and far more disgraceful, than a monarchical

* Nine voices in the council were given against this judicial murder. Ribbing characterized his own brutal vulgarity by the expression, "What need is there of forms? *He has lived like a rascal, and he must also die like a rascal.*"

† In Bassewitz's *éclaircissemens* in Busching's Mag., part 9, p. 321, the following passage appears: "Il objecta, que vu leur inimitié et le malheur de Goerz sa délation seroit suspecte et peu généreuse et se borna simplement à réfuter ce qu'une haine implacable ou peut-être la nécessité de se disculper firent avancer à celui-ci contre lui. A son sens ce politique sans foi mérita la mort en Holstein, mais non en Suède, où il enfila le vrai chemin de rétablir les affaires de la couronne en se tournant du côté du czar."

one. The five great dignities of the kingdom had been already restored, and now five courts were formed, in order to add dignity to the men who filled these honourable offices, and for whom money must in some way or other be procured. Charles Güldenstern was created first magistrate of the kingdom (*reichsdrost*), Niels Güldenstern, commander-in-chief (*reichsfeldherr*), Rhenschiöld, admiral-in-chief (*reichsadmiral*), Arfwed Horn, chancellor of the kingdom, and Cronhielm, treasurer. These gentlemen were presidents of the various colleges of government, whose members were chosen from the twenty-four councillors of state to whom the government of the country was entrusted, and among whom Dücker also had a place. The queen who had been elected possessed the mere shadow of royalty, and could do nothing without the consent and approbation of the council, and whatever she did without such consent and approbation was invalid; whereas on the contrary, as expressed in the law, the council might interfere about the rights and privileges of the kingdom without the queen; and whoever opposed or resisted them was declared guilty of high treason, and subject to the penalty of life and limb. No resolution was to be regarded as valid unless ten councillors at least were present. The queen was to have the privilege of the casting-vote in case of an equal division in the council, and also of maintaining her opinion in opposition to a majority of two, but in the latter case she must assign her reasons. All the colleges of the kingdom were subject to the council of state; and the high court of criminal jurisdiction, before which alone persons of patrician or equestrian rank could be accused, must always be presided over by a member of the council. The places of honour and profit were bestowed upon the nobility, or rather upon the clients of the council, for whose pleasure and advantage the whole of Sweden was divided into twenty-four circuits of jurisdiction, or prefectures.

This constitution was again modified for the advantage of the ruling oligarchy in 1720, after having been accepted in its original form by the queen. The estates were the mere plaything of the nobles, who comforted the citizens and peasants by the assurance that a diet should be held once in every three years. The peasants from the beginning were excluded from the privilege which was secured to the three other estates—that of proposing three persons as candidates to fill up vacancies

when they occurred in the council of state. The weak and insignificant Charles Frederick duke of Holstein, who, like all his fellows, was disposed to despotism, was the object of hatred and persecution to his aunt, who was childish enough to bear in unkind recollection the simple and foolish tricks which he had played upon her in his childhood, and of the council of state, who were afraid that Stambke, who had taken refuge in Russia, might bring about an alliance between the duke and the czar. The duke was at length driven out of Sweden (June 1719) by repeated annoyances and insults, but the kingdom fell a prey to the Russians, whose predatory incursions deprived thousands of Swedes of their property, and many of health and life, whilst the council at the same time sold the external provinces of Sweden to other powers for contemptible sums. The English minister, Carteret, was the soul of all those negotiations with Denmark, Prussia and Hanover; he eagerly sought and gained the favour of his king by diligently working for the territorial augmentation of Hanover by the influence of English money; he distributed wealth liberally among the members of the council of state, and sought to win the favour of the queen, who was tenderly attached to her husband, however little he, like the other princes of his house, remained faithful to his wife, by promising to support her in her attempts to procure him the crown.

Peace was first concluded with the elector of Hanover in July 1719, although not confirmed till November of the same year. This preference was not founded on his being either a fearful enemy, or having any just claims to be satisfied, but because services and money were expected from Hanover and England. By the terms of this peace, Bremen and Verden, together with the claims upon Wildshausen as a pledge, were ceded, and Hanover promised, as a compensation, to pay to Sweden 1,000,000 dollars within three months. The same English ministers who were thus solicitous to win the favour of their king, in order that they, with their relations, friends and partisans, might domineer over England undisturbed, afterwards gave money to the Danes, which they paid over to the Swedes, and on the conclusion of the defensive treaty on the 1st February 1720, promised that England would assist the Swedes against Russia, although the ministers knew well that parliament would never allow them to fulfil their promise. The peace between Prussia and Sweden was brought to a close, by means of English and French mediation,

in 1720. Prussia received all the country lying between the Oder and the Peene, Stettin, Damm, Golnau, the islands of Usedom and Wollin. The voice in the imperial diet which was attached to the dominion of this part of Pomerania was however left to Sweden, and Prussia engaged to impose no tolls on the navigation of the Peene, and within half a year to pay 3,000,000 dollars.

As Sweden had now left king Stanislaus to his fate, there was no longer any cause of quarrel with Saxony, and the only subjects of negotiation were the terms of the amnesty to be granted on both sides, about which their respective representatives speedily came to an agreement (January 1720). Matters could not be brought to such a speedy issue with Denmark without doing violence to all sense of propriety, for both Denmark and Sweden would be obliged to make a sacrifice of the duke of Holstein, who was wholly blameless in the war, if Denmark did not once more enter into an alliance with Russia. Peter had already made a proposal to Denmark to attack Sweden with their combined forces, and sword in hand to place the duke upon the Swedish throne. Carteret, who had previously accomplished everything in Stockholm by money and cabals, was again indefatigably active in the negotiations between Sweden and Denmark; he in fact importunately urged the Danes and Swedes to subscribe an agreement drawn up by himself, and which, contrary to all usage, custom and propriety, was written in French. The French draft of the agreement had been hastily made, but Carteret himself travelled from Stockholm to the king of Denmark, and succeeded in securing his precipitate acceptance of the conditions which had been drawn up. The conditions were of such a nature, that although the agreement had been confirmed in the end of July, neither of the parties ventured to make them known. Their publication first took place at the end of the year 1721. Sweden received back Pomerania, Rügen, Marstrandt, and all the places conquered by the Danes in Bahuslehn: it promised on the other hand not again to fortify Wismar, and to renounce the claim of freedom from toll in the Sound. Denmark was to receive from Sweden, as compensation for the return of the conquered places, 600,000 dollars, which probably did not come from the Swedish but from the English treasury. The main point however was the spoliation of the duke of Holstein, who was to lose Sleswick, without

having taken any part in the war. The queen of Sweden was ashamed to secure to the king of Denmark a country of which her own nephew was forcibly robbed, and therefore England and France became guarantees to Denmark for the fulfilment of this condition. It was proposed to the duke, in the way in which such proposals are often made by the stronger to the weaker, that he should formally consent to the cession of Sleswick, and he should in that case be fully restored to Holstein: he sought protection however on account of Holstein from the diet of the empire, and refused his consent to the violent spoliation of Sleswick. Denmark however kept possession of Holstein till the end of the year 1720, in spite of the imperial decree of exhortation, till at length the emperor and Hanover became ashamed of allowing the decree of the empire to be made a matter of scorn and contempt. The emperor issued a decree of execution, addressed to the directors of the circle of Lower Saxony, and touching the case of Holstein, which placed Hanover in a position of great difficulty; and the government, in order to avoid displeasing the emperor, prevailed upon the Danes to re-establish the government, chancery and chambers of Holstein in Kiel.

The disputes between Denmark and Holstein were moreover neither brought to a conclusion by the peace with Sweden, nor by the establishment of the government in Kiel. Their differences were not merely about possessions, but a contest was also carried on with reference to the administration of justice and the common government over the prelates and nobility in Holstein. The duke travelled about the world, made himself ridiculous by his obstinacy and contemptible by his immoralities, and spent the little he had in diplomatic undertakings from which he derived no possible advantage, when Peter at length by fair promises allured him to Russia*. Peter caused this invitation to be given, in order to frighten the council of state into a peace,

* Hojer, 'Life of Frederick IV.' part ii. p. 6. This unfortunate duke went on the 7th of May from Stockholm over Ystadt to Rostock, and arrived in Hamburg on the 15th of June, where he first assumed the title of "Royal Highness," but was led into all sorts of sensuality by his own people, who by means of wine and other allurements knew how to obtain from him titles, employments, discharges for debts, &c., and everything which they desired. He then, notwithstanding his own bad circumstances and the disadvantages consequent upon being in a state of pupillage, made a present of 300,000 dollars to his guardian, the bishop of Lubeck. From Hamburg he went in July to the king of England in Hanover, but returned without having accomplished anything, *et seq.*

from the apprehension that he would support the pretensions of the rightful heir to the throne by force of arms. The Swedes were so deeply incensed against Peter, in consequence of his late predatory incursions, and of the unheard-of and barbarous devastations* of which he had been guilty in Sweden, that they could not bring themselves to the resolution of ceding the Baltic provinces. Before the duke went to Russia he took a journey to Vienna, where, considering his situation, he was guilty of most extravagant conduct, maintained ambassadors at all courts, whilst his ministers tried in all directions to borrow money, and their attempts were everywhere unsuccessful. The miserable courtier who had charge of the duke's affairs accepted a present in money† from the duke-regent, or rather from Law, made a loud appeal in England, and attempted even to get a contribution from the covetous and selfish Menzikoff; but he, before he would give a loan, required Peter's guarantee for its repayment. When the duke found that he merely received friendly words and communications in Vienna, or at most well-sounding decrees, but neither active interference nor money, he went at length to St. Petersburg. Whilst the duke of Holstein was exhibiting this miserable greatness of empty ostentation, the crown prince of Hesse had sacrificed more than a million of good Hessian dollars, in order to obtain the empty shadow of kingly power after which he was striving. He was elected and crowned in

* Peter went in June 1719, with a fleet of 30 ships of war, 150 galleys and 300 barges, carrying in all 40,000 men, to Åland, took up his station for a time among the cliffs of the island of Lämeland, and sent Apraxin to ravage the coasts on the right of Stockholm, whilst Lessy destroyed everything on the left of the city. North and South Telge, Nyköping, Norköping, Osthhammer and Öregrund, together with two small towns, were burned, besides 150 noble mansions, 43 mills, 1360 villages, 21 copper, iron and tile works. Among the iron-works, one was worth 300,000 dollars. 100,000 cattle were slaughtered, and 80,000 bars of iron thrown into the sea. The mines were sprung and the woods set on fire, and fears entertained for Stockholm itself.

† On this occasion the regent of France played the same part which many have played in a masterly manner in our own days. We shall quote his own MS. correspondence in order to prove that the landgrave of Hesse Cassel had already calculated, before the death of Charles XII., upon his son's succession to the throne of Sweden. In Carton K. 148. of the 'Archives du Royaume de France,' there is a volume of letters from the duke-regent, in one of which he writes in answer to the landgrave, who had made him acquainted with Charles's death, that "he wished him joy," because he had no doubt that the wife of the crown prince would be elected. When the duke of Holstein afterwards wrote to him from Hamburg, he answered: "*Je ne puis en attendant que plaindre votre triste situation et vous assurer que je serois ravi de la rendre plus heureuse.*"* Then he sent him alms.

May 1720, but was first obliged to acknowledge the new constitution, which made the king quite the toy of the high nobility*. Almost all offices, situations and advantages to be derived from the state were formally secured to the nobility as a right, and what is remarkable enough, the fourth estate or peasantry were not permitted to choose their own secretary, or person who was to speak and write on their behalf, but were obliged to submit to his being chosen for them from one of the other three estates. The relation of this most iniquitous constitution to the people may be best seen by the composition of the committee which was to manage the general affairs of the estates. This committee, appointed (1720) for the more speedy despatch of the current business, consisted of fifty nobles, twenty-five of the clergy and as many from the class of citizens; whilst of the peasantry, or those who might represent them, there was none. This will explain the reason why every meeting of the diet afterwards presented a field of contest for life and death; why the constitution was altered almost at every successive meeting for the greater advantage of the oligarchy; and why Peter, as soon as he began to threaten them with the duke of Holstein and with the party of the people who were favourable to him, obtained conditions which he did not venture to ask for during the time of his devastations on the coast (1719), when he sent Ostermann from Lämeland to Stockholm. The oligarchs and their mock king had reckoned in vain upon the intercession of the English ambassador, and the assistance of the admiral and his fleet. Carteret was not however listened to by Peter, and admiral Norris did not venture to attack the Russians, because he knew that the English nation was dissatisfied with the politics of their king and of his ministers, who favoured his Hanoverian plans. The Swedes were at length obliged to acquiesce in the Russian demands: negotiations for peace were again commenced in Nystädt at the end of the year 1720, but continued till the close of the following, and their conclusion was only

* The king can give no order upon the state treasury for more than fifty dollars; he can only ennoble eight persons every diet, and is not permitted to bestow the privileges of citizenship upon any stranger; he is not allowed to alter any of the privileges of the nobles, and they arrange all amongst themselves without his interference. As to offices, the colonels in the military and the presidents in the civil service appoint their subordinates. The higher officers are either chosen by the council by plurality of voices, or the king is to select one out of three proposed by the council.

brought about by the exercise of some further cruelties on the part of the Russians. The Swedes had demanded a cessation of hostilities during the whole time in which the negotiations were pending, but Peter had only granted it till May 1721, in order to compel the council of state to come to a resolution by that time; and as this did not take place, the whole coast of Sweden was again plundered and devastated in the month of June. The Russian incendiaries landed in sight of the English, whose fleet under admiral Norris still continued in the Baltic, but did not venture to lend any assistance to the Swedes. The whole coast, from Gefle as far as Umea, was plundered; four small towns, nineteen villages, eighty noble and five hundred peasants' houses burnt; twelve iron-works and eight saw-mills destroyed; six galleys and other ships carried away; and still the government did not conclude a peace in consequence of the sufferings of the people, but only because the narrow-hearted selfish oligarchs and their anxieties required it. The shameless audacity of a government in which one member can always shift the blame of all faults and mistakes upon another, the total want of all magnanimity and patriotism, which sooner or later becomes the characteristic of every privileged body, was exhibited in the clearest light on this occasion. At first they preferred exposing the country to a new landing and devastation of the Russians to admitting a Holstein ambassador into the assembly, or opening up the most distant prospect to the duke of reaching the throne. Afterwards, the cession of the Swedish provinces which were occupied by Russia were combined with and compensated by the provisions of the seventh article of the treaty about to be concluded. By this article, Peter promises not to interfere with the internal affairs of Sweden, and to take no part, mediately or immediately, in the disputes respecting the succession to the throne. This was quite in accordance with the cruelty with which these aristocrats persecuted every friend of the monarchy. About this time the council, by importunate demands, constrained the citizens of Hamburg, who were anxious about their trade, to deliver up a provost of Finland who had taken up his abode in their city, and had committed no other offence than that of travelling for the duke to Russia and corresponding with his partisans. The provost was executed, and the Swedes had the consolation, that on this occasion an orthodox German government of tradesmen

and jurists had sunk itself still a degree lower in the scale of contempt than their own noble oligarchy. The provinces ceded to Russia by the peace of Nystädt (10th Sept. 1721) were Livonia, Esthonia and Carelia, together with Wiborg, Kexholm, and the island of Oesel; on the other hand, Peter restored Finland, with the exception of Wiborg and Kexholm, and promised to pay two millions of dollars, but in the first years of the peace scarcely paid off half a million.

From this time forward, the despotic sway and military oppression of Russia became the dread of all neighbouring countries and people. All contributed to the external greatness and splendour of the ruler of a barbarous but powerful race of slaves, whom Peter constrained to adopt the vestments of civilization. The czar commanded in Poland and Scandinavia, where weak or wicked governments were constantly in dread from the discontent of the people. He also gained an influence in Germany which ultimately caused no small anxiety to the emperor and the empire. The Russian minister Bestuschef played the chief part in Sweden in all political affairs, sometimes by counsel and sometimes by threats, sometimes by mediation and sometimes by commands. Bestuschef was powerful in the Swedish council, and at the same time, in compliance with the wishes of his master, allured artists, artisans, workmen, and all those who had been deprived of occupation or ruined by the late inroads of the Russians, to remove with their tools, manufactures and trades to Russia. Peter employed these people in all parts of his empire to raise up manufactories, to originate trades, and to set mines and iron-works in action. The Russian minister spoke in a no less commanding tone in Copenhagen than in Sweden, for Denmark was also frightened by Peter's threats to adopt and second the cause of the duke of Holstein. The duke was detained in Russia by repeated promises, of whose fulfilment there was little prospect; Poland was suffering from the Saxons and Russians since the withdrawal of the Swedes. King Augustus, ever distinguished for his love of pomp and splendour, and admired as a pattern of all courtly ornament in language and manners, gave himself no concern about the misery of the Saxons and Poles. He projected plans for balls, festivities and processions, and Flemming, who had spent a princely fortune in his lifetime, and nevertheless bequeathed many millions of ill-gotten wealth to his heirs, pledged whole towns and estates in Poland to the

Jews*, in order to be able to rival the fêtes of his master without loss or injury to himself. At this time the confederated Poles were carrying on the struggle in arms against Augustus, the Saxons and their friends, and Peter availed himself of the bloody contest between the Poles and their king (1716–1717) to interfere as umpire in their affairs. The Poles, through Russian mediation, were at length reconciled to their king, and the Russians not only kept firm possession of Courland, but remained in Poland itself, under the pretence of preserving the peace of the country. Peter nevertheless, in his negotiations with Görz and Charles XII., showed himself well inclined to sacrifice king Augustus to his plans; but this scheme was frustrated by the death of Charles. The unfortunate Stanislaus in the mean time wandered about the world poor and forsaken. Charles XII. alone, as long as he lived, magnanimously maintained his cause, and after his death he was obliged to find an asylum in the territories of France. Charles had given him permission to reside in Deux-ponts, which had been the property of Sweden since the time of Charles X.; after the extinction of the male line by the death of the king of Sweden, it fell to the poor prince of Kleeburg, Charles X.'s nephew, as an imperial fief. The new possessor was under obligations to the king of Poland, because the latter had exerted himself to prevent any other pretender from getting precedency of the prince; but the new duke was as zealous a friend of Protestantism as Stanislaus was of the Jesuits, by whom he was continually surrounded. He was therefore very unkindly treated by the new ruler, because, during his sojourn in Deux-ponts, he had done everything in his power to promote the interests of Catholicism and to injure those of the Protestants. Stanislaus moreover accused king Augustus of having sent out hired assassins against him, whilst he was thinking of nothing else in Deux-ponts than of making proselytes to his faith. The new ruler of Deux-ponts would not endure his presence for an instant in the city, and he was obliged

* In Carton K. 149. of the 'Archives du Royaume de France' are to be found the papers left behind him by king Stanislaus. They consist of numerous letters to his daughter, the queen of France, his will, a full statement and valuation of his estates and his disposition of them. We shall occasionally refer to and quote from them, however insignificant and unworthy of a throne Stanislaus, from his bigotry and fanaticism, shows himself to have been. In the statement of his lands and property he observes:—"Quant à ceux qui possèdent actuellement ces terres, la ville de Lissa et de Reizen; le juif Lehmann en est actuellement le possesseur sous le nom du feldmaréchal Flemming."

to take his departure with so much haste, that Keyssler in his 'Travels'* informs us he had difficulty in procuring even the means of paying the expense of his journey from Deux-ponts to Weissenburg in Alsace. Under these circumstances it was an act of beneficence for Stanislaus, on the part of Sweden, to include him in the treaty which was concluded with king Augustus. He was to be allowed to retain the title of king, to receive 1,000,000 florins for his estates, which were confiscated, but which Augustus indeed treated like all his other pecuniary obligations and never paid†. The preliminaries of peace between Sweden and king Augustus had been concluded as early as 1719, but the proper contract was only confirmed three years afterwards by the Swedish and Polish senates.

If we turn our attention from politics, chanceries and diplomatists, as they are presented to us in the preceding narrative, to cast a glance upon private life, and upon the manners and usages of the courts and higher circles, we shall find them on the one hand artificial, extravagant, ostentatious, burthensome and tastelessly pompous, and on the other rude and semi-barbarous. The fêtes of king Augustus of Poland, and the life in Berlin, Potsdam, Wusterhausen, or in Moscow and St. Petersburg, present us with the most surprising examples of both; we shall therefore in our remarks especially keep Russia under Peter, Prussia under Frederick William, and Saxony under king Au-

* Keyssler's 'Travels,' part ii. p. 1463:—The palatine Gustavus Samuel received the first news of Charles's death from Stanislaus; nevertheless he not only sent Stanislaus out of the province, but was unwilling to furnish a single carriage for the conveyance of his baggage, although Stanislaus had not at that time more than twenty louis d'or in his treasury.

† Stanislaus in the above-mentioned Carton K. gives a full account of all his estates and claims in Poland, and says the actual Leszinski estates brought in a yearly income of some 50–60,000 dollars, and it appears from his own words how great his folly was in accepting the crown. He states that his father left his property deeply in debt:—"Ce qui demandoit un grand arrangement, non seulement pour acquitter les dettes, mais pour prévenir que sous leur charge tout le bien, et toute la masse de la substance ne succombât. Cependant au lieu de pouvoir y travailler, j'ai été obligé de quitter non seulement le soin de mes affaires domestiques, mais encore l'habitation sur mes terres depuis 1704. Pendant ces trente-quatre années [He wrote this after the second Polish war, when he obtained Lorraine] j'ai été obligé à mes dépens à plusieurs fraix de guerre, la Suède me laissent souvent manquer du plus nécessaire pour soutenir une révolution, qui à la fin s'est terminée à me faire vivre dans le pays étranger et à pourvoir à mon entretien et à celui de ma famille. Depuis 1709 mes terres ont été pillées et brulées et exposées aux ravages continuels jusqu'à ce qu'elles ont été prises en possession par des créanciers qui hors de possession ont accumulé des intérêts que surpassent les capitaux."

gustus, in our eye, and briefly advert to the other German courts, temporal and spiritual, in their order. We direct attention especially to those just mentioned, because they will furnish us with the best examples of the combination of the two extremes of rudeness and vain ostentation; and we shall also frequently avail ourselves of the information furnished by the biographer (Fassmann) of those courtly times, because he was an historian quite suited to the life which he describes. How happy were those times in which the follies and vices of men of rank were virtues! in which no one ventured to see their conduct in a more unfavourable light than themselves! That such was really the case, and that in private people condemned and despised what they dare not venture publicly to blame, we have abundant proofs, as in the detestable memoirs of the princess of Prussia with respect to her father and her whole family, and in by far the greater number of the memoirs published by those connected with the court in France.

King Augustus increased the splendour of his court and the expenditure wasted upon fêtes and processions, upon favourites, mistresses and illegitimate children, just in proportion as the misery and poverty of the Saxons became greater. Since the Poles had altogether refused the support of his troops, he rolled off their maintenance, and especially that of his noble guards, upon the Saxons alone. All means of procuring money, allowable and unallowable, were tried and exhausted; the easy and well-disposed estates contracted one million of obligations after another; according to traditionary usage, they continued to decree new scores of groschen and quarterly contributions to be extracted from the pockets of the people; they established lotteries and imposed taxes upon property. In order that their king and baron Flemming might celebrate carnivals, the estates of the kingdom caused excise and taxes to be raised even from the raw materials for manufacture, imposed ordinary and extraordinary war-taxes in times of peace, and were nevertheless obliged every year to contract new debts. The king had at an earlier period pledged the district of Borna to Saxe Gotha, Gräfenhayn to the princess of Dessau, the Saxon division of Mansfeld to Hanover, and Pforte to Saxe Weimar; the sums received for these pledges scarcely sufficed for the displays of a single carnival, and yet the amusements of each following year were more splendid than those of the preceding. We shall after-

wards present our readers with Fassmann's accounts of these festivities, because he speaks and writes the language of a fawning adulator of these high-born profligates. Some traits from the life of the courts of St. Petersburg, and from the rude insolence of Frederick William, may serve as contrasts; and every one will judge for himself from the facts, without our explanation, how much better the rude, vigorous and gormandizing people appear, who were still striving after progress and development, and are characteristically represented by the conduct of Peter and Frederick William, than the nobles, the high officials and court creatures reflected in the life and character of king Augustus. In order to introduce Fassmann, we select the occasion on which the elector was betrothed to an Austrian princess, and it was necessary to procure money for the marriage festivities. The heir to this protestant land had already passed over to the Romish faith in 1711, but the king only made the fact known years after its occurrence, and sought at the same time to pacify the minds of the estates of the country, whom he had assembled to contract new debts and to lay on new taxes, by a formal assurance with regard to their religion. On this occasion the court historian reports as follows:—"The gentlemen members of the estates, if they were disposed, might have gone every evening, for some weeks together, to masked balls at court, or might have visited operas and comedies; his royal majesty was one evening so splendidly dressed in masquerade, that the jewels which he wore upon his royal person were valued at several millions." Immediately after Augustus went with all his retinue of male and female courtiers to Poland in order to receive the Turkish ambassador, merely because the reception would afford him an opportunity for the display of pomp and splendour. The reception took place in the city of Reussen, which belonged to Stanislaus' personal possessions, and the court historian furnishes us with the following account of the ceremony:—"His majesty sat upon the throne dressed in a violet-coloured velvet mantle slashed. This was adorned and set with a garniture of diamond buttons, which, without the sword and other ornaments thereto pertaining, were valued at a million of dollars." The description of the pompous ceremonies and fêtes celebrated on the occasion of the electoral prince's marriage fill not less than sixty-eight printed pages. We must necessarily bring all this pro-

minently forward, in order that it may be known in what manner the German public were entertained in our fathers' times, and what kind of histories the faithful people were graciously permitted to buy and read. And when we hear the reasons which are assigned as an excuse for detailed and circumstantial accounts, we no longer wonder that the German nation became so servile and courtly as it still remains. He says, "he must describe all these ceremonies and festivities with great care and minuteness, because they would furnish splendid examples of the profound understanding and lordly taste of the king, by whom they were all arranged and given." We here learn that the whole month of September was occupied with the exhibition of Italian and French operas and comedies; that wild-beast hunts alternated with fireworks and exhibitions on horseback and on foot; that carousals and running at the ring, Turkish and other processions, night races, water-parties, a fair consisting of maskers of all nations, ladies' and miners' fêtes, rejoiced at the same time the high nobility who were parties in the exhibitions, and the people who stared with wonder and admiration at their splendour. Whilst these thankless and selfish portions of the people, that is, the alms-givers and the alms-receivers, were revelling in such pleasures and delights, the thinking part of the community, who were too poor to give and too proud to receive, had to lament over the existence of a terrific famine, which prevailed to such an extent in the Erzegebirge, and so oppressed its industrious inhabitants, that in many places they were destitute of bread. Notwithstanding all this, the corn which was bought up in Gotha, not by the extravagant ruler, but by the states, was made a matter of usurious speculation. On this occasion the courtly eulogist of extravagance for once shows that he knew well what a trade he was pursuing, and admits that the starving people were not cared for with such high understanding as those who were the instruments of pleasure and ostentation*.

Immediately afterwards, in the year 1725, it is said, "carnival amusements were kept up from the 7th of January till the 13th of February, which exceeded in splendour all previous

* 'Life of Frederick Augustus king of Poland, etc.' p. 845. Because the matter passed through the hands of the Jews, it is a question whether the price of corn was any relief to poverty, as the king's majesty had wished, willed and desired it might be.

years.” In June of the same year a new series of fêtes and ceremonies commenced, which lasted for several weeks; and it is characteristic of the life, tone and style of writing of the court life of that, or rather of all times, to read the terms of the official report. They run as follows:—“Count Von Friesen married the elder countess Cosel, who was a natural daughter of the king; the king therefore went to Pilnitz, collected some regiments of Saxons and the whole splendour of the court, and such amusements were got up as have never been seen at a count’s marriage *since the world began*.” We shall merely add, that such celebrations and festivities were repeated every year, and that some opinion of the whole expense of these absurd and unreasonable fêtes may be gathered from the fact, that the prizes for the court lottery for the ladies in 1719 amounted to 60,000 dollars, and that this was but a mere trifle in their pleasures and amusements.

Although Peter of Russia ruled over the whole country extending from the Chinese frontiers and the Persian mountains which bound the Caspian Sea to the Frozen Ocean, over Finland, Esthonia and Courland, with unrestricted power, and mediately by his influence over Denmark, Sweden and Poland, yet he remained wholly unchanged, and continued at the same time barbarously rude in his external appearance. His conduct with his niece, the duchess of Mecklenburg, even in Prussia, and before the whole court, was such as a regard for the most ordinary decency altogether precludes us from describing, and such as would have been disgraceful to the rudest barbarians. He left it to his wife, who was neither handsome, well-educated, nor particularly clever, as has been generally alleged, progressively to effect those changes in the manners of the court and to adopt those luxurious habits which prevailed in other European capitals and were now become indispensable; he himself retained the utmost simplicity, and directed his attention to those things alone which were of immediate necessity or advantage. The condition of the whole Russian court was so rapidly changed by Peter and his assistants, the Asiatic and barbarous modes of life were so quickly replaced by the artificial and European, that Peter’s court, life, intercourse and fêtes afforded the most singular contrast with his dress, morals and language. All was completely changed, from the highest to the lowest,—dress, dwellings, society and life; and Peter was not very scrupulous about the

choice of the means for effecting his objects, because he neither had had any principles of justice and morality inculcated upon him in his youth, nor had he at a later period either leisure or inclination to adopt and cultivate any such ideas for himself. The execution of his son by his first marriage, the cruel treatment and imprisonment of the repudiated mother of his child, and the inhuman punishment of her friends, were all with him means of civilization. As the Romans boast of their Brutus, he also sacrificed his son to the greatness of his people, because he foresaw that the barbarous and superstitious prince would allow everything to be destroyed which he, with so much pains and ability, had created. Peter's case is also a further proof of what is well known from history and experience, that the price which heroes must pay for immortal renown, and for power and splendour, which is more pleasing in the eyes of men than in those of God, is of that kind from which all serious and thoughtful men must shrink back, but which fills the masses, and their poets and orators, with wonder and astonishment. This is fully proved by the examples of Peter and Buonaparte, who resembled each other in making the most detestable and wicked uses of their police. Drinking-bouts and intoxication, in which he forced his attendants to indulge, were used by Peter as means of promoting his political ends, and of ascertaining the true opinions and feelings of those by whom he was surrounded. In his rude and barbarous festivities he displayed a liveliness and wit which were quite suited to the taste and understanding of his Russians, and ridiculed things which either he himself could not endure, or to which he wished to raise an aversion in others. Among these we reckon the ridiculous interment of his dwarf; the marriage of his court-fool Sotof, whom he made patriarch and afterwards pope; with these may be classed his ridicule of the Romish court and its cardinals, at a time when the report was intentionally spread that he would no longer endure a patriarch in his Greek church, because he was in negotiation with the pope. With respect to the habits of life which prevailed at the court of St. Petersburg, we possess three different, most minute and complete narratives, written by German courtiers. The first is that of Weber, the Mecklenburg ambassador, in his 'Altered Russia,' in which the most complete collection of documents is given with respect to the history of the unfortunate Alexis; the second is the 'Memoirs of the Holstein minister, Bassewitz;'

and the third is the tedious and prolix journal of the Holstein high chamberlain, Von Bergholz. Weber informs us of what was then, moreover, very usual in the German courts themselves, that immediately on his arrival he was entertained by admiral Apraxin in the name of the czar, and that he soon found himself and the whole court who were there assembled drunk and lying upon the floor*. In Bergholz we find, in almost every page, accounts of rude and barbarous bouts of drunkenness, at which Peter compelled the whole of the ladies, the duke of Holstein, and all by whom he was surrounded, to indulge in excessive and sometimes even deadly potations. Bassewitz informs us that Catharine, from the time of her visit to Prussia, where they were not very well satisfied with her demeanour in the ceremonious court of Frederick I., had accommodated herself to the formalities of a condition in which she was not born. She herself, he observes (he is, however, a very partial witness), appeared with perfect propriety and dignity of conduct, and made her court imitate her example. The court, according to Bassewitz, was numerous, regular and splendid; he is, however, obliged to admit that she was unable wholly to give up her Russian customs, although German manners and usages greatly prevailed. Peter's external appearance was utterly neglected, and the whole of his activity directed to the promotion of the various trades, institutions and domestic occupations of the Dutch and Germans, as well as to politics, naval and military affairs, and the useful arts. It appears, from the account given by field-marshal Münnich, that the whole expenditure of Peter's court scarcely amounted to 60,000 roubles a-year, and that there was no service of plate, and nothing was heard of chamberlains, grooms of the bed-chamber, or pages. From ten to twelve young persons of good family, who were called *dentschiks*, and as many grenadiers of the guards, constituted the court. Liveries were nowhere to be seen, nor was there any description of lace or embroidery upon the dress of the attendants. With this was combined a subordination of

* Weber, 'Das Veränderte Russland,' 1738, part 1. p. 3. "I had no time to remember my dancing-master, because a dozen cups of Hungarian wine and a quartern of brandy, which I was obliged to accept from the hands of the vice-czar Romanodoffsky, soon deprived me of all sense and understanding; it was a consolation, however, that all the other guests were soon lying asleep upon the ground, and no one was able to perceive the faults of the other."

ranks which could only be called singular by a German nobleman like Bassewitz, who had been accustomed to a very different system in the German courts, where idlers and praters alone have rank at court, and all other persons belong to the populace. Peter's sixteen classes of rank embraced only persons who had rendered some real service, and whoever wished for rank must show some claim to its possession by services rendered to the state. The sons of distinguished nobles were indeed allowed to appear at court in their order, but they possessed no rank till they had entitled themselves to its enjoyment by service. Peter never put on the princely garments of ancient times, or dresses set with diamonds, pearls, rubies and emeralds of unusual value and size; his dress, on the contrary, was such as was suited to the mechanical occupations in which he delighted to engage. His house-clothes were made of coarse linen, and his knives and forks had wooden handles. Peter himself was neither generous and magnanimous, nor avaricious and covetous, but his friend and assistant Menzikoff was as vain as he was contemptibly covetous and meanly selfish; the emperor corrected him and hundreds of other noble sharpers and cheats when he caught them in the act, as people among us are accustomed to discipline dogs or dangerous animals. Executions, mutilations and the knout were quite matters of course at the court. There was a wish to create everything anew, and therefore there was a constant struggle between brutality and the total absence of all feelings of honour on the one part, and inhumanity and lawless violence on the other; barbarism and rudeness were for the moment restrained and abashed, but it was impossible to root them out by such means.

There is no want of examples to prove that Peter was eminently successful, by his example, in promoting the arts and industry, the regulation of military affairs and finance, but he never could succeed in establishing feelings of honour and respect for morality by the knout. He had scarcely inflicted the most cruel punishments upon Schaffiroff and prince Gagarin, and repeatedly beaten his friend Menzikoff almost to death, when he again found the last-mentioned committing the most scandalous acts of oppression. On this occasion he punished him by depriving him of a part of his spoil. It is a melancholy fact in the history of this new civilization, whose acceptance Peter enforced upon the people, that he justly regarded Menzikoff as

the only man among his people who was capable of embracing his views and of promoting their dissemination among the Russians. Menzikoff could scarcely read or write, but he was a practical man, as Buonaparte would have named him, and Peter therefore overlooked all his faults and left him at the head of affairs, because he was persuaded that he could not replace him by any other. This appeared plainly enough when Peter made trial of another: being embittered against Menzikoff, he removed him from his office and appointed Jagusinski, who was deeply learned in jurisprudence and thoroughly versed in all the details of the desk, to be president of the senate, and entrusted him with the direction of affairs during his own absence on a journey to Moscow. In the case of Villebois we are furnished with another striking example of the fact, that Peter thought only upon immediate utility, that he was wholly destitute of all sense of moral propriety, and overlooked the grossest transgressions of its laws. The story is given upon the authority of Villebois himself. In a moment of intoxication he had been guilty of the highest breach of decorum towards the empress Catharine herself, with whom he had taken the most unpardonable liberties; he was, it is true, condemned to the galleys and to hard labour; Peter, however, again recalled him into service after two years, and replaced him in all his offices, because he did not wish to lose a good naval officer. Huysen, who, under the name of Ywan Nesturanoy, has written a book respecting Peter full of untruths, therefore gives himself most unnecessary pains to excuse or vindicate transactions which Peter himself neither wished to conceal from the observation of the world nor to palliate, but which he regarded as completely within the scope both of his rights and of his duties. Whoever was at his court must be content to submit to his humours and fancies, which for the most part were directed towards the accomplishment of something useful. Weber tells us that he and a large court party whom Peter had entertained, were invited after dinner to lend their aid in cutting down a row of trees which stood in the czar's way. It was, however, a demand of a very different and disgraceful character, to require the foreign ambassadors not merely to be present at the execution of the Strelitzen, but actually to take part in the work of slaughter, which Villebois describes in the most revolting manner*. We

* Villebois, 'MSS. de la Bibliothèque du Roi,' no. 254, sous chiffre 7, pp. 34, 35. In p. 36 he appeals against Huyssen and his lies to the testi-

must here return to the cruelty of this execution, on account of the customs and morals of the new empire, although they belong to the period immediately preceding the northern war.

Peter was quickly recalled from his journey by an insurrectionary movement among his Russian janissaries; Gordon, however, had succeeded in putting down their attempt before the arrival of the czar, and had besides not been sparing in his execution of the most guilty; but immediately after his arrival Peter caused two thousand of them to be hanged by his guards, and afterwards five thousand to be beheaded; on which occasion he was present himself and actively engaged, for he alone cut off the heads of a hundred men. His sister Sophia, who was the chief cause and promoter of the insurrection, was shut up in a prison, to which light was only admitted through a grated window which looked to the city wall; Peter caused the wall directly opposite the window to be covered with the heads of the conspirators, so that the princess, till the day of her death, had no other prospect before her eyes than the remains of these unfortunate men.

Frederick William of Prussia was the image of German roughness, coarseness and vulgarity, but at the same time of German honour, vigour, ability and sound understanding; he resembled the Germans of his age in his behaviour, and treated them precisely in the same way as Peter did his Russians. Before, however, we pass on to speak of him and his court, we must pause for a moment, to cast a glance upon the manners and usages of the persons who were attached to other courts. It must appear, from the description already given of the Saxon court and of those who composed it, that it must have been a matter of rejoicing for the citizens at large, that a man, who was at least a vigorous monarch, without mistresses, ministers, plenipotentiaries, court state, and all that belongs to it, came forward as the Robespierre of his time and the representative of strength and ability in opposition to fashion and its follies, to court etiquette, court poetry, cookery and science,—to all useless trifling and learning. Whoever has acquired any knowledge of the petty German courts, will learn better to estimate the character of a monarch who only cared for theology and soldiers, many of the refugee Avay, who had accompanied Peter on his journey, and of a dentschik, both of whom were obliged to take part in the execution.

and as determinately forced the one into definite forms as the other, than his wife and his daughter estimated it.

Frederick William, as will be hereafter seen, treated all those by whom he was surrounded in a manner completely original, as if they were in fact his slaves; but a slight glance at the German courts will show, that there was nothing anywhere to be seen but slavish crouching fear and ridiculous ostentation; the nobility and the officials with equal pride despised the people whose cause the king adopted as his own, and no forms of the prevailing Roman law protected the people or inspired the tyrants with fear, because resistance was impossible. The whole German culture of that time sprung either from the numerous but often small and insignificant universities, to which that of Göttingen, wholly practical in its character and objects, but of greater pretensions in its foundation, was afterwards added, or from the small courts, whose number was not only great, but which were emulous of one another, because every count of the empire who furnished a contingent of six men-at-arms had also his court, mistresses, and dignitaries. We do not dwell upon that kind of culture which was the produce of the universities, in which pedantry, custom and the rudest manners were intentionally kept up together with all sorts of gormandizing and fighting: this has continued to be the case, and in late years has been often enough discussed, but, alas! as hitherto, without any useful result; we shall however endeavour by some examples to illustrate the wonderful government of the courts, and the mixture of brutal insolence and vulgar rudeness amongst the whole tribe of officials.

We shall commence with the two courts of the family of Guelph, and present our readers with some scenes from the life of the nobility in Hanover, and from the practice of the government in Wolfenbüttel. We must necessarily return to Hanover hereafter when we come to speak of England, of the private relations and gross ignorance of George I. and George II., and of the language and usages of their new subjects. The ill-bred and unfriendly intercourse which prevailed in the family life of these princes may be best learned from the history of the disputes between George II. and Frederick William of Prussia, and from the account of the negotiations with respect to a double marriage which was to bring about a closer connexion between the houses of Guelph and Hohenzollern; and a few hints will suf-

fice with respect to their morality. George I. was married to the daughter of a French woman, the wife of the last duke of Zelle. This duke regarded it as an honour to be altogether French, and to live as a Frenchman. His daughter, George's wife, was separated from her husband on account of her levities, and died as a repudiated wife in the castle of Ahlden. This had at least some appearance of justice; but the German nation must blush at the fact, that Ernest Augustus was able to find murderers among his nobles; that some of his distinguished attendants caused count Königsmark to be murdered and thrown into a pit, most probably by some of their assistants. He had been brought to Hanover on business, and they lay in wait for him by night as he returned from a visit to the castle, and nothing more was ever heard of him after. In touching upon English history, we shall notice the ladies who had the honour to fill the place of the princess of Zelle; we are now only speaking of German courts and of the manners and morals of the German nobility; and for an illustration of this point, the marriage and journey of the daughter of George I., who was married to Frederick William I., is particularly deserving of notice. On this occasion (1706) the father of Frederick William and George I. rivaled each other in foolish and extravagant expenditure. The covetous elector of Hanover, even whilst his mother, the princess palatine Sophia, was begging for a pension in England, caused the bridal ornaments to be ordered in Paris (and that in the middle of the war of the succession), and had them selected by the princess of Orleans, who, as is well known, was a German princess. Louis XIV. was quite right on this occasion in giving expression to the wish, that all the German princes might fall in with the ideas of George I., in order to have their presents admired by him. The retinue of the princess was quite in accordance with her bridal outfit: there were forty coaches and carriages, twelve electoral provision-wagons, and fifty-six peasants' wagons in the train of the princess, for which 520 horses were required to be kept in readiness at every post. A portion of the court from Berlin was sent to receive the princess at the frontiers, for whose further progress to the capital fifty carriages and 350 horses were ordered to be in readiness at every post, so that 860 horses were necessary in the territory of Brandenburg. We shall give below a note from the work to which we have already referred, in order to show the

burthens which such a procession brought upon the peasants and citizens of the provinces through which it passed*. George II. had lived in a state of continual and bitter strife with his father and his concubines. During his reign, his wife, Caroline of Brandenburg Anspach, maintained a considerable influence along with his mistresses, and in Hanover she protected Herr Von Busche, who was the very head and front of an aristocratic government and of the despotism of noble ministers. George II. himself was at that time, and not without reason, praised as the defender of popular rights and the privileges of the people in England; but the good Germans derived no benefit therefrom. We shall select one or two striking traits from the life of Herr Von Nüssler, an eye-witness, in order to show how matters were carried on in Hanover. The Hanoverian ministers at that time were Von Busche, president of the chambers; Von Alvensleben and Von Münchhausen, which last was well known and highly praised as the Mæcenas of university learning and of our literature, and together with that a truly noble and able man. Von Busche for some time was in no very good favour at court, but he made a present to queen Caroline, just at the fortunate time, of ten shares in the Caroline mines, the proceeds of which were valued at 20,000 dollars yearly, and he then played the tyrant in Hanover in the most wonderful manner. Not contented with keeping on his hat at entertainments which he gave once or twice in the week, and with tying a napkin to his wig, he sometimes gave occasion to a true masquerade from his positive disinclination to certain kinds of dress†. The disputes at his table

* ‘Frederick William king of Prussia,’ by Friedrich Forster, 1834, 3 vols. 8vo, 1st vol. p. 118.—“Large contributions were required from the provinces in order to supply the necessaries for the kitchen and the cellar. The New Mark alone contributed 640 calves, 7600 fowls, 1102 turkeys, 650 geese, 1000 ducks, 1000 pairs of pigeons, and 120 shocks (60) of eggs. Prussia contributed 100 fat oxen, and every other province in proportion. No compensation whatever was given.”

† Busching’s ‘Contributions towards the Biographies of Remarkable Persons,’ Halle, 1783, part i. p. 309.—“He could not endure clothes, neckhandkerchiefs, or other things, of certain colours, such as blue and *blue mourant*. On one occasion Bergrath (councillor of mines) Bütemeister went to dine with him. The minister no sooner saw him than he called out, ‘Groom! Groom!’ and ran away. The groom came back and said to Bütemeister, his excellency could not endure his dress, and he would therefore be good enough to go and choose another from the minister’s wardrobe. This he did; but as Bütemeister was a short thick man, and the privy councillor tall and thin, the former cut a singular figure in his clothes. But the privy councillor was peculiarly gracious to him at table, and rejoiced that things had been done according to his wish.”

often degenerated into mere scandal, which could only be tolerated by the humility and subserviency of the servile minds of Hanoverian guests. We shall give in a note the conversation to which Herr Von Nüssler was a witness at table, when the minister and his brother the chamberlain had a dispute, in which also the paymaster of the forces took part, as to whether a hash which was served was made of lamb or veal*. The minister twice requested the count Von Oynhausen to remove from one place and take his seat at another, and this caused a similar scene in a very large company†.

The mode of conducting legal affairs was also of the most singular kind; of this we shall quote a single example. The mother of George II. and of the queen of Prussia died at Ahlden, and the question was raised about her inheritance. A sum of money which she had lent to the duke of Brunswick was fortunately recovered, but she had made a present to a certain count Von Bar, and this was to be taken from him by force. They learned that he was in Frankfort; a Hanoverian lieutenant and twelve men were sent off to seize him there. He had however anticipated their design, and having deposited the written order of the electress with the councillor of the imperial court, he received a protection from the emperor, and the soldiers were obliged presently to march away *re infectâ*.

In Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel matters went on in the same manner as in Hanover. Two brothers ruled in the country, Augustus William in Wolfenbüttel, and Louis Adolphus with full do-

* Herr Von Nüssler relates, that the minister being enraged at his brother and Heiliger for maintaining that what he thought was lamb was really veal, caused his valet to call up the cook, who being previously warned, decided the matter in his favour. The privy councillor now shouted out, "Herr Heiliger! Herr Heiliger! are you still eating veal?" "Ycs," answered the latter, "your excellency, it is and will remain veal, and your cook only agreed with your opinion in order to please you." The minister became angry, and said, "Herr Heiliger never ate such a hash at his own table, and he should not interfere in things he does not understand; he had better now give over such a foolish defence." Heiliger wished to prolong the dispute, but the party *brought it to an end by agreeing with the minister*, and those who sat near Heiliger begged him to let it drop, which he did. But when the minister continued repeatedly to cry out, "Herr Heiliger, is the hash still veal?" he rose from the table, put on his hat and went away.

† The same author, p. 310.—"Now," answered the count, "I have removed once to please your excellency, but I will not do so a second time. If you had not the hateful custom of dining so late, I would go to the London Coffee-house and order a dinner for myself; but as it is now too late, I will dine here, and take my leave and never accept any more of your excellency's invitations." The minister was silenced, and the count did as he said.

minion in Blankenburg. Louis was to be the successor in Wolfenbüttel also, and therefore saw with twofold displeasure the extravagance of his brother and his favourite Von Dehn, who wished to play Flemming, and had Herr Von Stein as his companion. Herr Von Dehn was a country gentleman like Flemming; as a page he gained the favour of Anthony Ulrich, under Augustus William he was employed on various embassies and shone at courts, and after having in this way obtained some orders, and the title of 'count' in Vienna, he squandered the money of the country and of the duke at such a rate in Wolfenbüttel, that the duke was even obliged to borrow 40,000 dollars from the unfortunate Sophia Dorothea in Ahlden. This annoyed and vexed the clever president Von Münchausen, who wished to protect the money and rights of the country and the successor to the throne against count Dehn, the duke, baron Von Stein and their companions, and with this view he wrote to his presumed friend privy councillor Von Campen in Blankenburg, and drew a picture to the life of count Von Dehn and the whole management of affairs in Wolfenbüttel. Von Campen was afterwards discharged from his office in Blankenburg and sought the favour of Dehn, and the latter availed himself of letters, which were now of ten years' date, to effect Münchausen's dismissal by the duke. Münchausen then betook himself to Blankenburg, where he entered into the service of Augustus William, who then, on behalf of his minister, required from his brother an honourable discharge and satisfaction for his shameful banishment from Wolfenbüttel. This gave rise to a prosecution, which proves that the German courts and universities were always in close alliance against justice in favour of arbitrary dominion, or of a corrupt aristocracy. The minister, who without any knowledge or merit had risen from the condition of a page and a prodigal, and become a count of the empire, ruler in Wolfenbüttel, and a knight of most of the European orders, wished to give an air of justice to this prosecution of the meritorious and able man, who was protected by the brother and successor of his master, and to dishonour the banished minister. He found the whole college of the privy council and the law faculty of the university ready and willing to become his tools. The absent Münchausen, who for years had rendered most important services to the country, was summoned as a criminal before the same privy council which had previously shown itself his enemy; and when he did

not appear, because he would not acknowledge his submission to the partial tribunal of the ministers of the duke who had banished him, he was condemned in his absence. His only offence was that of having, ten years before, given a just representation of the doings at the court of Wolfenbüttel in letters to Von Campen. In order to give some appearance of justice to his conduct, the minutes of the case were sent to the university of Helmstadt, where the law faculty, as is usual, showed themselves as well disposed to meet the wishes of their ordinary, as the college of the privy council had been towards their most gracious master and count Von Dehn. Augustus Leyser was *ordinarius* of the faculty of law, and at the same time one of the most learned jurists of that learned but dark age; he had had a dispute with Münchausen, in which the latter was probably wrong, and, as judge in this case, he took his revenge. He proved with an immense expenditure of legal learning and of pettifogging acuteness, that the Roman law of high treason was applicable to the innocent letters of this German nobleman, and that a free German noble in the dominions of a prince subject to the emperor and the tribunals of the empire, might and must be judged and condemned according to the principles of Roman despots. Had Münchausen been an ordinary citizen, or a man without connections, he would, according to the usage of the times, have been deprived of honour and freedom, and according to circumstances, of property and life; but fortunately for him he belonged to the nobility, who sympathized with him, because they thought his sentence an invasion of their rights. Duke Louis Rudolph of Blankenburg also took him under his protection, and the two together were able to do more than justice alone could have done, for the emperor and the Aulic Council declared in his favour. And now began the second act of this German state prosecution, whose single scenes and passages are as illustrative of the life and doings of those times as those of the first. We must not however delay longer on the point, but, without referring to particulars, content ourselves with the general remark, that the duke and his cringing privy council entered upon a long struggle with the supreme courts; and with a view to the extinction of justice, but happily this time in vain, they tried to bring the case before the diet of the empire. Münchausen ultimately obtained a splendid triumph when his persecutor died (1731), and his protector Louis Rudolph became ruler of the whole country.

If we turn from the temporal to the spiritual princes of the time, or in other words, to the heads of the noble families of the empire, who, in the character of prebendaries, deans and canons of the religious foundations and bishoprics, squandered on their pleasures the incomes of these pious foundations and the taxes of the country, we shall observe that the effort to equal or even to excel the temporal lords presents itself in the most detestable light. In order merely to introduce and deal with facts, we shall present our readers with some extracts from the journal of a tour of pleasure made by count Lynar in 1731, and complete the history of the life of the tone-giving noble society in Germany from Keyssler's 'Travels.' Count Lynar arrived at Würzburg and Bamberg at the time in which a member of the family of Schönbron was bishop, and Herr Von Geusau, who accompanied him, gives us the following report of what he there saw*: "The bishop kept up a complete court in Würzburg and Bamberg, and in Bamberg he had at least thirty chamberlains and sixteen sets of carriage-horses. At table, the prince-bishop sat at the top on an arm-chair covered with crimson velvet and adorned with golden tassels: the table was covered twice with fourteen different dishes each time, and as many afterwards for the dessert: nine pages stood round the table, who set on the dishes, which were brought up by bearers. The bearers wore boots and spurs and the sling of a carabine over their shoulders, and were preceded by one officer with his hat under his arm and followed by another." We are made acquainted with the kind of morality which prevailed at these spiritual courts by Keyssler's 'Travels.' At the court of Würtemberg, which was famous for the qualifications of its drinkers, Keyssler found a Würzburg privy councillor and minister whom none of the Würtembergers could match. He relates that this spiritual minister was in the habit of drinking ten quarts of Burgundy in a day, and boasted that there were four or five others at the court of Würzburg who could keep him company. At the time of count Lynar's journey, prince Clement of Bavaria resided in Bonn. The description which his companion, count Von Geusau, gives of the entertainments and customs of the court of Cologne, quite reconciles us to the barbarism of Frederick William. Rudeness and vulgarity were, alas! at that time domiciled

* The portion of Herr Von Geusau's journal here referred to will be found in the 4th part of Busching's 'Contributions towards the Biographies of Remarkable Persons,' p. 199, &c.

among us, and therefore genuine German; they produced however no idlers, whom king Frederick William would neither endure nor protect. No gourmands were permitted to consume and squander the hard-gained earnings of his poor subjects under the government of Frederick William, and he suffered nothing but the German language and German industry; instead of which, nothing but foreign customs were to be seen at the court of Cologne. Archbishop Clement maintained a court of not less than 150 attendants: even in Lent his table was served with twenty dishes and a suitable dessert, and in his palace, gentlemen and cavaliers stood round the table in rows: French was spoken, and everything was got up in the French style: a crowd of servants brought the dishes into the last antichamber; then another crowd of gentlemen clothed in black received them and set them upon the table. In the audience-chamber of this German prince there stood a throne, under the canopy of which a likeness of the pope was suspended, and in this German country the pope's nuntio bestowed livings and kept up a species of court and chancery at German cost: he had a reporter and chancellor, two chamberlains and two grooms of the chambers, two chaplains and eight servants; he kept six horses, and besides all this, sent large sums for himself and for the pope to Rome.

As to the other German courts, Keyssler informs us with respect to that of Bavaria, that the greatest expense was lavished upon dogs and horses, hunts and processions, and that there were thirty-three gala-days at court. He further states, that these days of splendour and extravagance were being increased every year, to the great regret of those who had not much to spend upon dress, and nevertheless did not wish to appear several times in the same clothes. Pölnitz, Keyssler, and Spittler also, in his 'History of the Counts and Dukes of Würtemberg,' although the last-mentioned writer speaks with caution and consideration for their follies, furnish us with accounts of the modes of life in Würtemberg. Spittler speaks only of the scandalous domestic management and of the government under duke Eberhard Louis: we shall therefore add some remarks upon the following reigns. We observe in general, that, under the reign of Eberhard Louis, the whole country was governed and sold by an audacious and detestable woman, who was steeped in all sorts of criminality: under the following reign the same thing was done by a Jew and his shameless associates.

In the year 1708 Eberhard Louis made the acquaintance of a Miss Von Grävenitz, and married her during the lifetime of his wife, who appealed to the emperor and retired to Tübingen. When threatened with an imperial commission, he went to Geneva and there kept up a splendid court, separated from Grävenitz for appearance sake for fear of the emperor, and bestowed her in marriage on a count Von Würben. As countess Von Würben he again took her under his protection, and placed the whole government at her disposal; and now high chamberlains and chamberlains, prime minister and ministers, marshals and peculiar orders of which nobody had previously thought, were all introduced at the court of Würtemberg, and Grävenitz, in conjunction with her brother, her nephew and two others, had the shamelessness to form a ministry, over which she herself presided and sold all public offices. Every man of merit was driven away; the former court-marshal Förstner, who moreover did not belong to the class of men of merit, fled to France, where his statements were not believed, as appears from a letter of the regent himself*. The whole court was filled with the creatures of Grävenitz; Louisburg was made a beautiful town at the expense of this poor country, although the government had neither *money* nor *credit*. The loss to the peasants from the quantity of game may be guessed from the fact mentioned by Keyssler, that one severe winter had killed 7000 head of red deer. This female regent was remarkable for her love of gambling, for covetousness, avarice, and sensuality of the grossest description combined with an utter disregard to all feelings of decency or shame. When we think of the attendants by whom she and the duke were surrounded, we can only feel astonished that one trace of that honesty and heartiness for which the Würtembergers were distinguished was left remaining. We must not therefore forget that the consistory in Stuttgart at least had

* In a volume of MS. letters which have been transferred from the library of St. Geneviève to the French archives, Carton K. 146, there is a letter of the regent to the duke of Würtemberg, in which he says: "This former early friend of the duke must necessarily find an asylum in France, till he is there guilty of some crime: that he was at that time gone to Vienna, but when he returned he should be carefully watched." Förstner had caused his apology, or rather a full account of the state of things in Würtemberg, supported by documents, to be published in Paris, which is to be found appended to Spittler's 'History,' under the title, "Apologie de Mons. Förstner de Breitenbourg et de Damburg: par laquelle il instruit et fait voir au public les fausses accusations et les calomnies horribles de ses ennemis à la cour de Stoudgard et son innocence. A Londres aux dépens de la compagnie 1746." 44 pp. 8vo.

the courage manfully to resist her, and that the prelate Osian-der replied to her request to be included in the public prayers of the church, that she would always be remembered in that portion of the Lord's prayer which says, "Deliver us from evil."

Charles Alexander, the successor of this duke, was in the imperial service: he had become a catholic, and only thought of pleasures, pomp and money, of which, after the last government, there was a great lack. A Jew named Joseph Süss, of Oppenheim, who had formerly supplied him with means, and whom he brought with him into the country, now continued to raise money for his use. Places and the administration of estates were handed over to Süss like wares, which he sold to the highest bidder. A severe retribution was expected to be inflicted upon Grävenitz and her companions: we shall relate what took place, because an insight will thereby be given into the course of life and the management of such things in the whole of Germany, which will give a clearer view of such matters to the intelligent reader than we feel ourselves called upon to do.

Immediately after Charles's accession, in December 1733, the former prime minister, court marshal count von Grävenitz, his two sons, director Pfeil and others, such as councillors Vollmann, Pfau, Scheidt and Damo, were arrested, and a prosecution was at the same time commenced against the former mistress, who was expelled the country, and her estates in Boyhingen and Freudenthal attached. The countess had money enough: she first went to Mannheim, and as she did not feel secure in that city travelled to Berlin, where she found friends and protection as well as in Vienna, because she was not very scrupulous as to the means of securing them. The king of Prussia wrote a strong letter on her behalf, and the emperor earnestly recommended the quiet arrangement of the affair: the duke's Jew also treated with her. She surrendered her estates, for which Joseph Süss took care that she was well enough paid. An agreement was also entered into with her brother, who relinquished the whole of his plunder to the new bloodsuckers, and received 56,000 gulden as compensation: the rest were dealt with according to their particular cases; some paid fines, and some were pushed in among the scandalous creatures of the new government. Innocent and guilty officials were in like manner amerced by the treasury, of which Süss was the president, and all processes

were at length drawn into this court. The Jew also presided in the department of grace, by which all the appointments in the hands of the crown were sold, and all places, especially church livings, were offered at a kind of taxed rate and given to the highest bidders. Orphan and other pious institutions were plundered, and in two years more than 450,000 gulden were illegally raised. It appears from a letter of the reigning duke to one of his employés, with respect to the lawsuit then being carried on between him and the heirs by will of the late duke concerning his estate, that at that time people ventured to give publicity to their sentiments, and to treat those virtues with the greatest scorn and contempt to which the respectable citizens still remained faithful*. Some opinion may be formed of the sufferings which were inflicted upon the country and poor inhabitants of Würtemberg from the fact, proved by documents, that during the three years of the government of duke Charles and the band of sharpers and cheats to whom Süß sold the country, above a million of gulden was raised by the sale of places and extortions of various kinds. The injuries suffered by the peasants from game amounted perhaps to as much more; for although 2500 stags, 4000 wild animals, large and small, and about 5000 swine of different ages, had been shot in the year in which duke Charles Alexander died (1737), in the following year the injuries by trespass from game alone amounted to 500,000 gulden.

If the question should be asked, what became of all the money which was not appropriated or secured for their future advantage by Süß and his companions, the answer is this:—it was spent on fêtes and processions; on jewels, in which Süß cheated the duke; on operas, comedies, female singers, and splendid carnival entertainments; and the duke was so short of hard cash, that he was obliged to borrow money for the purchase of two or three very inconsiderable estates. Singers, charlatans and buffoons found the court of Würtemberg quite a paradise,

* A complete history of the government of duke Charles Alexander, together with all the documents and records, is given in the 1st part of Moser's 'Patriotic Archives,' p. 108—220. The letter above referred to, however, is contained in the 3rd part, p. 107, and is in the form of a note from Serenissimo to privy councillor baron von Schütz; its conclusion is as follows: "Whether the heirs propose to pay off money debts with the property, that is their affair; for I do not mean to depart from this principio" (viz. that of litigation): "the suit will probably continue for some hundred years, and I can well look on whilst in possession."

and in the course of a subsequent persecution, in which all those who had been used by the duke for his pleasure or pastime were treated with violence and injustice, 5000 gulden and 150 watches were found in the house of a female singer. When the duke felt himself approaching his end, he wished to go and consult a quack doctor in Danzig, in order to be cured; but he must first remain till all the balls, comedies and masquerades of the carnival were past. On his decease his body was opened, and according to the medical report, the heart, the head, and all other parts were perfectly sound; a tumour in the lungs had been completely healed; *but the breast was so full of the dust and smoke and steam of the carnival, that a suffocatio sanguinis must have been the necessary result.*

We must dwell somewhat longer on the reign of Frederick William I. of Prussia than we have thought it necessary to do on the preceding narratives, and in this case we have less to do with the mere personality and character of the king than with his relation to his age. The mere statement of facts will be sufficient to give an idea of the life and customs whose representative he was, and of the men who allowed themselves to be governed and treated as he governed and treated them, or rather was obliged to govern them for their good. Moreover the malicious wit of those scoffers, who were trained in the French school, has so completely engrossed the history of this king, and represented the weak or bad side of his character in such strong colours, that it is extremely difficult to enter upon the subject without prepossession, and to contemplate and judge the vigorous ruling nature of the man from the standing-point and culture of his age, which called for such a dictator or despot. Voltaire, who was a complete master of bitter scorn and clever derision, in the very first pages of the book which he calls his ‘Memoirs,’ has brought forward everything most ridiculous and hateful which could be said of an avaricious and tyrannical ruler as well as of the unholy combination of legislation and administration which took place in his reign in Germany, and which is still occasionally found to exist. Pölnitz, who was a man of similar wit and of a like stamp with Voltaire, has added single traits to the general representation which the latter has given; and Voltaire’s friend and correspondent the princess of Bayreuth, in her ‘Memoirs,’ published about twenty-five years ago, has treated her own father worse than he was even treated by Voltaire himself. Who-

ever attentively reads this work of the German princess, which would have been much better unwritten or at least unprinted, and had to choose between the character of the father and daughter, would unquestionably prefer the German rudeness and barbarity of the king, and the straightforward, rough, but simple and honest, though almost shocking coarseness of his manners and conduct, to the false, boasting, vain, malicious, extravagant French-courtly character of his daughter, as she exhibits herself in her book. The king's avarice, the excess of which was at once ridiculous and detestable, procured for his son the means of restoring the credit and honour of the German name and nation, which had become a laughing-stock to Europe, in those days of princely absurdity and extravagance. Moreover Frederick William showed the Germans, whom he heartily honoured, that he dressed after the same fashion as themselves, that he lived and spoke in the same manner as his subjects, and in what way every citizen can or must secure his own independence. The king became rich and powerful, not by means of speculations, banks, paper, buying and selling, but by frugality and economy; and he showed the German citizens, to whom, from the situation and circumstances of their country, the same means of gain never could be open as were enjoyed by the English and Dutch, and who did not profit by the riches of an extravagant nobility, that wealth does not consist in the possession of large estates, but in a contempt for costly pleasures and in a simple life. Nothing was ever heard at Berlin of gormandizing, of refinements in drinking, of mistresses, and of fashionable irregularities, of foreign arts and artists, singers; dancers and fiddlers; but also there was nothing heard of culture, civilization, and no effort at progress, except with respect to what was of immediate advantage for his objects. In order to form some idea of the grounds of the king's contempt for science, we must remember that the French education and civilization which his mother and instructor had wished to engraft upon the coarse, practical, German disposition of Frederick William, was as uncongenial and burthensome to him as the senseless extravagance, and the French-Italian-Spanish etiquette of his father's court was distasteful and offensive. German culture and civilization there were none, as we shall afterwards prove; and Weber, in his 'Altered Russia,' expressly assures us that all people of rank and distinction in Germany despised their own language and

the customs of their own country ; and the Pietists, in whom alone, together with his officers and soldiers, Frederick William placed confidence, hated and persecuted every species of philosophy and poetry which had not something of spirituality.

The union of pietism and barbarism is less surprising in Frederick William, because the two great leaders of the pietist party of that time, Franke and Lange in Halle, praised and commended him for having driven away Wolf the philosopher from their university as if he had been a robber. A few examples will serve to show that the princes and free towns were at that time not less cruel and persecuting in the cause of the pure and true faith, than the pretended friends of freedom and equality in France in the times of terror for the promotion of their dreams. A fanatical archbishop of Salzburg, who would have no heretics among his subjects, banished from their homes and their country 3000 industrious, quiet, and pious Protestants. The Catholic government and their Jesuits in the Palatinate dared not venture to proceed to such lengths in consequence of the laws of the empire ; but both intentionally did all in their power to injure the university of Heidelberg, and to supply the Protestant cures in the worst possible manner, in order to bring Protestantism into neglect and contempt, and to destroy all feelings of independence and intelligence. In the Lutheran city of Hamburg, pastor Neumeister wrote a work in favour of Lutheranism, in which the most scandalous sins were attributed to the reformers and their doctrines. This work gave great offence to Frederick William, but was completely in accordance with the feelings of the magistracy and ruling powers in his own city. The city of Frankfort could not be induced by any entreaties or applications of the king of Prussia to tolerate the celebration of divine worship according to the usages of the reformed churches within their walls. The Lutheran professor in Wittenberg wished to imitate the Anglican unimprovables ; they insisted upon their right (a right which is yet exercised in Oxford and Cambridge) of excluding from the university, and from university honours and privileges, all those who did not belong to their own sect. The king of Prussia avenged himself by forbidding his subjects to visit the university of Wittenberg.

If this were the place to expose at length the pedantry and tyranny of the schools, churches, and their ridiculous monarchs,

to treat of the pride and insolence of the officials and nobility, and to compare all this with the crimes and extravagance of the courts which have been previously mentioned, it would be no difficult task to justify Frederick William's autocracy. In the name and sense of the whole class of citizens of his state he exercised an equalizing arbitrary rule, but he was neither noble nor amiable.

We shall present our readers with some examples, in order to show the manner in which the German coarseness of his character triumphed over the affectedly-refined education of the nobility, and the half-French half-academical learning of the times of his father. It was the fashion in his days, as it is now, to speak French at court: those who aimed at refinement and distinction never spoke German, except with the common people or tradesmen, and they preferred murdering French with one another to conversing in good German. Frederick William was indeed quite master of the French language; he allowed his family to be educated after the French manner, because it was the custom of the court and he could not prevent it, and spoke the language when politeness required it in case of visits from foreigners; but he nevertheless permitted the use of no other language than German in his evening circles, and used it continually when speaking with his family and with the ambassadors of the German powers. His sound understanding therefore led him to ridicule and despise the Berlin academy as a mere empty piece of ostentation, wholly unsuited to the demands of the country. This academy had been set on foot by his father, or rather by his mother; it was an evidence of their homage to the foreign fashions of the time, being wholly arranged after the French model, but was quite out of place in Berlin, where institutions of a much more practical nature were wanting. On one occasion, in the case of a wonderful cure, he recognized the science of medicine as connected with the natural sciences, and presented a small sum for its advancement. As may be expected therefore, he did not imitate the example of all other princes by surrounding himself with Frenchmen and Italians; he did not send foreign counts and marquises, as was then the custom, to be his ambassadors at foreign courts, because he very properly alleged that he could find Germans enough for the management of his affairs, and the mere ability of paying a well-turned com-

pliment in the French or Italian language at a foreign court was not worth the money which it cost, and which he must pay to foreigners.

The rude ignorance of the king, and his aversion to science, may be in some measure excused, when we remember that the learning and knowledge of his time had become altogether foreign to life. Wherever he looked, he observed in the life and books of his time that mere tasteless German learning, book-making, and rage for citation, to which his good natural understanding attached its true value and viewed in its true light. The king said with justice, "that he wished to know nothing of persons who knew how to make verses in thirty languages, and who could tell upon their fingers the names of all the books which had been written upon the different departments of science; he wished to have persons who had strength of judgment, and capacity and experience in turning them quickly to account." When therefore he consulted any one, and the person to whom he was addressing himself began, after the fashion still prevailing in schools and universities, to state what this and that celebrated individual had said upon the subject in question, his German disposition cut the matter short, and said, "He did not wish to know what this man or that man had said, but the opinion of the person addressed." Like the great body of his people, of whom he was the genuine representative, he himself had not the slightest idea of poetry and philosophy, or of all that is connected with them; he wrote ungrammatically, and was even unacquainted with orthography: he nevertheless saw clearly the advantage and necessity of the practical sciences for a time in which Germany was still lingering in the condition of the middle ages.

Frederick William's police suffered indeed no free expression of opinion on political subjects; but it never entered the mind of any German in those days to entertain an opinion opposite to that of the ruling powers. The king saw very clearly the advantage of newspapers. Instead of maintaining costly embassies, he himself took the Dutch newspapers (the only ones, with the exception of the English, which contained news of importance), as well as those of Paris, Frankfort, Hamburg, Leipzig, Breslau, and Vienna, and it was the duty of one of his attendants, whilst he was at table or in his smoking-parties, to read and explain the news which they respectively contained. At first however

he would sanction no newspaper in his own dominions; but when his armies distinguished themselves, and gained reputation and glory by their victories over the Swedes, the Berlin papers were again allowed to appear; but they were placed under such a strict censorship, that whoever wished to know what was going on in Potsdam must read the Leyden newspaper. Von Gundling, the king's reader and interpreter, belonged to the literary class of the age; and the king, in order to ridicule learning, titles, and the prevailing love of rank, loaded him with all sorts of honours and distinctions, in order afterwards to expose him to the most inhuman and brutal treatment. He had written many learned historical books, and was the very personification of that dead knowledge, and of the vulgarity of soul connected with it, which people in Germany were accustomed to cherish.

The learned science of Roman law appeared to the king to be more injurious than advantageous to practical life in Germany, in consequence of the tediousness of its processes, the chicanery of the learned, and the excessive anxiety to overlook no formula or form. When therefore he would not allow the celebrated Heineccius to accept the invitation of the Dutch to establish himself at Leyden, or grant their request for his removal, it was not from any feeling of respect for the science of law, but partly because he did not wish to deprive Halle of the man whom he regarded as his property, and partly because, as he openly said, "the Dutch would not allow him to bring tall men for his regiments from the Netherlands, and he would not therefore allow the jurist to go to them." The opinion which he entertained of the value of Roman law in Germany may be gathered from his having sent the crack-brained Bartholdy, who was also treated with barbarous ridicule in his societies, as professor of the Pandects to Frankfort-on-the-Oder.

His mode of administering the law had something Turkish in it: the property and life of his subjects, without any protecting forms, were wholly subject to the exercise of the sound understanding of a king, who judged after the fashion of a peasant. His opinion was no doubt sound,—that it was quite absurd, in the case of a dispute between two peasants in Pomerania respecting an acre of land, to ask the learned what the ancient jurists and Justinian held to be right in such cases, or to keep an accused person in prison for years before his suit was commenced; but when he shortened proceedings after his own

fashion, the advantage of forms speedily became obvious. His judgments were speedily formed, but all legal order was at an end; and even among the Turks and barbarians a ruler rarely ventured with impunity to do what the king of Prussia did not hesitate to command*. When it pleased his fancy, he interfered with the criminal courts as well as in legislation, and commanded what he pleased, without reference to any previously-existing law, to custom or to humanity. He inflicted most cruel punishments and tortures: persons who by word or deed drew upon themselves his displeasure, or ran counter to his ideas of modesty and his commendable zeal for matrimonial fidelity, were either treated with personal violence, if he personally met them, or condemned to the most cruel punishments. Everyone, but especially women and children, trembled with fear when they saw the king approaching, because he would stop to talk to them respecting their business or their dress; and if one or the other displeased him, he was accustomed to treat them to the discipline of the stick, in order to bring them to a better mode of action or thinking. Even flight was not always advisable; for the king, whether on horseback or on foot, immediately despatched some one in pursuit, and those so taken were fortunate if they escaped with hard words or a few blows of the cane, and were not sent for some days to the workhouse, or to Spandau. His biographer has given many examples of the punishments which he inflicted. He caused women who were guilty of child-murder to be thrown into the water bound up in sacks, which they themselves were compelled to make. Young profligates, who wasted their property in extravagant pleasures, were sent to Spandau or to some other fortress. The king's eulogist adds, "such a person is to be found at this day in the

* Fassmann, who wrote the 'Eulogistic History of the King,' about 1735, is indeed a loose knave, and represents the king in the most detestable light, whilst pretending to praise him in his newspaper style. We shall quote his words, and the style and manners of the time may be judged of from the king's behaviour. He observes, "the king pronounced his opinion as unfavourable to learned and legal quibbles;" and adds, "Yea, if the lawyers were of one opinion, and did not often give the most perverted judgments after the most tedious processes; or if the faculties, circuit and other judges, did not give the most contradictory judgments when they had had all the Acta before them, it were well. But because this is the case, it is good for the king sometimes to interfere with the judgments of the courts, to increase or mitigate the severity of their decisions according to circumstances, or if he is convinced they are in error, wholly to disallow or annul them."

house of correction in Halle, where," as the biographer thinks himself bound in the spirit of his age to add, "he enjoys good health, and moreover receives instruction." Many, without further inquiry, were mounted upon the wooden ass, or set in the pillory, or dragged to Wusterhausen, bound with cords or chains, where the king himself immediately passed judgment, and saw his sentence carried into execution on the spot.

His police regulations may be illustrated by the course pursued towards the unfortunate class of women who constantly increased with the increase of his soldiery, to whom marriage was almost forbidden. The king ordered these unfortunate persons to be seized upon from time to time, swept them away by a general capture, and shut them up in the workhouses. His biographer relates his exploits of this kind, executed by such means, with the greatest degree of simplicity, as follows:—"On the second day of the Easter feast, 1731, such a general visitation was made; but on Easter Tuesday all was again full, and a new general visitation was instituted." He had originally ordered that no persons should be allowed to remain in taverns or public-houses later than nine o'clock, but notwithstanding his piety he gave up this principle, and no longer suffered the people to be driven out of the inns and taverns by patrols, because this proved injurious to his revenues. He moreover habitually maintained in his own family and domestic arrangements the same order which he wished to see observed and maintained in the houses of his people. We learn from Busching's '*Life of Provost Reinbeck*,' who possessed the king's confidence, that he came one evening to this clergyman's house in order to deliver a note, in which the provost was requested to tell the queen not to keep such late hours with her society in Montbijoux, for that the king might hear of it and take it amiss. Reinbeck wished to transfer the commission to the queen's confessor; but Possart, who held that office, was unwilling to undertake it, and Reinbeck himself was therefore obliged to deliver his commission, to the great annoyance of the queen.

This tendency of the king led him to be a powerful protector of the people at large against the insolence of the nobility. He showed this feeling very distinctly when the nobles of East Prussia delivered to him a representation composed in French, which he laconically and scoffingly answered in a mixture of

German, French and Latin*. The distinguished profligates and prodigals, of whom all the courts were at that time full, durst not show their faces at that of Frederick William; and the nobles and landowners were obliged, however reluctantly, to relinquish all those privileges of the middle ages which were inconsistent with the demands of the new age. Instead of furnishing men-at-arms they were obliged to pay regular contributions in money, and to be contented with the exchange of their feudal possessions into property, with which they were not at first contented, in consequence of the conditions which were arbitrarily imposed upon them; they were obliged to give up all claims to using the public domains at their discretion; and all farming of crown lands to nobles was put an end to, in order to introduce a more profitable and better mode of administration. In all questions which concerned his own interest, or the cause of justice and right, the king was inexorable, and paid no attention whatever to the claims or privileges of the nobility. He gave evidence of this feeling when he caused a descendant of one of the oldest and most distinguished noble families to be summarily beheaded†; he proved it towards his own son, Frederick the Great, when the latter offended and irritated him by his offensive behaviour and by contracting debts, and against his friend Von Katt, who was put to death, although nearly related to the first and most honourable nobles of the empire.

* An account is given of the transaction in the list of works of authority appended to the first part of Förster's 'Frederick William,' pp. 49, 50. Field-marshal count Von Dohna, as marshal of the nobility of East Prussia, had drawn up a report composed in French, dated 31st January 1717, in which a protest was made against the very reasonable introduction of a general horse-tax, which had been ordered by the king instead of the duty upon horned cattle, and which was concluded with these words: "tout le pays sera ruiné:" to which the king replied, "Tout le pays sera ruiné? Nihil credo aber das credo, dass die Junkers ihre Autorität wird ruinirt werden. Ich stabilire die Souverainetaet wie einen Rocher von Bronze."

† Von Schlubhuth. The transaction is related by Fassmann in his chancery style as follows:—"A member of the council of war and domains had cheated the colonists of some 14,000 dollars, which, according to the king's grace, should have fallen to them; upon which it followed, that a gallows was quickly erected and left standing opposite to the chamber in which the college held its sittings, and the councillors of war and domains had a full view of their companion who had been hanged," &c. &c. The same account is given by Förster, i. p. 323. He adds, "That the criminal court had judged him to some years' imprisonment only; that the nobleman had appealed against the king to his privileges, and offered to replace the money; but the king, without paying any attention to the judgment of the court, caused a gallows to be erected and had him hanged, after he had called out to him, 'I will have none of your rascally money.'"

The fashions and the ladies escaped the notice of the king as little as the nobility. He ill-treated ladies who appeared in dress which, in his opinion, was unbecoming, and published a severe edict against young women who did not wish to remain in their service, or were insolent to their employers*. He treated his manufacturers in the Westphalian provinces as Peter did his Russians, however much in other respects he was desirous of promoting the interests and progress of the practical arts. Peter sent the king tall men for his regiments of guards, and Frederick William in return seized upon blacksmiths and other artisans in the Mark and in Westphalia, and forwarded them from one military post to another like criminals. In this way they reached the frontiers, and were handed over to the power and for the service of the Russian†. Without regarding himself as going beyond his duty, or exciting any surprise in the minds of his subjects, he not only prescribed fashions and dress, but even the price of corn by law. With respect to corn, he prohibited all importation, even when there was a scarcity. The people were obliged to take their supply from his magazines at a fixed price, but at the same time he neither wished to make usurious profits nor to lose anything by the transactions. As a matter of fashion, his military eye could endure nothing but queues; bags for the hair, and certain particoloured garments of the Paris fashion of that day, were his detestation—no man durst appear in such a costume in Berlin; and the gentlemen of the French embassy were no little surprised, at a grand review, to see the drum-majors of all the regiments appear in the Parisian costume in which they themselves were dressed, and all adorned with hair-bags.

Frederick William would not endure play-actors, at least Italian and French, who at that time were found in multitudes in all courts. He was an enemy to all poetry, but an example of social integrity and piety. It is impossible to draw a stronger contrast between the degeneracy of the courts and the rude virtues of the king of Prussia than has been done by his own

* The words of the edict are as follows:—"All sorts of disobedient and impertinent young women who wish to betake themselves to their own hands, whether they be gentle or humble, are to be sent to Spandau, or to some house of correction, upon the desire of their employers and masters, if such employers can conscientiously allege that they have been disobedient or insolent."

† A fuller account of this interchange, and the circumstances connected with it, will be found in the second part of Förster's 'Life of Frederick William,' p. 299.

daughter, without having any such design in her contemplation. She gives us an account of the manner in which Frederick Augustus surprised the king and the crown prince when they visited him, by conducting them into a chamber enchantingly lighted up, where his daughter Orselska was lying in a state of nudity upon a sofa. This daughter at the same time stood in a relation to himself too shocking to state. On this occasion the king of Prussia, as we shall see below, not only showed that he looked upon the court morals of his host with contempt and detestation, but he also gave free utterance to his opinion*.

The king, urged on by a restless activity and always acting on the spur of his own impulses and opinions, very often pulled down with the one hand what he built up with the other. He beautified Berlin, Potsdam and other cities, or rather he built them anew, furnished the money and materials, and at his own cost caused many parts of the Berlin and Potsdam morasses to be drained and made fit for building; but at the same time he directed those morasses to be filled up, and appointed places for building in a perfectly arbitrary manner, and people were obliged to build, irrespective of all disadvantages or remonstrances to the contrary. By this building mania he ruined many excellent and faithful subjects, or made them the prey of those wicked and selfish men to whom he had committed the execution of his plans. The same course was pursued with agriculture, manufactures and trade, things which, according to their nature, cannot be promoted by any arbitrary means. The king encouraged the rearing and pasture of sheep, the trade in wool, and the manufacture of woollen cloth†; he sacrificed capital and laid the foundation for the future advantageous erection of manufactories; and, above all, awakened a spirit of industry, to which the indolent inhabitants of the Mark had been previously alto-

* We shall quote the passage from the 'Memoirs of the Life of the Prussian Princess Frederica Sophia Wilhelmina Margravine of Bayreuth.'—Germ. Trans. Tübingen. Cotta, 1810. Part 1st, p. 84. — "Nach Tische zog sich ein jeder zurück: Abends war Apartement bei der Königin, wobei sich die Gräfin Orselska und Bilinska, beide Töchter des Königs (von Polen) auch einstellten. Die erste war, wie ich schon gesagt habe, und so scheusslich die Sache ist, ihres Vater's Maitresse. Ohne eine regelmäsege Schönheit zu seyn, hatte sie viel einnehmendes, sie fragte wenig nach ihrem alten Liebhaber, und zog ihren Halbbruder den Sohn einer Türkin, den man den Grafen Rudetzky nannte, bei weitem vor. Die Lästchronik sagte, dass sie alle ihre Brüder, deren es einer ganzen Schwarm gab, begünstigte."

† Förster, part 2, p. 280, gives a full account of his absurd legislation about wool and cloth.

gether strangers ; but here also he injured with the one hand whilst he conferred advantages with the other. He took up a strong prejudice upon the subject of cotton, and therefore not only prohibited all cotton stuffs, but required that every article made of this material, which was the object of his indignation, should not only be removed from all public shops by a certain specified time, but that its use should also be discontinued in all private houses ; domestic visitations were ordered for hunting out cottons, and every transgression of the cotton law was severely punished. The solicitor-general and other officials were very sensible of the absurdity and folly of such a law, and did everything in their power to mitigate its operation and to obstruct its being rigorously carried out. The king became cognisant of the fact, and it happened at the moment that he had a grenadier in one of his regiments who had formerly studied law, and was by no means unskilled in the science. To the astonishment of everybody he made the grenadier solicitor-general, who showed himself quite equal to the duties of the office. He gave directions for a general search after cotton, not only in Berlin but in all the Prussian states ; and this house-searching, breaking open of doors and seeking out private vaults continued for no inconsiderable time to the great terror of the people, till the general directory of government ventured to submit some representations on the subject to the king, which were favourably listened to. The general visitation was stopt, but the grenadier solicitor-general remained in his office and teased and annoyed persons of the highest consideration, although he himself in the mean time had been once brought as a prisoner to the guard-house. Such modes of government and police were quite common in all the German states, and the effect upon German culture and the intercourse of life could not be otherwise than destructive. The subjects necessarily became servile, and the officials tyrannical and despotic, and so it continues till the present day. If we would speak of the universities and their meanness, of the pedants who taught for money and for money alone, of the combinations and societies among the students, of the duellists and bullies, their excessive drinking and brawling, and of a literature in accordance with such learned corporations, it will be easy to see that every well-organized mind would feel offended and disgusted with German life and German books, and have recourse to the French. Fre-

derick William rendered himself the laughing-stock of his own, and has continued to be that of succeeding times, by his childish delight in those tall and well-dressed living puppets who constituted his soldiers and army. It cannot however be denied, that it was owing to his love of soldiers and his frugality that North Germany, under his son, was enabled to make the glorious stand which it did in the field and the cabinet against ignorance and blind despotism. Together with his fuglemen, who consisted of giants, and his Potsdam guard, which was in like manner merely distinguished for stature, he had contrived progressively to form an army of 70,000 men*, whose discipline was strict, and who were trained by the best tacticians in Europe,—by persons who had gained experience in the war of the succession. The king not only seized by force upon all such persons in his own country as came up to his standard for soldiers, without respect to circumstances, rank or employment, but he carried on a regular system of trade and robbery in grenadiers; he seized upon travellers, carried off soldiers who were in foreign service, and fell into a serious dispute with the Dutch, to whom he was in other respects very much attached, because they would not suffer him to recruit in the Netherlands, and avenged the carrying-off their soldiers by the execution of the officers who had been instrumental in the theft. Bavaria also, and the episcopal government in Aichstadt, would not tolerate his kidnappers, whilst other states profited by his folly and gained his favour by recruits. Large and overgrown men were sent to the king from Austria, Saxony and Mecklenburg, just as if men could be disposed of in Europe as they have been, and are, sold in Africa. Peter delivered no inconsiderable quantity of this human ware, and received in return from Prussia manufacturers, well-trained serjeants and engineers. As he spent enormous sums for the indulgence of his folly about his Potsdam guard, and individuals were paid for at a cost of many thousand dollars, as 16,000 to 18,000 dollars were expended yearly for recruiting in every regiment, and the whole sum which was disbursed in foreign countries for recruits during his reign is said to have amounted to more than 12,000,000 of dollars, the

* Förster (2nd part, p. 295) specifies with precision the number of the army which Frederick William left to his successor, and states it at 89,000. In the same place will be found a complete account of the Potsdam guards and the cost of recruiting them; we therefore omit what we had remarked on the authority of Fassmann.

question will naturally be asked, whence all this money came? because the king not only met the expenditure, but also amassed a considerable treasure. The answer to this question shows us the life of that time in another point of view, and for that reason we shall dwell upon the point a little longer. The king provided for all this expenditure from a recruiting-chest, which was supplied by the produce of pecuniary fines, and all the perquisites and fees for the preparation of official appointments, but especially from the proceeds of the sale of places and titles. And as the king himself, like a strong-minded man, entertained a thorough contempt for the prevailing love of rank and titles, as well as for ceremonial and etiquette, and lost no opportunity of giving free expression* to his opinions on this subject by rescripts and in other ways, he certainly was not the cause of this abuse of trading in titles and rank, but he profited by the folly of his subjects for the promotion of his own views. It may easily be imagined what an eagerness there was for the possession of titles and rank in this title-loving age, when all the different titles might be had for a sum of from 300 to 600 dollars, and for what an income the recruiting-chest was indebted to this love of rank, which was merely calculated to embarrass and disturb the whole intercourse of society.

The trade in places was, however, much more melancholy than the sale of titles and rank; and such sales were at that time quite common in Germany, although not driven to the same excess elsewhere as in Prussia. In Hamburg and the Palatinate the sale of places went to such an extent, that not only the places themselves but the expectation and reversion of them were sold long before they were vacant, and before the death of the holders. Fassmann informs us, that in Prussia the situation of a porter, which was worth not more than ten dollars a month, was sold for 600 dollars; that the situation of an excise

* In the authorities quoted by Förster, part 1, p. 74, there occurs the following passage:—"The baron von Strunkede complained to the king in August 1732, that a certain councillor Pabst, who was merely of plebeian descent, had taken his place in the church upon the benches appropriated to the nobles, and prays, 'Da Sr Majestät allerhöchstes Interesse dabei versire, zur Wiederencouragirung der getreun, *jetzo bis in die Seele affligirten*, ritterbürtigen Bedienten dem Pabst zu injungiren dass er seine demensurirte Ambition einschränke &c.' To which the king answered, 'This is nonsense. In Berlin there is no distinction of rank, in Cleves there must be none also. If Pabst sits above me in the church, I still remain what I am; my extraction always continues the same.'"

officer or toll-collector, worth seven dollars a month, was once offered for public sale and pushed as high as 800 dollars, to the no small surprise of the royal council. All that was obtained in this way, by the sale of places and situations, Frederick William's biographer boastingly informs us, was drawn by the king into his recruiting-chest; and he assures us that he had great skill in thus getting possession of and appropriating the hoarded and concealed money of his subjects*. The private life of Frederick William furnishes us with the picture of the domestic establishment of a citizen of that time. His daughter abuses him, and alleges that nothing was to be found at his table except turnips and cabbage, or bacon and peas, but this tittle-tattle is gross exaggeration; the complaints which she makes with respect to the daily family arrangements to which she and her mother were subjected are better founded, and we shall give her own account in a note†. Fassmann, in the tone of a eulogist and in his chancery style, defends the king with respect to the supply of his table. Confectionary he admits was not introduced, and no fine or foreign dishes were ever served, except for the queen and the princesses; but, on the other hand, there was fish and game in abundance. When we examine the whole affair more closely, we find that the whole domestic arrangements were rude and coarse, like the king himself; however, a German patriotic nature is not to be mistaken even in these trifles. He

* We expressly quote Fassmann's words, because they illustrate the meanness of that class of men to which he belonged, and the way in which such people were then regarded. He says, "It could not be believed how much secret money was stowed away in families by aged mothers and widows, *and which could be brought to light in no other way.*" He illustrates the remark by the case of a woman who had accumulated money by keeping a public-house, married a footman, and paid 600 dollars to the recruiting-chest for a place for her husband. The woman died, the man married a second wife with money, again bought a place, and became a royal farmer.

† Memoirs, part I, p. 65. She states, "that she lodged on the ground-floor and was awakened every morning at seven o'clock by the noise of soldiers exercising before her windows. At ten we went to my mother, and proceeded with her into the chamber next to that of the king, where we were obliged to sigh the whole morning. At length dinner-hour arrived; the service consisted of six ill-dressed dishes, which were to suffice for twenty-four persons, so that most of the company must be satisfied with the mere savour. After dinner the king sat in a wooden arm-chair and slept two hours. As long as the king slept I worked; as soon as he awoke he went away. The queen then retired to her chamber, and I was obliged to read to her till the king came. He remained only a few moments and then went to his smoking-room. We supped at eight and the king was present, but we were for the most part obliged to go away hungry. The king seldom came back from his smoking till four o'clock in the morning, and we were obliged to wait till he came."

suffered, for example, no French or Spanish wines, but had abundant supplies of Rhenish, and permitted the use of Hungarian. If we might venture to place any confidence in his daughter, his country palaces were the image of the country seats of the Pomeranian squires*, as well as the kind of society and conversation which were to be met with at the king's evening circles. In these societies the most important affairs were settled conversationally; in general only four or five persons were present, but sometimes also the company was very numerous. All sat upon wooden chairs, smoked tobacco, and lighted their pipes after the Dutch fashion with a turf coal, which stood in a basin ready for the purpose. The rest of the entertainment was quite in accordance with this†.

When it is remembered how things were managed in Saxony, and in what a condition Frederick William found affairs at his father's death in Prussia, it will be seen how beneficially all this wonderful simplicity and frugality, this representation of the highest democratic, even radical, repugnance to ostentation and etiquette, must have worked upon the minds of the poor Germans. However great was the respect which Frederick William entertained for the emperor, he took great offence at his anxious attention to ceremonies and formality on occasion of their meet-

* The margravine having first described Wusterhausen as a detestable place, proceeds:—"The sentinels consisted of ten or twelve bears, which walked about upon their hind legs, because their fore paws had been cut off. In the middle of the court there was a fountain, from which, with great art, a jet-d'eau was made to spring. This fountain was enclosed by iron railings and ascended by some steps, and the king had chosen this agreeable place for his smoking. My sister and myself, with our attendants, were crowded into two chambers, which appeared more like an hospital than the apartments of two royal princesses. Whatever the weather might be, we were obliged to dine under a tent, which was overshadowed by a large lime-tree; and when it rained we sat up to the middle of the leg in water. The table was always laid for twenty-four persons, of whom at least three-fourths must go away fasting, for no more than six portions were served, and these cut so small that a single hungry man could have eaten them all with great convenience." Much of this, as well as that the royal family were shut up in their chambers in Wusterhausen as in a prison, is confirmed in the official reports; only it is there stated, that when it was bad weather the court dined in a beautiful room of the old castle, and that the evening societies were held in the new building. From this other exaggerations may be judged of.

† Fassmann states, "That whoever was present at the king's evening parties and wished to eat might go into the antechamber, where there was cold roast meat, bread and butter, and wine. In the company of the king's majesty himself, however, every one had his white jug of beer and a glass before him. It was ridiculous enough, that those who did not smoke, such as Leopold of Dessau and Seckendorf, kept pipes in their mouths."

ing, and entertained afterwards a much lower opinion of him. When he came to Leipzig, Herr Von Hopfgarten loaded him with court compliments, and the consequence was that he declined the dinner which he had wished to partake of in Leipzig, from sheer apprehension and disgust at the courtly manners of the man to whom king Augustus had committed the duty of receiving him, and took his departure. On his accession he immediately dismissed all the valets, pages, Hungarians, couriers, chamberlains and court officers, who swarmed in his father's court. His despotic severity relieved the people from the necessity of paying yearly salaries to all those idlers, who had not only hitherto used the royal kitchen and cellar as if they were their own, but had driven a wholesale trade with the proceeds of their embezzlement. Frederick William is indeed obnoxious to blame, for having at the same time wished to maintain a court and for not furnishing the means for its expenditure: he required all the expenses to fall within 4000 dollars monthly. The king allowed his ministers only 2000 dollars as salary, whereas his father had placed his in a situation which enabled the minister to keep a princely household. Frederick William had neither court trumpeters nor kettle-drummers, whereas his father maintained four-and-twenty, of whom each, besides his expensive clothing and entertainment, received thirty dollars a month. The whole of Frederick William's attendants consisted of sixteen pages, of whom two were constantly in service, and along with them six footmen.

In all matters relating to hunting and game, as well as in his modes of living, Frederick William showed himself to be an image of the coarse country landowners of his age; and not only was everything maintained, which in his father's lifetime had been done for the chase for the sake of ostentation, but game preserves of several German miles in circumference were laid out and kept up in the neighbourhoods of Wusterhausen and Potsdam.

The cruelties which were exercised in the protection of these detestable preserves, the barbarous and arbitrary augmentation of the ordinary sentences of the courts, and even the self-willed imposition of the severest penalties for the most insignificant offences; the unreasonable severity of the king towards his family; the violent and treacherous system of man-stealing which was carried on by his command, wherever a man could be found

of the necessary stature, no matter of what country or condition ; —all these stand in remarkable contrast with the piety which Frederick William promoted and practised. We touch upon this point, because it furnishes another illustration and peculiarity of German life—the combination of coarseness and barbarity with the forms and formulas of the strictest external piety, and of a faith for which no point of traditionary dogmatics was or is too difficult.

The king always showed the greatest respect to the clergy ; he not only corresponded with the Pietists in Halle, but he entered as minutely into the affairs of individual settlements, and was as anxious about preachers as about his officers and farmers. It appears from his letters to provost Reinbeck, that he treated him with as much attention as he did prince Leopold of Anhalt Dessau, the founder of the whole discipline of that Prussian army of which Frederick afterwards made such an admirable use ; but who, notwithstanding all his exalted military qualities, had no equal in vulgarity and wickedness.

The result of all these observations upon German life and the customs and usages of those times, is, that at courts, and in the mode of living in distinguished families, there was a singular and ridiculous union of splendour and poverty, debt, niggardliness and ostentation, with wealth, pomp and contemptible meanness : of all this Frederick William furnishes us with remarkable proofs. It occurred to him once, when king Augustus had entertained him with splendour and at a most extravagant cost, to show that he also could be splendid, and that too after the Dutch fashion, as the other imitated the French* ; but he,

* This royal fête, which was prepared and given according to the Dutch fashion, is also characteristic of the age. The margravine in her 'Memoirs,' part I, p. 242, gives the following account of it :—"She wore a crown of brilliants set in six rows, to which were attached four-and-twenty pendants. Her dress was of rich silver brocade with golden net, and a train twelve ells long." She then speaks of the rooms :—"The immense silver services with which they were adorned were of enormous value. As the king had seen the splendour of the king of Poland in Dresden, he wished to exceed it, and therefore adopted quite a new mode of extravagance : he caused looking-glasses to be made of ten or twelve feet high, which twenty men could with difficulty carry, and under each glass was placed a table of pure silver, at which a dozen persons could sit. The sconces were four feet in size, and the chandeliers were worth from 10,000 to 100,000 dollars. The curtains were seven feet high. Both rooms were provided with side-tables, on which the smallest piece was worth 12,000 dollars. The balcony of one of these rooms was of the same metal, and all wrought with the greatest skill and taste. *The whole of the chambers were lighted with immense wax-lights (altarkerzen), which smoked so*

immediately after this display, returned to his usual habits of extraordinary frugality. Indeed he pushed his penuriousness still further. Instead of the former daily allowance of ninety-three dollars for the maintenance of the royal table and house, he gave directions that in future only fifty to fifty-five should be devoted to this purpose; this rule was to be observed except when the household of the queen was at a different place from his own, in which case seventy-two dollars were allowed. From that time forward also he forbade all delicacies to be brought from Hamburg and other places. The transactions connected with the marriage of the princess are in complete keeping with all the rest of his conduct. The marriage itself was celebrated with extraordinary pomp; but he only gave her 40,000 dollars fortune, 16,000 as a settlement in case of widowhood, and 2000 pin-money.

In the training and discipline of the young in these times, the most wearisome and tasteless piety was combined with a certain self-denial and a patriarchal relation among the various members of the family. The excessive severity which resulted from a religion whose fundamental doctrines were original sin and the utter corruption of human nature, neither work better nor more disadvantageously than the relaxed mildness and the presumption, that human beings can be brought up in educated society like children of nature, work in our days. As to Frederick William himself, his daughter has only given us an account of his barbarous severity and discipline in the education of his children and in his behaviour towards his wife. His family intercourse however had also its good and praiseworthy side, but which indeed was incapable of awakening any good feelings in such a wife and daughter, who had no goodness in them.

as almost to produce suffocation, and covered countenances and dress with black. The value of all these treasures was reckoned at 6,000,000 dollars."—Forster (i. p. 327) states that of the silver furniture to have been 1,376,000.

CHAPTER III.

FROM THE ERECTION OF THE NEW RUSSIAN EMPIRE, AND FROM THE BEGINNING OF ITS PREPONDERANCE OVER THE NORTHERN STATES, TILL THE AUSTRIAN WAR OF SUCCESSION.

§ I.

NEW GOVERNMENTS IN FRANCE, SPAIN AND ENGLAND; CHARACTER, MORALS AND FIRST STEPS OF THESE GOVERNMENTS.

IN the last years of his life, Louis XIV. had indeed dazzled the world by the splendour of his government and the theatrical pomp of his court; but he had outlived his renown. A universal feeling had grown up against the oppression of an arbitrary military dominion, springing from the will of a bigoted man, who looked upon everything as subject to his control, and who was surrounded and misled by flatterers and priests, and a change was earnestly desired. This extensive and sullen discontent arose from the general decay, the impositions and oppression of the numerous farmers and undertakers of the public taxes (*traitants*), from the impossibility of maintaining the credit of the nation any longer, of meeting the current expenditure, or even paying the interest of the debt. This feeling sprung up in spite of the police and the bastilles, and took the deeper root because no man dared to utter a murmur of discontent, and such expressions could only find a vent in the most private and confidential circles.

All historical documents,—those which have been printed, as well as the numerous papers preserved in the French archives with respect to the history of these times,—agree in expressing the conviction that the government and administration could no longer have been carried on as had been done under Louis XIV., and the integrity and peace of the kingdom be maintained. The king however remained unmoved and unaffected till his death; and not only so, but Louis wished to prolong his reign beyond the period of life, and conceived that he had provided for the carrying out of his plans by his will and codicils. It soon ap-

peared however, after his death, which took place on the 1st of September 1715, that all dispositions are utterly inefficient which cannot be maintained by the bayonet when power has usurped dominion over right. Louis XIV. had adopted his illegitimate children into the number of the princes of the blood, and educated them as such; or in other words, the count of Toulouse and the duke of Maine, who were born without talents, were made completely unfit for any serious employment or useful service by the misfortune of a court education. The king nevertheless had appointed the latter to be guardian of his eldest great-grandson Louis XV., who was then five years of age, and committed the government to a regency during his minority*. In one of the codicils, marshal Villeroi was appointed as the person who was to maintain the directions of the king's will by military measures; and if he had been a man of as much character as pliancy and courtliness, he would probably have carried out the king's intentions by force and the bayonet. But neither Villeroi nor the duke of Maine was at all a match for the duke of Orleans in the determination to use either cunning or force. The latter was a man who feared neither God nor man, and was ready to adopt all the necessary means to realize his designs: he laid claim to the regency as the eldest legitimate prince of the blood. Philip of Orleans was the son of an original and vigorous-minded German princess, whose scandalous memoirs have been sought out and printed in our days: he combined talents, resolution and skill, with a reckless contempt for all the principles of morality and religion; he purchased the friendship of a Noailles, a Villars, and the princes, for he knew well, that among such persons everything is venal; he had even gained over marshal Villeroi before Louis' death, and by his means had become acquainted with the contents of the will, which was to be kept a secret, and to be maintained by Villeroi by force of arms†.

* Besides Lacretelle in his '*Histoire du Dixhuitième Siècle*,' Lemontey, in his '*Histoire de la Régence et de la Minorité de Louis XV.*,' has treated the history of the period from 1715–1735 at great length. Instead therefore of the quotations in the first edition of the '*History of the Eighteenth Century*,' we shall occasionally present our readers with notes drawn from the documents in the French archives, which have been carefully examined with a view to this object.

† The codicil is as follows: "Pendant qu'il sera au parlement il aura des gardes à toutes les portes du palais comme il se fait lorsque les rois vont au parlement pour la dignité et la sureté de leurs personnes. Il sera accompagné

The parliament was to be used as an instrument for annulling the will. Philip of Orleans therefore flattered its councillors by promises, and by the assurance that he as regent would again restore the parliament to that degree of influence and importance of which it had been deprived under the reign of Louis XIV. The people were consoled by the empty hope of being delivered by Philip from the intolerable oppression and torturing want under which they were suffering. In addition to the smooth words and fair promises which he used, the duke of Orleans gained a powerful influence among the people, from the same cause which made Robespierre so strong in 1793. They entertained the expectation of being cruelly avenged on the blood-suckers and favourites of the previous reign through his instrumentality: this indeed was a degrading and inhuman joy, but it nevertheless had a great effect in the times of the revolution. The humbled and slavish aristocracy, whose power had been almost annihilated by the monarch, were allured by the promise that all questions under the regency should be determined by plurality of votes, and that the different branches of the government would be entrusted to bodies of commissioners (*conseils*) formed from members of the aristocracy. This sounded almost like the administration of the Swedish colleges of the kingdom; but the promise was empty, and so far it was good. By the aid of the parliament the will was set aside, and the duke of Orleans (nephew of Louis XIV.) was acknowledged as regent. The regent found the kingdom in desperate circumstances; and although he possessed abilities and skill, eloquence and wit, together with some degree of kindness and magnanimity, yet his devoted attachment to sin, his wilful contempt for virtue, honour and truth, as things only fit for tradesmen and peasants, his extravagance and habitual indulgence in the grossest sensualities, to which he devoted night and day, and all founded upon a species of hellish philosophy, made him wholly incapable of undertaking any good designs.

When Louis died, the treasury was not only completely exhausted, there not only existed universal want and misery, but the credit of the nation was utterly gone, and the whole income of the country was pledged for two years to come. It appears

dans sa marche des compagnies des gardes Françaises et Suisses jusqu'à Vincennes, où il demeurera le temps qui sera ordonné par le conseil de la régence."

from the autograph letters of the regent, preserved in the French archives, and which were sent to the various provincial governors, that a very few days after assuming the government, he found it quite impossible to obtain means of paying or maintaining the troops even for the next month, and that according to these starving mercenaries, he was obliged, as had formerly been done, to make a reduction in their miserable pay*. Under these circumstances, the hatred of the people towards the ministers of Louis, and all those speculators who had enriched themselves at the cost of the public, increased with double violence, and there was a universal cry for the punishment of those much-envied cheats, who had however subjected themselves to no legal penalties. We learn from a document which the regent allowed to be preserved in the archives, that he was impelled to the appointment of a most unjust tribunal by the expectation that he might be able to extort a sum of 200,000,000 livres from the guilty, by an investigation of all the frauds which had been perpetrated under the former government. This motive influenced the regent and his creatures, whilst the parliament supported the plan of these miserable schemers from a desire of revenge†.

* Archives du Royaume de France, Carton K. 145. He writes to Elbeuf, governor of Picardy, on the 8th of September 1715, that it is quite impossible to procure bread and pay for the troops. "Ce n'est pas qu'on n'ait pas en vue de leur rétablir la paye en entier le plutôt qu'il sera possible, mais plus elles sont préparées à un peu de patience plus elles nous sauront gré de ce soulagement lorsque nous pourrions le leur procurer. On me mande de Flandres que toutes les troupes des places sont disposées à prendre le pain jusqu'à la fin de cette année. Je ne doute point, Mons^r., que, habile et persuasif comme vous êtes, vous ne calmez pas plus aisément qu'un autre celle de votre gouvernement." He continues in this strain, and rejoices that Mons. Bernaye had been able to do something to find funds for the next month. In a letter to De Richebourg, governor of Poitou, he refers to a contribution of tenths which it would be necessary to raise, and in which also the nobility who were acquainted with the "besoins pressans du royaume" must take their share. To Medavi in Dauphiné he writes, "that he must not be surprised at not receiving his salary, for even the troops were without pay." For further information on this point, see 'Mémoires de Noailles,' and Millot, 5th part, 1778.

† What was to be expected from such a tribunal, so constituted and with such views, may be seen from a document (Carton K. 147), where an account is given of a Nions. de Novel de Kerfas, who boasts of having previously made similar proposals to the duke of Burgundy, of which he had availed himself, and who now explains to the regent the way in which he may extort this legal plunder and the persons from whom it may be drawn. The extortion was to amount to 200,000,000, and to be obtained in the following manner:—The controller-general, 10,000,000; chancellor Pontchartrain, formerly controller-general, 10,000,000; De Bercey, superintendent of finances, 2,000,000; Rebours, superintendent of finances, 1,000,000; Guyet, 1,000,000; Phelippeaux de Pontchartrain, formerly minister of marine, 2,000,000; the treasurers of the royal money, each 300 crowns; Bourvalet, 2,000,000; the

This gave him therefore the appearance of justice and the arm of a tribunal. In the next year, this court of pains and penalties (*chambre ardente*) was instituted; and as we learn from the duplicate minutes of the Chambers which are to be found in the archives, the attorney-general excused himself from defending the measure on the plea of hoarseness, and only allowed his complaints and his requirements to be recorded in the minutes. The complaint and request of the attorney-general appear to us so important for the history of the morals and judicial barbarism of those times, that we shall select some passages, in order to show by documents the relation of the officers of finance and contractors of Louis XIV. to the people, and that of the courts of law to the principles of justice*.

The attorney-general says, “that among all those who might be called before this tribunal (*aussi juste que sévère*), those who might have enriched themselves by the usual means were least liable to punishment; but that, on the other hand, the farmers-general had abused the revenues of the royal demesnes, especially in cases of extraordinary levies, and almost all had over-stretched the power entrusted to them, because they were aware how necessary they themselves were to the state.” Then follow accusations which can only be regarded as moral reproaches, but are here used as a ground for legal penalties; after which he continues, “the present condition of the finances, and the extraordinary want of money, which has been as ruinous to the kingdom as a failure in the crops, are the effects of those measures of avaricious foresight which have been taken by usurers, who have

farmers-general, both those who have been and those who are now in office, 500,000 livres; secretaries of foreign affairs, each 500,000 livres; and under-secretaries, each 100,000; the receivers-general of the exchequer, each 100,000 crowns; the receivers of excise, each 50,000 livres; the military treasurers, each 300,000 livres; the superintendents of the provinces, each 300,000 livres; their deputies, each 50,000; the great contractors, each 100,000 livres; the commissaries in the former as well as in the last war, 10,000,000 livres; Rivié, inspector-general of artillery, 500,000 crowns; the shopkeepers of the frontier towns and others who had furnished supplies to the king's troops, each 100,000 livres; and generally all those who had made their fortunes in connexion with public affairs. We have quoted this in order to show who the blood-suckers were, the greatness of their number, and the proportion of gains which were attributed to each.

* Two copies of minutes of the *Chambre de Justice* appointed by the regent are to be found in another roll of Carton K. 147. From this roll, what follows in the text is extracted. An extract of the edict of March 1716, with respect to the institution of this chamber, may be seen in Noailles' *Mémoires*.

thereby become rich. All however are not in like manner deserving of punishment; the reputation of those who have gained their money by honest means will not be injured by the strictest scrutiny or the severest judgments passed upon others, and there is a class of rich men among whom guilty persons alone are to be found. To this class first of all belong those usurers who have dealt in state paper-money, who have pushed their scandalous traffic in secret, and by such means have accumulated an immense property, the method of acquiring which they have understood how to conceal from public observation. Finally, the judges are exhorted to root up the foundations of the wealth of such suspicious characters, and to destroy the building of their injustice.”

It appears from the minutes that some councillors of the parliament protested against such a tribunal, and against such arbitrary measures as those which the court required; but they were silenced by the declaration that the course recommended was precisely in accordance with what had been pursued in 1607, 1624, and 1661. A description of public advertisement* quite unheard of formed the suitable preliminary to a criminal investigation as to the manner in which those who were called to account had come by their property, and the examination was carried as far back as the year 1689.

This tribunal carried on its investigations through the whole of the year 1716, by means of terror, torture and imprisonment. The first roll, which is followed by nineteen others, contains nineteen pages filled with the names of those who were subjected to the inquisition, together with all the various documents connected with the process: the sum extorted amounted to 31,000,000 livres. In the year 1717, this court became completely a means of terror, and a commission was appointed in connexion with it, which imposed sums upon the accused in the most arbitrary manner. The number of persons from whom money was demanded reached 4470, and the money which was extorted by this tyrannous process amounted to 220,000,000. The state however did not derive the slightest advantage from this enormous sum. The regent and the dissolute and ruined men whom he favoured shared the penalties, and when the public clamour

* In the Carton already referred to a copy of the placard is to be found, which was posted up all over Paris; “*portant défense à tous gens d'affaires de désenparer de Paris sous peine de punition corporelle et même de mort.*”

with respect to the injustice of the tribunal became so great that some limits must necessarily be placed to its operations, they sold their protection and mediation to individuals for considerable sums. A universal feeling of indignation arose, that 4470 persons, whose property amounted to 800,000,000, should be publicly sacrificed to the reckless extortion of a scandalous court: but the regent was far exalted above all ordinary notions of morality,—above all social prejudices in favour of justice and truth. He read with complete indifference the most vehement attacks*, which were full of well-merited reproaches, and even allowed them to be preserved among his papers, where they have been since found; but because he had no regard either for immortality or posterity, he favoured those persons alone who procured him money for the pleasures of the moment, in which alone he placed the value and enjoyment of life.

The brothers Paris deserve to be particularly mentioned amongst the number of those whom the regent used as instruments for the promotion of his views, though they did not exactly belong to the utterly depraved society with which he associated: they undertook the character of auxiliaries to those great men who are ready to resort to every means to relieve themselves from the perplexities of the moment. This character they maintained under the regent, and afterwards under the duke of Bourbon, and ruled the whole state. They were born in the neighbourhood of the Piedmontese Alps, among an industrious and frugal people commendably devoted to every species of trade, afterwards became distinguished for their capacities and knowledge as bankers in Paris, and at this time suggested various financial measures to the regent. Their advice sufficed to meet the demands of the moment, but its adop-

* In the roll already referred to, which contains the *pasquilles*, denunciations, &c. which were sent to the regent and carefully preserved, there is a piece superscribed,—“*Mémoire pour les trois ordres des Etats*,” in which the calling together of the estates is very importunately urged; and among other matters it contains a notice of this *Chambre de Justice aux Augustins*:—“*Cette chambre de justice, dont le fruit devoit être si grand, qu’il devoit acquitter une partie des dettes du roi, n’a été de notoriété publique qu’un moyen d’assouvir l’avidité des maîtresses et des favoris, qu’en un mot le désordre et la misère augmente et qu’on ne voit aucune espérance d’être délivré de tant de maux; peut-on de bonne foi donner à la stupidité avec laquelle on les supporte le nom de fidélité et de raison, où se flatter qu’une servile crainte, une lâche et misérable obéissance produira des effets qu’on ne doit attendre que de la fermeté, du courage, de l’union à soutenir chacun ses propres intérêts?*” Eight rolls of the names of those who were taxed, together with a sum of 147,355,433 livres, are found subjoined to the first part of D’Angerville’s ‘*Vie Privée de Louis XV.*’

tion afterwards became more ruinous to the nation than the plague, starvation, or war could possibly have been. They discovered the most wicked means of defrauding the honourable and simple-minded of their hard-earned money, and of enriching the sensual and ostentatious with the possessions of the honest.

The first measure suggested by these political economists was the *VISA*; then followed the melting-down of the coin, and the arbitrary depression or even abolition of the annuities and pensions which had been secured under the previous reign. A third measure of finance, equally destructive with these, was adopted upon the recommendation of a Scotch speculator. This consisted in the erection of a state bank and the establishment of a trading company, which brought about a formal revolution, or a complete change in the state of property among all the independent families of France, and the ruin of multitudes.

The melting-down of the coin gave occasion to innumerable frauds; for sterling money, which was either concealed or exported, became rare, whilst everyone was obliged to pay a higher price for all articles of necessity and ordinary wares, not only on account of the relation of the new money to the old, but to fill the pockets of the usurers as the price of their speculation. Lecomtey states the advantage which the regent derived from debasing the money at 72,000,000 livres; and the nation was obliged to pay this trifling gain at a loss which it is impossible to calculate. In order to compel the people to deliver up their hard cash for the purpose of being melted down, the government onewhile gave permission to export the precious metals and then suddenly prohibited exportation, and carried their severity to such a length, as even to search the person in order to see whether money might not in this way be concealed. A native of Basle (Burckhardt), who was making a short journey on the French territory, was searched, and some louis-d'or taken from his person, as the case is stated in the papers of the regency. He wrote in consequence to the regent himself, to demand the restoration of his money: the regent sent him a favourable answer, but stated that it had been most properly taken from him. The *Visa* (an examination of the justice of the demand or debt, and an arbitrary diminution of claims) affected the national debt and the holders of national paper in the same manner as the melting-down of the coin affected the possessors of cash. A

sum of six hundred millions of debt was wiped out by national paper (*billets d'état*), which was not quite worth two millions. This operation was used by those persons to whom the investigation of the nature of debts to which this principle should be applied was entrusted, with a view to enrich some families and to hurl others into the deepest poverty.

Before mentioning these measures, which led to a formal bankruptcy, in its nature altogether fraudulent, we may observe, that the blame of these arbitrary proceedings is not to be thrown wholly upon the regent, but rather upon those boards by whose establishment he at first flattered the aristocracy, and made a pretence of softening and ameliorating the despotism of the last autocratic government*. It had been resolved that six boards (*conseils*) should be appointed, consisting of seventy persons, and that to these boards should be committed the administration of the army and navy, treasury and law, ecclesiastical and foreign affairs; all the powers, in short, which, under the reign of Louis XIV., the individual ministers of these several departments had exercised in their own persons.

The regent however by no means intended to concede unconditional powers to these boards, but reserved to himself the distribution of the business. In an autograph letter preserved in the archives, he complains bitterly to the duke of Elbeuf of his having referred some military affairs immediately to marshal Villars, who presided over that department as cardinal Noailles did over that of ecclesiastical affairs. In this letter he declares expressly, that everything must be exclusively directed to him personally, and that he would afterwards refer the various questions to those whom he wished to consult; but he was in fact so completely immersed in his indulgences, that it was quite impossible for him to give the necessary attention to public affairs, and he often neglected public business of importance for weeks together. The abbé Dubois, who had been his tutor and led him into everything that was evil and wicked, afterwards worked for him as his private secretary. From this time all hope of a council of regency disappeared, which the duke had before pro-

* He writes in an autograph letter to cardinal Tremouille: "La situation présente de ce royaume, la disposition des esprits lassés de voir chaque partie du gouvernement entre les mains d'un seul homme pendant tout le règne précédent, la nécessité de rétablir la confiance en donnant une nouvelle forme à l'administration des affaires, firent recevoir cette proposition avec un applaudissement universel."

mised to appoint*, and in the following year Dubois alone, although privately, conducted the whole affairs of the state.

The two measures which had served to raise money for immediate necessities speedily increased the difficulties of the government and nation. The melting-down of the old coinage lessened the amount of sterling money and the mass of the precious metals which were in circulation, and the depreciation of the national debt annihilated the public credit. It was now proposed to meet these difficulties by the establishment of a bank, which was to increase the circulating medium and to sustain the national credit. This proposal was made by a Scotch speculator named Law, a man of great experience in money affairs and in trade, who proposed to the regent to effect by artificial means what it seemed impossible to accomplish in a natural way. About this time Law had projected the plan of a bank, in order to enrich himself and to ease the circulation in France; he now proposed to the regent to adopt this bank as a national institution, and was referred by the latter to the board of finance. The duke of Noailles was president of the board. He looked upon Law's scheme as somewhat critical and dangerous, but on the other hand he was more disposed to approve of a national bank which was only to issue notes and not to carry on any trade, as the originator of the plan was generally regarded as a person far beyond all his contemporaries in theoretic knowledge of the affairs of trade and especially of dealings in money. The capital of the bank was to be six millions; all trading strictly prohibited; and every bank-note was to be made payable in cash, on demand. This was the substance of the decree for the establishment of the bank in May 1716. Such a bank might indeed ease the currency and facilitate exchanges, but could never throw the state into confusion by a superabundance of paper money, because the capital was too small, and the bank-notes were every moment liable and likely to be exchanged for cash.

The advantages of the establishment were soon obvious; the course of exchange altered in favour of France, and good bills were discounted at five per cent.; usurers diminished, and mer-

* In the letter to cardinal Tremouille already referred to he observes,—Every officer shall be brought before one of the “conseils particuliers; avant que d’être portée au conseil de régence que je *pourrois* former ainsi que je le jugerai à propos.”

chants and manufacturers were again able to procure money to carry on their trade. In consequence of this, Law, the director of the bank, soon obtained the highest reputation not only in France but in the whole of Europe. He was regarded as possessing the highest degree of mercantile skill, and an insight into the nature of social intercourse and the industry of modern times which was then remarkably rare. As long as the duke of Noailles was at the head of the exchequer, he used all his endeavours to oppose and counteract the deep-laid plans of the scheming Scotchman, who was speculating at the cost of the French, for he himself had nothing to lose; and the parliament also, which was firmly attached to the old paths, was disinclined to every new science, and had already fallen into a dispute with the court on account of these arrangements. The regent alone supported Law in his undertaking, and resolved, in spite of the parliament, to change Law's private bank into a national institution.

The plan, which was opposed by Noailles as well as by the parliament, consisted at first in resolving that the notes of Law's bank should be received at the royal treasury, and then put into circulation and multiplied as royal notes. All the representations of the parliament were vain; the notes of the public treasuries were exchanged for these royal notes to the disadvantage of the holders, and as early as 1717 the project of a company for trading to the West Indies, or more properly to Louisiana, was formed, connected with the bank in 1718, and formally established in shares. From this moment the bank became a mere instrument of fraud: immense dividends and premiums were paid to the holders of this Louisiana stock; its value was thus fraudulently raised and the public deceived. The new regulations with respect to money, the melting-down and recoinage of cash, caused such a fluctuation in the value of money, that paper was now preferred to cash; and the parliament, which had hitherto protested in vain against the royal notes, now also represented in vain, that by the new decree* every holder of money and state securities would suffer a double loss. It is stated in their remonstrance that prices were raised by the depreciation of the money, and by the increased circulation and apparent wealth which resulted from bank-notes; it might there-

* The first decree was officially communicated to the parliament in December 1715. The coinage was therefore twice altered in the space of two years.

fore be with truth alleged, that the income of every private individual was diminished a third and his expenditure increased at least a fourth*.

The wild intoxication of the public and the eager desire to become rich by means of trade to the Mississippi were so great, that the remonstrances of the parliament were wholly unheeded; the regent dismissed Noailles, and even D'Aguesseau was removed from his office because he was sparing of the parliament. Law was now looked upon as a universal oracle, because he had suddenly caused extraordinary and incredible wealth to spring up from the midst of the deepest poverty. D'Argenson, chief of the police (lieutenant de police), who used less ceremony with the parliament than D'Aguesseau had done, and who was among those whom Law had enriched, was appointed keeper of the seals and nominally president of the board of finance, although Law in reality managed the whole of the affairs. From this time forward Law laboured indefatigably to deceive the world by the most ingenious devices of mercantile frauds: he employed all possible means in order to draw all the cash in the country into his bank, which was now a state bank, and to force the circulation of his paper amongst the people. The Mississippi company was established in 1717, with a capital of one hundred millions: the report of its progress and success made a great noise in 1718, and the covetous and dazzled Parisians had been already deceived in the previous year by various other arts. The interest of the national state paper, which was thus artfully played into the hands of the people, was most advantageously changed into annuities; a most favourable lottery scheme was proposed, and the prizes were to be paid in cash: no wonder

* The Remonstrances and their answers are to be found in Carton K. 147, but they are too well known to render it necessary for us to give them verbally. This Carton contains the remonstrance, together with its answer, of the 9th September 1717, against the substitution of *billets royaux* for the *billets d'état* of the receivers, which bore interest; and also the remonstrance of January 26th, 1718, against the *billets royaux*, together with the sophistical answer of the court of the 21st February 1718. In reply to this the president De Mesmes made a representation, which contains the following remarks: "According to the new edict, everyone is obliged to take his cash and *billets d'état* to the mint: suppose a person brings 125 marks of silver and 1000 livres *billets d'état*, he will receive indeed nominally 7000 livres back, but in reality only 116 marks (= 5568 livres). He will therefore lose all his livres and 9 marks besides." The regent gave an evasive answer, and said at the end that he could not suspend the edict: "parce qu'il y a déjà une très grande quantité d'espèces nouvelles distribuée et des dettes nécessaires à payer."

[A mark of silver = 14 Prussian dollars = 2*l.* 2*s.*—TRANS.]

that all thronged forward to exchange their good money for Law's notes. Dealings in bank shares and in those of the Mississippi company were at that time carried on with the same spirit of speculation as that which now prevails on the Stock Exchange with respect to state securities and public funds. It resembled the play of a faro-bank, and became the misfortune and ruin of the country, because the richest as well as the poorest engaged in these speculations. Money flowed into the court, which distributed paper in return and rewarded its most worthless adherents with full hands; expenditure and dissipation increased incredibly. Not merely the French, but foreigners pressed forward to share in this grand scheme of sudden and enormous wealth, and exchanged their money for paper; the parliament alone continued to offer the most determined opposition to this new system, and zealously to counteract those edicts by which this swindling was promoted and cash formally and legally rendered of less value than bank-notes. In order to deceive the people, government ordered the state securities, which had fallen 50 or 60 per cent., to be received at their full value, in exchange for bank-notes or shares: by this alone the French might at once have seen the fraud, if all sense of prudence had not utterly forsaken them in the intoxication of sudden and abundant riches. But they went still further; and in order to give bank-notes a decided superiority and preference over coin, the inherent worth of the coinage was perpetually altered, so that in the short space of four years, the value of money was changed not less than fifty times.

The parliament not only refused to register the new edicts with respect to alterations in the currency, banking, and finance in general, but they even prosecuted the persons who suffered themselves to be used as tools of the government in this affair. At length the regent caused three councillors of parliament, who had spoken with the greatest vehemence on the subject, to be arrested and imprisoned, but he found it advisable to insist no further on the registration of his edicts; he only took care that they should be obeyed. This state of warfare with the highest independent court of the kingdom, this delusion and folly, this dream of unheard-of riches and the expenditure founded upon it, continued through the whole course of the year 1719, and in that year reached its highest point: the deceit and arbitrary conduct of the government increased with the delusion of the

people. In spite of all the opposition of the fanatical parliament, the protestant Law was made comptroller-general. With a view to the further fraudulent maintenance of Law's bank, an East India company, and another for the purposes of trade to Senegal and China, were founded and connected with the Mississippi scheme. At the same time speculations were set on foot with respect to fisheries and manufactures: the government gave a monopoly of tobacco to a joint-stock company, as well as the salt duties in Alsace and Burgundy, the produce of the mint, farming of the tolls, and the incomes of the royal and national domains; and in this manner the whole kingdom,—all ranks and almost every individual,—were intentionally, or at least with an utter neglect of the most sacred duties, unavoidably involved in the necessary failure of the bank. On the slightest appearances of mistrust, of which there were occasional manifestations, all the fraudulent arts of trade were resorted to, and the state issued law upon law and proclaimed penalty upon penalty in order to uphold the cause of the bank-notes and of the scandalous usurer who was their fabricator. At length however the delusion could no longer be maintained, and at the end of the year the impossibility of selling air-bubbles and paper for gold became obvious. At the close of the year the poor deluded and ruined people became convinced that those much-boasted shares were worthless, and that bank-notes were so numerous, that all the cash in the world would not suffice to redeem them. In the commencement of the following year the whole scheme was completely exposed, and parliament began to prosecute the system and its promoters.

Law himself furnished the parliament with an opportunity of again coming forward as the defender of the rights of the people against the tyranny of the government: in May 1720 he all at once lowered the bank-notes and shares to the one-half of their value, by which a formal act of bankruptcy may be said to have been committed. Thousands of honest families now found themselves cruelly defrauded of their property and plunged into poverty; whereas those who were in the confidence of the parties to this plunder, the princes and nobles, and the initiated in general, had paid off their debts in the depreciated currency, bought large estates with paper, and laid up cash in their strong boxes for the evil day; and the sight of their splendour and wealth was more galling to the defrauded than even their own

poverty. The order for the depreciation of the bank-notes was indeed immediately recalled, but no influence was thereby produced in quieting the public alarm; and when at length Law resigned the office of comptroller and D'Aguesseau was recalled, the charm was dispelled and distrust became universal.

In order to sustain the bad cause yet a little longer, the regent now required the parliament to sanction all that had been done under Law's administration, or to speak more correctly, to attack it no further*. This led to a new and bitter strife between the government and parliament, which was carried on with great noise and vehemence from the 15th till the 21st of July, when the whole parliament was at length banished to Pontoise†. The animosity and want of confidence were increased by Law's remaining in France till December, which he ventured to do, relying upon the favour and protection of the regent, of Dubois, and the princes whom he had enriched with the plunder of the people. When at length the fraudulent bankrupt was about to take his departure, the madness of the people had reached such a height that Law was no longer safe even under the protection of the regent and the princes: he was obliged to flee from the country. The regent however publicly protected him and

* We have made large extracts from the minutes of the archives of the parliament, which are now in the royal library, with respect to all the transactions of the days from the 15th till the 21st, but we do not think it necessary here to give them at length; they commence as follows: "Les commissaires du parlement étant pressés depuis plusieurs jours par M. le chancelier d'approuver un édit dressé pour faire autoriser et ratifier par le parlement tout ce qui s'est passé depuis l'administration de M. Law," &c. This occurred on the 15th of July.

† In the first contest the parliament answered the decision given by D'Argenson upon the representations of the 27th of June 1718, by historical deductions into which the government would not enter. Thereupon the parliament ordered the prévôt des marchands to be summoned, to examine him about the "fonds de rentes sur la ville," deliberated upon the administration of the public moneys in general, passed a decree against Law, and appointed a meeting for the 26th of August 1718 to consult "sur les *billets* des receveurs-généraux et les *billets d'état* qui auraient dû être éteints tant dans les actions du Mississippi, de la lotterie, qu'à la Monnoye." The parliament was now required to go as a "lit de justice" to the Tuilleries, and proceeded along the Rue St. Honoré in *robes rouges*. It was required to register,—refused; three members were arrested, and the president De Mesmes was sternly refused when he petitioned for their liberation on the 29th of August. Disputes began the second time on the 17th of April 1720, which ended with the banishment of the parliament in a body to Pontoise in July. In the very commencement of their representation the parliament attempts to prove, that by the fraudulent conduct of the bank and the royal edicts in its favour, private persons had lost three-fifths of their incomes.

favoured his escape, although he was no sooner beyond the realm than all the blame was thrown upon him (Dec. 1720). Judicial investigations, such as had been carried on against Louis XIV.'s bloodsuckers, were renewed, but the most guilty were altogether spared and overlooked. By the records of these prosecutions, which were printed, the people were made acquainted with the corruption and shamelessness of the first men of the kingdom, and all feelings of honour and shame wholly disappeared.

A new Visa was ordered, after the investigation of the cases of all those who had shamelessly abused their situation, and taken advantage of the facility of obtaining bank-notes and shares to defraud and impose upon the credulity of the people; but what was to be expected from such an investigation? The nearest relation of the young king, the duke of Bourbon, was among the most guilty, and the prince of Conti used all possible means to stave off the inquiry. The latter read a speech* in the royal council, a copy of which is to be found in the archives, in which he did all in his power to prevent at least the official announcement of his degrading frauds. He wished to prevent the notaries from being obliged to produce their registers, from which it would be seen who those persons were who had made a speculation of the general misfortune and had employed their paper money in the purchase of estates. The duc de la Force, who had been long as great an object of hatred to the parliament as he was a favourite with the court, was prosecuted as a common criminal. The parliament, which had returned to Paris, fell into a new dispute with the regent on the subject of the prosecution of the duke, who was accused of usury and fraudulent speculation; but the duke was obliged to give way. By these judicial investigations, Law lost all the immense property which he had acquired in France by his fraudulent schemes; others, and among them some of the most distinguished persons in the kingdom, were arbitrarily taxed by a commission appointed for the purpose. The historian who compares the names of the guilty

* This speech is also found in the roll already referred to: in it the prince attributes the whole of their misfortunes to their having proceeded upon an *arrêt* instead of an *édit enregistré*, for that the paper-money was brought into circulation by this alone. "Aujourd'hui que votre majesté se trouve chargée de ce qu'elle devoit et de ce que des sujets se devoient réciproquement, et que dans l'impossibilité de l'acquitter il s'agit de réduire les biens immenses amassées par le crime et faire valoir aux légitimes possesseurs ce papier royal qui leur tient lieu de patrimoine."

with the list of their gains and the amount of penalties inflicted, will at once see that the morality of those times was quite in accordance with the principles of a Voltaire and Helvetius. The spirit of degrading avarice was so common, that even some of the members of that commission, and among them a distinguished ecclesiastic, were guilty of such gross embezzlement, that it became necessary to issue a new commission to investigate the conduct of its predecessor. Besides, all this contributed nothing to relieve the country from debt, for after the bankruptcy and after the Visa, the state soon found itself much more deeply encumbered than before.

The undertaking of the Scotchman and the mischief to which it led proved to be no warning to other nations, because his speculation and the favour shown to it did not arise so much from the mere personal will of the regent and his companions as from the spirit of the age, which must therefore give evidence of its existence in other quarters as well as in France. A completely new species of administration had become at that time prevalent throughout the whole of Europe, which was founded upon money and military power. This new system absolutely demanded the procuring of money by honest or dishonest means, and raised the knowledge possessed by such men as Görz and Law, who were especially distinguished above all their contemporaries, to the honour of a science. We shall afterwards see, not only that similar speculations were made and similar companies established in England, but that even Spain and Austria conceived the singular project of enriching their respective treasuries and supplying the privy purse of their rulers no longer mediately but immediately, by great commercial speculations and usurious trade in money, by navigation and manufactures. This project gave rise to no small jealousy between the emperor and the naval powers.

We shall not dwell upon the history of the private life, or upon the symptoms of hypochondria and incapacity of Philip V. of Spain, although all the histories of the eighteenth century are full of them; the results alone seem to us important to general history, and these we shall give. The king of Spain was in that peculiar condition which can neither be called imbecility of mind nor yet soundness; according to his natural disposition he needed female society and female guidance, and became therefore the mere tool and plague of his wives, because his

pious principles did not suffer him to have recourse to that government by mistresses, which was then common in all the courts of Europe. His connexion and mode of life with his first wife, the princess of Savoy, furnished abundant materials for the anecdote collectors, and those entertaining histories which were written for the French public are full of them*. At first both king and queen were ruled by a woman, who had been trained in an admirable school of cabals in Rome and in the house of madame de Maintenon. This lady, who is best known under the name of the princess Orsini, was chief governess to the first queen and the friend of Maintenon; she united in her character Romish cunning with a French education, and as the widow of a Spanish grandee, was not unwelcome to the nation and well acquainted with its usages and customs. During the war this princess conducted the affairs of Europe, which were so closely connected with the Spanish court cabals, that even the several treaties of peace which had been concluded at Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden remained uncertain, till Philip V. and Charles VI. were completely reconciled and mutually acknowledged their validity. After the death of his first wife (Feb. 1714), Orsini managed the affairs of the hypochondriac king with unlimited sway, as long as he remained unmarried. After some time she perceived the necessity of providing the king with another wife, and sought out for him an unimportant person, who should have been attached to her from gratitude; but she was deceived in her selection. For this purpose she chose Elizabeth Farnese, princess of Parma, who lived in no very agreeable circumstances at the court of her uncle, who was also her step-father, and from the youth and gratitude of the new queen, she fully reckoned on the continuance of her rule. On this occasion she probably gave offence to the aged king of France, who at least appears to have contributed to her speedy removal. Louis XIV. had once before, in the course of the war of succession, compelled Orsini to proceed to France; but he was afterwards obliged to suffer her to return to Spain, because affairs were much worse conducted after her removal than they had been before. He probably took offence because he had been informed by the count de Chalais of the plan of arranging

* See 'Mémoires du Duclos;' Lacretelle, 'Histoire du Dixhuitième Siècle;' 'Mémoires de Noailles et St. Simon;' 'Mémoires de Louville;' Coxe's 'Mémoires,' etc.

a second marriage for his grandson, before any communication had been made to him on the subject by the court of Spain.

The successor of the princess in the conduct of the Spanish court cabals was cardinal Alberoni, an Italian ecclesiastic, who probably had also had the chief instrumentality in her unexpected removal. The cardinal was a man of great natural abilities, and combined the advantages of a good academical education with all the cunning and all the arts of a Görz and other renowned diplomatists. Alberoni was treated with by far too much contempt by the French, who overlooked his genuine popular Italian character: they were greatly offended at his habit of low jesting and his practical skill in the art of cookery, by which he won the favour of the cynical Vendome. As a clergyman and a man of classical learning, he became known to Roncoveri, who accompanied the duke of Parma on his travels. Roncoveri afterwards selected him as tutor for his nephew Barni when the latter set out upon his travels, and induced the duke, whose business with Vendome Roncoveri managed, to transfer the same duties to Alberoni, when he himself as a bishop began to find Vendome's manners somewhat too familiar and cynical*. He afterwards passed from the service of the duke of Parma into that of the French marshal, to whom he had made himself indispensable, travelled with Vendome to Flanders and afterwards to Spain, when he recommended him to the favourable notice of the court. He had already attempted to interfere by advice in Spanish affairs even in the lifetime of Vendome, and, in conjunction with the Spaniard Macanaz, projected a financial plan for the regulation of the kingdom. He wished to put an end to the distracted condition of the state and to restore its credit. Immediately on the death of Vendome, whose confidential adviser he was and with all whose secrets he was acquainted, he hastened to Paris to communicate his last plans to the king of France; but he quickly returned from France to Spain recommended by the

* When Vendome was in Parma, the duke sent Roncoveri, who was then bishop of St. Domingo, to the French general, and Alberoni was interpreter. The cynical manners of the marshal were not however agreeable to the bishop. Alberoni alone therefore remained behind, and pleased the French duke so much, that he persuaded him to enter into his service. We remark merely in passing, that Voltaire, Düclos, St. Simon, and all Frenchmen, have exercised their satirical talents upon Alberoni; whereas Coxe and Poggiali ('*Memorie storiche de Piacenza*' and the '*Elogio*' therewith connected) are by far too favourable. The '*Life of Cardinal Alberoni, the Duke of Ripperda and Marquis of Pombal*,' &c., London, 1814, is of no authority.

court, and was able to render some useful services to the duke of Parma. For this reason he became immediately the negotiator of the marriage between the king and Elizabeth Farnese, and he then, probably in his own name and that of the king of France, urged the removal of Orsini, which most unexpectedly followed*.

Elizabeth of Parma came to Spain in September (1714) and was received by Alberoni in Pampeluna. Philip was expecting her with impatience in Guadalaxara, from whence he sent Orsini, a distance of four hours on the road to Xativa, to meet her. To the astonishment of everyone, Orsini was immediately sternly addressed by the young queen, scolded, dismissed, and even arrested upon her command and forthwith sent out of the kingdom, without baggage and in her court apparel. The officer who was about to execute the command hesitated, when he was immediately reminded by the queen, that he had Philip's command to yield unconditional obedience. He demanded a written order: she wrote it upon her knee, and it was couched in such strict terms, that the princess was obliged to travel for twenty-three days, wholly destitute of all proper apparel or other convenience, before she was allowed to pause and recover from her fatigue in St. Jean de Luz. From this time forward Alberoni, though at first secretly, directed the whole affairs of the Spanish monarchy: the ministers were cardinal Giudice and the Biscayan Grimaldo. The weak king was unable to govern his own house, much less Spain; yet Alberoni flattered him with the hope that he might be able to procure for him the administration of France, upon which, according to his wonderful imaginations, the duke of Orleans had seized to his prejudice and disadvantage. The cunning Italian flattered the queen with the thought of being able to wrest from the emperor the former possessions of the Spaniards in Italy in favour of a Spanish prince by the second marriage.

Alberoni's plan was by no means visionary; he succeeded thereby in awakening Spain from a long slumber, and in calling into action the resources of the country and the energy of the people; and to the astonishment of all Europe his views were realized. He raised an army and equipped a fleet, and found money for warlike undertakings as well as for the encourage-

* In the first edition it is said that Orsini repented the selection of Elizabeth; that is very uncertain, for it rests on the authority of Düclos alone.

ment of internal industry, instead of being unable, as was formerly the case, to meet the daily expenses of the court. The Dutch ambassador Ripperda, who afterwards entered into the Spanish service, was extremely useful to him in all questions of trade and commerce, and at a later period undertook Alberoni's duties and character. The cardinal hatched conspiracies in France, maintained secret understandings in Italy, kept up communications with the duke of Savoy, who was then king of Sicily, and wished to avail himself of the confident feeling of security entertained by the emperor and of the Turkish war, to send a fleet and an army to Naples. Cardinal Giudice, long deceived and betrayed, had laid down his office in July 1716, and a complete year afterwards expired before Alberoni took his place, having first obtained a cardinal's hat from the pope, who conferred the dignity upon him rather from constraint than inclination. Alberoni at length won over the pope by the false assurance that the army, which was intended to act against the emperor, was destined for his assistance and that of the Venetians against the Turks. The pope was deceived and he became a cardinal. Alberoni's plans would have been completely successful, had not the two men who combined against him been masters of the same arts which had raised him to such greatness and power in Spain. The one used them to maintain freedom and the cause of George I. in England, the other to uphold the most infamous despotism and Philip of Orleans in France. These men were Dubois and Robert Walpole.

Walpole, to whom we shall have frequent occasion hereafter to refer, was unacquainted with literature and history, even with foreign languages, and the position and circumstances of foreign states; but, on the other hand, he was so much the better acquainted with his own court and its weaknesses, with the English nation as well as with human nature in general, with the lower house, with the tactics of debate and the means of securing majorities. Lord Dover, who has edited the letters of his son, justifies him against the charges of bribery which have made him so celebrated in history, and which, as we shall hereafter see, had drawn down upon him even in those times the public indignation and parliamentary censure. When the Whigs were overthrown in the year 1712, he was secretary of war, and was arrested and expelled from parliament on account of his disgraceful conduct. Lord Dover however bestows upon

him great commendation, because he agrees with those who are of opinion that the strict laws of integrity and honour are not applicable to persons and affairs in the higher relations of life. The liberal Scotchmen of our own days appear to entertain the same belief, and take it grievously amiss that accusations should be brought against a man, whom lord Dover calls the glory of the Whigs, for having bought votes in parliament during twenty years*. It is true indeed that morality had been long altogether separated from politics in practice; but it belongs to the character of our century that people such as the Walpoles are again regarded with honour, and that their opponents are laughed at as men of narrow views and incapable of forming correct ideas.

Robert Walpole, who (with the exception of a very short period) conducted the affairs of England and of all Europe under the reigns of George I. and George II., had been expelled the house and even arrested by the Tory parliament of queen Anne. He had been secretary of war, and was accused of illegal and fraudulent practices in assigning favourable contracts to his friends; but the species of bribery with which he was charged was then so common, that he was immediately re-elected. The parliament next had recourse to a most unusual step, by declaring him unworthy to sit in that parliament, in consequence of his being proved guilty of public bribery and corruption. All this however did not prevent him from becoming prime minister under George I., and leader of that parliament which immediately followed the one by which he had been condemned.

The leaders of the Tories who concluded the peace of Utrecht were not a whit more honest than the Whigs; they were only less patriotic. These Tories were genuine *doctrinaires*, for one of them, lord Bolingbroke, far surpassed in wit, knowledge, eloquence, ability and skill all his contemporaries, and especially

* Lord Dover's 'Letters of Horace Walpole to Sir Horace Mann,' 3 vols. 1833. He praises Walpole very highly. We shall however only quote the passage in which he cleverly turns aside the well-known reproach which attaches to his memory and conduct:—"That he practised corruption on a large scale, is, we think, indisputable; but whether he deserved all the invectives which have been uttered against him on that account may be questioned. No man ought to be severely censured for not being beyond his age in virtue. To buy the votes of constituents is as immoral as to buy the votes of representatives." To which the Edinburgh Reviewer, October 1833, pp. 242, adds,—"The fault was in the constitution of the legislation, and to blame those ministers who managed the legislature in the only way it could be managed, is gross injustice. They submitted to extortion because they could not help themselves."

the ignorant and narrow-minded people who supported the first kings of the house of Hanover. We are fully acquainted with the contempt for all principle with which these men are justly reproached; for Bolingbroke himself, in his much-celebrated and published letter to Windham, has fully declared himself upon the subject, and that too in a letter which was intended to be apologetic. In this letter, however, Bolingbroke passes over the worst points of the accusation in silence, viz. his cabals at the French court, his manifest treachery, his double and underhand negotiations with Hanover on the one part, and with the Pretender, the brother of queen Anne, on the other. All that he reports, however, leads us to this conclusion,—that the able but godless Bolingbroke, the ecclesiastical earl of Oxford, and the orthodox and pious queen were quite agreed on this point, that it was altogether impossible to combine the administration of public affairs with an observance of the principles of honour and justice.

The queen and her ministers, as appears from all accounts, conspired against the successor to the throne, who had been fixed upon by law and the national will: they refused permission to the dowager electress of Hanover to proceed to England, and they declined to aid with a small sum of money, or support this granddaughter of James I. and future heiress to the throne. In like manner they would not suffer the presence of the electoral prince (George I.) in England, and he was not allowed to take his seat in the upper house, although he had been created duke of Cambridge, and his son duke of Gloucester.

The queen's zeal for her family and her attachment to her brother were of no use to James, because his bigotry and narrow-mindedness frustrated every reasonable advice; the ministry however, who seemed to act in opposition to his claims, secretly did everything in their power to secure his rights and to foster the disturbances in Scotland and Ireland.

Bolingbroke accuses his colleague, the earl of Oxford, of having been triply false on this occasion*; they lived indeed on terms of the bitterest enmity, and Bolingbroke succeeded in procuring

* Bolingbroke's 'Letter to Windham,' p. 64.—“He was the spy of the Whigs, and voted with us in the morning against those very questions which he had penned the night before with Walpole and others. He kept his post on terms which no man but he would have held it, neither submitting to the queen nor complying with his friends,” &c. &c.

his dismissal, shortly before the death of the queen. Bolingbroke's enemies, on the other hand, accuse him of being a man who publicly mocked at religion and even ridiculed morality, and yet who was only prevented by the death of the queen from bringing the Pretender back to England, who was the mere slave and tool of Catholic fanatics.

Bolingbroke, as a man of learning and an eloquent statesman and writer, knew well how to justify his cause, as people of the same stamp are accustomed to do in our own times. He draws a distinction between Tories and Jacobites, and alleges that the former constituted the main element and staff of the English people, and that he was not opposed to the Hanoverian succession, but to the purse-proud plebeians, usurers, tradesmen, and dissenters, who disgraced legislation by their interference, and who called themselves exclusively Whigs*.

George I., ignorant as he was in other respects, understood his own private advantage well, and he therefore willingly resigned the administration in England to the Whigs, on condition that they should keep off the Pretender, which they did, and aid him in his own domestic affairs and the prosecution of his Hanoverian plans. The earl of Oxford had confidently gone to meet the new king on his arrival in England in August 1714 : George however sternly rejected his tender of service, and dismissed Bolingbroke also from his office ; and Walpole, to whom he committed the management of affairs and the calling of a new parliament, took good care that the whole of the former ministry should be cruelly prosecuted by the parliament. Bolingbroke was accused of high treason, and saved himself by flight ; his estates were confiscated, and he himself deprived of his titles and dignities. The condemned minister took refuge in France, and accepted the title and seals of a minister from the Pretender, who was at that time residing in Lorraine. This he himself looked upon as absurd, and immediately entered into a secret correspondence and treaty with lord Stair, George's minister in Paris, as the duke of Marlborough had previously done with the duke of Berwick†.

* Bolingbroke's 'Letter,' p. 20.—“We supposed the Tory party to be the bulk of the landed interest, and to have no contrary influence blended into its composition.” He then states that this party had become incensed against those who by their money had gained influence in elections and in parliament, and that these were especially “the banks, the East India Company, and the moneyed interest in general.”

† Such things we find continually recurring ; for in the English translation

As long as Louis XIV. lived, he favoured the undertakings of the Pretender; but George I., even before Louis' death, had entered into a treaty with the duke of Orleans, and had even offered him troops against his enemies, whose services indeed he did not at that moment require.

King George was a man destitute of heart and feeling, and from want of a knowledge of the language of the country and from ignorance, incapable of taking any personal share in the administration; he was therefore admirably suited for the men among whom, and the times in which he lived. He yielded the whole administration unconditionally to the Whigs, even at the risk of offending that portion of the Tories who had at first embraced the cause of Hanover*. The rule of the Whigs, and the foreign manners and conduct of George I., increased the number of adherents to the exiled Stuarts: there soon appeared an internal movement, which caused the king, from personal reasons, to attach himself to the regent of France, because he also was threatened with internal enemies who had in like manner turned their views to a pretender,—to Philip of Spain and his minister Alberoni.

Moreover George, who assumed the garb of religion, afforded no better example in his princely life than the duke-regent, although his extravagance, like his nature and his conversation, were far removed from that genius of sinfulness which distinguished the regent. George's wife was the unfortunate princess of Zelle, whose intercourse with count Königsmark had induced his father to cause the count to be cruelly murdered and to banish the princess to Ahlden, where she afterwards lived and died. Her son lived in a continual state of strife with his father, and their quarrels often gave occasion to the most disgraceful scenes. George, although a man of fifty-three years of age, brought two Hanoverian ladies of noble birth with him into England, the baroness Von Kielmansegge and Melusine von Eberstein, both of whom regarded it as an honour to be the declared mistresses of a king. The English ministers were yielding enough to secure to those ladies a place among the aristocracy;

of a work entitled '*La Vendée et Madame*,' by general Dermoncourt, it is stated, "That Louis Philippe's ministers, D'Argout and Soult, corresponded with the duchess of Berri." The reviewer in the '*Quarterly*' observes with justice, "That this precisely resembles the correspondence of the Whig ministers of William III. and queen Anne with James and his son."

* Bolingbroke calls this division of the Tories 'whimsical.'

the one was created countess of Darlington, and the other duchess of Kendal; and it may be added, that very shortly before his death, the king wished to enter into a similar connexion with an English woman named Brett.

Under these circumstances, the country gentlemen and Englishmen of the old school could not possibly feel any respect either for the king or his ministry, and the clergy preached against that contempt for strict morality which was shown by the court and the ministers. This is admitted with great *naïveté* by the official historian of the rebellion of 1715*. He speaks in the passage quoted below with respect to the causes of the rebellion in Scotland. Bolingbroke and the duke of Ormond, who had gone over to James II. in France, the former in a very equivocal and the latter in an open and honest way, sought to cause a commotion in England. Many of the most distinguished men were not disinclined to favour a landing on the part of the heir of the exiled family, if he was only sufficiently provided with money and troops, and was willing to issue a solemn declaration by which the minds of the people would be set at ease with regard to his political and religious principles. As to troops, money and stores, Louis XIV. had secretly done all that it was possible for him to do for James, whilst he had publicly declared he would use all the means in his power to prevent the Pretender from effecting a landing in England. After Louis' death, the regent, it is true, entered into some correspondence with Ormond, Bolingbroke, and their party, but it was only with the intention of getting a knowledge of their views and betraying them. The Spanish government (then secretly in the hands of Alberoni) did not fulfil its promises to the Pretender, because Alberoni still hoped to win over George I. to his plans, and James received nothing from Spain but an insignificant contribution in money.

The Pretender was a man wholly destitute of capacities, stupid, superstitious, and fanatical as a lay-brother of a monastery,

* Peter Rae's 'History of the Rebellion, London,' 1748, p. 280.—“Yet true it is, that the disaffection of the common people in several counties in England was come to a very great height, and that their minds were so poisoned with favourable thoughts of the Pretender, and with prejudices against the person and government of his majesty king George, that they made no scruple to join with the Popish party against the Protestant succession. And a great part of this was laid at the door of the inferior clergy, whereof many appeared openly and avowedly to foment these prejudices, and some of them joined the rebels in arms to promote the rebellion.”

and completely in the hands of the Jesuits. He abhorred the principles of a freethinker, like Bolingbroke, and was moreover cowardly. He altered the proclamation which Bolingbroke had drawn up in such a way, that it plainly appeared from the alterations made by the priests, that he was only laying the foundation for an excuse afterwards to recall the whole. As usually happens in conspiracies, so did it here: the reasonable were not listened to, the vehement broke out at an unseasonable time, and thereby furnished their opponents with a pretence to put down and oppress the innocent as well as the guilty. Blood flowed in England and Scotland in streams.

In July the *habeas corpus* act was suspended in England, and an act passed for encouraging loyalty in Scotland; the militia were armed; troops collected; many suspected officers, and amongst them fourteen colonels of the guards, dismissed; all Papists banished from London and Westminster; and that tyrannical law proclaimed which allowed any man, without ceremony, to deprive a Papist of any horse which he might possess of more than a certain small value. These measures accelerated the outbreak of the rebellion in Scotland in favour of the Pretender, where they wished to anticipate the measures which the government afterwards adopted. And now two armies appeared in the north of Scotland, both recruited in the country itself, in hostile array against each other. In England also the partisans of James collected a number of persons in Northumberland, which they called an army: these were reinforced from Scotland and marched against Lancaster; from thence they were to advance to Manchester, in order to promote the rebellion in the southern provinces. The duke of Ormond, provided with Spanish money, was to come by sea and join the troops of the Pretender. The whole result depended on the issue of the war in Scotland, where the cause of the Pretender was supported by the most warlike portion of the nation.

The earl of Mar, one of the ministers of the preceding government, was at the head of the Jacobites in Scotland, whilst the duke of Argyle commanded the Whig army by which he was opposed. Both armies were equally ill-disciplined, ill-commanded, and ill-supplied with the materials of war. This appears most evidently from the account of the battle of Sheriff-muir, near Dumblane. The armies met and fought a decisive engagement at this place on the 12th of November 1715. The whole

artillery of the royal army consisted of six three-pounders only, to which the enemy could not oppose an equal number; nor was a cannon-shot fired on either side. Both parties claimed the victory. The army of the Jacobites is stated at 16,000 men, and no more than 300 were left upon the field. On the same day however as that on which the indecisive battle of Sheriffmuir was fought, the cause of the Pretender was decided at Preston. The Jacobites had taken possession of Lancaster, and flattered themselves that they would soon be masters of Liverpool also; but they were now opposed by regular troops, which took quite different measures from those which had been adopted by the duke of Argyle and his militia.

King George, when threatened by a rebellion in Scotland, had demanded from his allies the Dutch, the assistance agreed upon by treaty; and Horace Walpole was sent in all haste to the Hague, to press on the embarkation of the 6000 auxiliaries. One division of these troops, which consisted of men who had gained experience and glory, landed just as the news arrived that the 4000 men who had expected to take possession of Liverpool had been surrounded by the royalist forces at Preston, and compelled to make an unconditional surrender.

The duke of Ormond, who had shown himself in the west of England, was obliged to consider himself fortunate in being able to escape back to France, and the Pretender himself appeared in Scotland, only to injure the cause of his partisans and to bring disgrace upon himself by his cowardice. The earl of Mar and the Pretender deserted those who had sacrificed themselves for the cause, left them without either counsel or refuge, and tried to escape pursuit by directing the master of the ship of which they had gone on board to steer for the coast of Norway, in order to deceive their pursuers.

After the capture of the 4000 men at Preston, the English ministers immediately sent the Dutch auxiliaries who had arrived, together with a regiment of English, to Scotland. All hope of the ill-provided force of the Highlanders being able to defend themselves against the superior numbers and discipline of the troops which were rapidly advancing against them had altogether disappeared, when the Pretender landed in Scotland on the 22nd of December 1715: he was nevertheless greeted on his arrival by an address from the clergy and citizens of Aberdeen. The disembarkation of the Dutch troops, and the arrival

of the heavy artillery, caused a delay of some days; and because the presence of the Pretender had made some impression in Scotland, the English did not wish to advance till they were quite sure of the issue. So little doubt however, with regard to the result, was entertained in London, that the destruction of the old Scotch families had been already resolved on, even before they were masters of the country. The ministry of king George had declared to the parliament, that one part of the cost of the civil war would be covered by the confiscation of the rebels' estates, and that the king would give up his share in those confiscations to the public treasury.

As soon as the troops and artillery had arrived, Argyle advanced to Perth, which was evacuated by the Jacobites. The Pretender and the earl of Mar had withdrawn from their own people on the 4th of February 1716 by a secret flight, and returned in a French vessel to France. The unfortunate and deluded Scots of the lower classes were routed, and the nobility and landowners were outlawed or taken prisoners. Bolingbroke states, that negotiations had been already entered into by the Pretender with a view to obtain Swedish auxiliaries, and that Charles XII. was by no means disinclined to take part in the affair, if sufficient money could be supplied. The regent used all his endeavours on the one hand to bring the negotiation with Sweden to a favourable issue, promised arms, military stores, and secret support, whilst on the other, he and Bolingbroke treated with George's ambassador, and both ridiculed the foolish plans of the Jacobites. The issue of these miserable cabals furnishes us with a fresh example of the melancholy condition of public morality, and of the small importance which, in courts and cabinets, was attached to the principles of truth and right. It was universally believed, that those in power might safely venture to despise public opinion.

The regent of France, in accordance with an agreement entered into with George I., compelled the Pretender to leave Paris, after having deceived him for years; and Bolingbroke, through lord Stair, made his peace with the English ministers, upon conditions which may be easily guessed after the experience of our own times*. Bolingbroke expressly refused to have

* Bolingbroke, in his 'Letter to Windham,' p. 250, says, "That if I was restored I should give an effectual blow to the Jacobite cause, by making that apology which the Pretender has put me under the necessity of making; that

the conditions committed to writing ; and he obtained his pardon, as well as a promise that his estates should be restored as a compensation for his secret services, although some time elapsed before the parliament could be brought to give their consent to this treacherous alliance.

The government of Britain was then wholly in the hands of the Walpoles and their friends ; the interests of the nation were one while sacrificed by the king to the Whig party, and at another by the Whigs to the personal objects of the king. Although the king, as a German prince, had the highest notions of legitimacy, rightful succession and sovereign power, yet he looked quietly on at the cruel and bloody persecution of the defenders of the doctrine of legitimacy both among the Jacobites and other Tories, and suffered the severest measures to be taken against the legitimists both in Scotland and Ireland. His hard and unfeeling heart made it easy for him to refuse the most touching appeals and earnest entreaties for pardon, which did not completely suit the selfish system of his ministers.

The rebellion in Scotland was taken advantage of by the English ministry, in the same way in which imprudent conspiracies and revolts, and ill-considered speeches and writings are usually taken advantage of ; for immediately after the suppression of the rebellion, the duration of the English parliaments was extended from three years to seven, and a double injury inflicted, in the violation of the rights of the people and the constitution of the country. First, the existing members of parliament, who had been elected for three years, by their own resolution, extended their powers of legislation for four years beyond the time of their constitutional existence ; and secondly, by this measure the purchase of votes was somewhat lightened to the minister of the day, who might reckon upon the services of his venal majorities for a longer period. In return for this concession to the ministry, they gratified the king by sending a fleet under admiral Norris into the Baltic, in order to repress or frighten the king of Sweden, who was then at peace with England but at war with Hanover ; and they also consented to abrogate the terms of the law with respect to the succession of the house of Hanover, which was in the highest degree inconvenient and dis-

in doing this, I flattered myself that I should contribute something to the establishment of the king's government and to the union of his subjects." See also lord Stair's 'Letter to James Craggs.'

agreeable to the king, who wished to make frequent journeys to Germany. By this law the limitation was expressly enjoined, that the king should not be suffered to leave the kingdom without the permission of parliament. Walpole and his friends took no part in Hanoverian affairs; but a number of his colleagues afterwards entered into all the cabals and negotiations which the king, during his residence on the continent (1716–17), and the regent of France promoted and carried on, in order to increase the dominions of Hanover, to gain Bremen and Verden, and perhaps even Mecklenburg, for king George.

Public affairs in France were conducted precisely after the same fashion as in England, *i. e.* for the promotion of private advantages, except only that Dubois went as far beyond the English Whigs in avarice, love of dominion, vanity and extravagance, as he excelled them in talents and knowledge. He had been about this very time taken into the council of state and was employed in working for the regent, who was so completely intoxicated with pleasures and lost in his orgies, that he more and more neglected every description of business, and even relinquished the oversight of his numerous spies. Dubois formed a close alliance between the regent and king George, and he was therefore as much favoured and beloved by the latter as by his own master; and even though what is usually alleged be without foundation, *viz.* that he received a yearly salary from England, he was at least overloaded with valuable presents, and the protestant king helped him to obtain the dignity of a cardinal. This honour was the highest object of Dubois' ambition, and the Roman court knew how to turn his anxious efforts for its attainment to their own advantage. The pope delayed and hesitated about the appointment, and managed the affair in such a way as to make Dubois, or, more properly speaking, France, purchase this favour by incredible sums.

It is besides a fact of great importance for the history of morals in the eighteenth century, and especially in France, that a man such as Dubois was made a prince of the church, at a time when the Jansenists among the French clergy, as well as the parliament and the theological jurists, who gave the tone in the assembly, were engaged in a struggle for life and death with the Molinists, with the pope, and with the monks and Jesuits, who were the supporters of the papal power, on the subject of faith and ecclesiastical discipline,—at a time when the most

bitter persecutions were carried on against any truthful and peaceable man who departed in the smallest degree from any point of the orthodox faith. The fact of this appointment, and at such a time, is not merely remarkable because the man was immoral to a greater extent than most men of his age, but because everyone was aware of the fact, and because in his letters and speeches he spoke of morality and religion with the coarsest and most vulgar scorn and contempt. This sinful prodigal was abbot in seven of the richest abbeys, became an archbishop, and was finally created a cardinal; and what is not less remarkable is, that the most ridiculous contests on the subject of rank were carried on in France between prince and prince, noble and noble, whilst this plebeian, the son of an apothecary, had all France at his feet, maintained the first place in the council of the regent, nay, even in a college whose honourable distinction should not only be earthly but heavenly, and laid claim to the character and rank of an apostle along with the vicar of Christ upon earth. The ridiculous claims of the high nobility over the lower classes show the same ignorance of the spirit of the age and its demands, which alienated the whole French nation from the Bourbons, the high nobility and clergy, and which at the end of the century brought about the revolution. One of the first subjects of dispute arose respecting the important question, whether the peers in parliament, when voting for the rejection of a motion, should be permitted to keep on their hats, or whether, like the other councillors of parliament, they should be obliged to take them off. The case was referred to the regent, who first decided in favour of the peers, but afterwards found himself obliged (May 1716) to recal his decision, because he did not wish to enter into a war with the legitimized princes and the parliament.

The dispute between the regent and the legitimized princes contributed greatly to the promotion of Alberoni's views. Louis XIV. had conferred on his illegitimate children the rank and privileges of princes of the blood. This was always regarded as a great offence by the legitimate princes, especially by the duke of Bourbon, the grandson of the great Condé, so renowned as a general, although but of bad reputation in other respects. This feeling of dissatisfaction was not even lessened by the eldest of the legitimized princes, the duke of Maine, being married to a princess of Bourbon. Bourbon and the other princes never

ceased importuning the regent, till he felt himself obliged to yield to their desires, for he was not able to withstand the urgent solicitations of those with whom he was nearly connected, and by a decree formally registered by the parliament (July 1717) he deprived the legitimatized princes of their rank, which they had now enjoyed for years; he made an exception, however, in favour of the count of Toulouse, because he was wholly insignificant*. The duke of Maine, or rather his wife, now thought upon vengeance, and fermented a ridiculous conspiracy among the opponents of the regent, and their vassals and clients, in favour of the king of Spain.

The regent was in this affair the mere tool of the princes, and acted by their impulse; and whilst the parliament, the peers

* ‘Archives du Royaume,’ Carton K. 147, contains a document headed “Requête de Messieurs et Mesdames les ducs et duchesses à S. A. R. Monseigneur le duc d’Orleans régent.” They complain “qu’on fait peu de cas d’eux dans le monde;” they wish, therefore, to be again reinstated in the privileges which belong to them, and they mention specifically what privileges they possess with respect to the nobility, clergy and people. The clergy enjoy a position in the state merely “parcequ’un certain nombre de pairs n’a pas dédaigné le titre d’archevêque et d’évêques.” Then follow four privileges which they claimed from the clergy:—1. They were to receive the sacraments from the hands of a bishop. 2. “Ils portent seuls des carreaux dans les églises.” 3. The chief places and the distribution ‘du pain béni.’ 4. The service must be kept back for them half an hour in the abbey churches. With respect to the nobility, the regent was required to issue a decree requiring the nobles, when they meet peers, whether on horseback or in a carriage, to give them the ‘haut du pavé’; and that the carriages of private persons “se rangeront devant eux et cela nonobstant tous les embarras qui en pourroient arriver.” Further, they were always to enjoy the privilege of ‘le fond du carosse’ without even being allowed to offer it to another from politeness. 3. Their healths must be proposed and drunk even before those of the master and mistress of the house. 4. They alone were to be allowed to keep écuyers et demoiselles. 5. In the theatre they were to have the best boxes, which must always be given up when they came, “n’étant pas juste et supportable que des pairs du royaume soient au dessous des personnes de condition.” 6. They should not be called upon to fight a duel with a simple nobleman, “même s’ils avoient reçu des coups de bâton.” 7. “Que nul seigneur, gentil-homme ou officier des armées du roi ne pourra prétendre à aucun gouvernement qu’à leur refus.” As to the people,—“Messieurs les ducs sont et doivent être si fort au dessus du peuple par leur naissance qu’à peine doivent-ils se connaître, néanmoins il est quelquefois nécessaire de se servir de ce bas état ainsi il est bon de régler une fois pour toutes.” 1. No workman or trader can complain of a duke or peer on account of non-payment; remind him he may, but “rarement, et c’est à Messieurs les ducs à rendre justice à ces gens là quand ils le trouveront à propos. 2. Les ouvrages de ducs et duchesses seront toujours préférés aux autres et les ouvriers quitteront totale besogne pour la leur. 3. Comme un gentil-homme n’a pas droit de faire tire l’épée à un duc de même les lacquais des gentils-hommes ne pourront pas obliger ceux des ducs à faire le coup de poing et ceux ci se laisseront plutôt rouer de coups de bâtons que de commettre l’honneur qu’ils ont d’être au service de leur maître.”

and the government made these miserable forms of etiquette—the rank and the place which everyone should take at court fêtes—a subject for long negotiations, the peers put forward claims in opposition to the nobles and citizens, parliament and clergy, which might appear altogether incredible, if the sources from which our information is drawn, and to which we shall refer in a note, were not such as to put the matter beyond suspicion.

These most absurd and unreasonable demands, which were preferred in a brutal manner, led to a correspondence on the part of the parliament, which had more influence than the freest press could possibly have had. This correspondence arose first on the occasion of the dispute about keeping on or taking off the hat in voting, and afterwards with respect to the difference with the legitimatized princes, above whom the peers wished to be ranked, as next in privilege to the princes of the blood. The duchess of Maine led the way in this correspondence, then the peers in their disputes with the lower nobility, and finally the lower nobles also published advertisements, representations and letters, which completely annihilated all respect for rank and title, which without these was beginning to disappear with the progress of the age. Those letters were composed in a style which, in our days, we should call jacobin and revolutionary, vehement and bitter; they contained historical reports about the high nobility, which must have necessarily opened the eyes of the blind admirers of the higher nobility, and of rank and privileges in general. The modes of life which were indulged in by the great, the history of Law's bank, and the writers of the following decennium, by their bitter scorn, utterly destroyed the last lingering feeling in favour of rank and privilege.

The most remarkable of these writings is that which was composed in the name of the parliament, in which the origin of the most distinguished families is derived from the meanest and most disgraceful persons and occupations*. This paper was printed and circulated, and another still exists in manuscript. The urgent representations of the nobles, whom the regent put to

* This letter is inserted in the Appendix No. 2. of the 'Vie Privée de Louis XV.' vol. ii. p. 285. That this is a mere party document is obvious. At the conclusion it contains an allusion to the demands referred to in the previous note:—"Ces sont les gens là qui veulent faire marcher la noblesse à leur suite, en exiger le titre de Monseigneur dans les lettres, lui refuser la main chez eux, obtenir même des distinctions jusqu'ici inouïes et se dispenser de mesurer leurs épées avec les gentils-hommes."

silence, are to be found in the French archives : and from the tone and spirit of the papers written in the name of the parliament, it appears that the lower nobility entertained no less contempt for the mass of the citizens than the higher nobles entertained for them*.

§ II.

ENGLAND, FRANCE, SPAIN AND HOLLAND TILL THE TREATY OF SEVILLE, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DON CARLOS IN TUSCANY.

The negotiations and cabals, in themselves wholly unimportant, which occupied all the European powers from the years 1716—1732, constitute the chief materials of all the histories of that period : they possess such importance, at least in reference to the history of morals, individual and national, that we cannot wholly overlook them. Degraded, immoral and utterly corrupt men were at the helm of affairs in almost all the European states, because a general belief was entertained that a diplomatist must be far above the prejudices of vulgar morality. States were either ruled by military force, or managed according to private interests by all sorts of disingenuous trickery, in the same manner as court cabals were usually conducted, or the government was carried on as a trade is carried on which can no longer be maintained by honest dealing. It has been incidentally shown in the course of the history, that Austria, notwithstanding the augmentation of its territory, was at this time in very much the same condition as Spain at the end of the seventeenth century. The diplomatists of Europe had now been busily engaged for eighteen years, and had arranged and concluded a whole series of treaties, which may have been important as illustrations of diplomatic science and for the art of court-negotiation, and which also occupy a great space in our historical manuals and diplomatic collections, but which in other respects were wholly without importance or value. What was to be hoped from national alliances or treaties which were concluded by a Dubois or Alberoni, a Philip of Orleans and the people who courted his fa-

* “ Ce sont ” (it runs) “ enfin ces gens là qui, oubliant qu'ils font partie du parlement, *osent* comprendre dans le tiers état cette compagnie la plus auguste du royaume.”

voir, a Ripperda and Sinzendorf, whom we know to have been faithless and deceitful, from the proceedings themselves?

After the expulsion of the Pretender, George I. took a journey to the continent, and Dubois availed himself of the opportunity to bring about a strict alliance between him and Philip. Dubois, as the confidential friend of the regent, travelled to Holland. By his journey George freed himself from Walpole, and he and his friends entered into negotiations with Dubois in the Hague, who, in the name of his master, relieved all George's anxieties with respect to the Pretender, by promising no longer to suffer the unfortunate James to continue his residence in Avignon, but to banish him to Italy. The Whigs, who carried on these cabals, wished to escape from the dominion of the Walpoles, and for that purpose needed the aid of the king; they therefore, for his pleasure, undertook to bring about an unnatural union between England and France. Stanhope and Sunderland at that time favoured the views of the king and his Hanoverian advisers; they carried on the negotiations in the Hague, and thereby caused a division in the cabinet: Walpole and his friends spoke in parliament against the treaties which had been entered into with the emperor and Hesse, which cost England very considerable sums of money, and, properly speaking, had only to do with George's Hanoverian plans. In consequence of the disagreements in the cabinet, the majority in favour of granting the money demanded (1717) was very small, and Walpole and his friends were therefore obliged for a time to withdraw from the ministry. Whilst Walpole was the leader of the government during the reigns of the first two Georges, the relation of the ministry to the king was singular enough: the king spoke very little English, and that little badly; Walpole neither French nor German; Carteret spoke German and was the only man of capacity in the ministry, but he was a drunkard, and Walpole was always jealous of conversations which he did not understand. Carteret also was unfavourable to the alliance with France, which was the great object of Stanhope, Sunderland and the Hanoverians, although in other respects he agreed with the king in German affairs. Dubois first met the king in the Hague, then in Hanover; and although we cannot believe, as has been already observed, that George I. actually gave him a pension, we nevertheless see from the letter which he wrote to the king that he felt himself under obligations to

him, and especially for his endeavours to procure him the dignity of a cardinal, whilst the regent and the pope hesitated, the one about requesting and the other conferring the rank and privilege in question*.

The treaty then concluded by Dubois was called the "Triple Alliance," and it was only possible for people as shameless as Dubois, and as destitute of conscience as Stanhope and Sunderland, to have concluded such a treaty. The English nation was enraged at the ministry and its venal parliament, whilst the French alleged that the honour of the nation and of the royal family was prejudiced and compromised. Three drafts of the triple alliance had been agreed upon and made in 1716 †, but the treaty, properly speaking, was first signed in January 1717. According to appearance, the only object of the treaty was the maintenance of the peace of Utrecht and the frustration of the plans of Alberoni; but its real purpose was a close alliance between the governments of France and England in general, in opposition to all those who might be personal enemies of the regent, or opponents of George I. upon the continent. The alliance was no sooner concluded than Dillon was sent to Avignon, in order to compel the prince, whom Louis XIV. had acknowledged as king, to leave that city and proceed to Italy, and all his friends were removed from Paris. The Dutch, who had been drawn in as the third party to the treaty only because it seemed to refer to the peace of Utrecht, received as a compensation for their accession, a reduction of the duties which their merchants had hitherto been obliged to pay, and some rights to which the French had disputed their claims.

The report of the conclusion of the triple alliance was immediately spread abroad, together with those of the arrest of the Swedish ambassador in London, of Görz's imprisonment in Holland, and of Saxony, Prussia and the emperor having consented to the sale of Bremen and Verden by Denmark to England. The union of the emperor with Hanover for the spoliation of Sweden and the arrest of his ambassador necessarily gave great offence to Charles XII., and Alberoni and Charles had also

* In the 'Mémoires Secrets,' or Correspondence of Cardinal Dubois, published by De Sevelinges, 1815, the report of his having received a pension is denied. George I.'s letter to the regency about Dubois and the dignity of cardinal will be found in vol. i. p. 275.

† On the 24th of August, the 9th of October and the 28th of November.

entered into negotiations with Peter, which led the Spanish minister to think himself sure of the aid of the northern powers in the execution of his plans upon Sweden; the duke of Savoy, as king of Sicily, had been long won over. The Spaniards were to go to Sicily as enemies but to be received as friends, and immediately to cross over into Naples. The allies however, by their system of espionage, of which traces are to be found in the archives, had become acquainted with the cunning and faithlessness of the king of Sicily, and therefore offered Sicily to the emperor if he would accede to the triple alliance*.

Alberoni now prepared an army and fleet, but the French had already promised an army against Spain in the agreement signed by Dubois, and the English had undertaken to send a fleet into the Mediterranean to watch that of the Spaniards. Alberoni wished at the same time to injure the allies in other ways: he sought to create or to foster disturbances in France; and by promoting a rebellion in Hungary, or rather in Transylvania, by a war with the Turks, to find the emperor such occupation as to oblige him to withdraw his forces from Italy, and to render him unable to send new ones thither. In this way he became confident of being able again to take possession of the former Spanish territories in Italy, which Philip had never formally ceded: he was the less apprehensive of an unexpected attack on the part of England, as he knew well how hateful to the nation the alliances and perpetual negotiations of the king and his ministers really were. It is impossible not to admire Alberoni's talents; his activity and knowledge of the Spanish character, as well as of the resources of the kingdom and the manner in which he employed them. He now not only raised up an army and a fleet, but also money for a war, as if by enchantment, in a country which for centuries had not been in a condition to defend its own frontiers. No wonder that the Italians, among whom a schemer (*scaltro*) has much more influence and importance than such a man has with us, called him the "colossal cardinal†;" in

* It is at present well known, from recent English publications and others, that Alberoni had been corresponding with Victor Amadeus from 1716.

† We refer particularly to the 'Elogio del cardinale Alberoni scritto del abbate Giuseppe Bignani,' Piacenza 1832, for the most part taken from the 4th part of the 'Ristretto della Storia Piacentina.' It is there said,—"The earl of Peterborough had been at length sent to Italy, per venire a capo d'abbattere il gran colosso del cardinale Alberoni."

comparison with the men who caballed against him, he might have been called the “moral.”

Alberoni had sent a colonel Boissimène to Ragotzy in Transylvania, although Ragotzy was ill qualified to be the head of a party. It appears from Boissimène’s papers, which are preserved in the French archives, that he was a double spy : he was at the same time to travel to Constantinople, and to encourage both Ragotzy and the Turks to carry on the war against Austria, by liberal promises of Spanish assistance. All this took place about the very time in which Alberoni was created a cardinal and had formally undertaken the direction of the Spanish affairs (July 1717). The cardinal at first succeeded in deceiving the naval powers, as well as the pope, as to the destination of the fleet, which had 9000 troops on board. He had caused a report to be noised abroad, that the Spanish army and fleet were destined to aid the Venetians and the emperor against the Turks, and there was therefore a universal feeling of astonishment when these troops landed in Sardinia (August 1717) and wrested this island from the emperor. A still more numerous army and a larger fleet were immediately equipped, in order, by a secret understanding with the governor of Sicily, to land on that island, and from thence immediately cross over into Naples.

Victor Amadeus, true to the system of his house*, had at this time secretly concluded a treaty with Spain, because he was not unacquainted with the fact, that negotiations had been long pending between England, Holland and the emperor with respect to the possession of Sicily. The attack of the Spaniards occurred precisely at the time in which prince Eugene had won two battles and captured Belgrade in the war with the Turks, which Austria had commenced as the ally of the Venetians. The war was brought to an honourable conclusion in the following year (1718) by the peace of Passarowitz, and the troops which were then disposable were destined for Italy ; the Spa-

* The whole history of this house and its aggrandizement is, as is well known, a web of faithlessness and treachery, and upon this its greatness rests. Victor Amadeus was besides quite a master of deceit and misrepresentation. On this occasion, however, he got into a difficulty between Spain and the other powers, and thereupon lost Sicily. The special points of the treaty will be found in Coxe, vol. ii. p. 194. If the Spaniards had succeeded in conquering Naples, they were to send 20,000 men to help Victor Amadeus in reducing the Milanese.

nish attempt upon Naples however had been already completely frustrated by the English.

This attempt upon Naples set the whole body of diplomatists in new motion; there was a great desire to avoid a war by negotiations, protocols and treaties, and it was suggested that the *triple* should be changed into a *quadruple* alliance. It is of very little importance to history, whether all the scandal and disgraceful anecdotes be true or not which are related in memoirs, and which have been copied from them into English, French and Spanish histories, with respect to the negotiations which were carried on on this occasion, or about the miserable cabals between the English ministers and the confidential friends and advisers of the regent of France; for everything is credible with respect to Philip and Dubois, except what is good. Whether the English procured the ministry and the whole conduct of foreign affairs for Dubois or not, we leave undetermined; certain it is that he possessed them. Anecdotes are besides in this case less important, because it was not negotiations or cabals which brought affairs to an issue, but arms. A French writer with justice accuses the government of his country of that day with having scandalously given up the Spanish fleet, which had been created by Alberoni, as if by enchantment, to the English, and of having entered into a close alliance with the natural enemy of their country in order to make a hostile attack upon the grandson of Louis XIV., who was connected with France and its young king by the ties of blood and attachment, by mutual treaties and benefits.

Alberoni relied upon this alliance against Spain finding powerful opponents in the French as well as in the English cabinet. Dubois urged on the affair in France with all the audacity and wantonness of a reckless profligate, and Stanhope and Sunderland, in the English ministry, defended their work. Walpole, Townsend, Carteret, Methuen and Pulteney retired for a time from the ministry (1717), as we have mentioned above. These leaders of the Whigs disapproved of these alliances and counter-alliances into which the king entered, impelled by his own narrow personal views; and when money was required from the nation to carry out the stipulations of the French alliance, they spoke and voted against such a grant.

The new English ministry and George I. himself were still less popular than the preceding one, which was under the

guidance of Walpole, the defender of freedom and the rights of the people. Sunderland was at the head of the new administration: he followed the king to Hanover, and then conspired with the Hanoverian barons against Walpole and his friends. Stanhope was the soul of the ministry, and carried on such a disgraceful contest with Walpole after his retirement, about the sale of places, that parliament commanded both to silence, that they might not expose the scandalous conduct of the government and parliament of the time, together with their own. The king lived in a continual state of enmity with his son, and their disagreements reached such a disgraceful height that the king banished him from his palace and court, and publicly declared that whoever visited or showed any marks of attention to the prince of Wales should not be suffered to appear at the royal court. The English, who at that time laid great stress upon morality and social propriety of conduct, and for that reason were peculiarly observant of the family relations of their rulers, looked upon these quarrels with sorrow and dislike. The ministry nevertheless fully attained its object. George's friends and those of the regent were in a state of excitement for eighteen months, in consequence of the plans of Alberoni; and Dubois himself took several journeys to London, as Stanhope did to Paris. The English ministry at length took upon itself to repress them by force. The Spaniards were no sooner landed in Sicily than the English commenced hostilities, without any declaration of war, and without wishing by their hostilities to put an end to the peace. However singular this may sound, such conduct has been every now and again repeated by the English, down to the (untoward) battle of Navarino. Victor Amadeus was the first who was frightened by this alliance between the naval powers and France: he was already negotiating with the imperial governor of Milan, before either Holland or the emperor had acceded to the alliance, whose accession however the French and English ministry had boldly assumed as certain. Alberoni had not allowed himself to be deterred by the English threats, which were first conveyed by an ambassador extraordinary, and afterwards by the admiral who commanded the fleet, which was to follow the Spaniards; and his fleet, consisting of twenty-three ships of war and 150 transports, sailed for Sicily. The Spaniards were already in possession of Palermo; they had taken the city of Messina and were besieging the citadel; after the capture of

which, the marquis of Lede was to transport his 30,000 Spaniards into Naples: this the English wished to prevent. The English ministry thought themselves at that time so secure of parliament, that upon their own responsibility they sent admiral Byng with a fleet to the Straits of Palermo, in order to come to an understanding with the imperial ambassador in Naples, and to act according to circumstances.

In the mean time the union between France and England, entered into on the 18th of July 1718, was publicly announced as the *triple* alliance, although the Dutch did not accede to the treaty till the following year, and the emperor was first gained over on the 2nd of August, by the promise that Sicily should be given him instead of Sardinia. Admiral Byng, however, proceeded (9th August) to execute his destructive measures against the Spaniards upon his own responsibility, and not in the name of the quadruple alliance. The admiral authoritatively demanded an unconditional and instantaneous suspension of arms for two months; and when this was refused he destroyed the whole Spanish fleet, on the 11th of August, whose commander, by his ill-judged measures, uncommonly facilitated his victory, and promoted the disgraceful plan of the English ministry of annihilating the new Spanish naval power in its very commencement.

Neither the quadruple alliance, nor the destruction of a fleet which he had equipped at so great a cost, compelled Alberoni, who now exercised unlimited dominion in Spain, to relinquish his plans upon Naples: he treated the European powers with contempt, and was not even afraid of the vehement anger of the pope. Clement was incensed against his spiritual brother because the latter had overreached him in cunning. France now set on foot and fitted out an army to compel the king of Spain to dismiss his minister, by wasting his territory and plundering his cities. Dubois and Alberoni, both ecclesiastics, both cardinals, both men of sound learning, carried on a mutual contest by means of perjury, treachery and spies, and Alberoni even attempted to excite new disturbances in England: he fitted out ships in order to support the partisans of the Pretender, which however had only the effect of plunging a few more zealous Jacobites and many Spaniards and Irish, who were engaged in the expedition, into further and deeper misfortunes.

The Spanish minister was the soul of a conspiracy entered

into in France, by which the duchess of Maine and other malcontents hoped to ruin the regent, who had many adversaries, especially in Britany and in the south of France. On the other hand, the regent attempted, through the agency of his ambassador in Madrid, count de St. Aignan, who was very ill provided with money*, not only to form cabals, but he availed himself of the very persons whom Alberoni had employed as spies in France, and entered into direct correspondence with men who sold him the secrets of the friends who had put confidence in them. Colonel Boissimène, and an advocate and mayor in Bearn, appear to have been distinguished above others in these disgraceful transactions by their coolness and audacity, as we learn from letters preserved in the French archives. Boissimène first requests that he may be permitted to continue in the service of Alberoni, because he can thus be much more useful to the regent, and at the same time draw his salary of 1500 pistoles, which the cardinal allowed him as his agent in Transylvania†. This colonel was thereupon arrested by superintendent Le Gendre, and was scarcely again permitted, by the command of the regent, to take his departure for Spain, when one of his honest companions gave a hint to Alberoni of the character which he was playing. He was immediately arrested in Spain, imprisoned and put in irons, purchased his liberty by a piece of useful intelligence which he communicated, and was then employed by the regent to follow Alberoni to Italy, and to make an attempt to form some new agreements with him after having been banished from Spain.

The papers in the archives show how wonderfully the whole system of espionage was established, and that truth and lies were reported from all quarters in cypher and without‡. One

* The records connected with these disgraceful cabals are found partly in separate portions, and partly together in a single roll of Carton K. 148, in the 'Archives du Royaume,' superscribed "Correspondance intéressante à lire et à garder sur les démêlés entre la France et l'Espagne de 1717-1725." In the very commencement it is stated that St. Aignan was often so ill-provided with money, that "il n'en avoit pas pour dépêcher un courrier."

† He writes l.c. in cypher (to which the key is annexed), that the cardinal had commissioned him to induce the sultan, through the instrumentality of prince Ragotzy, to refuse the conditions of peace which were offered him,—“Qu'il (the cardinal) promettoit de faire une diversion très-considérable en Italie pour la campagne prochaine, de manière que les puissances qui donnoient des secours aux Vénitiens seroient obligées à garder leurs vaisseaux dans leurs ports.” He hopes that when he has executed the commission, he shall have completely gained the confidence of the cardinal; “il pourroit bien me faire passer dans les cours du Nord dont je donnerois certainement avis à V.A.R.”

‡ Monsieur Cara's letters, which are to be found along with those of

can only smile to find it gravely recorded in English history, that George I. was the person who first gave information to the regent and Dubois concerning the conspiracy entered into by the duchess of Maine and her friends with the prince de Cellamare, the Spanish ambassador in Paris. The duchess of Maine and the friends of Philip V. in France secretly circulated letters and declarations of the king of Spain, and manifestos against the regent, who, on his part, caused all who were concerned in the writing or circulation of such letters to be publicly prosecuted by the parliament of the kingdom. The Spaniards excited disturbances and discontent in France, and thereby materially contributed to the success of the cabals carried on by the English and French ministers, who merely sought for a pretence to justify their operations against Spain in the eyes of both nations, who were to sacrifice their property and blood for the purpose of realizing the selfish plans of their respective governments. Victor Amadeus had already yielded to the necessity of his circumstances in November (1718), ceded Sicily to the emperor, and obtained Sardinia as a compensation with the dignity and title of king: Alberoni alone remained firm.

The imperial court at this time also exhibited that adherence to custom and anxiety about the empty formalities of right which were peculiar to the slow and wearisome proceedings of German men of business and German chanceries. The renunciation of all claims to the possessions long since ceded to Austria was one of the chief articles in the treaty of the quadruple alliance; but Austria nevertheless disputed and negotiated about the words and forms of this renunciation till October, and by this empty and useless strife delayed its accession.

Importance was not so much in reality as in appearance laid upon legal justification, because all parties were anxious to give the impression that they were sincerely desirous of watching over national and public rights, whilst in fact they were treading all principles of right and honesty under foot. This led Dubois also to use all his endeavours to get possession of the papers

Boissimène in the place already referred to, writes to the regent:—"Monsr. de Fenel, premier président du parlement de Navarre, est regardé comme votre espion ce qui fait, que ces meilleurs amis se méfient de lui;"—that he himself was less an object of suspicion, and that he would send him a complete register of all persons of consideration in the province, "en y marquant ceux qui sont fidèlement attachés à V.A.R. d'un F., ceux qui le sont au roi d'Espagne d'un E."

concerning the conspiracy, of which Cellamare was the centre and life. They had been long acquainted with the names of the conspirators and the progress of the conspiracy; copies of the documents were in their possession, when the copyist, who was at the same time in the service of the Spanish ambassador and of cardinal Dubois, gave notice, that the abbé Portocarrero, the nephew of the ambassador, was about to set out for Spain with all the original papers relating to the conspiracy in his possession*. Portocarrero was seized upon on the journey, his papers taken from him, and proofs thus obtained of the part which the Spanish minister in Paris had taken in the conspiracy; the minister was arrested, and Alberoni accused in public manifestos and his dismissal demanded. King Philip took the part of the cardinal, paid no attention to the complaints and threats of the powers, refused satisfaction, and declined to dismiss his minister; whereupon England declared war on the 28th of December 1718, and France in January of the following year.

The French, although still carrying on friendly negotiations with Philip, equipped an army of 40,000 men, which, under the command of Berwick, was advancing through the passes of the Pyrenees. The English carried on hostilities by sea. Catalonia and Navarre were occupied; Alberoni however still remained firm, and the English and French, who had not calculated upon such obstinacy on the part of the king of Spain, were brought into the greatest difficulty by their own success. Whilst the war was carried on in the field, secret cabals, schemes dangerous to morality and justice, continued to be devised in the cabinets. This appears not merely from the manuscript correspondence of Boissimène and other spies, but a detailed and authentic account of the whole of these transactions may be found in Lemontey's 'History of the Regency.' This historian had directed his peculiar attention to these mean and contemptible cabals, and treated them with the greatest minuteness.

After the Frenchmen who had maintained an understanding

* All the miserable cabals and tricks which they employed, and all the individual circumstances, which we pass over, may be found recorded with a wearisome minuteness in Lemontey, 'Histoire de la Régence,' vol. i. chap. 7. In the 'Mémoires Secrets, ou Correspondance du Cardinal Dubois,' published by Sevelinges in 1815, it is stated, that the last discovery was not made by means of a woman of pleasure, as is usually stated; but, as Lemontey also states, by Büvat, an employé in the Bibliothèque Royale, who had been employed as a copyist. He was never rewarded for the service. All this indeed is in the highest degree unimportant.

with Cellamare had fallen a sacrifice to their own folly, these spies and traitors still continued to push their trade under the highest protection; Alberoni even caused the Pretender to be invited to Spain, in order to convey him and his followers to Scotland in Spanish ships; but he quickly sent him back to Italy when he became better acquainted with his person and character. Philip himself appeared with the army which the cardinal sent to oppose the duke of Berwick, and the French commander took the greatest pains to prevent the supposition, that a service would not be rendered him by the capture of the king of Spain. In Sicily also the Spanish troops offered a courageous resistance to the imperial army, even after the loss of their fleet, which had been destroyed by the English.

King George and the regent had pledged themselves not to conclude a peace till Alberoni was dismissed, and as they could not accomplish their object by war, they were obliged to have recourse to a disgraceful cabal. The war had been carried on to the advantage of the allies and to the ruin of the Spaniards. Navarre, Biscay and Catalonia suffered from the French, and the English destroyed the navy, trade, docks and harbour of the Spaniards; but both the English and French nation were nevertheless in the highest degree dissatisfied with the continuance of a war which had no national object. Its termination therefore was equally desired by English and French, when the singular lord Peterborough, who, although undoubtedly a man of genius, entertained sometimes most foolish notions, and occupied his mind continually with hair-brained plans, offered to help them out of their difficulties. He had been scarcely liberated from an arrest which he had drawn upon himself by one cabal which he wished to carry on, as plenipotentiary of king George, when he entered into another with the duke of Parma in Colorno.

Lord Peterborough completely won the favour of the duke of Parma, through whom he tried to influence the queen of Spain, and through her to work upon her husband. On Peterborough's request, the duke resolved to write an earnest letter to his niece and step-daughter the queen of Spain, which (Scotti) his ambassador in Madrid was secretly to put into her hands. From fear of Alberoni, they neither ventured to entrust the letter to a courier, nor to send it by post; but a servant of the duke or of

Peterborough, disguised as a pilgrim, was to be the bearer. Scotti, furnished with letters of Alberoni, which had been sent to him from France, and in which the cardinal had used some severe and harsh language respecting the king, engaged in a formal plot with the queen and her nurse to take the king by surprise, and compel him by fear to adopt a hasty resolution. The queen was fortunately at this moment on bad terms with the cardinal, because her nurse and confidante, Laura Piscatori, had had a quarrel with the all-powerful donna Camilla, the house-keeper of the cardinal. The queen and Scotti arranged all the parts of a scene which they were to play together with the king, in order to induce him immediately to send off Alberoni as he had sent off Orsini, *i. e.* suddenly and without seeing him again, lest he might have an opportunity of re-establishing his influence over the mind of the king.

On the 3rd of December, Scotti and the queen, who appeared to meet accidentally, took the weak Philip by storm. Scotti laid before him Alberoni's letters which had been sent to him from France, and in which the cardinal had spoken of him with great freedom. On the 5th Alberoni was banished from Spain, precisely in the same manner as Orsini had been*, and travelled through the south of France into the territory of Genoa. When he arrived at Sestri, in the neighbourhood of Genoa, Alberoni heard that the pope had commenced a suit against him, that he wished to bring about his judicial condemnation, and had urged the Genoese to deliver him up, which however they had positively refused. The duke of Parma also wished to call the duke

* See Coxe, vol. ii. p. 288, etc. We follow the 'Ristretto di Storia Picentina,' and the 'Elogio del Cardinale Alberoni,' by Bignani, 1833. In the last-mentioned it is related as follows:—"Partirono i due regnanti (di Spagna) nel dì 5 Dicembre per andare a caccia al Pardo e il giorno stesso dal segretario de stato Don Miguel Duran fu presentato al cardinale Alberoni un ordine scritto del proprio pugno del re, che victavagli di più ingerirsi negli affari del governo e di presentarsi al palazzo o in verun altro luogo inanzi alle loro Maestà o ad un principe della casa reale, ingiungendogli altresì di partire di Madrid in otto giorno e degli statti Spagnuoli nel termine di tre settimane. E da notarsi la causale della dimissione e del esilio pronunziato dal re. Ecco le parole del biglietto autografo: Essendo portato a procurare incessamente a miei sudditti i vantaggi di una pace generale travagliando fin d' adesso per arrivare a trattati onorevoli e convenienti che possono essere di durata e volendo con queste mire levare gli ostacoli tutti che possono apportare il minimo ritardo ad un opera da cui dipende tanto il publico bene, como pure per altre giuste ragioni ho trovato a proposito di allontanare il cardinale Alberoni dagli affari," etc. etc.

to account as his subject; and he therefore thought it advisable to conceal himself for a time, in which he was admirably successful.

After the dismissal of the cardinal a speedy reconciliation took place between Spain and the quadruple alliance, for Spain accepted the conditions of the four powers as early as January in the following year, 1720, and acceded to their alliance; but still it seemed difficult completely to unite Spain and the emperor. France and England, in order to gain the favour of the queen, had laid claim to the reversion of Parma and Placentia for the sons of Elizabeth, without ever having consulted the German empire or the emperor. There was no reason to expect the death of the last weakly descendant of the house of Medici, the grand-duke John Gasto of Tuscany, although his father Cosmo III. had thought it right to provide for the contingency, and in case his only son should die without heirs, had bequeathed the grand-duchy to his daughter the electress palatine.

The unfortunate James III., who was totally unfit for any sort of business, and only capable of superstitious exercises, excited some attention by his fate, and George's fear of the shadow of a Pretender. Cardinal Alberoni had caused him to be brought with some show of pomp and dignity to Spain, and forthwith sent him back, because, being a good judge of mankind, he immediately saw that such a cowardly and narrow-minded man was unfit for any adventurous undertakings; king George nevertheless regarded it as necessary to keep a watch upon this weak-minded man, and lord Peterborough, who had undertaken the office, played the character of a spy upon this protégé of the pope. A report was in consequence spread abroad, that the wonderful Peterborough, who was capable of anything adventurous which might enter into his fanciful head, wished to have him assassinated. The queen dowager, who resided in Paris, in her anxiety wrote to the pope, who, by means of cardinal Gualterio, caused Peterborough to be arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of Urbino; and he first recovered his freedom on the application of the duke regent*.

* See a manuscript letter of the regent, 'Archives du Royaume de France,' Carton K. No. 147, in which he writes to lord Peterborough that he had not answered his two previous letters, because it was first necessary to persuade the queen of England; and "Je l'ai fait dernièrement avec la forte persuasion qu'un homme comme vous n'est guère capable des choses qui ont opéré votre détention à laquelle vous ne devez douter que je n'aie pris beaucoup de part.

This danger was probably only imaginary, because Peterborough was altogether incapable of undertaking anything so base or dishonourable. George I. indeed had recourse to schemes altogether unjustifiable to obstruct and hinder James's marriage. The pope had destined the daughter of the celebrated John Sobieski, king of Poland, for his wife, and the princess had set out on her journey through the Tyrol into Italy. She was stopped by imperial command, was obliged to remain nine months in the Tyrol against her will, and was earnestly besought to give up the projected alliance and to marry one of the princes of Baden. She made her escape by an adventurous flight, and when James was sent back to Italy by Alberoni, he consoled himself with the prospect of completing his marriage. The Polish princess however found no favour in his eyes, and as titular queen led a most miserable life*.

The negotiations and meetings to bring about a union between Spain and the emperor were in the mean time conducted in the usual manner without producing the slightest result, for the emperor always created new difficulties by his trading speculations in Trieste and the East India Company in Ostend, which Holland and England looked upon with suspicion and dislike. At length a congress was held in Cambray, but even this continued to drag on its existence for three years wholly without fruit: on the other hand, closer connexions were at this time formed between Spain and France, and new family alliances agreed upon. Dubois was now prime minister and managed the whole of the regent's affairs, who was so sunk in sensuality that he neither could nor would attend to questions of government. By virtue of the treaty which Dubois caused to be negotiated, the daughter of the queen of Spain, now four years old, was betrothed to Louis XV., and was to be educated in France; an elder daughter of the regent was immediately married to the prince of the Asturias (the heir to the crown); a younger one destined for a younger brother of the prince, and as his betrothed wife sent to Spain. The persecuted Alberoni was now from policy secretly taken

Je suis persuadé que la reine fera ce qu'il faut pour finir cette ridicule aventure que de mauvais avis donnés apparemment par quelques ennemis particuliers vous ont attirée. J'ai écrit au cardinal Gualterio," etc.

* For a full account of this history, see Stenzel's 'Contributions to the History of Poland and of the Family of the Sobieskis,' in Schlosser and Bercht's 'Archiv für Geschichte und Literatur,' vol. v. p. 352, etc.; and Lemontey, 'Histoire de la Régence,' vol. ii. pp. 261, 262.

under his protection by Dubois, whilst he publicly appeared to treat him with hostility. The cunning cardinal had suddenly disappeared, and even the spies of the regent had lost all traces of him*, till, on the death of his enemy, pope Clement XI., he all at once came forth from a monastery in the neighbourhood of Bologna, where he had lived in concealment from March 1720 till April 1721.

As we learn from manuscript correspondence, the spies of the regent were at this time active in Sicily, and among them Boissimène was especially distinguished, who anew offered his services at the same time to the Spanish ministers and to the regent. The worst means were employed by both courts with a view to promote the miserable private ends of the governing parties, which was in reality the only object, because the administration of an Alberoni, a Dubois, and such men, not only made no account of virtue, but regarded it as altogether incapable of being united with the more elevated views of the higher circles of society and with their circumstances and relations.

This double French and Spanish marriage was one of the delusions of cardinal Dubois, and in fact led to a greater evil than that which it was intended to remedy. The idea of betrothing a king of thirteen with an infanta of four years old was absurd, because the whole French nation must have eagerly desired the early marriage of their king; the daughter of the regent also was not well suited for the prince of the Asturias, and it was necessary to assail Philip on all sides by means of the queen, the duke of Parma, his confessor, and innumerable intrigues, before he would consent to the union of his son with the daughter of the detested regent. From Dubois' manuscript letters to the prince of Rohan, who received the Spanish princess†, we are

* Boissimène did not know whither Alberoni had gone. Coxe, after his fashion, relates with great confidence things which are altogether incorrect, vol. ii. p. 244. The extracts from Boissimène's correspondence, which we shall quote at another time and in another place, will serve especially to show how deep the credit of France was sunk. Among other things, he writes from Genoa on the 6th November 1720:—"Le banquier d'ici ni ayant dit que les affaires du négoce étoient si mauvaises en France, que pas un négociant ne vouloit plus s'y embarrasser sans de fonds sûres et certaines."

† The correspondence between Dubois and the prince de Rohan, about the presents on both sides, will be found in the French archives, Carton K. 147. Dubois in a long letter, among other things, writes as follows:—"Il en est de même de tous les autres présens qui sont du double, du triple et du quadruple plus forts que ceux qui doivent être donnés de la part du roi d'Espagne. D'ailleurs toutes leurs évaluations sont toujours exagérées et outrées, et ils

made fully acquainted with the meanness which was mutually practised, the deceit which was employed on both sides, and the anxious niggardliness of Dubois on the occasion of the betrothal.

Dubois died in a manner which was altogether worthy of his life: he fell a sacrifice to his own criminality, and left the immense wealth which he had anxiously accumulated to smiling heirs. In his fourteenth year the young king had apparently reached his majority, but the duke regent assumed Dubois' position, and not as regent, but as prime minister, ruled with as unlimited dominion as before; but he also had completely undermined his constitution. The king was fourteen in February 1723, and had in form undertaken the government of the kingdom. The regent however still presided over all matters of administration till December, when he paid the penalty of his sins; and the hated, incapable, narrow-minded duke of Bourbon, equally detestable in body and mind, importunately desired to occupy his place.

The duke of Bourbon, as prime minister, was under the guidance of a lady with whom he lived quite publicly, although she was properly the wife of the marquis de Prye. This lady was accustomed to consult with the brothers Paris, whom we have already mentioned; and the whole state, both in France and in Spain, was at that time the prey of adventurers whom accident had brought forward.

In Spain, for example, after Philip had first retired from and again resumed the government, a native of the Netherlands named baron Ripperda, a complete adventurer, had come into the government, and the character which this new Spanish minister played in Europe makes it necessary for us briefly to touch upon the history of Philip V.

At the time in which the duke of Bourbon undertook the administration in France, Philip V. had taken so great a repugnance to every description of business, that no representations or no arts of his wife could restrain him from abdicating the government in favour of his son by his former marriage, with whom he had been long offended. It was thought necessary to consult the estates of the kingdom respecting the manner, and the

n'ont point de honte de mettre pour cent écus ce qui ne vaut que cent livres,"
etc. etc.

form in which the question was submitted for their consideration shows that the very name of the estates, who had formerly protected the laws, rights and privileges of the Spaniards, had become a mockery. The clergy and nobles of the royal court were quietly regarded as the representatives of both estates and consulted accordingly, and then the question was sent round to the individual cities in the country, and this was called consulting the people!! A month after the death of the regent, Louis, prince of the Asturias, undertook the government (10th January 1724) in the sixteenth year of his age, and Philip went to St. Ildefonso, where he had built for himself a country palace, laid out magnificent gardens, and planted woods at an immense expense.

Scarcely three months had elapsed, when the Spaniards, instead of hearing of the absurdities of the former court, were obliged to listen to accounts of the disgraceful conduct of the young queen, and of the double and triple contests and disputes between the royal family in Madrid and that at St. Ildefonso. There was even a rumour of the separation of the young king from his wife, who had been for some time kept in confinement; and there was a public and vehement quarrel between him and his stepmother. Queen Elizabeth had at first reigned in Madrid as before, by means of her influence with the minister Grimaldo; this could not continue long; a vehement strife soon succeeded, and Louis complained that his parents had secured to themselves a large yearly income, whilst the treasury of the kingdom was completely empty. He had even begun to entertain the thought of depriving them of a portion of what they had reserved, when he was suddenly carried off by small-pox in the eighth month of his reign. In his last will, Louis had expressly besought his father again to undertake the government, but Philip had made a formal and solemn vow never more to ascend the throne. According to Philip's own appointment in the act of abdication, and in pursuance of the wish of his ministers, the second brother, prince Frederick, now ten years old, was to become king; but this was contrary to the wishes of Elizabeth, who thought she had found in Ripperda at Ildefonso a new Alberoni. What was to be done? Instead of calling together the estates or consulting the judges, as would have been done in other countries, the clergy were assembled, but they also decided against the resumption of the government by Philip;

and even his confessor, Bermudez, held that he was bound by the act. The queen and donna Laura reasoned in vain with the weak-minded and superstitious Philip; he remained wholly immoveable; a French marshal who had obtained the character of a saint, and as such had been sent to the Spanish court, helped them out of their difficulty. Marshal de Tessé, who had for some time taken refuge from the world and done penance in a monastery in France, and who was accustomed to speak in holy words after the fashion of such saints, but who in reality was a hypocritical courtier, applied to the nuntio, and he found out a means of accomplishing the plan by the usual ingenuity of Romish art. Philip, encouraged by the pope, again undertook the government, notwithstanding his vow, from which the head of the church gave him a dispensation.

Düvernoy (one of the brothers Paris) governed in Paris on behalf of the marchioness de Prye; Ripperda in Madrid, as the representative and creature of Elizabeth. The latter perceived the impatience of the queen at the tedious negotiations which were being carried on at Cambray, and the hesitation about acknowledging the infant of Spain as heir to the duchies of Parma and Tuscany; he laid the blame upon France and the naval powers, and proposed the adventurous plan of negotiating directly with Austria. The queen fell in with this proposal, and sent Ripperda under an assumed name to Vienna. Whilst he was negotiating in Vienna, the duke of Bourbon, to please his mistress, so grossly offended the Spanish court and nation, that they would have formed an alliance even with the prince of darkness in order to have their revenge.

The duke of Bourbon had scarcely assumed the direction of affairs in France, when it was determined immediately to promote the young king's marriage, without waiting for the maturity of the Spanish princess, who was in the course of being educated in Paris, and was treated as the future queen. The consultations upon this important step, which was a matter of very questionable policy as regards Spain, occupied the creatures of the court for the whole summer (1724); the minister for foreign affairs (count Morville), however, took very little concern in the discussion, and the affair was wholly left in the hands of the marchioness de Prye. The policy of endangering or breaking the union with Spain became still more questionable when Philip had again mounted the throne; this danger by no

means escaped the notice of the court, and especially of the old marshal d'Uxelles, whose opinion was deemed of so much value upon the occasion, that a special messenger was sent to him to his estate in the country in order to consult him; he, however, was still of opinion* that the Spanish marriage must be given up. The marshal at the same time was by no means disposed to acquiesce in the plans of the duke and his ministers, and could not be induced to sanction the proposal of choosing the duke's half-sister (Mlle. de Vermandois) as the new queen; nor would he go to Fontainebleau to take part in the consultations. The case, however, was determined in the royal council, and the political necessity of the early marriage of the young king proved in a memoir†. A list of fourteen princesses was appended to this memoir, from which a choice might be made. The list was ultimately increased to a hundred, when it was at last secretly resolved, in the end of October, to send back the infanta in the name of the king. A detailed examination of the claims and merits of all these princesses was entered into, an account of which is to be found in the minutes, and seventeen were selected; but as matters were drawing towards a close in

* We shall here notice this point at somewhat greater length, in order to give some details from the papers in Carton K. as above referred to, which form a large bundle. The same Carton contains the papers relating to the marriage of a princess of Baden with the young duke of Orleans. The confidential person who had been sent to the marshal by the duke of Bourbon thus reports his opinion:—The marshal “passa ensuite aux réflexions sur les conséquences de cette démarche. Il croit que le retour du roi Philippe sur le trône fait naître un obstacle considérable à l'affaire, non seulement de sa part mais encore de celle de la reine d'Espagne, que l'un et l'autre seront irréconciliables, et que la nation, sans être jalouse de la satisfaction du roi, sera extrêmement touchée. On affectera de le paroître pour lui faire prendre des engagements sans retour, en sorte qu'il envisage l'Espagne comme livrée à la fureur dont il croit que l'on ne peut prévenir les effets que par les mesures qui seront prises d'ailleurs.”

† This long memoir is to be found in the Carton already referred to, and is entitled “Sur l'intérêt qu'à Monseigneur le Duc de rompre le mariage réglé par feu M^r. le Duc d'Orleans entre le Roi et l'Infante d'Espagne.” The articles of the memoir are as follows:—“1. Il est essentiel à M. le duc de marier promptement le roi. 2. Il seroit de son intérêt que ce fut avec une des princesses ses sœurs. 3. Obstacles et inconvéniens qui se rencontrent en exécution du projet de rompre le mariage de l'Infante. 4. Moyens pour prévenir et remédier à ces obstacles et inconvéniens. 5. Objections qu'on peut faire contre le dessein de substituer une princesse de Condé à l'Infante. 6. Réponse à ces objections. 7. Quel parti prendre en cas que Monseigneur le duc se trouve trop pressé par les circonstances pour se donner le tems de faire les arrangemens ci-dessus marqués. 8. Quelles sont les princesses de l'Europe propres à être reines de France en cas que Monseigneur ne veuille pas l'une des princesses ses sœurs. 9. Par quel moyen M. le duc peut il pourvoir à sa sûreté en gardant l'Infante, supposé qu'il trouve des risques à la renvoyer.”

the council on the 6th of November (1724), the propositions were so skilfully turned, that the princess royal of England (who could not be obtained) and the half-sister of the duke were regarded as the only highly eligible parties*. The reason why the selected bride did not become queen has been sought for in vain in all official documents, notwithstanding the number of letters, drafts, minutes and opinions which exist with respect to the choice of the Polish princess. In the chronicles of scandal of that time, we are informed that the mother of the duke, as well as the bride elect, had intimated to the marchioness as soon as the case was decided, that she was not likely to enjoy the favour of the future queen, whereupon the whole affair was broken off.

The prospect of a union with the princess de Vermandois was no sooner broken off (25th March 1725) than the daughter of the unfortunate Stanislaus Leszinski, who was then living as a French pensioner at Weissenburg in Alsace, was chosen in her stead, and the news of this determination communicated to the Spanish court. The paper which was drawn up for this purpose was read in the council of state on the 12th of March, and is remarkable for having passed the same severe judgment upon cardinal Dubois which history has pronounced upon him, and for not concealing the fact of the great imprudence of provoking Spain†. All possible means were now tried to soothe Spain.

* The report thus concludes :—“ V. M. voit par les avis, que les personnes consultées jugent que votre choix ne peut tomber que sur l’une de deux, savoir Mlle. de Vermandois, à laquelle ils inclinent tous, et la princesse d’Angleterre en cas que V. M. ne juge pas à propos de suivre leurs avis sur Mlle. de Vermandois.” This is followed by the minute containing the result of the whole. Fleury (bishop of Fréjus) declares that the English princess was the most suitable, but in that case they must resolve upon the absolute and perpetual exclusion of the Pretender from the throne of England; and that as that would be a great detriment to the catholic religion, he would vote for Mlle. de Vermandois, “ sans la disproportion d’âge et d’autres raisons qui me regardent personnellement.” Villars, D’Uxelles and Morville concur in this opinion; cardinal de Bissi, de la Mark and Pecquet also yield their assent, with the expression of their opinion, that this would render the position of the duke embarrassing.

† In the first ‘Mémoire sur le Mariage du Roi,’ Cart. K. 148, it is first shown, that there was no reason for concluding the treaty, by which the king was obliged to wait until a child should arrive at years of maturity before he married, and then proceeds as follows :—“ Quels sont les motifs d’un pareil traité? Le cardinal Dubois, c’est tout dire en le nommant. [In a marginal note these words are written : ‘ Je les sais, je les tais par respect dû à un acte de ministre.’] Comment un tel ministre de l’iniquité peut il engager un bon Français, un prince qui nous gouverne, qui bien loin d’y avoir entré l’a ignoré absolument et qui en deviendrait, je l’ose dire, et complice et coupable s’il en

Father Linières wrote to the confessor Bermudez, and count Cambis used all his exertions in Turin, in order that Spain might be influenced from that quarter; marshal Tessé was quickly recalled, in order to withdraw him from the disgrace which was inflicted upon the new ambassador (the abbé de Livry). The latter was neither listened to nor even suffered to remain in Spain; cardinal Polignac was obliged to have recourse to the pope, and entreat him to write a letter to Philip V., in order to appease him, but all proved vain. Philip on this occasion paid no attention even to the pope, would not receive the letter which was sent to him by the king of France, and debarred the ambassador from all access to his person*.

The indignation of the king and queen of Spain against France crowned Ripperda's journey to Berlin with success, although every one regarded his plan of bringing the emperor into direct communication and union with Spain, after a hostile dispute which had been publicly and secretly carried on for twelve years, as one of those many visionary schemes which were universally and necessarily expected from him†. Ripperda

facilitoit l'exécution. Voilà pour le premier point. Quant à l'alliance de l'Espagne il ne faut pas la regarder comme peu de chose, l'étoffe y est pour en faire une grande puissance, ce que je souhaite qu'il n'arrive jamais, et on a vu avec étonnement ce qu'un homme médiocre en a su tirer dans trois ans de son administration." Everything was to be tried to soothe the Spaniards, and all honest means to be resorted to; the chief point, however, was to furnish money:—"N'attendez pas Monseigneur de trouver aucune onction ou facilité pendant la négociation, le roi, la reine, la nation tout sera en fureur, mais le retour de l'Infante notifié ils changeront bien de note."

* We have now before us the instructions given to the abbé Livry, the correspondence, and Polignac's letter to the pope, copied from the Archives, but we do not think it necessary to give them here in detail. We shall merely give the conclusion of the last instructions to Livry and the commencement of the ostensible letter:—"En cas qu'il vous devient impossible d'approcher de S. M. Catholique, cherchez quelque voie pour lui faire parvenir cette seconde lettre du roi, comme pourrait être le canal du marq. de Grimaldo ou celui du père Bermudez. L'un et l'autre vous manquant, recourrez à l'entremise du Nonce." In the secret letter, which is accompanied by a copy of the letter from the pope to the king, he is desired to remain as long in Spain as he possibly can. He was not to regard his refusal of access to the palace as a command to leave Spain, if he were not absolutely sent away, (this really took place,) although both the Spanish ambassadors should leave Paris.

† Ripperda was a baron from the province of Gröningen, well acquainted with manufactures and trade. He formed a secret connexion with Eugene, who engaged largely in the system of espionage, and had an annuity from the emperor; became afterwards Dutch minister in Madrid, expended vast sums and played all sorts of mean and treacherous tricks, changed his religion in order to relieve himself from his difficulties, became a citizen of Spain in order to erect manufactories, and had the direction of a great concern in Guada-

at first negotiated under a feigned name, and through him the imperial minister had drawn large sums from Spain (570,000 pistoles) in no very honourable manner, of which the emperor himself did not go away altogether empty-handed; and at last all sorts of secret agreements were entered into with him in May, to which they gave the name of a treaty. In June, Ripperda formally assumed the character of an ambassador, and France sent the duke of Richelieu expressly with the view of cooperating with the English ambassador, in order to counteract the Spanish representative by money, treachery, purloining despatches, and other iniquitous means. From the correspondence of the duke of Richelieu from the years 1725–28, preserved in the archives of the department of foreign affairs in Paris, the same conclusion may be deduced as that which may be drawn from the correspondence of Seckendorf, the imperial ambassador at the court of Frederick William, which has been lately published as an appendix to the life of the latter. The conclusion is no other than this,—that in the cabinets and courts of those times every species of modesty or shame was regarded as narrow-mindedness and incapacity. The English ambassador, therefore, immediately said to the duke, it may be difficult but is not impossible to get possession of all the secrets of the imperial cabinet; they will only cost somewhat dear.

Ripperda, notwithstanding all his cunning, was completely overreached in Vienna; the imperial minister signed the treaty on the 30th of April 1725, which they neither could nor would keep, and for which they allowed themselves and their court to be liberally paid. This treaty contained an offensive and defensive alliance with Spain, in which the emperor's East India Company in Ostend was not only recognised, but especial privileges were granted it in all the dominions of the Spanish empire. It was this very company which had caused disunion between the emperor, who was personally engaged in speculations about money and trade, and his ancient allies, and his refusal to withdraw these privileges from the company rendered the conferences at Cambray useless. The emperor promised the Spaniards his assistance in the recovery of Gibraltar. This point was made public by Ripperda, but he carefully concealed other points in

laxara. He then fell under Alberoni's suspicion and lost his influence; he was reinstated, however, in his position, and made himself quite indispensable to the queen at St. Ildefonso during the nine months of Philip's abdication.

the treaty, by which the contracting parties agreed, that if George I. should prove obstinate in refusing to concede this fortress to the Spaniards, they would lend their aid to the Pretender in his attempts to obtain possession of the British crown, and also that one of the archduchesses was promised as a wife to Don Carlos, the eldest son of the queen.

Richelieu knew right well that Sinzendorf had only, properly speaking, treated with Ripperda, relying upon his influence with Eugene and the emperor; he nevertheless spoke in his letters of the zeal with which the emperor and the empress had urged the union with Spain*. On this occasion the Holstein baron Pettekum makes his appearance anew in Vienna, whom we have already seen playing a similar character in the negotiations of peace at Getruydenberg; he served the French, the English, the emperor and Ripperda, all upon the same conditions—for money; he managed the cyphers, assisted in bribing the emperor's decipherer, recommended corrupting Ripperda's secretary, and looked after the spies. In this way the imperial ministers, whenever it was possible, got possession of the ambassador's papers; and they, in their turn, purchased Ripperda's most secret despatches; and Richelieu became possessed of the emperor's letters to his ambassador, as well as the key of his cypher.

Even after the conclusion of the negotiations (Sept. 1725), the imperial ministers drew considerable sums from Spain. Ripperda returned back in triumph, and (in Dec. 1725), as a Spanish duke, undertook the direction of the ministry. The imperial court pretended that they must reinforce their army, and for that reason drew 2,000,000 piastres; and yet Richelieu states confidently, that there was so little idea of increasing the army, that the imperial forces were never weaker than at that very time. Richelieu's letters, the report which he furnished, and the calculations by which it was accompanied, prove to us abun-

* "L'empereur (he writes to Morville in July, announcing the conclusion of the treaty which had been negotiated between Sinzendorf and Ripperda), L'empereur regarde le traité fait avec l'Espagne comme son propre ouvrage et est entêté de ses liaisons avec cette couronne au delà de tout ce qu'on peut dire. Le prince et l'impératrice regnante désirent avec un ardeur inconcevable les mariages des archduchesses avec les deux fils de la reine d'Espagne, les ministres seul en retardent la conclusion par les embarras, ou ils prévoient que ces mariages pourraient les jeter s'ils ne faisaient prendre de grandes précautions. Cela fait qu'ils ne savent de quel côté se tourner ne voulant dans le moment présent ni se brouiller avec personne, ni se charger du blâme de l'évènement et n'osant cependant s'opposer à la volonté déterminée de l'empereur et au goût qu'il a pour cet ouvrage."

dantly, that on this occasion also the very highest in rank disregarded all principles of morality, and favoured a system of distinguished fraud*. But the Sardinian minister employed still worse arts, and applied still more money than the French in this way and for the accomplishment of similar objects†.

The English minister had already got a full acquaintance with all that had been agreed upon between Spain and Austria before Richelieu's arrival, and proposed to the French ambassador to bring about a counter-alliance between England, France and Sardinia, even in Vienna. This alliance was however afterwards first concluded in Hanover, between England and France, in September 1725. They had besides succeeded in drawing the king of Prussia into this so-called Hanoverian treaty; but he speedily withdrew again, because he was very well-disposed towards the emperor, and was completely under the dominion of Sinzendorf. Ripperda, still in Vienna, no sooner received in-

* Among many others, we shall merely quote Richelieu's letter, in which he speaks of winning over Ripperda's secretary and the principal decipherer, Bitka (who however was not gained). He first says of these two persons, "que le St. Dubourg lui a procuré;" and that these had convinced him "de leur bonne foi et de la vérité de leur interception, c'est qu'ils m'ont redit des lettres entières que j'avoit écrites à M. le cardinal de Polignac et M. de Fenelon." For he says in another passage of this long report,—“Ce n'est pas à Vienne seulement où l'empereur fait intercepter les lettres des ambassadeurs, mais à Hannovre même et dans tout l'empire. S. M. I. a des gens gagnés aux postes, qui interceptent les lettres et lui envoient la copie du chiffre qu'on fait après cela déchiffrer ici.” He then communicates the expenditure of the imperial troops, of single regiments, and the places where they lay; and shows how indecently they wished to defraud Spain of 2,000,000 piastres by the meanest lies. The condition of the imperial army may be judged of from the fact, that in the beginning of 1726, Austria had only 125,000 men; and according to Richelieu, even if all had been made complete, only 145,000; and that this empire consisted, besides Austria Proper, of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, *the whole of Silesia*, together with Naples, Milan and the Netherlands, whilst Prussia alone had on foot an army of 75,000 men. In another letter he says, that Batthiany, who ruled Eugene, was greatly enraged at the English ambassador, because he had brought some of her tricks to light. Sinzendorf had obtained 100,000 louis d'or from Spain, but not all in hard cash. As to the presents to the imperial ministry, which were made in consequence of the conclusion of the treaty, which they neither could nor would fulfil, it runs thus:—“L'ambassadeur d'Espagne vient de faire présent à M. le prince Eugène de douze chevaux d'Espagne très-beaux et magnifiquement harnachés. Il a donné à M. Sinzendorf un grand bassin, une aiguère, une paire des flambeaux, tout d'or, valant 15,000 florins, et à M. de Stahremberg un service de thé d'or avec quelques autres bijoux, qui valent 25,000 florins.”

† “Il est inconcevable (are Richelieu's words), combien d'argent le roi de Sardaigne fait répandre ici par son ministre, et c'est le seul moyen d'être bien informé de ce qui se passe, n'y ayant point d'autre voie de persuasion auprès des Allemands que celle d'argent.”

telligence of this Hanoverian alliance, than he caused a communication to be made to Richelieu through Pettekum, that it now altogether depended upon him to bring about a reconciliation between France and Spain, and that he would undertake to effect it*. So vain and empty were all the movements and spiders' webs of these busy diplomatists!

In France, even Louis' cold mind perceived that among all the people who approached him, his former instructor, Fleury, bishop of Fréjus, was the only one who deserved his respect, and who took the slightest personal interest in him. The young king became so very much accustomed to this gentle flattering priest, who clothed all his ambitious designs in humble language and spiritual forms,—who was hostile to all genius in good as well as in evil, and who was a cautious and practical councillor, that he could not dispense with his services. The daughter of the poor Stanislaus, as appears from her letters, was, like her father, wholly devoted to the Jesuits: she was continually occupied with some of the mechanical practices of religion, and took no interest or concern in state affairs. In the singular instructions however which were given by her father, a blind attachment to the duke of Bourbon and to the marchioness of Prye were inculcated upon her as a duty; and this involved her in a cabal, set on foot by the marchioness against Fleury†. The duke was jealous of the tutor, and he wished to avail himself of the attachment to and dependence on his wife which the king at first exhibited, in order to withdraw him from Fleury; but he thereby

* On the 17th of October the duc de Richelieu writes, that Ripperda had caused to be communicated to him, “que si notre cour persistait dans les mêmes sentimens de réconciliation, nous pouvions en vingt-quatre heures finir cette affaire, lui et moi, pourvu que je lui marquasse la satisfaction qu'on vouloit donner au roi son maître, et que c'était très sérieusement qu'il parlait.”

† In Stanislaus' instructions to his daughter, this sentence occurs:—“Ignorez *toutes les doctrines* en matière de religion. Celle de votre catéchisme est la plus sûre, suivez la et ne demandez jamais à pénétrer ce qui ne convient pas à votre sexe.” So much for heaven; now for the world:—“Il ne me reste plus qu'à vous représenter ce que vous devez à M. le duc. Comme une fille toute la reconnaissance, comme reine de France toute la confiance, celle que le roi a en ce prince, sa prudence dans le gouvernement, son désintéressement pour le bien du royaume et son amitié pour moi sont, j'espère, des nœuds assez puissans pour votre cœur sensible à ne vous jamais détacher des infinies obligations que vous avez à ce prince et à suivre ses avis salutaires.” The duke had previously sent his marchioness of Prye with earnest recommendations to Stanislaus, in order that she might converse *personally* with the new queen, and inform her of what she must know, and she was received with all possible distinction.

furnished the occasion of throwing the whole conduct of public affairs into his hands.

Fleury had been excluded from a conference, which was intentionally held in the queen's apartments, in order to have a pretence for dispensing with his presence. He thereupon immediately and suddenly withdrew from court, and retired to his country-house at Ivry. From a painful feeling of being obliged to rely on himself alone, the young king commanded his return in a threatening tone, and even expressed his displeasure to the queen at her participation in Fleury's exclusion. The duke therefore found himself obliged to recall the exiled bishop from his country-house to Versailles. The bishop came, but now hesitated no longer to open the eyes of the king to the character and morality of the people by whom he was surrounded, and to advise him to free himself from their power. There were two persons who had foreseen this issue and the triumph of the bishop,—the English minister in Paris, Horace Walpole, the brother of Robert, who was very unequal to the minister in ability, but, on the other hand, very much surpassed him in elegance and readiness in the French modes of speech; and the duke of Richelieu, in Vienna. Both also remained true to the bishop when he appeared to have fallen into disgrace, and the English was the only one among all the ambassadors who visited him at his country-house. This afterwards gave both great influence, and a claim upon the friendship of an honourable man like Fleury, who ruled France for twenty years.

On Fleury's return the duke of Bourbon was immediately banished the court, on which occasion Louis XV., as a young man, exhibited the same coldness and cruel dissimulation which Louis XIII. had formerly shown towards his mother. Louis declared at a meeting of the council of state (June 16, 1726), that he intended to put an end to the office of prime minister altogether, abolish the title, and adopt a new method of administration*. From the tone of this speech, and from the flattering manner in which the deep gratitude of the monarch is there expressed to the duke of Bourbon, we learn to anticipate that mean and sneaking policy, which, under the administration of the pious author of this speech, was added to the prevailing public sins.

The time moreover was very favourable to the new head of

* The king's speech is recorded in Carton K. 149. See also the Appendix to the '*Histoire Privée de Louis XV.*'

the French cabinet : he was the only man who could compose the vehement and apparently irreconcilable enmity of the Spanish court, which was the consequence of sending back the infanta, and bring about a family union. The imperial ambassador in Spain, count Königseck, from time to time demanded considerable sums, under the absurd pretence that the emperor was obliged to purchase the favour of the catholic princes of Germany for the alliance. Ripperda would no longer submit to those claims, and Königseck therefore laboured for his overthrow. Ripperda no sooner saw how he had been deceived in Vienna, and perceived that this conduct was a mere continuation of the treachery, in order to draw money from Spain, than he again sought to renew his connexion with Holland, France and England, but he speedily fell a sacrifice to the imperial ministry. Königseck had secured himself a considerable influence in Spain, by promising the queen to bring about the marriage between one or two of the archduchesses and the princes her sons, and assistance to the king for the conquest of Gibraltar. Spain, relying upon the aid of the emperor, demanded the restoration of Gibraltar ; and when the English were fitting out a fleet to send to the West Indies and to the Spanish coasts, to resist the hostilities which were threatened in those quarters, the Spanish ambassador was recalled, and an expedition undertaken against Gibraltar. This expedition for the siege of Gibraltar (Feb. 1727) had a most unfortunate termination for the Spaniards ; but Austria continued to deceive the queen of Spain by its ambassador, and by a prospect of the marriage with the archduchess, in the same way as Seckendorf held Frederick William of Prussia fast bound by cabals of all kinds, by money and bribery (of the ministers, the princes, the princesses, and even the court-fool Gündling), and the hope of gaining some unjust suit in the imperial courts, through the interest of the emperor*.

* Richelieu, in his report about Prussia, shows us how matters were conducted in the German empire. He wishes that a new Prussian minister had arrived " pour des affaires." These *affaires* of the king of Prussia consisted in thirty-six or thirty-seven suits, "*parmi lesquels il y a bien deux ou trois où il pourroit avoir raison.*" Cette grande multitude d'affaires est causée par les terres qu'il possède à différens titres, en ayant comme electeur, comme prince de l'empire, et beaucoup d'autres achetées, qu'il voudroit mettre toutes, quoiqu'elles ayant des droits différens, sur le même pied que son électorat et rendre son électorat indépendant de l'empire. Tout cela lui forme de grandes discussions au conseil aulique. Il y a des temps où il les suit avec beaucoup de vivacité, d'autres où il les abandonne totalement. Son ministre est homme

Fleury profited by the circumstances and adopted the true character of an ecclesiastic, that of a peace-maker. In reference to the disputes between the naval powers and the emperor on the subject of trade, and the contests between Spain and England, he brought about an agreement in Paris (May 31, 1727), which Beurnonville, the Spanish minister in Vienna, afterwards signed. Some very threatening measures had already been taken by the ministers of George I., who were embittered against the emperor and the Spaniards. Sweden, Holland and Denmark had acceded to the treaty of Hanover; England had taken 30,000 Swedes, Danes and Hessians into her service, and French troops were collected on the German frontiers. We perceive from Richelieu's correspondence with his court, that Fleury was quite certain of obtaining everything by threats alone; for he writes from Vienna, that every one there was extremely incensed against England, but that no one thought of a war.

The diplomatic maxim, that everything is gained by time, received on this occasion also a verification. The treaty, which was to prescribe laws to the emperor and the Spaniards, and to which both had acceded, contained the following provision:—The Ostend Company, and the privileges granted to the emperor in the Spanish dominions, shall only in the mean time cease for seven years; and the final determination be settled at a congress to be held in Soissons. A year before the opening of this congress, George I. died (June 1727). This event, however, had no influence upon public affairs, because Robert Walpole, after a short retirement from the ministry, had again recovered his full influence, and still continued at the head of the administration in the reign of George II.

The congress of Soissons was protracted as usual, to the advantage of the diplomatists alone, who were employed, and like that of Cambray, was repeatedly broken off and again resumed. We pass over the negotiations, the spies, the activity of the ministers and mediators, and the Austrian and Spanish cabals, all of which led to nothing. Fleury alone effected all that was

de très-peu d'esprit, très mal-informé de toutes ses affaires aussi bien de ce qui se passe à la cour de Berlin. Il n'est pourtant pas tout-à-fait comme les ministres des autres princes d'Allemagne, qui sont absolument livrés à cette cour-ci, et qui par l'espérance de devenir comtes, barons, ou d'avoir des investitures de fiefs, ne mandent jamais à leur maîtres que ce que veulent les ministres de l'empereur auxquels ils servent ordinairement d'espions!"

essential, by succeeding in finding means of conciliating the anger of the Spaniards and of healing their wounded feelings, by a species of satisfaction which cost nothing either to the country or the king. The queen of Spain at length saw to what an extent she had been deceived by Austria; and by a document signed (March 1728) in el Pardo, and afterwards so named, confirmed everything which had been agreed to in the previous year by Beurnonville in Vienna.

The congress in Soissons was, properly speaking, first opened in June 1728. In this meeting, negotiations were carried on concerning the Hanoverian demands, the *barrière* of the Dutch, the Ostend East India Company, and particularly concerning Gibraltar. The difficulties respecting Gibraltar were increased by a letter of George I. to the queen of Spain, which she then brought forward, and is now printed*, in which he had formally promised the restoration of the fortress. The king of Spain at this time had sunk more deeply than ever into a state of almost hopeless hypochondria, and all business was at a stand: the queen gave formal audiences instead of her husband, but it was long before she could resolve publicly and wholly to renounce her delusion with respect to the Austrian marriage; she finally, however, concluded an agreement for a double marriage with Portugal. In February 1729, the queen removed her court for some time to Seville, but she demanded in vain a decisive answer from Austria; the imperial ministers made delays, and were prolific in excuses and evasions. Austria, since the time of Ripperda's administration, had continued to draw large sums of money from Spain, but at the same time used all possible means to prevent Parma, Placentia and Tuscany from falling to the Spanish prince, as had been fixed by treaty: this finally induced the queen of Spain to form a close union with England, Holland and France. On the same day (Nov. 9, 1729) on which the alliance with Austria was solemnly annulled, and all the obligations of the treaty of Vienna declared to be absolved, she concluded a new alliance with Holland, England and France, in Seville, which appeared to meet and realize all her wishes. Austria always presented new obstructions, and persevered in hindering the Spanish prince from taking possession, till at length, two years afterwards (July 1731), the

* In the Hardwicke State Papers. Coxe, vol. i. p. 176.

English transported Spanish troops into Italy, to carry out the provisions of the treaty of Seville by force of arms, if necessary.

In the treaty of Seville, the question concerning Gibraltar was altogether passed over in silence: on the other hand, it was expressly determined that the subjects of Austria should be deprived of the trading privileges which had been ensured to them by the treaty of Vienna, and that the English should again obtain what had been withdrawn from the Austrians. The imperial East India Company was once for all altogether destroyed, and the course to be pursued with respect to Parma, Placentia and Tuscany was definitely settled. They were obliged to receive Spanish troops into Tuscany, even before the death of the last descendant of the house of the Medici.

§ III.

RUSSIA, POLAND, SCANDINAVIA, TURKEY, AUSTRIA, TILL
THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.

We now pass on to the history of the east and north of Europe. This history will be connected with that of Russia, as the events just related have been most conveniently connected with the history of Spain, in another way indeed, and for different reasons.

We have before explained the manner in which Peter founded a new autocratic military power in Europe, and how he treated a sound, vigorous, skilful race of people, which, according to their nature, first directed their views to what was obvious and practical. Half consciously, half unconsciously, he subdued one rude nation by another, urged his Russians to civilization by his example, but at the same time compelled them by the knout, the stick and the scaffold, and created an invincible military force, whilst the net of his politics embraced at once both Asia and Europe.

In Poland, Peter had guaranteed the agreement of the nation with their king, in whom, according to his well-known character, they could put no confidence, and withdrew his Russians very slowly from the country; they remained however in Courland. This duchy was administered in the name of Peter's niece Anna, and the rightful heir kept at a distance. The Russian ambassador ruled in Warsaw. In Sweden great jealousy of Russia

was felt, because Peter had taken the duke of Holstein under his protection: but two years after the peace of Nystädt, Peter obtained a promise (April 1723) that his protégé should be chosen king after the death of Frederick*. In the following year, Peter availed himself of the influence which the Holstein party had gained by means of Russian interference to bind Sweden to Russia by a treaty. Bassewitz, the ambassador of the weak-minded duke, was obliged to lend his aid to the Russian Bestuschef, to induce Sweden to enter into an alliance which completely identified Sweden with Russian interests, and therefore was advantageous to Russia alone.

Fears were entertained in Denmark, that the same Russian fleet which had terrified Sweden into submission, and forced them to accept a disadvantageous treaty, might perhaps seize upon Sleswick for the duke of Holstein; that, however, formed no part of Peter's plans: he wished to rule in Copenhagen merely through fear, as he did in Stockholm and Warsaw. Peter also sought to gain a firm footing in Germany; he and king George speculated at the same time upon Mecklenburg, and sought in various ways to derive advantage from the mad and foolish tyranny which the duke at that time exercised. Duke Leopold had been at last banished by the emperor and the tribunals of the empire as a tyrant and enemy to the public peace, because he resisted the courts of law and the demands of justice; his country was taken possession of by the troops of the empire, in execution of the imperial decree, and Hanover hoped to bring such a reckoning for costs against the province, that all idea of payment would be impossible; as Maximilian of Bavaria had formerly done in the case of Donauwörth. Peter on his part tried to purchase the country from the duke. The latter had at this time been long separated from his wife, who was Peter's niece; she was living with her daughter in Russia, and he in poor circumstances in Danzig. Peter made him proposals, and wished to procure him Lauenburg, but the selfish tyrant gave him no answer, and Germany was spared.

In the mean time Peter had formed connexions with China, made himself acquainted with Kamtschatka, desired to colonize this distant country in the same way as Siberia, and interfered

* See Wichman, vol. i. p. 106; and further, Bassewitz's 'Eclaircissemens,' &c.; and in the ninth part of Busching's 'Magazine,' p. 354.

in the civil wars which were distracting Persia. By three campaigns he compelled a treaty of peace (Sept. 1723), by which the cession of the provinces of Astrabat and Ghilan, and of the towns of Derbent and Baku, were confirmed to Russia. Peter pushed forward his frontiers in all directions, and like Buonaparte, he was universally successful wherever external objects were to be attained by external means, by force and cunning, by the acquired experience of politicians and statecraft; but like Buonaparte too, he universally failed wherever he wished to create true civilization, because those who will rear a stable edifice require to use moral strength as a foundation, and to be guided by unchangeable principles. But how little foundation there was for any ideas of this kind, is proved by the character of those auxiliaries whom Peter regarded as quite indispensable in the commencement of his great undertakings, viz. his wife Catharine and his pupil Menzikoff. These two stood in a very suspicious relation to one another, and continually caused him new grounds of discontent; the one by her habitual sensuality, and the other by his degrading covetousness and shameless treachery.

However dissatisfied Peter often was with the conduct of his wife, he nevertheless thought himself obliged, in case of his death, rather to entrust the government to her than to his grandson Peter, the son of the unfortunate Alexis. He often declared this as in the highest degree probable in the circle of his confidential friends (as early as November 1733), at the time when, by a long manifesto, he announced and made preparations for the coronation of Catharine as empress in May (1724): this at least was afterwards alleged by the aged archbishop Theophanes. As to Catharine, immediately after her nomination as empress, she injured her husband by a liaison with a chamberlain called Moens de la Croix, who was distinguished for his beauty and politeness. This led to the most dreadful cruelties against Moens, his sister, the wife of general Von Balk, and against no inconsiderable number of other persons, who were either related to the criminals or were in their service. As to Menzikoff, it was necessary to inflict the most cruel punishments upon him, as well as upon the other high officials. Menzikoff was subjected to corporal chastisement, and punished by fines; the others, as we shall illustrate by an example, were tortured by the most barbarous inflictions; and notwithstanding all this se-

verity proved vain, and things remained just as before*. An eye-witness informs us, that notwithstanding the numerous and severe punishments which had with just severity been inflicted upon Menzikoff, he again excited the displeasure of the emperor to such an extent, immediately after the death of Alexis, that he amerced him one hundred thousand ducats, compelled him to surrender his jewels, and to give up the general government of Esthonia and Ingria to admiral Apraxin. He wished to deprive him at that time of his rank as a field-marshal and of his orders of knighthood, but he was always saved by the intercession of the empress. Notwithstanding all this, he immediately afterwards violated his duty to such an extent, and allowed himself to practise such oppressions, that it was generally believed nothing but the sudden death of the emperor could have prevented his complete destruction†.

As to the last scenes of Peter's life and Catharine's connexion with Moens, an eye-witness expresses his conviction that the empress was guilty‡; and states at the same time, that Peter himself had conducted her to the stake on which the head of the unfortunate Moens was impaled, and had resolved to have her publicly accused before a criminal court. Tolstoy and Osterman had in-

* Bassewitz, p. 363 :—"The establishment of a court of justice not liable to be bribed, and of an honest administration of the finances, were among the things impossible to be accomplished. In order to correct these frauds, the first month of the year 1724 was distinguished by a bloody severity exercised against those who had been guilty of such offences. This was done with the hope that the seeds of honour, which he wished to strew among all classes, would produce some fruit. Eighteen offenders, almost all persons of rank, aged men and councillors, were brought to the scaffold. Nine received fifty lashes with the knout, had their nostrils slit open and were sent to the galleys; three were beheaded, and one was racked on the wheel. Next came the attorney-general Nestoroff, who was previously so highly esteemed by the emperor, that he often called him the most honest and most eloquent of his old Moscovites, and when he gave him his appointment he had bestowed upon him several estates, that he might be under no pecuniary temptations. He was nevertheless proved guilty of embezzlement to the extent of 300,000 roubles. The last five, who were accused of signing unjust judgments from neglecting to read them, were canded and sent for six months to the galleys."

† Weber, 'Verändertes Russland,' 3 Theil, s. 19. His account concludes with these words :—"Menzikoff had so enraged the emperor by his insolence and immoderate covetousness of great wealth, that he had fallen into lasting disgrace, and according to all appearances would have been utterly ruined if the emperor had long survived."

‡ Villebois (MSS. de la Bibliothèque du Roi, Histoire du Nord : Suppl. 234, sous chiffre 7) :—"Ce qui se passait entre la czarine et chambellan Moens de la Croix, non seulement, je le soupçonnois, en les voyant ensemble, mais même je n'en doutai pas; cependant je ne les vis qu'en public et dans un jour où il y avait un grand concours de monde à la cour."

fluence enough to restrain the emperor and to lead him to alter his severe resolution; and Villebois defends Catharine and Menzikoff against the accusation which has been repeatedly brought against them, of having contributed to hasten the emperor's death, from a fear of the vengeance with which they were threatened.

Peter, as well as his wife, who survived him only two years, fell a sacrifice to a dissolute course of life: both destroyed an iron constitution by immoderate drinking and excesses of every description. There is therefore no reason whatever to accuse Menzikoff of having destroyed both, one after the other; the sins for which he had to answer were quite enough without adding these to their number! Peter died so suddenly at the end of January 1725, that he had no time to make any testamentary disposition with regard to the succession. For this reason Catharine, Menzikoff and Jagusinski kept his death a secret till their measures were completely taken, and then for appearance sake they called a meeting of senators, generals and ministers. Catharine was generally beloved, but Menzikoff, on the contrary, was so universally hated, that the people were more disposed to proclaim the young Peter Alexowitz emperor than to call Catharine to the throne, because she was inseparable from Menzikoff; but as field-marshal Menzikoff had the soldiers in his favour, and these alone secure the throne to their favourite in despotic kingdoms, this decided the question in favour of Catharine. Most accounts refer the decision to the falsehood told by the aged archbishop Theophanes, who affirmed, that the emperor, shortly before his death, had appointed the empress his successor. The archbishop's declaration may have contributed to the choice, but probability, together with the express testimony of the Holstein minister Bassewitz and admiral Villebois, are in favour of the notion that Menzikoff threw his sword into the scale.

In Catharine's reign, the Austrian ministry succeeded in establishing an influence in Russia, as it had done in Prussia, and an agreement was contracted from which Austria derived little advantage, but which greatly facilitated the plans of the Russians, viz. the removal of the Turks from their frontiers, and the oppression of the Tatars on the Black Sea and in the Crimea, in the same manner as the Poles.

About the end of the seventeenth century the Turks began

again to lose what they had previously conquered. By the conditions of the peace of Carlowitz, they were obliged to restore to Austria and Venice the conquests of earlier times. Venice received the Morea in return for Crete, which the Turks had captured in 1669; and all the towns which had formerly been taken from Austria in Hungary and Transylvania, with the exception of Temeswar, were given back. In this way Austria, after 150 years, again recovered possession of all the most important cities of those countries which had been wasted by the Turks ever since the battle of Mohacz.

The Russians and Venetians were indebted to the difficulties of the Turks for the confirmation of this peace in the first year of the century in Constantinople, and internal disturbances for a long time so deeply engaged the attention of the sultan, that he had no time to think of preventing Peter from founding settlements on the sea of Azov. Even Ragotzy was not supported by the Turks in his rebellion against Austria in the early part of the war of the Spanish succession. It was Charles XII. who first roused the Turks to compel Peter by force to destroy his fortifications in the neighbourhood of the Turkish and Tatar territories. The encouragement and cabals of the wonderful Swedish king impelled the Turks, almost against their will, to engage in the above-mentioned undertakings against the Russians, which again restored their superiority. The campaign against Russia, which was brought to a close by the peace on the Pruth (1711), by no means fulfilled those expectations which were naturally raised by its success. This arose from the treachery of the grand vizier, who had succeeded in shutting up the emperor, the empress, and the whole army; but it awakened in the minds of the Turks the hope of being again able to wrest from the Venetians those territories which they had so unwillingly ceded.

The situation of Europe appeared very favourable to the plan of robbing the Venetians of all their possessions except Dalmatia, perhaps even of that province and the seven islands. The war of the succession was just brought to a conclusion; all the powers of Europe were in a state of discord; the Venetians were neither well provided with military nor naval forces, and their army was without a leader. The Turks at this crisis wished to unite their forces under the grand vizier, in order, according to

an Italian proverb*, to begin with the completion and to end the whole affair before the tedious allies of the Venetians (the Austrians) should have considered what was to be done. A pretence for the war was easily found, and was as follows.

The knights of Malta at that time still carried on their piracy under the name of the holy cross. The Turks complained that Venice was the only naval power which protected them in the midst of peace, and justified them in keeping possession of the Turkish ships which they seized. The Turks also demanded the delivering up of the inhabitants of Montenegro, who had fled from the Turkish dominions and taken refuge in Venetian Dalmatia, and the refusal of this demand furnished them with the pretence for a war. This war was suddenly declared, the standard of Mahomet was raised, and the faithful were united under the command of the grand vizier. The undertaking against Venice assumed the appearance of a religious affair, and the sultan himself encouraged the army which was destined for the conquest of the Venetian provinces by his presence, and a very considerable Turkish fleet was sent to cooperate with the land-army of the vizier.

The Venetians could only oppose this immense Turkish irruption into their territories with at most 5000 men, and these were ill-officered, ill-armed, and ill-placed. After the loss of the Morea they appointed Schulenburg as their commander-in-chief, one of the best generals in the northern war and in that of the succession, and who had at that time left the Saxon service. Schulenburg, with Venetian money, immediately recruited 18,000 German troops for the service of the republic, from men who had been disbanded in consequence of the peace. The war was commenced by the Turks at the close of the year 1714, and at the end of 1715 they had already conquered the Morea, the islands of Tine and Cerigo, together with two other places which had remained in the occupation of the Venetians in Crete in 1699. Schulenburg now appeared; but the Turks had no doubt of being able to take possession of Corfu and Dalmatia also in the following year (1716).

The peace of Carlowitz, which the Turks then violated, affected Poland, Russia and Austria as much as Venice; but the first-mentioned kingdom neither could nor would enter into any

* Cosa fatto ha capo.

strife with the Turks; circumstances did not permit the second; there remained only the third, and in fact Austria was roused, in which, at that time, prince Eugene had fortunately the greatest influence. He found the circumstances very favourable; and besides, a war with the Turks would serve for an excellent pretext for keeping the army on foot without raising the suspicion of the Christian powers, instead of disbanding it after the close of the war with France, as was the custom; and this was the more desirable, as Spain still continued threatening. The pope also did all in his power to procure assistance to the Venetians, and even negotiated on the subject with Alberoni. When Schulenburg took leave of Eugene, the latter gave him a promise, as we learn from Schulenburg's papers, that the emperor would declare war against the Turks if the Venetians were only able to hold out for a year*. The Turks however did not wait for an attack from the Austrians, but anticipated their design. The grand vizier with the Turkish army marched against Austria (1716) to the Danube, whilst the Turkish fleet with a considerable land-force blockaded Corfu. Both undertakings failed; Schulenburg gained as great glory by the defence of Corfu as he had done by any of his previous military exploits; the Turks were obliged to retire, and to leave behind their stores and artillery. At Peterwardin (5th August 1716), Eugene in five hours gained so complete a victory over the grand vizier, that the whole Turkish camp, with all the baggage and artillery, fell into the hands of their enemies, and the grand vizier himself lost his life. This victory was followed in the same year by that of Temeswar, the only Hungarian city which had remained in the hands of the Turks after the last peace; and a marauding expedition was undertaken into Wallachia, and even as far as Jassy.

In the following year prince Eugene crossed the Danube and encamped before Belgrade, between the Save and the Drave. The new grand vizier could only save the city by offering him battle; but he selected a most unfavourable time, just the very moment in which Eugene wished to attack him. He had tried

* Schulenburg's 'Memoirs,' part 2nd, p. 5:—We see from the manuscript now in our possession, that prince Eugene, under the seal of secrecy, promised Schulenburg, before his departure to Venice, that if the republic did not make war with the Turks till the next year, the emperor would enter into an alliance with them. This assurance was confirmed to Schulenburg in the audience which he had of the prince to take leave. See the 32nd chapter of Von Hammer's great work upon the 'History of the Turks.'

to compel him to retreat by blockading his camp, by cutting off his supplies, and by a cannonade; but the imperial troops were exposed to the want of supplies, from which they no doubt suffered longer than the Turks had expected, and this induced the grand vizier to offer them battle under unfavourable circumstances. The battle of Belgrade was fought a year after that of Peterwardin, and with a like result. The artillery of the Turks, with their camp and baggage, became a second time the spoil of their enemies, and on the day after the battle, Belgrade, with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, was surrendered to the Austrians.

The situation of European affairs was at that time critical, and Alberoni's plans induced France, England and the emperor to sacrifice the cause of the Venetians in order to gain a favourable peace for Austria. In the year 1717 Alberoni had thrown off the mask, and thereby compelled both the naval powers to become mediators for a peace. At the end of the year negotiations were commenced under English and French mediation, and a congress opened in Passarowitz in January 1718. The Venetians had at that time conquered some small places in Dalmatia, and the Austrians at first insisted upon their indemnification; but the news of the conquest of Sardinia by the Spaniards, and of their landing in Sicily, made it necessary to bring the Turkish war speedily to a close. The cause of Venice was therefore relinquished, and the weak republic could not prosecute the war alone.

The peace concluded in Passarowitz (July 1718) was the most glorious which Austria had ever obtained from the Turks. Temeswar was not only given up to the emperor, but in addition to this, Belgrade and Semendria, together with a portion of Wallachia, by which Hungary obtained a most advantageous military frontier. Venice, on the other hand, was sacrificed to secure these advantages: it neither recovered the Morea, Tine, nor Crete, but merely the unimportant island of Cerigo, and in addition to this a small district and some insignificant towns on the coast of Dalmatia*. Austria obtained these most important

* The terms of the treaty are as follows:—"The republic shall receive the fortresses and castles conquered in Dalmatia, Albania and Herzogowina, viz. Imoschi, Iscovaz, Sternizza, Cinista, Rolok and Creano, with the territory of three miles in circumference; the island of Cerigo, and the fortresses of Butrinto, Prevesa and Voniza." On the other hand, Venice was obliged to cede

advantages through the mediation of the naval powers, whilst Russia afterwards, by the mediation of the French ambassador Bonac, shared the spoil with the Porte which had been forcibly wrested from the Persians.

As long as Peter reigned, there was a continual jealousy between Austria and Russia: his death was followed by the rule of that imperial ministry, which, as Tacitus reports of the Romans of his time (*"corrumpere et corrumpi seculum vocatur"*), regarded bribing and being bribed as things quite permissible. It acted upon this principle with Menzikoff, and in this way brought about the alliance with the Russians which has been already mentioned, and which afterwards proved so injurious. This alliance proved ruinous to the Poles and the Turks, and separated Austria from its natural ally—England. As long as Peter lived, he consoled the duke of Holstein with empty hopes, and used him as the toy and tool of his politics; and Catharine effected his marriage with her daughter a few months after she ascended the throne (June 1725). The empress loved her daughter so tenderly, that for her sake she overlooked the incapacity of the duke and assigned him the first place in her council, where Bassewitz continued to be his prompter, although not much more useful than himself. The empress wished also to turn his claims upon Denmark and to the reversion of the Swedish throne to account: for this purpose she stood in need of the assistance of the emperor of Germany, whose favour therefore she and the duke earnestly tried to gain. Menzikoff possessed wealth, estates and lordships in Silesia, and was the more easily purchased, as he needed the aid of the emperor in his Polish affairs: he was supported by Austria on political grounds, whilst at last his friend the empress was opposed to him in Courland.

The nobility of Courland at that time were in dread of the impending blow of a union with Russia: they tried to rouse the spirit of Poland and to gain the favour of king Augustus, in order to save and preserve their freedom. Their duke was long dead, but his widow Anna (Peter's niece) still lived in the country under Russian protection. The brother of the last descendant of the house of Kettler was living abroad, poor* and child-

the districts of Zarine, Ottovo, Zubzi, and a small portion of territory, in order to keep open the communication between the Turkish dominions and Ragusa.

* A remarkable illustration of this occurred in the year 1706, in which Fer-

less. The Courlanders sought for a more vigorous man, and one who had connexions which might be useful to them, and they ultimately chose count Maurice of Saxony, a natural son of the king of Poland, for their duke. Maurice was born with the genius of a great commander, and at a later period, as a marshal of France, he reached the very pinnacle of glory: as the ruler of a small country, he might have had as destructive an influence upon morality by his example as his father had had in Saxony. The choice however was not realized, because the Poles as well as Menzikoff opposed the selection. The Poles wished to unite the duchy with their republic after the death of the last descendant of the family, with which they had formerly concluded an agreement for the secularization of the country, by the instrumentality of the nobles*; Menzikoff, on the other hand, wished to force himself upon the Courlanders as their duke. Whilst the ambassador of his empress was carrying on a vehement contest with the senate in Warsaw, Menzikoff ventured to go in person to Mittau: he here met with resistance from the nobility, who knew that neither the empress, the dowager-duchess, nor the Poles would support him; and he treated the estates and their president in Courland with his usual brutality. If Bassewitz had not lent him his aid, Menzikoff would have been then utterly ruined. Catharine, light-minded as she was, would have willingly married the young and much-admired Maurice; she therefore wished to promote his election, and had expressly come to St. Petersburg in order to advance his cause. Bassewitz probably supported Menzikoff, because he foresaw that his duke, on Menzikoff's removal, must necessarily occupy his place, and knew that he was not equal to the duties of a ruler. The empress indeed, shortly before her death, had sent count De Viez to Mittau to investigate the accusations which were brought against Menzikoff. This Viez was a Portuguese, who had en-

dinand of Courland was a general of infantry in the service of the elector of Saxony. Schulenburg had entrusted 8000 dollars to a certain captain Von Benkendorf. In Cassel prince Ferdinand of Courland, who thought he had some claims on the king of Poland, persuaded the captain to entrust him with 5000 dollars of this money, under a promise of repayment on demand. This however the prince afterwards refused, notwithstanding all demands, and upon the most absurd pretences. (Schulenburg's Mem. i. p. 282.)

* [The order of knights had formerly possessed only life-interests in the ecclesiastical fiefs. It was now proposed, as Protestantism began to prevail among them, to secularize their estates, and give them to them in fee, instead of as, heretofore, holding them as ecclesiastical fiefs.—TRANS.]

tered into the Russian service, and although brother-in-law of Menzikoff was nevertheless his most deadly enemy. Her death soon afterwards altered the whole state of affairs. Maurice had also deceived Anna: he tried in vain to maintain himself against the Russians, and the latter made no hesitation in driving him by force of arms in the midst of peace from Courland, where he had settled as a stranger, and Austria even deputed a person to be present at his expulsion.

Austria had previously shown itself favourable to the pretensions of Russia. In April 1726 it had guaranteed the reversion of the crown of Sweden to Charles Frederick; and when an English fleet afterwards appeared in the Baltic for the protection of the Danes, who were threatened by the Russians, a formal treaty of alliance was concluded (6th Aug. 1726) between Russia and the emperor of Germany. By the terms of this treaty, each party engaged, in case of a war with a third party, to furnish 30,000 auxiliaries to the other; and Russia also formally acceded to the alliance between Spain and Austria which had been negotiated by Ripperda. Immediately afterwards, Frederick William also withdrew from the Hanoverian alliance and joined that of Spain, Austria and Russia.

The premature death of the empress Catharine appeared to place Russia altogether at the disposal of Menzikoff; for Peter II., the son of Alexis, was yet only a boy, and by Catharine's will Menzikoff had not only obtained the presidency of the supreme council, but by an article which it contained, the young emperor was to marry Menzikoff's daughter. All this however was not enough to satisfy his ambition, and he himself first violated the testamentary dispositions of the empress, upon which his guardianship was founded, and sought to seize upon everything by force. Mannstein gives the following report of these transactions*:—Catharine's heir, Peter, was between twelve and thirteen years old when he came to the throne, and the empress had therefore ordered that he should remain under guardianship. This office was to be executed by Catharine's daughters, Anna and Elizabeth, the duke of Holstein, the bishop of Lubeck, husband of her daughter Elizabeth, and by the supreme council. The senate at that time consisted of prince Menzikoff, the high admiral Apraxin, the grand chancellor Gallowkyn, the vice-chan-

* Mannstein, '*Mémoires Historiques, Politiques et Littéraires sur la Russie à Lyon.*' 1772. 2 vols. 8vo. vol. i. pp. 2, 3.

cellor Ostermann, and privy councillors Gallizin and Dolgorucki. This commission of government, however, only assembled once, and that on the day of Catharine's death. At this meeting nothing was done further than the recognition of the will, which in two hours afterwards was practically annulled. It had been expressly provided in the will, that every question in the council should be determined by a majority of votes: that was by no means agreeable to Menzikoff. He alone wished to decide, the others were to listen, and no one ventured to oppose that on which he had resolved: whoever did so was lost.

Three months afterwards, Menzikoff compelled the duke of Holstein and his wife to leave Russia (5th Aug. 1727), and received the dignity of generalissimo from the emperor in May: he accepted the lordship of Cosel in Silesia, as a present from the emperor of Germany, and betrothed his youngest daughter with the emperor, but by his brutality he awakened a universal feeling of repugnance to himself and his rule. At length he insulted the emperor himself, and thereby furnished the Dolgoruckis, who had long gained the emperor's confidence, with the desired opportunity of effecting his overthrow. As early as September 1727 he was dismissed and sent into a miserable exile, which he bore with calmness. From that time forward the Dolgoruckis were at the head of the state, and it appeared as if Russia had forgotten European affairs and wished to occupy herself with her own.

Peter had changed his residence to Moscow, and favoured Russian institutions and usages in preference to those which were foreign; he betrothed himself to a Russian lady, a Dolgorucki, and during his reign nothing was thought of but internal affairs and court cabals, whilst the other powers concluded their agreements about Parma, Placentia and Tuscany. The unexpected death of the young emperor however recalled Russia to its old politics. After Peter II.'s death (Feb. 1730), one of the Dolgoruckis, supported by the will of the emperor, attempted in vain to secure the succession to his own daughter: his Russian colleagues in the council however hit upon the bold thought of changing the imperial autocracy into a shadow, and sharing the power of the czar among themselves.

Among all those who had any pretensions to the succession, the most distant and the most incapable was elected—the duchess Anna of Courland, who was expected to accept of the proffered

dominion upon whatever conditions might be prescribed; she was however first obliged to sign a sort of capitulation, whose conditions were of such a kind as to have brought Russia either under the dominion of a destructive oligarchy, or have thrown it into anarchy and confusion*.

Jagusinski had secretly sent a messenger to Mittau to the duchess, to anticipate the arrival of the deputies who were sent by the supreme council with the conditions of the election, and had advised her to their unconditional acceptance, giving her assurance that it should be his care to see that they were annulled. It was sufficient to induce the Russians to abolish these conditions to know, that by virtue of them all the power would fall into the hands of the Dolgoruckis. Anna, besides, was not in circumstances to fulfil any conditions which would prevent her from bringing with her her favourite Biron (Von Bühren). The new empress subscribed the articles which limited her power, first in Mittau and a second time in Moscow, and even made the new form of government publicly known by means of a proclamation, whilst all the arrangements had been already made to restore the autocracy.

If the senate had been in a situation to maintain their new constitution, they should have immediately sent back Biron, whom the empress brought with her to Moscow contrary to the stipulations, and then have punished Jagusinski and dismissed the guards, who were unfavourable to an aristocracy. As they were unable to do this, the constitution, or rather the influence and power of the Dolgoruckis, was gone. By Jagusinski's advice, the empress gave the abolition of these articles of election an appearance of justice; and she was able to do so with greater truth and propriety, because no one approved of the new constitution except the senate. A numerous assembly was called, whose members were named deputies and representatives of the nobles and the army, although in reality they had no such commission; and they were asked whether the limitations imposed

* Weber, 'Verändertes Russland,' 3 Theil, s. 184. 1. The empress shall only govern according to the pleasure of the supreme senate. 2. Neither war shall be declared nor peace concluded without the advice and approbation of the senate. 3. No taxes to be imposed or important offices conferred without the senate. 4. No nobleman to be tried before the ordinary tribunals or to be punished with death, nor 5. his property to be confiscated. 6. No part of the crown lands to be disposed of or alienated. 7. Not to marry, or name a successor, without the consent of the senate.

upon the imperial power were agreeable to their will and desire. All demanded the restoration of the old form of government, and loudest of all, those who were called representatives of the army*.

The empress pretended to be very much surprised that the conditions imposed upon her had been so much in opposition to the voice and desire of the Russian people, and tore up the articles in the presence of the whole assembly. Immediately afterwards a new proclamation was published, by which the complete restoration of the autocracy was announced; and this was forthwith succeeded by a second, in which the senate was again restored to all those rights and duties which, as a council of the empire, it had possessed under Peter I.

Anna's favoured lover Biron, under the title of grand chamberlain, was now in reality the ruler of Russia. This incapable and brutal favourite was prompted and aided by a man of unlimited ambition, but at the same time of great abilities: this was general Münnich. Münnich was soon after appointed generalissimo and a member of the cabinet. He completely reformed the Russian army, erected admirable schools and institutions for instruction in the science of war, and as a man well acquainted with the subject, projected and carried forward the construction of canals and public roads, and finally directed the military power of the Russians against Poles, Tatars and Turks, at whose cost, and with reckless sacrifices, the new army was trained and fitted for European warfare. Under the reign of this empress the alliance between Russia and Austria was continually made firmer, and each wished to secure for itself an influence in the approaching election of a king of Poland. By his dissolute life, king Augustus II. had at length destroyed his robust constitution; he could no longer stand upright, and his end was manifestly approaching: France would gladly have seen Stanislaus Leszinski, the father-in-law of Louis XV., again elevated to the throne of Poland; but this was vigorously opposed by both Austria and Russia. Neither of these nations was in reality disinclined to the elector of Saxony; they only wished that he should purchase their favour and support by the sacrifices which they respectively required.

In this period of negotiations and cabals, of alliances and

* As such there appeared Trubetzkoi, Tscherkaskoi, Boratinsky and Matwejef.

counter-alliances, Charles VI. began to entertain the notion of securing the succession in his empire, or the rights of his daughter Maria Theresa to the inheritance of his hereditary states: this he proposed to do by a solemn declaratory paper. He himself first issued a decree (Dec. 1724), which, when it was afterwards confirmed at Ratisbon, received the name of the “Pragmatic Sanction.” By virtue of this decree, Maria Theresa was declared heiress of all his states. All the European powers were called upon to approve of and subscribe this sanction; but at first neither France nor England could be induced to comply with this demand, and least of all Spain. This point was first accomplished by means of the disputes concerning Parma and Placentia.

France offered to guarantee Maria Theresa’s succession as heiress of Charles VI., if the latter would acknowledge the rights of Don Carlos in Italy. Horace Walpole, who was then ambassador in Paris, induced his brother to do the same for England, which then took upon itself to persuade the other nations to agree to the guarantee. Just at this time (Jan. 1731) the duke of Parma, Antonio Farnese, died, but his widow affirmed that she was pregnant, and Austria took possession of the country for the heir which might be expected, whilst Spain and England threatened hostilities. In order to avoid a war, Austria agreed, by the treaty of Vienna (22nd July 1731), that Don Carlos and Spanish troops should be brought to Italy in English ships. After new difficulties on the part of Austria, these troops finally took possession of Parma and Placentia, and partly also of the Florentine territory, and Johann Gasto himself, as well as the elector palatine, acknowledged Don Carlos as successor in Tuscany.

The difficulties about Italy were not however thus brought to an end. The Spaniards sent many more troops than were necessary for the occupation of the duchies: they disputed about the formulas and terms of recognition, and France took alarm when the heiress of Austria was betrothed to Francis duke of Lorraine and Bar, because provinces which lay in the very heart of France would thus necessarily become united with Austria. Saxony, Bavaria and the Palatinate first opposed the reception of the pragmatic sanction in the diet of the empire; they protested when Hanover afterwards wished the German diet to confirm the document and give it validity, and they altogether refused to renounce their claims to the inheritance of the emperor. The emperor hoped by the aid of Russia to gain over

Saxony at least to subscribe the sanction, because the throne of Poland was now vacant.

Russia was at that time still disputing with Poland concerning Courland. The nobles of Courland elected the last descendant of the house of Kettler, in order to gain a respite at least till his death. The Russians took this very much amiss, and not only prevented the aged man from taking possession of the duchy, but even caused the president of the nobles in Mittau to be seized upon and carried off. Poland, on the other hand, made immediate preparations after the death of Ferdinand, the last of the Kettler line, to divide the country into waywodeships and starosties*. New Russian troops were sent to the Polish frontiers in order to prevent the fulfilment of this design, and especially because the Courlanders were disinclined to any union with Poland. Biron wished to secure the duchy for himself. Austria concurred readily in this plan, and the only difficulty was to prevent France from adopting and maintaining the Polish claims upon Courland. This was a new reason for hindering, even by force, Leszinski's election. Austria and Russia therefore set up a pretender in order to deceive Prussia, which was opposed to the elector. Von Löwenwolde, the Russian master of the horse, travelled to Berlin, and there (Dec. 1732) concluded that treaty which is called by his name, and the only object of which was to restrain the king of Prussia from taking part with Stanislaus, and to separate Saxony from Prussia†. Neither of the powers was in the least degree serious about a Portuguese prince, who, according to the terms of this treaty, was destined for Poland.

King Augustus II. died a few months after the conclusion of the Löwenwolde treaty; his son, the new elector of Saxony, courted the favour of the Poles to obtain the vacant throne, but they were by no means well-disposed towards the Saxons; and moreover, the primate of Poland had recently persuaded the nobles to enter into a new and close alliance with Russia against their own king, in whom they had no confidence, and to guard

* [A starost is a nobleman in Poland who has charge of a castle and district, and administers justice within his circuit and jurisdiction; waywodes are governors of large provinces.—TRANS.]

† Many particulars are to be found in the 6th chapter of part 2 of Forster's 'Life of Frederick William,' p. 114, concerning the partition of Poland, which was contemplated as early as 1710, as well as the contemptible arts employed to separate Saxony from Prussia and to accomplish the treaty; Russia promised Courland to a Prussian prince.

against his secret agreements and dreaded engagements. On the death of Augustus, the majority of the Poles declared (February 1733) that they would only elect a native Pole (Piast) for their king.

Immediately after the death of king Augustus, it was publicly declared that the Löwenwolde treaty had not been seriously intended, and Frederick William, therefore, was only a sullen spectator of the following events. Austria and Russia now completely gave up the Portuguese prince Emanuel, whom a pretended suit for the hand of the empress had brought to Russia, and declared that they would not oppose the election of a Pole, Stanislaus alone excepted. Their real object was to compel Saxony to purchase their favour by sacrifices, to which Brühl was easily influenced. This minister helped the phlegmatic Augustus III. to bear the tedium of life, and ruled absolutely in his name: he drained the whole resources of the Saxon people, as Flemming previously had done. The elector of Saxony had already made a treaty with France in order to maintain his claims to the inheritance of Charles VI., but he now renounced this alliance, subscribed the pragmatic sanction, and promised also that he would not oppose the views of Russia with respect to Courland. On these grounds the aid of both powers was promised him in his endeavours to obtain the crown of Poland, and the usual anarchy was again promoted in that unhappy country. One part of the nobility followed the hints of the two powers, accepted their bribes or obeyed their threats; but by far the most numerous party, led by French influence and old preference, declared itself in favour of Stanislaus. The country was torn by internal disturbances from March till September (1733), and as early as May a confederation was formed under French influence; on the other hand, three Russian armies appeared on the frontiers, and Austria also made a threatening movement.

France could not refuse assistance to the father of its queen; the ministry had supported Stanislaus by money, and had even embarked some troops for his service. The spies of the powers who favoured the elector of Saxony were deceived, and it was generally believed that the troops which had been embarked and who were accompanied by Stanislaus were destined for his protection, whilst he came by land through Berlin to Poland, where he was chosen king upon the 13th of September 1733, upon the

legal field of election. Fifteen senators and some hundred nobles had been purchased by foreigners, and these were supported by Lascy at the head of 20,000 Russians against the majority of their countrymen, who seemed desirous of maintaining their national rights in Warsaw. The partisans of the newly elected king assembled in Praga; at their head stood the primate, with whom the majority of the Poles agreed, but they proved unequal in perseverance to Lascy and his Russians. Stanislaus therefore hastened to Danzig, where he could not so easily be cut off, and there awaited the French troops which had been promised him.

The Poles of Stanislaus' party had broken down the bridges over the Vistula on the approach of the Russians, and the fifteen senators and six hundred nobles of the opposite party were therefore obliged to hold their election upon the field of Wola, where Henry of Valois had been formerly chosen. They chose the elector of Saxony as their king (5th October), in order that the Russians might be in a condition immediately to attack and harass king Stanislaus, in the name of Augustus III. The Russians advanced, and their number in a short time increased to 50,000 men, who closely blockaded Danzig. Field-marshal Münnich, the generalissimo of the Russian army, at length arrived (February 1734), in order to conduct the siege of Danzig in person and to accelerate operations, whilst Fleury very skillfully profited by the occasion to promote the advantage of France. Fleury avenged on their ally the emperor of Germany the injuries and insults which the Russians had heaped on the father-in-law of their king.

After the dissolution of the Hanoverian alliance, England was separated from France, and had again united with Austria. She remained this time a quiet spectator of the struggle on the continent, because the ministry were anxious only about their own maintenance of office and power, and continually in a state of difficulty between the king and the people, although they commanded the purchased majority of parliament and held almost unconditional dominion.

The whole reign of George I., as well as that of his son, unhappily furnishes nothing but other specimens of those cabals, and of that treachery, corruption and extravagance which prevailed in the eighteenth century in almost all the courts of Europe. This remark will appear equally well-founded, whether we look to

the conduct of Stanhope, Sunderland and their party under George I., Carteret, Townshend and their followers, or even to the two Walpoles, or finally to the reckless manner in which the revenues of the kingdom were spent upon the mistresses of the king and to promote his private objects. The vain and foolish anxiety about the Pretender, and their wish to increase the power and territories of Hanover, greatly augmented the national debt under the reign of George I., whose subsidies enriched several German princes. All the agreements and payments to Cassel, Wolfenbüttel, &c., related to the guarantee for the new acquisitions, and the money was given in order that these states might keep troops in continual readiness for George. When Denmark was at last obliged to pay for Sleswick, this money also flowed from the English treasury, but by a tributary channel. Melusine von Eberstein, or, as she is called in England, duchess of Kendal, gave occasion to the publication of the 'Drapier's Letters,' by which Swift made a great sensation in his day. A commissioner of the Mint made a most shameful use of the complaisance of the ministers towards the favourite of the king. Four thousand pounds' worth of copper money was to be coined for Ireland; the ministers gave the contract to William Wood, who was to share the profits with the fair Melusine. Swift, and the people who were roused by his writings, proved this time more powerful than the ministers and the parliament which supported them. The celebrated Sir Isaac Newton, who was then master of the Mint, in vain exposed himself to reproach, by declaring that Wood had not coined inferior money to that of preceding rulers (the farthing, which had been sent as a specimen to the Tower, was indeed heavy enough), and the patent was obliged to be recalled. The same ministry squandered considerable sums in order to acquire Mecklenburg, then occupied by the troops of the empire, for Hanover, but this plan was a failure. So much for the government of George I.

After the death of George I. (1727) Sunderland was no more, and Townshend had retired not long after the accession of George II., but Robert Walpole was more powerful than ever. Walpole maintained his influence in parliament till 1742, not so much by talents, which he indisputably possessed, as by tactics and bribery. Neither the minister who so willingly promoted all the private views of George II. and his mistresses, nor the favourite son of the king, William of Cumberland, who wished

to play the general, was in a condition, either in the field or the cabinet, wisely to profit by that superiority for which England was then indebted to a concurrence of favourable circumstances.

England had fortunately survived a species of national bankruptcy, such as that which Law's financial schemes had brought upon France; the delusions respecting the shares of the South Sea Company only proved disadvantageous to public morality, and not to national credit.

The English nation was now distinguished and exalted in every respect, and looked down with proud contempt upon the other nations of Europe. Voltaire and Montesquieu, as is well known, collected about this time in England the sparks of that political light and of that legal religious freedom which was dawning in France. The English were and are indebted for the freedom of which they were, and continue to be, so justly proud, not to the ministry or the parliament, but to a constitution independent of both. The Whigs, who ruled under the reigns of George I. and George II., asserted that it was their desire to protect and maintain this freedom against the strictly monarchical Tories; and commerce, trade, industry,—all the arts of external life, were developed and flourished in England, in the same degree as they progressively declined in Holland. Freedom and the natural progress of events contributed to give England her pre-eminence, but neither the government nor the decisions and conduct of parliament, which were often strange enough. The ministry were continually occupied with their own interests and affairs and those of the king: we are furnished with more than abundant evidence of this in the thick volumes of family papers left behind by those ministers, and collected and published by Coxe.

Robert Walpole and his brother Horace had at that time entered into a close political friendship with the duke of Newcastle and his brother Pelham, and in this way the mastery of talents was combined with that of wealth and influence, which the possession of land and property formerly conferred in many places, in the election of members of parliament. Both parties were precisely on the same footing with respect to disregard for principle and ambition. Robert Walpole was superior to the others in talents. Pelham came next to Walpole in all those qualities which constituted the greatness of an English states-

man before the latest reforms; we shall see him hereafter taking a prominent lead in the administration. The duke of Newcastle furnishes one of the most remarkable examples of the manner in which England was ruled by the high nobility. The great and rich men, who, according to the old arrangements, domineered over public opinion and disposed of the votes of the people, sometimes, it is true, opened up access to business, honours and wealth to the people at large, but only to individuals of distinguished abilities, and merely because they themselves were incapable. They continually wished and required that, above all, they themselves and their kindred should be first and especially enriched by the public, and at the expense of the honest gains of the people, and then occasionally the clever men whom they purchased as their helpers and adherents.

The duke of Newcastle made himself generally ridiculous by his ignorance, his precipitation, his confusion, and, in short, by the whole of his singular mode of life and action; and Coxe, the collector of aristocratic papers, has convinced no one to the contrary in that defence which he has lately published, and in the eulogies which he has bestowed upon this eccentric man for the pleasure of this noble family*. This singular man, who was unfit for any and every description of business, stood, in name at least, for the whole following period, at the head of affairs; *i. e.* he dispensed sinecures, pensions, dignities, places and distinctions to the families whom he favoured, merely because he had an immense parliamentary influence by rotten boroughs. Such men as Walpole, Hardwicke, and, at a later period, the elder Pitt and Yorke, were obliged to submit to this man and his caprices, as well as to those of the narrow-minded king, either because they could not maintain their ground without him, or perhaps were even brought into parliament by his instrumentality. The miserable manner in which the govern-

* Coxe, as is well known, has published a whole series of volumes, which contain letters and documents of English statesmen. Among these, one of his latest is that which refers to the family of Newcastle:—'Memoirs of the Administration of the Right Honourable Henry Pelham. Collected from the family papers and other authentic documents by William Coxe, Archdeacon of Wilts. 2 vols. 1829.' Coxe not only tries to establish the admirable qualities of Pelham, to whom no one will deny certain talents and readiness, but also to commend and elevate the duke. We merely allege the fact, that Robert Walpole and lord Waldegrave, who had so much to do with Newcastle, testify the contrary. This duke, remarkable for his stupidity and silliness, was for thirty years secretary of state, and afterwards for ten years first lord of the treasury.

ment of states was conducted in the eighteenth century may be learned from the fact, that those of England and Russia were loudly and universally praised, because in those countries talents, or at least some knowledge of business, was regarded as indispensable to those who guided the administration.

As to George II. himself, Walpole maintained as good an understanding with the queen (Caroline of Anspach) as he did with his mistresses. Like other privileged rulers, George had his favourites, but his wife retained a great influence over him even till her death, which he honestly lamented. She therefore, even in the presence of many persons, indicated to the ministers by words or signs, whether the time was favourable for speaking with the king upon certain subjects or not. As to the king's mistresses, even during the life of the queen, Mrs. Howard, as countess of Suffolk, took her place among the peeresses of the realm on occasions of ceremony, and after the queen's death (1737) baroness Von Wallmoden was created countess of Yarmouth, and carried on a trade in places almost publicly; she is even said to have often sold the dignity of the peerage.

A ministry which was obliged to maintain its influence and power by such means as have been stated, durst undertake no war, however critical might be the union of France with Spain (1733) for the common conquest of the Austrian provinces, during the war in Poland and concerning Poland. Walpole was obliged to direct the whole of his attention to the approaching election for a new parliament in England, and the English ministry therefore were contented with the promise of France not to invade Belgium. Walpole indeed pretended that his system did not allow him to increase the English national debt, in order to take part in foreign affairs, but his wisdom came a little behind hand. England had already interfered in foreign affairs; she was now obliged to follow the same course; and, besides, the English people vehemently demanded a war with Spain. That portion of the English nation which carried on trade with the West Indies, or was engaged in cutting mahogany in the bay of Honduras, or in smuggling with the Spanish possessions, thought they had found good reasons for complaint when Spain formed an alliance with France against Austria, and they clamorously called upon the government to avenge the injuries which the Spaniards had inflicted upon the English.

By the activity and zeal of their minister Patiuhó, the Spa-

niards had at that time accomplished more than they had found it possible to do for a hundred years; they had increased their fleet in an extraordinary manner, even after the destruction of the greatest part of it by the English in the time of Alberoni, which they could never forget; they had got on foot a powerful and well-trained army, and tried to urge on the peaceful Fleury to war, even before the time of the Polish transactions. Fleury long obstinately resisted; the Polish affairs first compelled him to enter into an alliance with Spain against Austria, which, from anxious prudence, he had previously refused to do.

On the 21st of October (1733) an agreement was entered into by Spain, Sardinia and France, and hostilities were immediately afterwards commenced. An army of the three united powers was to take possession of Lombardy and Naples, and to drive the Germans completely out of Italy; a French army under the old marshal De Berwick advanced against Philipsburg, and a second flying army levied contributions in the neighbourhoods of Coblenz and Neuwied, and places further down the Rhine, on the poor Germans, who were obliged to pay the penalties of foreign sins as well as those of their own princes. Twenty ships of war conveyed sixteen thousand Spaniards to the coasts of Genoa, where the Sardinians and French under Villars, who was now weak from age, were to unite and conquer the Milanese. The Spaniards were commanded by the marquis de Montemar, who had gained great renown at their head in a war against the infidels; as soon however as the latter landed, to the great vexation of the king of Sardinia, he did not follow the conditions of the treaty, but the secret commands of his own queen.

The whole of the Spanish troops were to form a junction near Sienna. Don Carlos was of his own authority to declare his majority, undertake the government which had been hitherto carried on in his name by others, and advance with the army into Tuscany. The expedition against Naples in favour of the Spanish princes was favoured by circumstances and the indifference of the Neapolitan people, who were intentionally kept in a state of degradation. How far this indifference and the shamelessness of its expression went with respect to the change of their rulers, has been shown by Coletta in his admirable '*History of Italy from 1734-1825*,' where he briefly but energetically alludes to the first invasion of the imperial troops in 1707. The

same Neapolitan writer informs us, that the only point in which the Austrians and Spaniards agreed at this period was religious fanaticism*. This appears from the occasion on which they solemnly burned two unfortunate old people, who in any other nation, or under any other government, would merely have excited compassion, or been regarded as deranged. Coletta describes the ceremonies of this “*auto da fé*,” which was publicly performed in Naples in 1724, and admits that among the thousands of his countrymen who were witnesses of the spectacle, not one shed a tear for the fate of the unfortunate beings, except the twenty prisoners of the Inquisition who were compelled to be present at the execution; all the rest manifested their joy! What is to be made of such a people?

The arrangements which were adopted by the imperial officials and generals, as the Spaniards advanced, secretly supported by Clement XII., were no better than the modes of thinking among the people. Traun and Caraffa, the two commanders of the troops, could neither agree with one another nor with the governor Visconti as to the measures which were to be adopted. Traun separated and dispersed his troops in the fortresses; Caraffa kept his together; and Visconti the governor took much better care of himself and his followers than of the imperial affairs. He sent his family and his most valuable possessions to Rome, caused such of the Neapolitans as were suspected by him to be arrested and brought to Germany, arbitrarily extorted considerable sums from the laity, spared the rich clergy and monasteries, and finally, as the enemy advanced, left Traun to shift for himself and went to Rome.

On this occasion the supreme council of war in Vienna exhibited the same character which it had continued to exhibit for a whole century in the history of Austria—since the time of Leopold I. The question was raised, whether Caraffa’s advice to keep the army together, or Traun’s proposal of dividing it among the fortresses, should have been followed. The emperor had written a letter, in which he expressed his approbation of

* Coletta, ‘*Storia del Reame di Napoli*’ Parigi, 1835. Voll. 8. Vol. i. p. 27.—“Tollerarono i martiri più acerbi, la tortura, il flagello, il digiuno, la sete (since 1699) e alla per fine giunse il sospirato momento del supplicio. Avegnachè gl’ inquisitori condannarono entrambo alla morte per sentenza confermata del Vescovo d’Albaracin stanziato in Vienna e dal grand’ inquisitore della Spagna, dopo di chè il devoto imperatore Carlo VI. comandò che quelle condanne fossero eseguite colla pompa dell’atto di fede.”

Caraffa's advice, and the supreme council sent a resolution in which the opposite was ordered. The issue of this affair, as regards Austria, was the more suitable to its commencement, as a hopeful monarch was promised to the Neapolitans in the person of Don Carlos, now seventeen years old and of Italian blood, who would again choose Naples for a residence; and a Spanish fleet appeared before Naples, which took possession of Ischia and Procida.

The expedition had been undertaken in April 1734, and as early as May the castles of the capital had been reduced and Charles made his solemn entry into Naples; in June he published the document by which his father had ceded to him the kingdom of the two Sicilies, and caused himself to be proclaimed king. Although it was no good sign for the future, that the young king, in the midst of warlike affairs, exhibited a passionate love for the chase, and that in order to gain friends he conferred, according to ancient custom, privileges, freedoms and favours, distributed money with the most extravagant prodigality, and even threw vast sums among the people in every city into which he entered, yet he showed no priestly or monkish disposition. It was a most important event for the whole of Europe, that Tannucci, advocate and professor of the law of nations in Pisa, and whom he brought with him from Tuscany, was appointed minister of justice, and that the king afterwards bestowed his whole confidence upon him.

Caraffa, the viceroy, and prince Belmonte had collected 8000 men in Apulia; the Spaniards, who were 12,000 strong, under Montemar and Eboli, sought them out there, and appeared in Apulia at the very moment in which Caraffa was ordered to Vienna to justify his conduct. Caraffa and the viceroy embarked, and the command of the whole army devolved upon prince Belmonte, who yielded an easily-gained glory to Montemar at Bitonto (near Bari) on the 25th of May 1734. The Italians in the imperial army took to flight as soon as Montemar attacked the weak lines of Bitonto, and the Germans followed their example; 400 hussars alone escaped to Pescara, the rest of the army was completely routed. The fortresses were in like manner quickly reduced, and even Gaeta made no long or vigorous resistance. Traun alone sought to save his honour by the defence of Capua, and maintained his position till the 24th of November.

By the month of August the whole kingdom of Naples was in the hands of the new king, who at the end of the year (1734) was in possession of Sicily also, except Messina, Syracuse and Trapani. These cities likewise were surrendered in the middle of the following year (June 1735). The fortune of war had not in the mean time been much less unfavourable to the imperialists in Lombardy. If we cast our eye over the history of the war in this part of Italy from its commencement, we perceive the same miserable condition of the Austrian government, the same neglect of the army, the finances and administration, which was exhibited in the case of Naples.

The Italians, whom the emperor had sent as ambassadors to various courts, had already warned the court of Vienna in 1733 of the designs of the Sardinians and of the impending war; they were not listened to; all military preparations and even the garrisons were neglected. The kings of Sardinia had become great by an hereditary system of dissimulation and faithlessness. Charles Emanuel, to whom his father had ceded the government, and who had at a later period kept this father in close confinement, surpassed all his predecessors in diplomatic falsehood. He so completely deceived the imperial governor of Milan, that the latter not only made no preparations against the impending attack, but even lent his neighbour arms and ammunition, which were afterwards turned against himself. For this reason, the French and Sardinians took possession of the duchy of Milan also in the beginning of the year 1734, almost without opposition, except from the citadel of Milan and fort Pezzighettone. When the emperor afterwards assembled an army at Mantua, the world saw with astonishment Mercy, who was nearly blind with age, placed at its head, whilst the opposing force was commanded by the French marshal Villars, who was in his dotage. On the advance of the imperialists, Mercy met his death in the field; Villars was recalled; Broglio and Königseck, who succeeded them, fell into as great errors as their predecessors, from want of due vigilance and the adoption of proper measures against the enemy. More men were sacrificed in the year 1734, in consequence of the oversights and faults of the commanders, than the most considerable undertakings of the last war had cost.

On the Rhine, Eugene, now weakened by age and scarcely the shadow of his former self, took the chief command of an

army which, according to traditionary custom, was ill-composed and badly equipped, and he was therefore also obliged to give way before the French. On this occasion Frederick William showed his patriotism above all the other German princes. He was indeed completely under the influence of Seckendorf, the imperial ambassador, who, by the liberal use of money, by attendance at his smoking-parties and flattering his weakness, was able to induce him to do whatever he desired. He this time sent a number of excellent troops to the imperial commander, and even appeared himself on the Rhine accompanied by his son the crown prince; but there was a total want of that energy and unity which has ever been the case in Germany, and the weaker has always felt the oppression of the more powerful, as was experienced on this occasion on the march of the Prussians through Franconia. Bavaria was unable from its own resources to supply the wants prevailing at the court, and was therefore completely sold to France, by the aid of which its ruler hoped to make good his claims to the Austrian inheritance after the death of Charles VI.; and the government was at this moment so destitute of all shame, as to recruit an army with French money to be used against their fatherland. Happily the subsidies were in a great measure, according to custom, dissipated on pleasures by the elector and his mistresses, and the army recruited was not very numerous. The palatinate and Mayence were also parties to the French alliance; Cologne was sold as in the last war, by which Trèves was placed in a situation of great embarrassment in its endeavours to fulfil its duties to the empire. The electors of Hanover and Brandenburg, who were quite upon a par in ignorance, rudeness and insolence, lived at bitter enmity, threatened war, abused each other in words and letters, and finally challenged each other on account of those violations of national rights which Frederick William allowed himself to practise against other states also. The military king of Prussia suffered his troops, on their passage through Franconia, cruelly to maltreat its towns and states, temporal and ecclesiastical; because in the circle of Franconia people were as much concerned about kidnappers as in Holland and Hanover*.

The duchy of Lorraine was occupied by the French and kept

* [In Holland the men were bought and paid for sometimes; in Franconia they were taken by force.—TRANS.]

in a state of subjection, whilst the emperor made scarcely any serious preparations and the empire had not even formally declared war, although three foreign armies now stood upon German soil. A declaration of war on the part of the empire was first issued in March 1734; but three generals-in-chief were already disputing concerning the right to command an army not yet in existence. The hero Eugene, who was now superannuated and dull, came forward in order to put an end to the strife, and the king of Prussia and his son the crown prince afterwards visited him in his camp. Eugene had lost all his influence; he was scandalously domineered over by the countess Bathiany, and the imperial court paid as little attention to his counsel as could possibly be done without offence, and he was therefore wholly unable to prevent the Swabians from being exposed to more suffering and oppression from the defenders than from the enemies of the empire. Eugene found it impossible to prevent the enemy from capturing Philippsburg, and an honourable retreat to Brüchsal closed his campaign. Germany, in the midst of its disunion and despair, was at that time obliged to seek for aid from distant foreigners, because the German people neither took nor should have taken any interest or participation in the wars of their princes.

The naval powers, it is true, had desired to mediate a peace between Austria and its enemies; but, under the appearance of friendly services, they wished in reality to conceal the steps which they were taking for the promotion of their own advantage, and recourse was therefore necessarily had to Russia. Eighteen thousand Russians had already reached Germany on their march towards the Rhine, when an accidental circumstance led to the opening of direct negotiations between Fleury and the emperor.

Russia moreover had now fully attained all its objects in Poland, and it only remained in a time of peace to compel Austria to compensate France and Spain for the disgrace which Louis XV. had suffered, and for the loss which had befallen Stanislaus. The letters which Stanislaus wrote to his daughter, the queen of France, are preserved in the French archives, and furnish abundant proof, that although he was a good father, a zealous friend of the Jesuits, and as a Romish christian, a pious man, yet in all that pertained to activity, resolution and elevation above the

most vulgar prejudices he had no inferior*: it was only such a man who could longer continue to deceive himself after his flight to Danzig. After his departure from Warsaw he still invited his wife to come to him, and only wrote to her to put off her journey when he received the news of his opponent's election, which he ought to have foreseen. In December (1733) he first perceived that his condition was desperate, and yet he nevertheless continued to make a fruitless resistance, relying upon the aid and protection of France†. In order to please the king and queen of France, the minister Chauvelin pretended to believe that the Russians would not proceed to extremities. In May (1734) some thousands of French troops made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Danzig; but Münnich was not the man to be withheld from any undertaking from considerations of propriety or danger in attacking the French, with whom Russia was at peace. The French were taken prisoners; the city surrendered in June, Stanislaus having made his escape by reaching the Prussian territory in disguise.

The city of Danzig was obliged to pay for its fidelity to its rightful king by a contribution of 2,000,000 florins; the Russian empress however afterwards relinquished the half. Stanislaus placed Frederick William in great difficulty by taking refuge in his territories; the latter however rejected the application to deliver him up, and not only gave him a very friendly reception in Königsberg, but showed him, by his reception in Berlin, as he travelled through, that he was by no means satisfied with the

* Carton K. 149. contains all his letters from the 3rd of October 1733 till 1735, and again from 1754 till his death. We have made copious extracts, but presume that the whole of this correspondence will be published by some French collector. The correspondence itself is not important. In the next volume we shall have occasion to make several extracts in reference to Jesuits and idolatry. The letters are often written in Polish—often half Polish, half French, and often in cipher; but always accompanied by a key. Scarcely a day passed in which he did not write to the queen. *

† Letter dated 25th December 1733:—"Actuellement pour vous donner une juste idée autant que cela se peut de ce qui me regarde, je vous assure que, si le roi (Louis XV.) ne s'emparera pas de la Saxe, je serai obligé de quitter mon héritage et d'aller trouver mon ancienne ferme, et je serai votre locataire. Ainsi si les traités et les conventions rendent l'invasion en Saxe absolument impossible, selon le dire de Monsr. le cardinal et de M. de Chauvelin, il vaut mieux terminer dès à présent cette affaire à l'aimable que de risquer des frais inutiles dans sa poursuite, car je ne vois pas d'autre moyen de gagner. Pour moi, il me suffit d'avoir fait mon devoir, et d'avoir acquis un droit légitime à mon héritage," etc. etc.

behaviour of the Russians nor with the success of the elector of Saxony. At this time the military power of Russia threatened the freedom of Europe in such a way as to become a matter of serious concern. The army which had conquered Danzig was scattered about in Poland, and another division under Lascey, Keith, Bachmetew and Charles Biron was advancing into Germany. A chosen army of 10,000 men had reached the Rhine in June, and the appearance of the Russians produced a very favourable influence upon the negotiations between Fleury and the emperor, which were being carried on in secret.

Fleury had no confidence in prince Eugene or the imperial ministry, and the emperor distrusted Chauvelin, who had been minister of foreign affairs in Versailles; the negotiation was therefore carried on with the emperor himself through the instrumentality of Sinzendorf, to the neglect of his ministry, and Fleury first asked Chauvelin's opinion, when they had already come to an agreement respecting the preliminaries*. The naval powers had offered their mediation, as we have already observed; they had made proposals, and so much had been committed to paper in this affair since January 1735, that the minutes and documents in the French archives of foreign affairs fill a thick folio volume†. But Fleury trusted diplomatic tradesmen as little as the emperor; and an accident brought both to entertain the notion of a direct correspondence.

* See Seckendorf's 'Journal,' pp. 129—138, which contains many anecdotes in reference to this peace. The fourth volume of the 'Correspondence and Documents concerning the negotiation of the Preliminaries of Vienna,' in the 'Archives des affaires étrangères,' contains, "Jointe à la lettre pour M. le Garde des Sceaux du 2 Janvier 1736, la traduction d'une lettre de M. de New-
 enville du 4 Nov. 1735, touchant l'accommodement conclu entre le roi et l'empereur." This paper, among other matters, contains the following:—"Au commencement de cette année le baron de Nierodt du conseil de M. le comte regnant de Wied se trouvant à Versailles pour des commissions particulières de la part de notre maître fut présenté par le comte de Belleisle au cardinal ministre. A la première audience qu'il obtint, la conversation tomba inopinément sur la présente guerre. M. de Nierodt ne laissa pas échapper cette occasion de représenter l'état misérable de presque toute l'Europe. Ce digne prélat, touché de ses représentations et du malheur publique, dit à M. de Nierodt de déclarer son sentiment, si la cour de Vienne," etc. etc,

† This correspondence, &c. is entitled, "Négociations en 1735 pour les Préliminaires de Vienne." This contains all the various proposals of the naval powers from Jan. 1735; all the reports of the imperial ministers in the Hague and in London to their courts; all the minutes and accounts of the various sittings of the imperial ministry, in which consultations were held about the proposals of the naval powers. Cardinal Fleury knew better what was going on in Vienna than the emperor himself.

The count of Neuwied had some business in Paris, which he entrusted to one of those distinguished adventurers which swarmed about every court; this person, a Herr von Nierodt, who had formerly been in the Swedish service, availed himself of the connexions which the count of Neuwied, like all the rest of our German distinguished nobles, had in Paris, in order to obtain an audience of Fleury in reference to the count's affairs. On this occasion he received from Fleury a secret commission to the emperor*. With this commission the young count of Neuwied and Nierodt travelled in May to Vienna, when they immediately obtained a favourable answer from the emperor, as appears from a letter of the count dated the 10th June†. As soon as Fleury

* We shall complete what is already known from Seckendorf's 'Journal,' from the records of the French archives of foreign affairs. It is known from Seckendorf, that the count of Neuwied had spent German money at Louis XV.'s coronation and marriage, and therefore had formed acquaintances at court, and especially with marshal Belleisle, who had great influence. When his troops were in the county of Neuwied (1734), the marshal received the disgraceful commission of collecting the contributions of the preceding war, and at the same time the demands of a contractor named Menzer, whose widow had come to Metz and had placed her daughter in the house of the king's sisters. Belleisle made an agreement on the subject with the count to stay the execution till he had treated in Paris: for this purpose the count used the services of Nierodt, who availed himself of the audience with Fleury to obtain verbal proposals, which the count put down in writing, submitted them to the cardinal, and when he approved of them, travelled with them to Vienna.

† We shall give the count's letter entire, because it will furnish an example of the manner in which those gentlemen always combined bribery, extravagance and ostentation: we shall merely give the conclusion of the report. The count writes on the 10th January 1735:—"M'étant rendu chez M. le, &c. de Sinzendorf selon l'ordre que j'en avai reçu, il m'a dicté d'un mémoire qu'il tenoit en sa main le billet cy-joint, disant que c'était une méthode reçue en France, et sur ce que j'aurois souhaité qu'il y eût fait connoître que quant à présent il lui paroissoit trop dangereux de dire quelque chose de plus, qu'il ne pouvoit rien signer à moins qu'il ne vit aussi une signature de M. le cardinal de Fleury, en la droiture et l'intention pacifique duquel je vois qu'on a ici beaucoup de confiance. Il n'en est pas de même d'un autre ministre que vous sçavez, en sorte que je conçois qu'on facilitera beaucoup la chose si l'affaire se traite secrètement et immédiatement avec cette Eminence dans la participation d'aucun autre, auquel cas je ne doute plus de la réussite depuis qu'on m'a fait entendre qu'on étoit toujours dans des bonnes dispositions d'une paix solide et qu'on n'avoit aucun engagement avec les puissances maritimes qui pût empêcher de traiter de la paix d'une voie infiniment plus courte. Vous ferez sans doute de votre mieux, M^r., pour engager son Eminence à envoyer ici avec vous un homme affidé lequel je me charge d'introduire et de lui rendre tous les services que je pourrai, je me flatte même, qu'ils ne seront pas entièrement inutiles, sachant comme je fais la carte du pays, le fort et la foible de chacun de sorte qu'il sera fort visé de venir à nos fins. *Le plus grand inconvénient jusqu'ici c'est l'énorme dépense que je suis obligé de faire, car je n'épargne rien pour gagner ceux qui pourroient nous être utiles dans cette négociation.* Dieu veuille bénir une œuvre qui tend à épargner le sang humain et prévenir l'en-

had consented to pass over Chauvelin, the negotiations commenced*, and a second thick folio contains the first letters and documents respecting the preliminaries, which begin with a long letter of Fleury's to the emperor dated 16th July.

It had been left to Fleury to make the first proposals, and secretly to send a plenipotentiary to Vienna. This took place. In his letter to the emperor, Fleury excused himself and Chauvelin also†, and gave credentials to M. de la Baune, who was afterwards obliged as a spy to sneak over the frontiers and re-

tière désolation de tant de pays. Je demeure, &c. Fred. Alex. comte de Neuwied."

* In the detailed report of the result of the conversations of the count of Neuwied and Nierodt with Sinzendorf and his confidants, it is said that Sinzendorf had added much verbally to what he had previously dictated. This constitutes the essential substance of the report, of which we give merely the conclusion.—"Que comme il sera nécessaire lorsque cet agent secret (the French) sera à Vienne qu'il rende compte à S. E. de tout ce qui y sera proposé et agité et qu'en conséquence il reçoive les ordres de S. E. et que cependant il est également important de part et d'autre d'écarter tout soupçon de négociation, S. E. pourra charger quelqu'un de sa correspondance avec un agent secret sans qu'elle ait besoin de paroître en rien que lorsqu'en sera d'accord sur tous les articles. Mais qu'attendu les justes raisons qu'on a à Vienne de ne point traiter avec le ministre François qui a essentiellement manqué dans plus d'une occasion au respect où à la personne de l'empereur et dont les vues particulières ont été la principale cause de la guerre présente et seront toujours un obstacle à la paix, ils supplient V. E. de ne le point admettre dans le secret de cette négociation qu'il étoit naturel au surplus que l'honneur d'une paix dont on veut bien déferer les conditions à la droiture et à la modération de S. E. retournât à elle tout entier et sans partage."

† This letter is of considerable length ; we shall merely quote its commencement, and the justification of the cardinal against the accusations which were made against him :—"M. le baron de Nierodt," he writes, "attaché à M. le comte de Wied, arriva ici il y a trois jours et demanda à me parler en particulier. Il étoit conduit par un François que j'ai toujours regardé comme honnête homme et dont je n'ai aucun sujet de me défier. Ce baron me montra une manière d'instruction qu'il m'assura avoir été dictée par M. le comte Sinzendorf, par laquelle je vois que V. M. I. concouroit avec plaisir avec le roi mon maître à un traité de paix sous des conditions équitables et solides." Then follow declarations about his inclination to peace, the treatment of the Poles, and the calumnies against himself, and proceeds, "Je ne puis m'empêcher d'en rapporter une qui aura fait impression sur V. M., et qui lui aura fait perdre la bonne opinion qu'elle avoit bien voulu jusqu'ici avoir de ma probité. Il m'est revenu qu'on m'avoit accusé auprès d'elle d'avoir révélé au roi d'Angleterre le projet d'un ligue que V. M. offroit de faire avec la France pour le détrôner. Que ce prince en avoit eu connoissance par moi, que par l'ancienne et aveugle confiance que j'avois aux Anglois, je leur avois fait part des avances que V. M. m'avoit faites et que le roi de la Grande Bretagne lui en avoit fait porter les plaintes les plus amères. Quoique c'étoit la plus noire des impostures, j'avoue qu'elle n'a pas laissé de me troubler sensiblement, et j'ai même, quelque honte d'être obligé de m'en justifier, n'ayant pas cru de me voir jamais espéré à une pareille accusation V. M. sçait s'il y a été jamais question d'une telle ligue," &c. &c.

turn to Vienna. On the first of August, De la Baune writes to the cardinal that he had arrived safely at Neuwied, having been obliged to make the journey chiefly by night. About the same time, as it appears from the documents quoted, count Von der Mark and count Harrach in Brussels also made proposals for peace through the pope's nuntio, and even the English pretender offered his services.

The cardinal's instructions to De la Baune indicate the total exhaustion of Austria and the very miserable condition of this power; they very earnestly recommend secrecy in the negotiations, and contain a brief and definite statement of the French demands*. The count of Neuwied travelled with De la Baune to Vienna, and it is melancholy to see from his letters how the love of splendour deprived all our great and small German nobles of all sense of modesty and shame, and how they sought to gain privileges and advantages one over another, and to sell themselves to any foreigner who would purchase their service†.

* In the instructions which M. de la Baune received, the cardinal says to his secret ambassador, "*Je n'ai pas une connoissance assez exacte de la situation des affaires à Vienne, ni de ce qui a donné lieu à désirer que j'envoyasse quelqu'un pour donner des instructions précises. Ce que je sais est que la personne qui est venue ici paroît avoir une mission de Sinzendorf qui sera celui avec qui vraisemblablement M. de la Baune aura à négocier. C'est aussi principalement pour n'avoir pas à me reprocher de négliger les moindres ouvertures de la paix, que je me détermine à envoyer à Vienne dans la persuasion que l'épuisement où est cette cour doit lui faire désirer la paix, mais dont il ne faut pas faire semblant d'être instruit. M. de la Baune doit avoir pour principal objet de rester dans une profonde retraite et de ne prendre tant de précautions, quand il entretendra M. de Sinzendorf que l'on ne puisse pas avoir le moindre soupçon que nous ayons quelqu'un à Vienne. Il vaudroit mieux de rien faire que d'être deviné, et si Vienne n'est pas disposée à la paix, il me suffit de s'y être offert d'une façon que la mette entièrement dans son tort.*" Then follow the special instruction, then a draft of the plan—the same draft afterwards corrected by the cardinal—and last a summary of the conditions: 1. restoration, or at least compensation to king Stanislaus; "2. partage convenable pour Don Carlos; 3. partage raisonnable pour le roi de Sardaigne dans le Milanais; 4. justice pour la maison de Guastalle ou de moins un équivalent honnête si elle est obligé de céder Mantoue pour le bien de la paix." In reference to England, De la Baune was to declare in the name of the cardinal,—"*1. que je ne suis point content des Anglois parcequ'ils nous auroient fait plus de mal s'ils avoient pû; 2. qu'il croit que la cour de Vienne n'a pas grand fond à faire sur une nation, que n'est occupée de son intérêt particulier.*"

† In this letter he calls Nierodt his privy councillor, and begs the cardinal's "*puissante protection pour se mettre en possession du comté d'Isenbourg et de tous les lieux que l'électeur de Trèves lui retient injustement dont on fournira une liste dans son tems et d'instruire incessamment M. de la Baune d'insister absolument là dessus dans le prochain traité.*" The count expresses his opinion that the cardinal would not only gain immortal glory, but give all persons "*courage de s'attacher à ses intérêts;*" and he did not forget to remind him, to protect him against the claims of the Menzers.

The negotiations were pushed on with great haste, although the conscientious cardinal at first entertained great scruples concerning his allies; these were removed by Sinzendorf, who communicated to him the partial agreements which had been entered into between Spain and Sardinia in Vienna, in the years 1734 and 1735. The chief point was agreed upon on the 22nd of August. In September Chauvelin was reconciled with the emperor, the negotiations were transferred to him, and on the 3rd of October the preliminaries signed, although a suspension of arms was not concluded on by the generals till the 1st of December.

In Lombardy the Austrians had not been able to prevent the union of the Spanish troops which had conquered Naples with the Sardinians and French, or the siege of Mantua; but Fleury tried to delay or prevent the conquest from fear of the exaggerated and unreasonable demands of his own allies, because he had really no desire to insist that all their possessions in Italy should be wrested from the Austrians, as Spain and Sardinia required. It is probable that the arrival of the Russians on the Rhine had also some influence upon the mind of the cardinal. Moreover, the interests of Stanislaus were duly provided for in the preliminaries. He was again to obtain possession of his Polish estates upon certain conditions, to retain the title of king, and to rule during his life over Lorraine, which was to be ceded to him by the emperor's son-in-law. Francis Stephen of Lorraine immediately ceded Bar to France; and Lorraine was to fall to the same power upon the death of Stanislaus, which took place in 1766; and on the other hand, the husband of Maria Theresa was immediately to be put in possession of Parma, Placentia, and of Tuscany on the death of duke John Gasto, which happened in 1737. Don Carlos was compensated for the loss of the above-mentioned duchies by the kingdom of Naples, which was ceded to him by the emperor.

The king of Sardinia had calculated upon the possession of Milan, but according to the preliminaries, he was obliged to be satisfied with Tortona, Novara, or Vigevano, and to relinquish the rest of the duchy. However dissatisfied the king really was, he was prudent enough to see the proper moment for giving way; he therefore retained possession of Novara and Tortona also, to which fifty-seven fiefs of the empire were afterwards added. The indignation of the Spanish queen knew no bounds, when she was

made acquainted with these preliminaries; she alleged, that France had acquired Lorraine at the expense of Spain, and would not sign the treaty. This indeed she was afterwards obliged to do, when the French retired from Italy; but she would neither hear of a formal peace nor of the renunciation of Parma and Placentia, together with the reversion of Tuscany. The preliminaries were twice altered, a new document was twice prepared, and the peace was only first formally signed on Nov. 18th, 1738. The writings connected with this treaty are the most voluminous of the kind with which we are acquainted, except those concerning the treaty of Westphalia, and occupy 150 quarto pages, and yet after only two years they were entirely useless*.

The Russian power had gained new vigour, and the army new experience in this war, and in fact the whole gain and glory of the Polish war fell to the Russians. The first consequence of this new humiliation of Poland, and of placing a king upon the throne who was forced upon the people, was, that the rude, brutal, incapable Biron, the favourite of the empress Anna, accomplished what Menzikoff had attempted in vain. In the year 1737, Biron was chosen duke by the nobles of Courland, and in the year 1739 his new dignity was acknowledged in Warsaw by the king and the senate. Münnich possessed the greatest influence in all affairs in Russia; and after the death of Eugene, which occurred about this time, Austria fell into its old state of confusion and indolence. Every minister followed his own plan and took care of himself and his friends: the high-born nobles of the ministry looked down with contempt upon Bartenstein, who was not their equal by birth, and he in his turn opposed and counteracted their designs, and had the confidence of the emperor, who often employed his services to thwart the views of his own ministers.

* The preliminaries of the 3rd of October 1735 were first determined by the minute of the 11th of April 1736, which is headed, 'Plan for the completion of the preliminaries;' they were then altered by the convention of the 18th of August. These three pieces are then taken word for word into the treaty of Vienna of the 18th of November 1738. The treaty itself was printed at the Royal press in Paris in 1739, and fills 139 quarto pages. We shall give in this place the articles alone which refer to Poland:—"On restituera à Stanislaus ses biens et ceux de la reine son épouse dont ils auront la libre jouissance et disposition. Il y aura une amnistie de tout le passé, et en conséquence restitution des biens de chacun. On stipulera le rétablissement et la maintenance des provinces et villes en Pologne dans leurs droits, libertés, privilèges, honneur et dignités, comme aussi la garantie pour toujours des libertés et des privilèges des constitutions des Polonois, et particulièrement la libre élection de leur roi."

Bartenstein was moreover a stiff and pedantic jurist, well skilled in legal affairs, but quite after the ancient fashion. The heiress to the throne, although young, had also her own politics, which differed from those of her father and his ministers; and those who were attached to her, relying upon her protection, often worked to overthrow the designs of the ministry. Things were carried on in the council of war and the army in the same way as at court and in the cabinet. The president of the council was opposed by the vice-president, and one general in the army by another; and no one who aimed at being regarded as a man of business dare venture to speak of sacrifices for the public well-being, or of generosity: every man took care of himself and his protectors and friends. The last war had laid open the miserable condition of the whole of the great Austrian monarchy, and yet the emperor suffered himself to be misled by Russia into a new war.

Biron did not wish to allow the Russian army, which had been brought to a high state of efficiency by Münnich, and provided with officers of all nations and an admirable artillery, to fall out of practice by peace; after the conclusion of the Polish war, he therefore looked about for an opportunity of employing it, and at length persuaded the empress to avenge upon the Turks the disgrace suffered by the Russians on the Pruth. Ostermann was vehemently opposed to the plan of a Turkish war, and even Münnich was not disposed to commence it, although he was the only one who was afterwards anxious for its continuance; but Biron and some Russians also insisted upon the plan. The Russians could have no difficulty in finding a pretence for the war, because the khan of the Turkish allies and dependents, the Tatars on the coasts of the Black Sea, and the sea of Azov, and in the Crimea, could never wholly restrain his wandering hordes from committing depredations and making incursions into the neighbouring pasture-lands of Russia.

The Tatars had already suffered a defeat from the Russians on their attempt to cross the Russian territory, in order to march by the nearest way to the assistance of the Turks in their war against Persia; and the khan himself was afterwards attacked by them and beaten on his march to Daghestan. Not contented with these victories, the Russians still further avenged the violation of their territories by making a plundering incursion into the countries of the khan. This last expedition was under the

command of general Leontiew, Weisbach and his successor having previously fallen victims to the climate ; Leontiew also brought back into the Ukraine only a very small and weakened portion of his vigorous troops ; no less than 9000 had fallen a sacrifice to cold and want during the brief period of this campaign.

The Turks had overlooked all these hostilities and devastations which had been practised against the Tatars ; but when Münnich with the main army began to advance against Azov, the sultan was obliged to lend assistance to his feudary. The Osmons published a manifesto against Russia, but they were neither able afterwards to protect the Crimea nor Moldavia, for they were soon threatened with an attack from Austria also.

By the treaty with Russia, the emperor was bound to furnish 30,000 auxiliaries in case of a war with the Turks ; but a party in the Austrian cabinet persuaded the emperor that it would be more advantageous to make war himself. The expedition which had been undertaken by Münnich against Azov and the Crimea in the year 1736 had undoubtedly cost 30,000 men, and the only advantage gained by it was, that the Russian army and even the Cosacks gained self-confidence by the easy-won victory over an enemy hitherto an object of especial dread ; but the glory which Münnich and his army would have gained from this expedition is tarnished by the cruelties of all kinds which they practised, and by the barbarities and devastations in which they indulged.

In the year 1737, a new expedition was undertaken from the Ukraine at an immense cost, because all sorts of supplies were provided and conveyed along with the army, in consequence of the dear experience which they had purchased, and from having learned that there was more to fear in these wastes from hunger and want than from the weapons of the enemy. Some idea of this immense expenditure may be formed from the fact, that more than 90,000 wagons were employed to transport their provisions and stores. A new treaty had been concluded with Austria before this campaign, in which the two empires agreed to carry on the war in common according to a stipulated plan*. In order

* This convention is neither to be found in Marten, Schöll, nor Wichmann, who is in general very careful and minute in these matters. Von Hammer, in a note in his 7th vol. p. 483, mentions that he had seen it in the state archives, that it contains fourteen articles, and the auxiliary corps were settled at 80,000 men and the plan of operations stipulated.

to gain a pretence for the war, Austria had previously acted as if it wished to force its mediation upon the Turks.

The naval powers began to apprehend a partition of the Turkish provinces, offered their mediation, and caused a congress to be held in Niemerow, where negotiations were carried on between Austria and the Porte till the month of August, although Austria had commenced the war in May. The circumstances under which Austria began the war were far from being ominous of a fortunate issue. Charles VI. had become very infirm; his son-in-law, who was to play an important character in Europe, was a kind and domestic man, but totally unfit for the business either of peace or war. The finances were by no means sufficient for the necessities of the singular household and court at Vienna, to say nothing of the expenditure of a war. An aristocracy of courtiers, servants, cooks and clergy shared among themselves and their protégés the revenues of the Austrian monarchy; and these revenues amounted to a very small sum, in consequence of bad administration and the immense number of persons who belonged to the privileged classes. The heiress to the empire, Maria Theresa, the wife of Francis duke of Lorraine, who held a command in this war, followed her own course of politics; Bartenstein, whom the ministers employed and despised, caused orders to be issued by the emperor different from those which had been given by the ministers, and the ministers were as little agreed in opinion among themselves as the generals, and had no confidence either in the emperor or his daughter.

Bartenstein in the cabinet and Schmettau in the army were zealous in favour of the war, and unheard-of demands were made upon the Turks; whilst on the other hand, from a feeling of jealousy towards the Russians, they were afraid of the successes of their own allies in Wallachia and Moldavia. Thus in the negotiations at Niemerow, Austria not only claimed new territories in Dalmatia and Bosnia, as well as in Moldavia and Wallachia, but vigorously opposed the wishes of Russia with respect to the Crimea and Cuban. Count Königseck was president of the council of war; a man who had gained no laurels in the last war in Italy, although he had sacrificed an immense number of men: he was blamed for having sacrificed his army to the enemy, especially at Guastalla (1734), without necessity or object. Little confidence could be placed in the plans of such

a man, and had they been ever so good, all would have been straightway frustrated by some private letter of the emperor.

The emperor had raised three armies: one advanced towards Servia, and was led against Nissa by field-marshal count Seckendorf (uncle of the ambassador to Prussia). This army was about 22,000 strong, but Seckendorf was an object of suspicion as a Protestant, and hated as a domineering, selfish and immoral man*. He was accompanied by Francis Stephen of Lorraine, who had indeed declined the chief command, but of whom Seckendorf says, he was obliged to give him the precedence and allow him the highest honours without obeying him, since he was rather obliged to watch over his behaviour, without however being able to command him. The other generals under Seckendorf's command were, lieut.-general Philippi, who put confidence in no one; Khevenhüller, who as vice-president of the council of war had reckoned on Seckendorf's place, and therefore followed his own notions and not those of the general-in-chief; and finally Wurmbrand, who knew nothing whatever of service.

The commanders of the second army, which at the same time advanced into Bosnia, were nothing better than those of the army in Servia. At its head was Seckendorf's pupil, the prince of Hildeburghausen, who had committed many faults in the last war in Italy: he was only once fortunate enough to find a commander of the enemy's forces who was still more incapable and foolish than himself, and who surrendered a well-fortified place from fear of a number of wooden cannons which the prince had mounted as if to play upon the fortifications. Disunion prevailed in this army also, for Esterhazy, who as ban of Croatia commanded along with the prince, was in a continual state of strife with his colleague.

A third army, under Wallis, was sent into Wallachia, because an Austrian cabal at the Russian court had worked out a command for sending Münnich with the Russian army into Wallachia, which however did not take place. Every intelligent man foresaw the issue of the Austrian campaign, but the court of Vienna continued blind. The imperial armies pushed forward far

* In reference to Seckendorf, we avail ourselves of a biographical sketch from his own papers: "Versuch einer Lebensbeschreibung des Feld-marschalls Grafen von Seckendorf, meist aus ungedruckten Nachrichten bearbeitet." 1st and 2nd parts, 1792; 3rd and 4th parts, 1794. [The place where printed not mentioned.]

into the enemies' countries, and captured fortresses, till the Turks had slowly collected their forces. As soon as the Turks appeared the separate Austrian corps were defeated, whole divisions completely cut off, the fortresses captured by the Austrians retaken, and the chief army was in danger of being completely blocked up in the enemies' country. The first year's campaign was so unfortunate, that the Austrians were obliged to give up all idea of prosecuting their operations in the second, and to think of the protection and defence of their own frontiers, because the Turks were making vast preparations with a view to invade their territories in return. Whilst the Austrians were thus losing all the glory which they had previously won under Eugene, their allies the Russians were everywhere victorious, and made the name of their armies a terror both in the East and the West. Lascy undertook a new raid into the Crimea. Münnich first threatened Bender, then reduced Oczakow without much difficulty, and left a few troops behind him when he withdrew, whose defence of this fortress put to shame the great armies of the German emperor. The main body of the Russians withdrew this year also into the interior of the Ukraine according to their custom, and left a small Russian force in the fortress of Oczakow, who were there besieged by a large combined army of Turks and Tatars, supported by a fleet. The Russians not only maintained the fortress, which was properly speaking untenable, but they forced the Turks to retire with a loss of 10,000 men.

The French alone were at that time attentive to the progress of the Russians; the English ministry were obliged to use all possible exertions to maintain their own ground, and were nevertheless soon after blown up. The French came forward as mediators; but the advantages already gained over the Austrians, the bad condition of their army and their finances, filled the grand vizier with such feelings of confidence and pride, that he declared to the French he would not make peace till he had reconquered Oczakow, Kinburn, Azov, Belgrade and Temeswar, and made Ragotzy prince of Transylvania. The undertakings of the Turks were better conducted than ever; for they had not only taken a large number of French officers into their service, but Ragotzy also and his friends rendered them material service; and moreover the renegade Bonneval, who was in their camp as a Turkish pasha, taught the Turks how to avail themselves of the faults of their enemies.

The marquis de Bonneval was first a general officer in the French service; he then passed into that of Austria; became a general and member of the council of war—as such he had frequent and violent disputes with his colleagues; went over to the Turks; became a Mahometan, and was the first who attempted with any success to introduce the system of European tactics and European artillery into the Turkish armies. The last plan indeed ultimately failed. As long as the affair was a mere amusement on a small scale the Turks acquiesced, but Bonneval no sooner attempted to introduce a system of wholesale improvement and change, than the sultan, frightened at the murmurs of his subjects, was obliged to relinquish his views. The Russians, among whom all clever adventurers found a better reception than among the Turks, had enticed away to St. Petersburg several French and Italians, who were quite indispensable to Bonneval for the realization of his plans. Bonneval's counsel and influence were nevertheless in the highest degree advantageous to the Turkish undertakings in the following year.

All the divisions of the army were unsuccessful, although the enemy offered them nothing more than a passive resistance; but Seckendorf's division in particular was the very picture of Austrian administration under Charles VI. The son-in-law of the emperor was passionately addicted to the chase, and brought Seckendorf into daily perplexities with the enemy. Philippi, Khevenhüller and Wurmbrand, the first two field-m Marshals and the third a general of artillery, were promoted and set over field-marshal Von Schmettau, who was thus only fourth in command, notwithstanding the length and value of his services. The emperor compensated him by conferring on him a separate command: how were union and cooperation in such a case possible? Seckendorf should by no means have undertaken the command; for he writes to Bartenstein, that is to the emperor's private government, with respect to Wurmbrand, who died during the campaign, "Wurmbrand can just as little command a wing as I can read a mass. This however I hope to learn, as it is daily read in my quarters, before parole, according to the usages of war; but Wurmbrand, during his whole life, will never learn to command one wing, to say nothing of two." The whole expedition against Widdin failed in consequence of Khevenhüller's want of skill; and Seckendorf's biographer, who follows the field-marshal's papers, thinks to excuse his own hero, by bring-

ing hard accusations against the other generals and the whole Austrian army. He says*: “Khevenhüller’s behaviour deserved severe punishment; but Seckendorf treated him with the greatest forbearance, partly from magnanimity and partly from *prudence*, for Khevenhüller was vice-president of the council of war, and his relations were among the most powerful persons in Vienna.” The consequences proved that this mildness was ill-applied.

Khevenhüller wholly escaped, whilst the priests, and even the voice of the ignorant multitude, cast all the blame upon the Protestant Seckendorf: the whole failure was attributed to him. The emperor, contrary to his own wish, was obliged to arrest him and bring him to a court-martial; the prince of Hildeburghausen and the duke of Lorraine, who were both far more in fault than Seckendorf, received anew the most distinguished appointments in the next campaign, which was undertaken with a newly-equipped army. Seckendorf however excited no one’s compassion; for although he was not guilty of that neglect with which he was charged, yet his degrading covetousness, his treachery and extortions were well enough known, and besides, with all this malevolent wickedness of heart he combined a ridiculous affectation of piety. He was a man, with a heart of stone, whose inclinations were utterly corrupt, and yet he was as zealous for the genuine, pious, orthodox Protestant faith as his own and his nephew’s friend, Frederick William; and whilst he deprived the soldiers of the necessary means of subsistence, he caused bibles to be distributed among them at his own cost in Bosnia.

The Russian campaign in 1738 was as fruitless and cost quite as many men as the Austrian, but it was at least the means of bringing them some military renown. Münnich marched through the provinces on the Dniester and the Bog, wasted them as he had done in the previous year, and afterwards returned to the Ukraine. The emperor’s son-in-law nominally had the command of the army, but properly speaking, all was under the superintendence of the president of the council of war, field-marshal Königseck; but the latter, as well as the duke, was to be guided by the determination of a council of war, so that it was difficult to say who was really the commander. The prince of Hildeburghausen, who was the laughing-stock of every intelligent officer, and count Styrum, so well known by his faults and defects in

* Versuch einer Lebensbeschreibung u. s. w. 2r theil, s. 143.

the war of the succession, were the heroes of the year 1738. The campaign came to an unfortunate termination, and Königseck was recalled in disgrace, as Seckendorf had been in the previous year. He was obliged to resign his office as president of the council, but as a compensation was made grand chamberlain to the empress, for which truly he was far better fitted than for a general.

Things succeeded no better in 1739 than in the preceding year: Wallis held the chief command, but Neipperg was at his side: each trusted on private support in Vienna and took his own course. Wallis relied on the emperor; Neipperg held his commission and received his orders from Maria Theresa: the latter, most probably, was to try to bring about a peace upon any conditions, in order that Maria Theresa might not be obliged, immediately upon her father's death, to enter upon a struggle at the same time with the Turks and with those parties who were disposed to dispute her claims to the whole Austrian monarchy. Neipperg remained with the greater part of the army on this side the Danube: Wallis attacked the whole Turkish army on the other side with his cavalry alone. The grand vizier himself was at the head of that army which was attacked by the Austrians in a position very unfavourable to the latter, and Wallis was defeated with great loss on the 22nd of July 1739.

Whilst the grand vizier was afterwards besieging Belgrade, Neipperg continued to negotiate for peace under the deceitful mediation of the French ambassador, and obstructed every bold undertaking in order not to disturb his negotiations. The French had now caballed for two years in order to induce either Russia or Austria to agree to a separate peace with the Turks, and thereby to break up their union. The jealousy of the Austrians with regard to the success of the Russians now helped them to their object, and the Turks to the possession of their old provinces.

Field-marshal Münnich had not contented himself this year, as in previous ones, with a fruitless campaign through barren wastes and with the capture of a few fortresses: his army was more numerous than it had ever previously been, and he lost fewer men by accidents and sickness than in any former campaign. The war of the Russians with the Turks had hitherto cost the former more men than the most bloody engagements. The Russians at first advanced towards Wallachia, but after-

wards suddenly turned in the direction of Moldavia, and on this occasion the Polish territory was unquestionably violated without any permission from Warsaw, and Poland barbarously devastated. The Turkish and Tatar army which was opposed to the Russians was beaten and routed on the first attack (Aug. 1739); forty pieces of cannon and the whole camp fell into the hands of the enemy. Immediately afterwards the whole garrison, struck with a panic, forsook the fortress of Chotzim, which had never been even once attacked, and the fortress was then taken possession of by the Russians, who were astonished at the ease of the conquest. Jassy was also taken, and Münnich even wished to attack Bender, when the news of the peace of Belgrade having been concluded by Neipperg made him infuriate, because he saw clearly enough that Russia alone was not equal to carry on the war, and that nothing, in short, would remain to them after all their conquests except glory.

By the peace of Belgrade, Austria was not only humbled, suffered shame and disgrace, but lost also all the possessions which had been gained by Eugene in the last war, the best military frontier, and the most considerable fortresses. This peace, which was concluded by Wallis and Neipperg, whilst Münnich and his Russians were committing all sorts of outrage and plunder in Moldavia, as they had previously done in the Crimea, was properly speaking the work of the French ambassador; the French have therefore also published a detailed history of the peace of Belgrade, which was the masterpiece of their diplomatic and courtly art*. This French history however by no means contains the true key to the negotiations, for we learn nothing there of the incomprehensible confusion of the Austrian administration and government, nothing of the shameless audacity of Wallis, Neipperg and Sinzendorf, nothing of the confusion, orders and countermands from the cabinet and the court, and again from the emperor and his successor to the throne. In order to explain this singular affair, to understand why Neipperg accepted such scandalous conditions, we must know the disputes, the envy and hatred which subsisted between Wallis and Neipperg, and then it will clearly appear what must have been the result, when these deadly enemies held commissions of equal authority to carry on the war or to make peace. The proper

* Laugier, *Histoire de la Paix de Belgrade*, 2 vols.

explanation of this history has not at all been given in the recently published papers of Neipperg*. So much however at least appears from these papers, and from what Von Hammer has drawn from the Austrian archives, as proves that the capitulation concluded by Mack in Ulm (1805), and the miserable way in which the negotiations on the subject were carried on, was honourable when compared with Neipperg's negotiations and the peace of Belgrade, although in other respects this peace is considered as the greatest disgrace which Austria ever suffered.

The negotiations concerning the peace and the cession of Belgrade were all completed in the short space from the 18th of August till the 18th of September, by Neipperg, the grand vizier, and the French ambassador Villeneuve. Neipperg was not even ashamed, as commanding officer, to leave his army and to go without guarantee into the Turkish camp, where he was insulted and almost treated as a prisoner. He finally concluded the treaty on his own authority without consulting Wallis, who however held an equal commission with himself. Every one was astonished, but most of all the emperor, when the preliminaries were made known. What was even more scandalous than the preliminaries themselves, was, that, according to the conditions, Belgrade was to be surrendered before their ratification, by which the emperor was compelled to confirm everything, because after the surrender, Wallis and Neipperg's precipitancy could not be remedied by his refusal to confirm. The French also negotiated for Russia, bribed the Italian who was the plenipotentiary of the empress Anna, and he immediately subscribed the preliminaries; and his agreement was confirmed at St. Petersburg, notwithstanding all Münnich's remonstrances.

By virtue of this treaty, Austria restored to Turkey Belgrade, Shabacz, the whole of Servia, that portion of Bosnia which had been acquired in the last war, and Austrian Wallachia. Russia was also obliged to evacuate Chotzim and Oczakow; the fortifications of the latter were however blown up, as well as those of Perekop: Russia retained Azov, and a boundary-line was determined, which offered the Russians the most favourable opportu-

* "Umständliche, auf original Documente gegründete Geschichte der sämtlichen und wahren Vorgänge bei der Unterhandlung des zu Belgrad am 18 Sep. 1739, geschlossenen Friedens. Frankf. und Leipzig, 1790." See also Von Hammer, 7th Th. s. 532 etc.

nities and every suitable occasion of extending their vast empire southward, at the cost of the Tatars and Turks. The emperor Charles VI. addressed a most extraordinary manifesto to all the other courts, in which he bitterly complained of his own generals and plenipotentiaries. Neipperg had not only left his camp without any express agreement, which, as commander-in-chief, he should never have done, and gone into that of the Turks, where he was afterwards honourably treated as a prisoner, and concluded a treaty in such circumstances with the enemy, but he did not even take care that the different copies of the treaty precisely agreed. The articles of the Turkish treaty, which were written in Latin and Italian, ran very differently in the different languages to the disadvantage of the emperor. Neipperg himself is either simple or bold enough to excuse the difference of the last Turkish copy of the articles from its Latin and Italian draft, by saying that he understood no Turkish and very little Latin and Italian; and this excuse he himself puts forward in German which can scarcely be called by that name. We thus see most clearly in what hands the Austrian state was.

Wallis and Neipperg, it is true, were arrested like Seckendorf; but they had really no cause to fear, for they were intimately connected with the aristocracy, who, as is well known, being sure of their dominion and privileges, rule in a kind and condescending spirit in Austria, and every one has his trusty friends at court. Both were again in office and honour after the lapse of a few years, and made new mistakes. From all this, the conclusion obviously follows, that in all states and among all nations, a high nobility without education and merit, who lay claim to all the highest places and regard them as their right, are in the greatest degree injurious and always have been so. This will appear still more indisputably, if what the celebrated Austrian author of the Turkish history alleges be true, that all that is usually stated on this subject is false and unfounded; for that Neipperg was entrusted with a special commission from Maria Theresa or her husband, and thereby emboldened to that precipitation of which he acknowledges himself to have been guilty.

SECOND PERIOD OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

FROM THE ACCESSION OF FREDERICK II. TILL THE
END OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

FIRST DIVISION.

HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES, AND OF SOCIAL
AND DOMESTIC LIFE DURING THIS PERIOD.

CHAPTER I.

FROM THE DEATH OF FREDERICK WILLIAM I. TILL
THE PEACE OF AIX LA CHAPELLE.

§ I.

PRUSSIA, BAVARIA, SAXONY AND FRANCE TILL THE TREATY
OF NYMPHENBURG, BETWEEN BAVARIA, FRANCE AND
SPAIN.

FREDERICK WILLIAM I. of Prussia died in May 1740. The time was in every respect favourable to the views and plans of his successor Frederick II., because it enabled him to profit by the period which intervened between this event and the death of the emperor Charles VI., which took place in the autumn following, and to make all the necessary preparations for availing himself of the disputes respecting the succession to the throne of Austria. Frederick William had taken care to unite in his own hands all those elements of power in which the old monarchies of the continent were deficient. The Prussian finances were in good order, the treasury without debt, and even rich in cash and bullion, and the army well-trained and under the guidance of admirable leaders. All the other states were obliged to raise and complete their armies by costly methods of recruiting,

whereas in Prussia alone a regular system of recruiting was established, although it might have been much better and more justly arranged, and made more completely suitable to the defence of the country. The whole state was in the hands of the king, and military obedience had become a habit; the property of every citizen was absolutely liable to whatever tax might be arbitrarily imposed upon it. When yet crown prince, Frederick had commenced the struggle with the prejudices of the middle ages, and was regarded by the men who gave the tone in France as one of their distinguished proselytes and the head of the promulgators of the new light. Even during his father's lifetime, Rheinsberg had become the rallying-point of all the courageous, as well as insolent and malicious opponents of the reigning darkness: when he became king, he commenced a similar strife with all the decayed states of his own time whose constitutions and interior administration had outlived their age. Frederick William, without being himself distinctly conscious of the fact, had already entertained the thought, that it required only money, soldiers, energy, and a mind which should regard every principle of the olden time as a prejudice, to give weight and importance in European affairs to a state whose inhabitants scarcely reckoned three millions; Frederick II. has given expression to this thought in the very commencement of his 'History of his own times.' The sovereign of the small kingdom of Prussia possessed an army of 80,000 men, and money to pay them without contracting debts: France had only 150,000, and the Austrian troops had almost entirely disappeared after the unfortunate war with the Turks; and neither France nor Austria knew where to find money for the supply of the most common necessities.

The bold and energetic measures which were adopted by Frederick, from the time of his father's death till that of Charles VI. in October, abundantly proved to the world, that he meant to pursue a very different course from that which had been followed by his father. Like him indeed, he took his own views alone as his rule; but he did not, like him, allow himself to be restrained in the pursuit of his political objects, or in the adoption of his faith, by prejudices or forms, by matters of routine or etiquette.

The pious and rigidly orthodox friends of his father lost all their influence in literature and ecclesiastical affairs, and their

affected or real piety, which they had always used for the worldly advantage of their adherents, was no longer of any avail. These men had banished Wolf from Halle; Frederick recalled him and restored him to his office. He took this course, not because he entertained a very high opinion of Wolf, for in his writings he speaks contemptuously enough of the quarts of this monarch of the schools, but because he was highly praised by the new generation. He therefore, from political cunning, recalled this philosopher to Halle, because he was at that time the fashion. The friends and wits of Rheinsberg cheered and enlivened him by their society in those hours which his father spent with his smoking companions. Voltaire appeared once in Clèves, and a second time in Berlin, in the house of his royal pupil, and recommended to his notice a number of witty persons, who conversed with him in French, and laughed with him at the faith and prejudices of the vulgar world.

Frederick carried on his reforms in the state after the same fashion, but without making any essential changes. He gave up all that ridiculous foolery of giant guards, which had cost large sums without being of the slightest advantage, and made quite a different use of those wildernesses which his father had created for the purposes of the chase. He changed and abrogated many singular social usages, without being untrue to military simplicity; and although he renewed his grandfather's French academy in the German capital of a completely German land, yet he by no means reverted to his absurd and burthensome courtly ceremonials. Frederick himself appears to admit* that his views were directed to the promotion of the social and scientific education of his subjects by the instrumentality of the French, in the same manner as Peter attempted to give a practical and moral education to his Russians by means of the Germans. German names therefore in abundance are to be found among the members, but scarcely an atom of German mind or spirit in the whole academy.

The same ruling and active mind which put to shame all the dull and indolent rulers of those times as well as their ministers, who were generally selected from a benumbed and feeble caste,

* Frederick, in his 'Histoire de mon tems,' tom. i. p. 97, says:—"Je ne fais point mention de Wolff, qui ruinoit le système de Leibnitz et rabâchoit longuement ce que l'autre avoit écrit avec feu. *La plupart des savans Allemands étoient des manœuvres, les François des artistes.*" Both are true, in a certain sense.

and which showed itself in the very earliest measures of Frederick's internal administration, gave abundant evidence of its existence and vigour in the first steps which he took against states less powerful than his own. His conduct with respect to them was by no means praiseworthy, but at least it was energetic and openly military; this purely military mode of proceeding appeared strange and surprising to our countrymen, who had been accustomed to much writing, to multitudes of forms and legal stipulations. Brandenburg had long carried on a tedious legal dispute with the bishop of Liège with respect to the possession of Herstatt, which Frederick soon brought to a conclusion in a military fashion, during a journey which he took to the Rhine immediately after he ascended the throne. The French and Dutch indeed took up the cause, because the justice of the emperor and the empire was either long delayed, or totally neglected; but the subjects of the bishop were nevertheless obliged to pay a sum of money by no means inconsiderable even in our times, to the Prussians who were quartered upon them, till the bishop at length, under French and Dutch mediation, was constrained to pay as much for the lordship as Frederick himself demanded. He assisted the landgrave of Hesse in a similar manner to get rid of a tedious suit which was carried on in the imperial courts. He learned on his journey that the landgrave had a lawsuit with Mayence about the possession of Rumpenheim; he caused a hint to be given to the elector that the landgrave might reckon upon his bayonets, and the cause was speedily brought to a conclusion.

There were two other suits which Frederick attempted to terminate by a military force, which are intimately connected with the history of the Austrian war of succession; both had their origin in the time of the thirty years' war. Prussia had been deceived by Austria with respect to the inheritance of a collateral line of its house in Silesia, and it alleged that it had just claims upon the duchies of Juliers, Clèves and Berg on the extinction of the Neuburg line in the palatinate, which was then imminent. The latter claim might have been made good if Frederick had taken the part of Maria Theresa, for Frederick William I. had signed the pragmatic sanction only upon condition of the recognition of his right to Juliers and Berg; and on the other hand, the Silesian duchies of which Prussia had been robbed were to be recovered by an alliance with France,

which had guaranteed the integrity of the possessions of his house to the heir of the palatinate.

Shortly before the commencement of the thirty years' war, duke Wolfgang William, of the line of Neuburg, had changed his religious profession, and through the support of the emperor and the Catholic party in the empire had obtained possession of the greatest part of the duchies of Clèves, Juliers and Berg, which were claimed by the house of Brandenburg. On the death of the last descendant of the unfortunate Frederick V., the Neuburg line succeeded to the inheritance of the palatinate of the Rhine, and with this united the duchies of Juliers, Clèves and Berg, notwithstanding all the protestations and resistance of the electors of Brandenburg. France and the emperor now guaranteed the possession of all the territories of the Neuburg line to the heir of the house of Sulzbach, who was to succeed on the extinction of the Neuburgs. Frederick William, on the contrary, declared that, on the occurrence of this event, he would maintain the rights of his house to the Rhenish duchies, and agreed to sign the pragmatic sanction only upon condition of the emperor consenting to promise him this reversion. Charles VI. nevertheless afterwards found himself obliged, in his capacity of head of the empire, to give a formal decision in favour of the line of Sulzbach: he thus contradicted and acted in opposition to his own previous agreement, and completely justified Prussia in following its own course in the dispute concerning the succession, altogether irrespective of the pragmatic sanction. The inheritance to the palatinate became vacant on the last day of the year 1742. Frederick had preferred making good his claims upon Silesia by an alliance with France, and suffered Charles Theodore to take possession of the whole territory of his predecessor Charles Philip. The grounds which induced Frederick to prefer making good his claims to the countries on the Oder, rather than to the Rhine provinces, have been fully detailed by himself in his history. The chief reason was, that in his contest with Austria he would have France in his favour, whereas he must encounter French opposition if he attempted to take possession of Juliers and Berg.

As to Silesia, the uncle of George William, the then reigning elector of Brandenburg, had been forcibly deprived of his principality of Jägerndorf; his heirs of the Brandenburg line had therefore the best-founded claims to the possession of his property,

which however the house of Austria would never acknowledge. The emperor, as possessor of Jägerndorf and as feudal superior, had also afterwards excluded Brandenburg from Brieg, Liegnitz and Wolau on the death of the last duke in 1675, although a compact of hereditary succession existed between Liegnitz, Brieg, Wolau, Jägerndorf, and the reigning house of Brandenburg. Austria on her part alleged, that the estates of Bohemia had abolished that hereditary compact, and that Frederick I. had annulled it by a formal decree in the year 1546.

The great elector had already shown symptoms of an inclination to maintain his claims upon Jägerndorf by an appeal to arms; and the Austrians in their political prudence exhibited a greater degree of fear of the christian elector, who had just claims upon Silesia, than of the Turks, the avowed enemies of Christianity, who were advancing with murder and devastation, and who at that time (1683) had taken possession of the whole of Hungary, and were pressing Vienna with a vigorous siege. The great elector had offered to send 8000 men, under the command of a German prince; their aid however was refused, because the French minister in Berlin had maliciously given a hint to his colleague in Vienna to beware of these troops in reference to their march through Silesia. The Austrian policy led it not only to delay all negotiation respecting the compensation of Brandenburg for the loss of Jägerndorf, but it even frustrated an agreement which had been actually concluded. The circle of Schwibus had been formally ceded, but was recovered from Frederick William by a miserable cabal, so that his successor still maintained his claims upon Jägerndorf. On the death of the emperor, Frederick did not fail, with some appearance of right, to come forward * among the number of those who were

* The elector Frederick William, whose second wife was a Holstein princess, the widow of Christian Louis of Zelle, allowed himself to be overruled by her, so that he wished either to disinherit his son Frederick altogether, or at least to bestow his *acquired* territories, as he called them, upon his second son Philip William. The favour of the elector was desirable for the emperor, and the latter therefore ceded the circle of Schwibus to Frederick William in discharge of his Silesian claims; but Frederick I., afterwards king, in like manner used the emperor, in order to prevent the accomplishment of his step-mother's intentions. He therefore proposed an agreement by which he gave back the circle of Schwibus which his father had received, and the main object was thus defeated. This point was brought prominently forward in Frederick II.'s manifesto. Philip William, as is well known, received only Schwedt, in which his two sons succeeded him, but this dynasty became extinct in 1788 on the death of the second of those sons.

eager to take advantage of the death of Charles VI., and to wrest some portion of her hereditary states from his successor Maria Theresa. For this purpose the king of Prussia had no need to call in the aid of foreign armies and to beg for subsidies, as the elector of Bavaria was obliged to do; having disbanded his father's guards, he reinforced the regular regiments with a considerable number of troops, and in October 1740 he was quite prepared to take the field. Frederick moreover, when he had determined to make good his claims to Silesia, declared expressly in his manifesto that he was ready to acknowledge the pragmatic sanction as his father had done, although the emperor had not fulfilled the conditions on which this recognition was founded. He declared that he merely further wished to act in accordance with his great-grandfather's declaration to the court of Vienna, and to use the privilege of every ordinary citizen, viz. to take possession by force of the property to which he was entitled and which was forcibly withheld.

Among the various pretenders to the inheritance of Charles VI., Spain occupied the first place: she laid claim to the whole inheritance, but especially to the Italian provinces which had been formerly subject to Spain.

Charles Albert of Bavaria, the only one who had never subscribed to the pragmatic sanction, but on the contrary had always protested against it, laid claim particularly to Austria, Bohemia and the Tyrol. He had however neither troops nor money, but never ceased to conjure the aged cardinal Fleury to fulfil the promise which Törring had extorted from him on his mission to Paris in 1738, and to support the somewhat doubtful claims of the elector. Charles Albert could not calculate on the favourable disposition of the inhabitants of the various countries which he wished to conquer, as Frederick II. could upon that of the Protestants in Silesia, for the Austrians were altogether unfavourable to his success, and he had but few friends in Bohemia; in fact there was little, if anything, to hope from the good-natured, weak, superstitious Charles Albert, who was completely under the guidance of priests and jesuits, whereas all possible and useful progress with the spirit of the age was reasonably to be expected from the understanding, good-will, firmness and energy of Maria Theresa.

Charles Albert inherited from his father not less than thirty

millions of debt, of which the country had undertaken to pay only a part, and therefore, however great his inclinations, and however unbounded his love of splendour and pomp, he could maintain only the half of the four hundred horses which adorned his father's stables, and was compelled also to diminish the number of his dogs. On his accession (in 1726) the number of attendants was reduced to one-third, from thirty-six to twelve; and if the number of chamberlains was not diminished, the biography of the future emperor Charles VII. (which was composed in the chancery style and appeared immediately after his death) consoles the good Bavarians with the assurance that chamberlains were cheap. The chamberlains, it is there stated, received only 600 florins salary, and few of them had thought it worth while to draw this trifling sum; they had nevertheless performed all the duties of their office and relieved each other every fortnight. Another swarm of the court mob was also dismissed upon half-pay, but with the hope of being again speedily called into active service. On the other hand, the army was diminished, and when it was increased during the war from 1733–35, it was done by the aid of alms from France received under the name of subsidies. This was the second time within the century that the Bavarians showed themselves so dead to all shame as, in the midst of an imperial war, to furnish German troops for money to the enemy of the empire. Such a course of conduct awakened no scruples of conscience in Munich; but, on the contrary, the whole court was deeply occupied with and anxious about various points of orthodox faith, and especially about that of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. This point seemed so important to the Austrian councillors of Charles VI. also, that, contrary to all usage and to the general astonishment, this doctrine of the immaculate conception was mentioned no less than twice in the form of oath which was taken by Charles Albert on his investiture with the Bohemian fiefs in the upper palatinate (1731). The army, which had been diminished to ten thousand men, was not reinforced by the French subsidies, according to agreement; for the elector and his wife were never in possession of money, although they made rich presents to churches, monasteries and places of pilgrimage, and were as ceremonially pious as if they were living in the middle ages. Both made pilgrimages on foot to Altötting; and they presented a silver image to

the shrine as heavy as the electoral prince, who was eight years old; Loretto was also visited at immense expense, and gold and silver sacramental cups and plates were presented in numbers.

The fêtes, cabals and intrigues of the court, the disputes between Preysing and Fugger, Törring and the chancellor Unertel, with regard to their respective influence upon the mind of the weak and vain Charles Albert, completely occupied the attention of the Bavarians long after Frederick had advanced into the territory of Silesia. In the mean time great hopes were entertained in Munich as to the result of the negotiations with the French, which were chiefly conducted by the elder and younger Törring. Under their direction and advice the elector wrote a humiliating and abject letter to Fleury and Louis XV., and that too at the end of the year 1740, at the very moment in which he was putting forward his claims to the imperial dignity*.

The elector of Bavaria could not have prevented Maria Theresa from taking possession of her father's inheritance; and France would also have acknowledged her as his heiress, had not Charles Albert's ministers in Vienna taken some ridiculous steps of a legal and diplomatic character. Bavaria had neither money

* Many of the obscurities in the history of the period from 1740–1742 can only be cleared up by the aid of French documents. For this reason the author has consulted with great care the thick folio volume marked *Bavière*, No. 91, in the French archives of foreign affairs, which contains all the necessary materials, and even newspaper articles of the day. With respect to the imperial dignity, the elector writes as follows, in answer to a letter of cardinal Fleury dated 17th December 1740, and delivered to him by the marshal de Broglie, 10 January 1741:—“*Persuadé comme je le suis des bontés de S. M. T. C., plein de confiance dans l'amitié de V. E., je pensai que le premier pas que j'avois à faire étoit de me jéter entre les bras de S. M., que je regarderois toujours comme mon seul soutien et mon unique appui* (and the man wished to become emperor of Germany!!!), et de confier à V. E. que je croyois que la conjoncture présente seroit la plus glorieuse pour votre ministère, puisque vous pouviez d'un seul coup augmenter la puissance du roi en diminuant celle d'une ancienne rivale et récompenser la fidélité d'un allié, dont vous n'ignorez pas le constant attachement pour la couronne de France. Je reconnois effectivement, parceque V. E. me le marque, que ma confiance dans le roi n'as pas été trompé puisque les premières pensées de S. M. T. C. se tournèrent de mon côté et sur le désir extrême qu'elle avoit, de trouver une occasion favorable pour faire valoir les droits de ma maison et *me faire monter, s'il étoit possible, sur le trône impérial*. Je n'ai point de termes qui puissent exprimer toute l'étendue de ma connoissance, et combien je suis touché de ses bontés * * *. J'en regarde comme une nouvelle preuve la peine que vous ressentez de la prévention fâcheuse, que la cour de Vienne a trouvé des moyens d'inspirer contre la justice de mes droits, en donnant aux termes du testament et codicile de Ferdinand I. une interprétation aussi éloignée du vrai sens de ces mêmes termes, qui est prouvé clairement.”

nor army, and what must particularly excite the surprise of Germans, because our country abounds in learned writers, had no manifesto prepared; and when the manifesto was drawn up, as appears from an autograph letter of the elector to his ambassador in Paris, they were obliged to send for some person from that city, in order to translate the bulky and barbarous document into French. The Bavarian ambassador in Paris, prince von Grimberghen, stood in a very peculiar position: Törring had been in Paris in 1738, and had received only very indefinite assurances from the cardinal and the king; Grimberghen was to carry forward the negotiations, as has been already observed; but the French had so little confidence in him, that Fleury as well as Amelot required that he should be entirely passed over, and the whole affairs be transacted immediately with Belleisle*.

The claim which Charles Albert founded upon the will of Ferdinand I., from whose daughter Anne he was descended, was so triumphantly disproved by the production of the will itself, that Fleury was ashamed to maintain his cause, and the elector was obliged to take all possible pains to induce him to relinquish his first intention, of allowing everything to take the course indicated by the pragmatic sanction†.

The Bavarians themselves were obliged to acknowledge that their copy of the will was false in the passage relating to *male heirs*, and that in the original the succession was bequeathed only to the descendants of the princess Anne in case of the failure of heirs born in wedlock. They had then recourse to a new memorial, in which the claims of Bavaria to Bohemia and the Tyrol were put forward and defended upon very different grounds. We shall quote the substance and essential points of

* This is often repeated by letter, and on the 14th of March 1741, when all was ready, the cardinal writes as follows:—"Je n'ai aucune méfiance de M. de Grimberghen, qui vous est fort attaché et fort zélé, mais je crois pourtant si V. A. E. le trouve ainsi, qu'il sera bon que je ne lui en dise que ce qui est absolument nécessaire qu'il sache pour son instruction."

† In the letter above quoted, which, like his other correspondence in this case, is extremely long and wearisome, the elector writes as follows:—"Je comprends que le roi, pressé par le prince de Lichtenstein, n'a peut-être pas pu dans les premiers moments se dispenser de dire, qu'il maintiendrait fidèlement les engagements qu'il avoit contracté pour la sanction pragmatique, parce que son honneur et sa parole l'y obligeoient. Mais que ne dois-je pas aussi par les mêmes motifs espérer des engagements que S.M. a pris avec moi, surtout, comme V. E. le remarque elle-même, le *préjudice d'un tiers* étant réservé de droit dans toutes les transactions, et l'empereur n'ayant pas fourni, comme il s'y étoit engagé, la ratification de l'empire; condition essentielle pour rendre la garantie du roi efficace," &c. &c.

the memorial in a note, but it may be shown from the MS. letters* of the elector himself, that Fleury never would have taken up and maintained the cause of Bavaria against Maria Theresa, had it not been for the cabals of the brothers Belleisle and their friends.

In the letter referred to, the elector first acknowledges that he has no means equal to so great an undertaking, and that he stands in need of French subsidies to enable him to maintain only 20,000 men. He further admits, that the cardinal had answered his appeal for aid, and stated that the revenues of his own king were so materially diminished, that he could by no means undertake to support his cause. The letter goes on to state, that he had indeed sent the younger Törring to the king of Prussia, but that he was not to be relied on, because he aimed at getting possession of Bayreuth. No arrangement could be made with Saxony till France had reconciled the various and conflicting interests; and we therefore see clearly the grounds upon which the elector in the same letter expresses his great satisfaction that Belleisle was to be sent to Frankfort to be present at the election of the emperor. He also appeals to France to bring about an alliance with Spain, anxious also to profit by the occasion to make good her right to the provinces which had been ceded by the peace of Utrecht. Fleury was to persuade Spain to pay yearly subsidies to the elector, and

* According to this document, Moravia was to fall to Saxony; Maria Theresa to remain in possession of Hungary, Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and Croatia: and it was attempted to be proved in the Bavarian manifesto,—1. That Bavaria was innocent of the trick respecting the false will. 2. That the expression ‘heirs born in wedlock,’ used in the Vienna will, could signify nothing else than ‘héritiers légitimes,’ and that the emperor Ferdinand could only understand by this expression ‘heirs male’;—partly because this was the natural sense of the words, and partly because it agreed with the marriage-contract, the renunciations and reservations of the princess Anne in her marriage with duke Albert of Bavaria. 3. That the princess Anne was expressly named as successor in case of the failure of heirs male, and that this substitution must extend to the descendants of the archduchess, because the claims of Bavaria had always been maintained on this ground, and that the elector had entered into no obligations to the disadvantage of the rights of his house, either in his marriage-contract or in the treaty of 1726. The elector is ingenuous enough to admit, that the Prussian ambassador Kleingräff had said to the younger Törring in Munich, that that was all very excellent, but that the Bavarians must know, “que par la plume seule on ne sauroit jamais faire valoir ses droits, quelques justes et quelques claires ils puissent être. Qu’il falloit donc avoir recours à des moyens plus efficaces que ceux-là, et qu’il ne pouvoit s’empêcher d’avouer qu’en arrivant à Munich sa surprise avoit été extrême de trouver toute chose dans une si parfaite tranquillité.”

further to pay off the *rente dotale* and the million of piastres, for which Bavaria had still a claim. It is only possible to explain the reasons which influenced France to adopt and maintain the cause of such an ally by reference to the secret history of the French court; and in so doing, we shall pass over all the ordinary scandal.

Louis was a great sensualist, but notwithstanding this, he had lived, at least publicly, with his wife till the year 1737; about this time she began to lose her vigour and cheerfulness, partly in consequence of maternity and partly from excessive bigotry, and she could no longer chain the affections or preserve the constancy of a husband who delighted only in the chase, the pleasures of the table, wine and dissolute society. Multitudes of ladies now became suitors for the royal favour, and the nobles of the court emulated each other in their endeavours to have the honour of pandering to the tastes of the king. In this course his constant companion, the duke of Richelieu, who is celebrated as among the most licentious men of his age, and a man of universal gallantry, distinguished himself above all his fellows: he was the fortunate man on this occasion, and was in his own estimation happy to be the first to introduce a lady to the king who met with his approbation. The queen was now wholly forgotten, and the history of the government is intimately connected with the changes of the king's mistresses. Richelieu possessed all those qualities which pre-eminently fitted him to be the companion of a sensual prince who was insensible to every honourable and noble feeling; he therefore permanently retained his favour, and the cardinal fully concurred with him in the selection of the marchioness de Mailly, because the aged man as well as the favourite regarded this step as politically expedient, or at least harmless, however destructive its moral influence might be upon the king*. At this time those orgies began, in which at a still later period Richelieu, Soubise and Aiguillon played such prominent parts, and in which, at this early period, Mailly indulged in such excessive drinking after the pleasures of the

* Whoever wishes to read a complete detail of all the scandal, truth and lies, need not examine all the memoirs of the period; the whole will be found collected in Angerville's '*Vie Privée de Louis XV.*' With respect to the duke of Richelieu, who died in 1788, aged 92, the complete '*Chronique Scandaleuse*' of his life will be found in the '*Histoire de France depuis la fin du règne de Louis XVI.*,' vol. i. p. 214 and p. 419. This work is published under the name of Montgaillard.

table. The king had now a double line of politics; his own private and peculiar policy, as well as that of his minister: he had his own agents and secret reporters at every court, as well as those who were officially recognised; but Fleury retained the undivided direction of affairs till the death of Charles VI.

Precisely at the very time in which Charles Albert overwhelmed the French court with entreaties and petitions, the two brothers Belleisle and the duke de Broglio were ambitious of military reputation, and all the places in the cabinet and in the society of the king being already occupied, they therefore endeavoured, through the instrumentality of Mailly, to awaken the ambition of the young king, who was not yet entirely sunk in sensuality. The cardinal would willingly have maintained peace, but he afterwards found it advisable to yield to their views. The alliance with Bavaria had no sooner been formed, than the elder Belleisle, who was immediately created a marshal, submitted a plan, which was approved by the French cabinet, and entrusted to him to carry into execution.

From this time forward the brothers Belleisle, the count and the chevalier, conducted the whole affairs of Germany precisely as it seemed most agreeable to the ambition of the one and to the vanity and pride of the other, but by no means to the true advantage of their country. From the MSS. in the French archives of foreign affairs*, we learn that before Belleisle received his instructions, and such powers for negotiating in Germany as had never previously been conferred on any plenipotentiary, an uncommonly long paper had been addressed by Charles Albert to the aged cardinal, in which arrogance and meanness are combined in the most extraordinary manner. The vain man is eager for the imperial dignity, but he thinks only about its tinsel and pomp, and admits that he wishes to pay for these toys with French money: he is not ashamed to throw himself and the German empire to which he aspires at the feet of the French minister, and to use the most degrading and humiliating language†. This document was of such unusual length

* We possess indeed four thick volumes of the 'History of the Interregnum after the Death of Charles VI.,' Frankfort, Barrentrap, 1742-1746; but these were only intended for German publicists, and contain little that is interesting.

† The elector, who always used a peculiar ink, writes as follows in his tedious and voluminous despatch to the cardinal:—"Voilà donc le moment approché qui doit décider du sort du plus fidèle des alliés du roi et immor-

and so tedious, that the cardinal directed a summary of the chief points to be made, and expressed in short sentences for his use, which summary occupies three folio pages, and may be now found with the original among the minutes connected with these affairs. Charles Albert however attained his object at the expense of France.

Belleisle received his commission and credentials in February (1741), and at the same time bills to an immense amount. The first made him lord and master of the negotiations with the German princes; the money was partly employed in bribery, and partly reserved for foolish and vain expenditure, which was to be made in Germany to the honour of France, as such things were called. Shortly before*, Charles Albert had given his ambassador in Paris full powers to treat with the marquis of Montijo, who had been sent thither from Spain; but the marquis immediately travelled to Frankfort to protest against, and to Munich to conclude, an agreement.

Belleisle suffered himself to be deceived and led astray by Frederick II. (now twenty-eight years old), who was well acquainted with his vanity and profited by his knowledge. The old cardinal, on the other hand, placed no confidence whatever in the friend of the infidel Voltaire, and wrote to the elector of Bavaria, that he was not to hope for anything good from Prussia. The cabals in Saxony under Augustus III. had however as great an influence as they had formerly had in the reign of his father, and even the Saxon ambassador in Paris did not, properly speaking, know what policy he was to pursue†; king Augustus being completely ignorant of all that took place.

taliser la gloire de son règne, en lui donnant occasion de procurer la couronne impériale à un prince, qui par inclination et par reconnaissance, tâchera toujours d'unir les intérêts de l'empire à ceux de la France, et comme ce doit être votre ouvrage, je mets toute ma confiance en vous que j'ai toujours aimé et regardé en vrai père, et ce sera une double consolation pour moi, lorsque je verrai le jour de mon élévation devenir l'époque la plus glorieuse de votre ministère."

* The letter to prince Grimberghen is dated the 25th of February, and the instructions to count Belleisle the 20th of February, 1741.

† Fleury and Amelot left the elector's letters unanswered till they received reports from Belleisle, and then follows, from the 9th to the 12th of March, an explanation of all the points; viz. Saxony had not yet declared its views, and the letter refers to the matter in these words: "Les desseins de l'électeur de Saxe sont toujours dans la même obscurité, et M. le comte de Poniatowsky lui-même n'y voit plus clair de nous.....J'appréhende fort qu'après avoir fait déclarer, par le jugement préliminaire du collège électoral, le suffrage de la Bohème caduque, il ne s'accommode enfin avec la grande-duchesse." With

The king of Poland and elector of Saxony, a good-hearted man, lived in a species of phlegmatic retirement from business, and whiled away the tædium of life, which even men of his disposition sometimes feel, by smoking tobacco and social intercourse with count and countess Brühl, the former of whom was also occasionally friendly to the queen. Those who surrounded the king and saved him the heavy labour of reading and writing, guarded him with such scrupulous care, that it was not possible to hand him a petition as he went to or came from the chapel, which he never omitted. The government was at first properly speaking conducted by Sulkowsky, who had exchanged his office of grand chamberlain, or constant companion of the king, for other offices with Brühl, whose career had conducted him from the office of a page to that of grand chamberlain; Brühl however afterwards allied himself with the confessor and the queen to overthrow Sulkowsky*. Sulkowsky's whole merit consisted in the experience and practice of the duties of a page. In 1738 Brühl also was appointed second page: he played the chief character in Poland and Saxony, and afterwards associated with a lacquey whom he created a count.

In the course of five years' service, Sulkowsky had acquired a property of two millions; but he had received large presents in

respect to Prussia, he writes as follows:—"La lettre de V. A. E. au roi de Prusse est parfaitement bien, mais ce prince désireroit par-dessus toutes choses pouvoir s'accommoder avec la cour de Vienne, et qu'elle voulût lui céder la basse Silésie y compris Breslau, mais jusqu'ici je doute qu'il y réussisse, malgré les instances de l'Angleterre et de la Hollande, qui voudroient obtenir d'elle ce sacrifice. Ce prince se vendra à celui qui l'achète le plus cher, et il est essentiel de pouvoir le gagner."

* These transactions are related in a work entitled 'Life and Character of Count Von Brühl, in confidential letters,' 1760. The work is completely authentic, but occasionally common-place and vulgar. It is first stated that Brühl had availed himself of the services of father Quarino, a jesuit and the queen's confessor, and that the cabals were betrayed by another jesuit; then it proceeds as follows: "Count Sulkowsky learned from another jesuit, as he often told several friends afterwards, what was being forged to his disadvantage by the queen's confessor. He now discovered how wrong he had been to put any confidence in the assurances of count Brühl. He wished to amend his error, and tried to persuade the king of Poland to dismiss count Von Brühl from court; but he was too late. The queen took advantage of this step on his part to importune the king so strongly, that he was forced to consent to Sulkowsky's dismissal. He was deprived of all his offices except that of a general," etc. etc. We may incidentally remark, that very little is to be learned from the confidential conversation between master and servant, or 'The pragmatistical secret History of Frederick Augustus, the third King of Poland and Elector of Saxony, and his Prime Minister Henry Count Von Brühl, impartially drawn from the best sources by Quarino Domicello,' parts 1 and 2, 4to. 1764.

the form of Polish starosties, waiwodeships, and crown dues; his various offices produced him a yearly income of 100,000 dollars, and he kept only eight servants and expended yearly 6000 dollars, whereas Brühl regarded poor Saxony as his estate and its inhabitants as his slaves. The king no sooner formally appointed him prime minister than he became absolute ruler, for king Augustus was so much disinclined to hear anything about business, that even during the war he was often unacquainted with the service on which his troops were engaged. Brühl himself knew nothing of business; his eight secretaries were therefore ministers in their various departments; and the able and industrious presidents, learned and distinguished men of business provided with great titles, might it is true consult and propose, but the decisions remained wholly in the hands of Brühl's creatures. His servants filled the first offices, and every one of his numerous pages was certain of the most splendid provision. Hennike was but a footman when he was thirty years of age, and married a housemaid in the same service, rose from place to place, became a count, and conducted the whole affairs, which consisted in making Saxony and the Saxons subservient to the advantage of his former master. No one however could practise a more gracious despotism than count Brühl, or suck the very heart's blood of the land after a more courtly fashion. He loaded the humblest who approached him with the finest compliments, and comforted every man with abundant promises, although he had nothing else to hope for.

We shall quote a passage in a note from a contemporary and eye-witness, in order to show to what an extent the insolent upstarts and great men of those times durst venture in dissipating the hard-earned savings of the poor, and publicly insulting and scoffing at the misery of the people*. Brühl continued to live

* 'Life,' etc. already referred to: at p. 135 we read as follows:—"When I was in Dresden, from the year 1744-1747, Count Brühl's table was never laid for fewer than thirty persons, and was served with such profusion, that the servants could carry away as much food from the house as they pleased. A slight banquet must consist at least of fifty dishes, and a great one of eighty or a hundred. I have since seen royal tables at which only twelve dishes were usually served, and in cases of entertainments twenty-four. At the same time Brühl's servants amounted at least to 200 persons. Among these were twelve footmen, twelve pages, and officers of the household, such as equerries, stewards, clerks of the buttry and kitchen, which are to be found only at the greatest courts. The kitchen establishment consisted of four cooks to the person, twelve other cooks, and as many assistants as raised the whole force to above thirty. I have been assured that there were more than a

in the most princely style and at a most enormous expense even in the time of war, and when Saxony was reduced to a state of despair by the bankruptcy of its treasury. His gardens, libraries and collections of art were so celebrated, that learned Germans could scarcely write books enough to praise and extol his wonders. His palaces were crowded with servants and pages, his table was renowned over all Europe, and even his collection of dressing-gowns, wigs and boots was peculiar in its kind; and yet, after he had utterly destroyed the whole of Saxony by two wars, and his estates had been plundered by the command of Frederick, he left behind him property worth two millions of dollars. In consequence of all this, Saxony played a most melancholy part in these two wars. Whilst Belleisle had the management of German affairs, and was engaged in promoting the elector of Bavaria to the imperial dignity, Brühl hesitated whether he would receive subsidies from England or France, or sell the blood of the Saxons to assist the cause of Bavaria or Prussia.

Whilst Frederick was making good his cause in the field, Charles Albert, after many an humble and petitionary letter, had at length received promise of support on the 14th of March, and Belleisle was to conclude a formal treaty with him on the part of France. Even before Belleisle had reached Munich, on his triumphal journey through Germany, the French learned from Törring, by a communication dated the 5th of April, that the elector could not recruit the 14,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry which he had promised to raise until he received money from France. France was obliged to pay very dearly for Belleisle's magnificence; for before his departure, and to provide the necessary means, the government was obliged to adopt the ruinous measures of commanding an advance of eight millions of livres from the farmers-general of the taxes, and of establishing a tontine of twelve millions.

In his letter Törring attaches very small importance to the troops which were to be recruited by the elector, but expects everything from Belleisle, whose appointment to be commander of the forces destined for Bavaria filled the elector hundred servants in livery. Shoes were ordered from Paris for the count by the hundred pairs, and wigs by the dozen, and even pasties were ordered and sent from Paris by post. Although excellent chocolate was prepared in Dresden and Leipzig, Brühl's was sent for to Vienna and Rome; and scarcely anything in his house was prepared or made in Saxony.

with joy*. The miserable sum of 400,000 livres, which had been received up to the 14th of March, disappeared without leaving a trace in Munich, and Törring continued to complain in every letter of the want of money, in consequence of which all recruiting was impossible; and as late as the 10th of May, the Bavarian ambassador in Paris writes despondingly to Fleury, that the elector could do nothing with the small sum which he had received, and that he had applied for loans upon any conditions, but he could find no one willing to lend. On the 3rd of March, or rather about two months earlier, the elector himself had written to Paris, to order French wines and a complete assortment of finery, dresses, liveries, jewellery, watches, carriages, gold lace, tassels, etc. etc.† The money to pay for all these was not yet received. Belleisle also occupied his mind with things of similar importance with those which engaged the whole attention of the elector, whom he was to make emperor. His mind was full of the demonstrations of respect and honour which he expected and received on his journey through Germany, and he wrote one letter after another in reference to the ceremonies which were to be observed on his reception in Munich, as they

* Törring writes as follows:—"Ce qu'il y a de plus flatteur pour S. A. E., c'est que le roi vous met à la tête de cette armée, c'est à dire, l'homme le plus capable en France, qui a le plus de réputation, et sur l'amitié duquel elle peut le plus sûrement compter. Il n'y a certainement point de secours d'argent qui vaille celui d'une armée d'élite comme celle que vous amenez, puisque avec tout l'or du monde on ne sauroit faire de vieilles troupes."

† Among the minutes bound up are found the following commissions and orders from "S. A. E. de Bavière et pour lesquels le prince de Grimmerghen demande un passeport. (8.) Huit habits pour S. A. E. tant brodés que galonnés ou en étoffes d'or ou d'argent. (2.) Deux robes de chambre riches avec leur dessus de toilette pareillement riches. Deux cents livres pesant d'étoffes d'or, d'argent, et de soie pour habits des princesses avec leurs assortimens, parures, coëffures, etc. Vingt-quatre paires de souliers pour femmes brodés en or ou en argent. Un grand carosse d'ambassadeur doublé de velours et or avec les harnois de même et ce qu'il faut pour le train. Le tout assortissant. Une Berline dorée pour S. A. E. Le dedans de velours garni d'ouvrages de dorure avec les harnois et le reste de l'assortiment pareil. Deux grandes housses brodées en or et argent, avec les selles, brides, bridons, etc. Huit mille aulnes de galons le fond argent et soie pour la livrée. Quatre paires de tabliers de timbales brodés et garnis de franges or ou argent avec les armes de S. A. E. Trois cents marcs de galons d'argent à jour pour la suite de S. A. E. à Francfort. Deux cents cinquante aulnes de draps avec leurs doublures pour habits et manteaux. Six pendules de bronze et de porcelaine, garnies avec leurs girandoles et bras de cheminé. Un service pour le dessert tout garni de glaces et de ses verres et cristaux. Six douzaines de paires de bas de soie. Vingt-quatre pièces de vin de Bourgogne achetés à Strasbourg." This may suffice. The original contains, besides a whole litany of housses galonnés, etc. etc.

had been performed in Bonn. Törring, who was continually writing concerning money, promised impossibilities, and when the count announced his intention to come to Munich, in a letter from Brieg, he assured him that he should be received as their protector*.

The king of Prussia at that time acted for himself alone, and Törring wrote as early as March to Belleisle, that the Prussian ambassador Klinggräf had written to him that his master would enter into no communications or treaty with the elector till France had publicly adopted his cause. In the mean time the Austrians might long since have taken possession of the whole of Bavaria; but they refrained, partly because they themselves were ill-prepared for the war, partly because they did not wish to furnish France with a pretence for adopting the cause of Bavaria, and partly because they were hard-pressed by the Prussians.

Maria Theresa had set Neipperg at liberty from his well-deserved imprisonment, and placed him at the head of the army which she sent into Silesia: such a general was no fit opponent for such commanders as Schwerin, Leopold of Dessau, and other Prussian generals, and his admirable cavalry were no match in the open battle-field for the well-drilled Prussian infantry. This clearly appeared in the battle of Molwitz (10th April 1741), in which Neipperg's incapacity was obvious, for he allowed himself to be taken by surprise, and had scarcely time hastily to draw up his men before he was attacked. The king of Prussia admits, that the victory here gained by his troops was due to no merit of his, for that in adopting the necessary measures for the battle, he had preferred Schwerin's counsel to his own views—and this does him great honour. In a single campaign Frederick qualified himself for a general; the Austrians were driven out of Silesia, and circumstances appeared very critical for the queen of Hungary, because in the existing state of parties she could neither reckon upon the friendship of England nor that of France.

* Törring answers the marshal's letter from Brieg as follows:—"Vous aurez donc vu, mon cher maréchal, par la lettre de M. de Mortagne et le mémoire qui lui a été remis, dont pour la plus grande sûreté je joins ici une copie, que votre cour n'a rien à désirer par rapport à votre cérémoniel, et que vous devez vous attendre à toutes les distinctions imaginables, dont le respect de l'électeur pour le roi et sa considération particulière pour vous sont de sûrs garants.....Outre le logement que S. A. E. vous donnera dans sa résidence de Nymphenbourg, elle vous fait préparer une maison à Munich, pour vous en servir, lorsque vous voudrez venir en ville."

The progress and success of the Prussians at length gave courage to cardinal Fleury also, whom both Belleisle and the Bavarians had importuned without success till the month of March. On the 14th of March, Amelot, the minister of foreign affairs, sent for prince Grimberghen, to ask him officially what means were at the disposal of Bavaria for the maintenance of a French army, if it should be sent to Germany. On the 12th of April, the elector, after having bestowed much time and great pains on the composition of his long epistle, wrote that he had received intelligence of the intention to send 30,000 French troops. Belleisle and his brother in the mean time were wasting their country's money in Germany. The former travelled with a splendid retinue by way of Dresden, first into the camp at Moltwitz, then to Brieg, where Frederick, taking advantage of the Frenchman's vanity, completely outwitted him, whilst Belleisle thought he was deceiving the king. Frederick concluded a treaty in which he promised to vote for Charles Albert as emperor, and to renounce his claims upon Juliers and Berg, on condition that the French should send an army of 30,000 men into Bavaria, and a second army into Westphalia, in order to prevent the Hanoverians and Saxons from attacking the king in the rear, who was desirous of withdrawing his army from the Elbe. Frederick had entrusted the command of this army of observation on the Elbe to the veteran prince of Dessau, because he knew that the latter would not serve willingly against Austria. The king of Prussia moreover did not sign the treaty till the French had put their army actually in motion.

From this moment Belleisle, who travelled to Munich to conclude the alliance with Bavaria, thought of nothing but ceremonies and pomp. On the 29th of April, after having received Törring's letter already referred to in Brieg, he not only wrote to Törring, but he also wrote once more a very long letter from Nuremberg to Mortagne concerning his reception, notwithstanding all the obsequiousness and servility of the Bavarians. His mind was at length set quite at ease upon that point by an assurance in a long letter from Törring, in which he minutely details and describes to him the whole of the splendid ceremonies which he might expect on the 18th and 19th on his entrance into Munich. All this Belleisle immediately forwarded to Paris, described every trifle, and added that the whole electoral family was at his service. During Belleisle's sojourn in Munich, nego-

tiations were carried on with respect to the celebrated treaty of Nymphenburg between Spain and Bavaria and France and Bavaria, which was finally concluded in the end of May and beginning of June (1741).

We shall now call attention especially to some points of the Nymphenburg treaty, copied from the archives of foreign affairs in Paris, and which will serve to delineate the state of public morality and the patriotism of the several governments. The public articles, as usual, are a mask only to conceal the private ones, in which France undertakes to bear the whole of the expense, and purchases in return from the future emperor, even before he is elected, what he will be obliged to swear most solemnly at his coronation to guard, uphold and maintain*.

In the public treaty, reference is made only to 16,000 men, who were to assist the elector to make good his claims upon Bohemia; in the ninth article 20,000 more are promised; but Bavaria was to defray the expense of their maintenance. In the secret treaty the very reverse is determined. According to the first article, France, in case of need, agrees to support the claims of the elector to the inheritance of Charles VI. with all her forces, and to send at least 60,000 men to the Rhine. According to the second article, France agrees to pay two millions of livres for the first fifteen months in monthly payments, under the pretence of a loan for the support of the first corps sent to Bavaria; and if a second corps should be required, a million more.

* The author of this work took the trouble to copy both treaties word for word from the archives of the department of foreign affairs in Paris, because the authenticity of the well-known copies of this treaty has been denied, and because those copies have never been certified by an official notice expressly appended to them. The one, "*Traité entre le roi très chrétien et le Sérénissime électeur de Bavière conclu et signé le 22 Mai et ratifié le 3 Juin 1741,*" contains ten public and five secret articles, and the notice, that the ratification on the part of France and Bavaria took place on the 3rd of June, and on the part of Spain on the 19th. The Spanish treaty concluded between Christopher Portocarrero, count Montijo and count Törring, president of the council of war and general of cavalry, contains seventeen articles, and one after another, two special or secret articles. It will be at once seen from the contents why they were not made known when circumstances became adverse, and why what was made public was denied. The chief point indeed is to be found in the '*History of the Interregnum after the Death of the Emperor Charles VI.,*' 3rd part, 1st div. p. 41; and in the '*History and Deeds of Charles VII.,*' 1754, 8vo. pp. 118, 119, but inaccurate and false. It is not agreeable to the plan of this work to append them to this volume, but the author offers them to any one who may desire to have them printed.

From the third article it further appears, that France shall and will be paid for those sums in Germany. It runs thus: all the provinces and towns which the French army shall occupy on the Rhine *shall remain in their possession, and never be reclaimed by the elector when he shall have become emperor.* And in case France shall be obliged in time of peace to surrender what she has taken possession of, this shall not take place till France has been fully compensated for the money expended in the cause of the elector, and the subsidies which she has paid. The fourth article contains the following provision:—if France send an army into the Low Countries, she shall retain possession of all the places which may be then conquered; and the elector is never to consent to require the surrender of these places by France, not even of the barrier-fortresses, on which account the elector, as far as this point is concerned, is to renounce his obligation to maintain the barrier-treaty. The fifth article in the same way refers to Spain. We think however that what has been quoted is sufficient for our purpose; those who are interested in diplomatic cabals may examine the treaty itself, the provisions of which were happily never fulfilled. On the other hand, the treaty of Basle between Prussia and the French republic, which was almost precisely similar, received its full completion.

§ II.

AUSTRIAN WAR OF SUCCESSION AND FIRST SILESIAN WAR, TILL THE PEACE OF BRESLAU.

Maria Theresa found herself in a most critical position, when the Bavarians began at length to prepare to make good the claims or rather the hopes of Charles Albert to a portion of the inheritance of Charles VI. by means of French money and troops, and the Spaniards marched an army into Italy to conquer the Milanese. Frederick II. treated Silesia as a province of his kingdom: the numerous Protestants in that country, who had hitherto been oppressed, did homage to him as their deliverer and avenger, whilst he protected the Catholics in all their rights. The Italian provinces of the Austrian monarchy might hope for a national government under a Spanish prince, Bohe-

mia fluctuated in its wishes, and Moravia remained neutral; on the other hand, the young queen aroused a feeling and spirit of patriotism in Hungary, Austria and the Tyrol which astonished the world. Maria Theresa had, it is true, acknowledged her husband as co-regent, but in this acknowledgment she had been careful to avoid any violation of the pragmatic sanction, and kept the duke wholly apart from public affairs; he was in fact a much better merchant than ruler, and was regarded as a foreigner by the Austrian nobility. In Frankfort they disputed her right to vote as electress of Bohemia; she was however invited to the election by the elector of Mayence, and Trèves also was favourable to Austria. At the very time when Charles Albert was ordering from Paris gold lace and tinsel with a view to the outward pomp of his imperial dignity, Maria Theresa was engaged in dismissing the greater part of those 40,000 persons who lived by the court (Camerarists), and whose maintenance cost her father a yearly sum of nine millions and a half. The release of Neipperg, Wallis and Seckendorf was advantageous; but unfortunately she again placed Neipperg at the head of an army, and caused Schmettau, whom Frederick recalled from her service as his vassal, to be tried and condemned by a court-martial, by which he became only the more serviceable to Frederick, who appointed him his commander-in-chief*.

In the spring of 1741, fortune seemed wholly to have forsaken Austria, and France appeared to have purchased Germany. The electoral vote of Bohemia in the choice of the emperor was not conceded: Belleisle had returned to Paris and succeeded in procuring the sanction of all the projects of his vanity in an extraordinary sitting of the cabinet, from which the aged cardinal intentionally absented himself, in order that he might neither agree to nor oppose them. The former then returned from Paris to Frankfort, there to enjoy his dear-bought triumph†.

* This appointment gave great offence to the crown prince Leopold of Dessau and the duke of Holstein-Beck, who were thereby passed over.

† In Frankfort Belleisle played the part of one of the first electors, and obtained what was altogether incredible in that ceremonious and rank-loving age. The elector of Mayence, who was the head of the electoral college, gave him the place on his right hand whenever he was at his house; and he again assigned this place to no one who came to his house except the elector. He took precedence of all the German princes; his credentials were handed in to the German chancery in the French language, whereas it had always been previously required that such papers should be written in Latin. In order to magnify himself, he wrote to Paris that it was necessary he should appear

Whilst Charles Albert and his protector Belleisle thus exhibited their insolence and pride, celebrated fêtes, held levies, and were deeply immersed in ceremonies and pomp of all kinds, Maria Theresa had been crowned in Hungary in June (1741), and many of the noblest magnates had awakened the warlike spirit of a brave nation. Regular and irregular troops, Pandours, Croats, and the plundering scum and rabble of the Turkish frontiers, by whatever name they were called, and the valiant nobles themselves, took arms in the autumn, on behalf of their noble, young and beautiful queen, who was threatened on all sides, and in defence of her youthful son, the heir to the throne.

As early as the month of July, the Bavarians took possession of Passau and advanced into Austria. The French army, which was called an auxiliary force, and which had been assembled in Alsace, whilst another was destined for the Lower Rhine under Maillebois, did not effect its march through Swabia and reach Bavaria till the 15th of August. The French first formed a junction with the Bavarians in September, from whom, as has been already proved by the letters of the president of the Bavarian council of war, there was little to be expected, as the new French subsidies were all necessary for the expenses of the gilding, pageantry and splendour attendant on the imperial coronation. The French were not much better *appointed* than the Bavarians, although they had deluded Brühl into sending them, for money, 20,000 Saxons under Rutowsky into Bohemia, in order to help them and the Bavarians. They not only paid the travelling expenses of the marshal and his brother the chevalier, in all the journeys which they made with their numerous suites, but also the cost of their splendid appearances at the respective courts, where, surrounded by members of the high French nobility, they exhibited their extravagance and pomp. Belleisle maintained something almost more than a kingly style, and was surrounded by imperial emblems in Frankfort; besides this,

in great splendour; and because the Germans attached great importance to a good table, dainties and delicacies were the best means of winning their favour and giving them pleasure. The extent to which he pushed this extravagance may be guessed from the fact, that as there were then no regular stage- or mail-coaches, he had established a line of light carriages all the way from Frankfort to Paris, and which continued during the whole of the years 1741-42, and by means of which provisions and various luxuries were brought to his establishment every week.

France paid the cost of the Bavarian follies. The war in this case did not support itself, but the French paid for everything which they obtained in Swabia, were obliged to spare Bavaria as a friendly country, and even to behave with great moderation in Austria, in order not to embitter the public mind in that country against Bavarian dominion. No kind of preparation was made in Bavaria in case of an unfortunate issue to their attempts, nor was there anything to hope for, because the Bavarians were entirely without credit. The king of Prussia profited by the French without forming a close alliance with them, in order that he might freely adopt his own plans and close his own account at the favourable moment; in addition to all this, France at that period paid and bribed the Swedish oligarchy, which, as we shall show, had at that very time commenced an unsuccessful war with Russia.

The king of Prussia was the chief gainer by Belleisle's vanity. The Bavarian and French invasion of Austria, and the inroad of the French and Saxons into Bohemia, lightened his undertakings in Silesia, and his troops ravaged the country to the very borders of Moravia. The 12,000 French who advanced into Westphalia under Maillebois were as advantageous to him as the others. King George himself had come to Hanover expressly to aid the cause of the queen of Hungary; but he was now so full of anxiety about his own electorate that he relinquished his determination, and promised to give his electoral vote in favour of the elector of Bavaria. Frederick was consequently able to separate his army of observation on the Elbe, which was under the command of the old prince of Dessau, and to send single portions of it to different places.

When Neipperg was driven out of the whole of Silesia by Frederick in October, and the Bavarians, supported by a French army, had pushed forward into Austria as far as Linz, Maria Theresa would much rather have come to terms by agreeing to some moderate territorial cessions to the elector of Bavaria, than have yielded Silesia to the hated and despised king of Prussia; but Bavaria did not wish to pay in vain for the voluminous proofs of her rights, and thought herself at least certain of the kingdom of Bohemia. And speaking of deductions and proofs, we must not omit to mention how rich Germany even then was in legal learning, when it was poor in counsel, money and union. The Bavarian deduction, or proof of the claims of the most illustrious electoral house of Bavaria to the kingdoms of Hun-

gary and Bohemia, as well as to the duchy of Austria and the countries thereto belonging, was written by Hofrath Ickstadt, (court councillor) and contains no less than fifty-seven printed sheets; and the reply on behalf of the archduchy of Austria, with its appendices, amounts to fully a hundred.

Frederick also, in the mean time, had made a treaty with Bavaria, promised his vote for the elector as emperor, and consented that he should take possession of Upper Austria, Voralberg, Tyrol and Bohemia. He had cunningly availed himself of Charles Albert's pecuniary difficulties in order to purchase from him the county of Glatz, as if he were already the rightful king of Bohemia. Brühl showed at this time that he was trained and fitted only for the business of an ordinary courtier: he had at first intended to unite with Hanover and Russia in favour of Maria Theresa, from feelings of envy and jealousy towards Prussia, and had not only protested against the march of the Prussians to Silesia, but, six months after the death of Charles VI., had renewed the alliance with Russia for the maintenance of the pragmatic sanction. In October, when Maria Theresa was hard pressed on all sides, he suffered himself to be gained over by Belleisle: but notwithstanding Brühl's accession to the treaty of Nymphenburg, on the recommendation of Belleisle, and his having bargained for Moravia in the partition of the hereditary states of Charles VI., he still continued to be jealous of Prussia, and laid claim to Upper Silesia, as if his intention was to place Saxony in a most critical position as regards Austria, Prussia and Bavaria*.

Charles Albert, who had at that time been named generalissimo of their troops by the French, longed for the moment of his coronation as king of Bohemia in Prague; he therefore withdrew his troops from Austria in order to conquer Prague, when a formidable army from Hungary was assembled to

* This treaty of accession between Saxony, Bavaria and Prussia was signed at Frankfort-on-the-Maine on the 1st of November 1741. It contains a careful and minute definition of the boundary between Saxon and Prussian Silesia, and Frederick appointed field-marshal Schwerin and privy councillor Von Nüssler to settle the partition. They were engaged on this business in the spring of 1742, when all was suddenly changed. The whole affair from the beginning was regarded as absurd by the king of Prussia; he was quite amused with Belleisle's partition of the several countries, and commanded his commissioners, that if the Saxons should oppose the Prussians taking up their winter quarters in Upper Silesia, to reply, that Prussia having conquered Upper Silesia without assistance and at great cost and sacrifice, nothing was more reasonable, since they had suffered so much in the late campaign, than that they should provide themselves with good winter quarters.

oppose him. Belleisle was not chargeable with this expedition to Prague. At the very instant in which they should have marched against Vienna he was in Dresden, and only joined the army after the conquest of Prague, and remained with it a very short time. The reduction of Prague by the united armies of France, Bavaria and Saxony excited great attention: Charles Albert and Belleisle, in this moment of exultation, celebrated the most splendid fêtes and the most pompous ceremonies at the coronation of the elector; but the conquest of the city, the pomp and empty ceremonies of their celebration, was the end of their good fortune.

The Bavarians and French under Minuzzi first entered Bohemia over Waldmünchen on the 25th of October, and the main army under Törring followed in November; the two divisions united in the middle of this month, and being joined by 20,000 Saxons, advanced against Prague. This capital fell on the 26th of November, being imperfectly garrisoned, and it was impossible for 3000 Austrians to defend a fortress of such great extent against an assault from an enemy of 40,000 men: four illegitimate brothers of the phlegmatic Augustus III. distinguished themselves in the storming of Prague; Rutowsky at the head of the Saxons, under him count Cosel and the chevalier of Saxony, and finally count Maurice of Saxony, who served in the French army, and commanded the division which made the first attack. Instead of rejoicing in empty pomp and ceremonies, Charles Albert, immediately after the capture of Prague, by a rapid march, should have made sure of all Bohemia. The archduke Francis, husband of Maria Theresa, had set out with an Austrian army to Prague in order to save the city, but returned as soon as he learned that it had fallen; everyone, therefore, expected that the allies would have marched out in search of him; but instead of that, Charles Albert continued to play the king in Prague in December. Belleisle came to Prague and took part in the festivities and ceremonies of his protégé; immediately afterwards he accompanied the elector to Frankfort, where the new emperor spent the whole of the remainder of the subsidies at his coronation, and Belleisle had full scope for his vanity. Broglio then went to Prague instead of Belleisle, and soon gave loud expression to his dissatisfaction with everything which Belleisle had done; the two marshals were inimical to each other, and were in continual strife. We doubt

whether those were right who blamed the cardinal, that, having once adopted Belleisle's plan, he did not rather begin the war with triple the number of troops, than sacrifice the third without any beneficial result, as auxiliaries of Bavaria; for a war carried on at such a distance must be still so much the greater folly, in proportion to the strength and renown of the army employed.

At the moment when the enthusiasm of the people was raised to the highest pitch in Austria and Hungary, and thousands flew to arms, when Khevenhüller was pushing forward at the head of a new army into Upper Austria, there were some 16,000 Bavarians and French in that quarter who had been left behind and were scattered about in various cities and camps: their communication with the main army was interrupted, and there was little order or harmony in the main army itself. As soon as Charles Albert left the army in January (1742) to proceed to Frankfort, in order to be crowned as emperor, Broglio was desirous of commanding both Bavarians and Saxons and met with resistance. No one placed any reliance on Prussia, and Brühl was struck with terror when he learned that 8000 Prussians had encamped in the neighbourhood of his Saxons*. He afterwards indeed accepted their aid, and forsook his allies like a coward, as soon as the affairs of the Bavarians and French appeared likely to take an unfortunate turn.

The army which the husband of Maria Theresa commanded in Bohemia had been separated; one division was to watch the movements of the Prussians, and a second to keep in check the army in Prague, whilst Khevenhüller attacked the 16,000 Bavarians and French who were in Austria under Segür. Frederick intended to make an incursion into Moravia, in order to save Segür; he therefore went to Dresden himself in the beginning of the year, even before Glatz had submitted to his rule, offered

* It is stated in the 'Life of Brühl,' already referred to, that after the conquest of Prague, in the end of December, a Saxon division under Von Birkholz, and a French one under Polastron, had marched towards Deutschbrod, in order to drive the enemy completely out of Bohemia, and that 8000 Prussians under general Kalkstein had encamped close beside them in Chrudim. It proceeds, "As soon as the Saxon generals had communicated this fact to Brühl, he was in great alarm as to what might be the object of this Prussian corps. He commanded the chevalier of Saxony, and the latter desired general Birkholz, by all means, to separate from the Prussian general, whether he came with a friendly or a hostile intention." Afterwards it is stated at length how unskilfully, from mere cunning, this separation was effected, and how the straightforward Kalkstein laughed at the Saxons.

the Saxons to aid them in the conquest of Moravia, and, after no little trouble, induced them to place their army under his command. From Dresden the king hastened to Prague, held a conference in person with the Saxon generals, and arranged the plan of an expedition into Moravia. Olmütz was taken, the north-west portion of Moravia reduced, and Brönn closely blockaded; but there was a complete want of harmony; distrust prevailed between the Prussians and Saxons; and when Frederick saw that Segür was not to be saved, he began to entertain fears for Silesia; he therefore relinquished the undertaking against Moravia (1742): however, the Saxon and French troops withdrew, and the Prussian corps under the prince of Dessau at last left Moravia.

The army which at this time liberated Austria and ravaged Bavaria had been collected in the beginning of December (1741) at Vienna, and commenced its operations against Segür's forces on the 28th. Khevenhüller held the chief command, and Wurmbrand and Bärenklau served under his orders. The facts of Wurmbrand's again appearing in the field as a general, and Neipperg's having been appointed to a command in the Low Countries, notwithstanding his acknowledged incapacity, are further proofs of the great difficulty which existed in Austria of breaking through the ordinary routine, and of ensuring merit its due reward in opposition to rank and family connexion. Prince Charles of Lorraine, brother of the archduke, who, by lending his name sometimes to general Brown and sometimes to general Traun, did much more evil than good, succeeded at length in having the ignorant and incapable Neipperg removed from the command in Bohemia. The archduke, however, did not suffer his protégé and former tutor to be lost sight of, but persuaded his wife to bestow the chief command of the troops in the Low Countries upon Neipperg instead of Aremberg. Before, however, he departed to assume his command, he who had so miserably conducted the negotiations with the Turks, took part in those which were carried on with respect to the peace of Breslau.

Khevenhüller blockaded the main body of the enemy under Segür in Linz. Menzel and Trenk, and other wild leaders of the Croats, Pandours and rabble of all kinds and from all places, who had been allured by the hopes of a rich booty, intercepted all communication between the French and Bavaria, cut off

single bands, plundered public and private stores, and, as soon as they were joined by Bärenklau* with some regular troops, made an incursion into Bavaria. At this moment Törring was marching in all haste from Bohemia for the purpose of relieving Minuzzi and Segür, who were being besieged in Linz; but he was attacked and beaten on the 17th of January 1742, between Braunau and Schärding, by Menzel and Bärenklau (Pereklö), and Segür and Minuzzi surrendered Linz on the 24th, on condition of being allowed to retire without molestation with their 10,000 men. Bavaria was at that time wholly destitute of troops; and as early as the month of February, Menzel appeared plundering and murdering in Munich, and Khevenhüller took up his headquarters in Landshut. In March, the whole country between the Lech and Danube was overrun by more than 15,000 fierce barbarians. These Austrian Raizen, Pandours, Croats, Sclavonians, Uscocks, Morlacks, and inhabitants of the countries watered by the Theiss and the Marosk, as well as Waradiners, nay, even the insurgents and portalists, made little resistance against the Prussians, for in regular warfare their service is of little value; but they were extremely useful in harassing the Bavarians and in spreading a panic far beyond the Rhine. Charles Albert celebrated his coronation in Frankfort on the very day on which his beleaguered army marched out of Linz, and in the midst of such critical affairs, the preparations for this ostentatious ceremonial had engaged his attention for months.

Whilst Bavaria was thus wasted, Charles Albert plunged into poverty and misfortune, and thousands of French were being sacrificed in his cause, the author of all this mischief was reaping new honours and being loaded with fresh marks of distinction in Germany and France. But so it is, alas! everywhere, with these decorations of honour for diplomatic services! Belleisle was created a prince of the empire by the new emperor, and Louis XV., who had made him a marshal in the preceding year, now raised his lordship of Gisors to a duchy. When Belleisle came to the coronation in Prague, the king of Prussia took advantage of the vanity of this frivolous and deluded man to deceive the French, who thought to deceive him, and to save

* We shall continue to use the better-known name of Bärenklau, although he was, properly speaking, called Johann Leopold Pereklö, Freiherr von Schönreuth.

the honour of the German name, which the emperor had disgracefully sacrificed*.

The French had sent another army across the Rhine at St. Louis and Mannheim, but they were scarcely 20,000 strong, and suffered great privations in Bavaria, because the Bavarians were entirely destitute of money, and had no expectation of an imperial army. The king of Prussia had then gained a new victory, which compelled the Austrians to withdraw their troops from the interior of Bavaria. The army which Frederick watched in Moravia, and which had followed him into Bohemia, was nominally commanded by prince Charles of Lorraine, but he was assisted by Königseck and Brown, the latter of whom was one of the most distinguished generals which Austria had possessed since the war of the Spanish succession. Before prince Charles and Königseck resolved to offer them battle, the Prussians had been reinforced from Silesia, whilst the Austrians had received additional troops in Moravia. Both had much to gain in public opinion by a victory, and should they prove unsuccessful they could easily repair their loss.

The different result of this war for the Prussians, Bavarians and Saxons is easily explained from the different course of conduct displayed by their rulers. Charles Albert contracted debts, and used the subsidies which he received in celebrating his coronation, giving fêtes, and gilding saloons. Brühl astonished all Germany by the brilliancy of the operas which he caused to be produced in Dresden, and his king purchased a large emerald for 100,000 dollars. Frederick renounced all conveniences and comforts, exhibited the greatest simplicity in his dress and mode of living, lived among his soldiers and shared their hardships; he even applied the large revenues of Silesia exclusively to the augmentation of his army.

The Austrians offered him battle, although the English had already commenced negotiations with a view to a peace, and Frederick, who had caused a new army under the old prince of Dessau to advance into Silesia, accepted the challenge. The engagement took place on the 17th of May 1742, between Czaslau and Chotusitz, and Frederick remained in possession of the field.

* Frederick II. furnishes an admirable and detailed account of the circumstances of the French and their blindness, as well as of his own views of the political condition of the various states, in the '*Histoire de mon tems*,' vol. i. chap. iv. p. 198.

victory confirmed Frederick's warlike renown gained in the battle of Molwitz, and that was the chief advantage which it brought, for the Austrians retreated in good order without having suffered considerable loss. The writer of the Austrian official report gives a very significant account to the intelligent reader, of the share which prince Charles of Lorraine took in the engagement and in the skilful retreat; he reports, that the prince was at first regarded as having either been killed or taken prisoner; he however made his appearance to his troops as they were retiring towards Moravia.

The supposition that the battle of Chotusitz was the consequence of a determination to come to an arrangement with Prussia, after having made a last attempt to retain Silesia by force of arms, receives an appearance of probability from the fact, that (through the mediation of the English) a suspension of arms had been agreed upon with the Prussians in Schnellendorf in the October of the preceding year; and besides, Austria was threatened anew by a second French army which had made its appearance in Bavaria. Broglio's army had beaten prince Lobkowitz, who had ventured with a few thousand men into the neighbourhood of Prague, to which at that very time 20,000 French troops had been sent as a reinforcement, and Belleisle himself had come from Frankfort to take the command.

Immediately after the battle of Chotusitz, negotiations were commenced between Austria and Prussia. On this occasion lord Hindfort, the English ambassador, was the representative of the queen of Hungary, from whom he had received full powers to treat, and he had also long been agreed with the king of Prussia as to the conditions of the peace: immediately after the battle of Chotusitz he was commissioned to sign the preliminaries. Before this took place, prince Charles's army marched out to meet the French, who were about to follow up the advantages which they had gained over Lobkowitz.

On the 11th of June, lord Hindfort on the part of Maria Theresa, and count Podewils on that of Frederick II., signed the preliminaries of the peace of Breslau, by which the whole of Lower Silesia and Glatz were ceded to Prussia; and it is singular enough, that the same count Neipperg, who had concluded the wretched peace of Belgrade with the Turks, was also employed in the negotiations regarding the cession of Silesia. The peace, properly speaking, was first concluded and confirmed in Berlin

on the 28th of June. If the population of Prussia be estimated as at that time amounting to 5,000,000, almost a third of the whole was gained by this treaty. Frederick excused himself for having wholly forgotten or neglected the claims of Saxony upon Upper Silesia, by stating that he had received information of Brühl's having carried on secret negotiations with the Austrians: still, for appearance sake, mention was made in general terms in the secret articles of a compensation for Saxony in Bohemia.

Prussia not only received Lower Silesia, but Upper Silesia also, with the exception of the principalities of Teschen, Tropaup, the Moravian lordships, and the district which lies on the farther side of the Oppa. The two moneyed powers and their commissioners who were mediators for the peace, took care not to forget the demands of their usurious countrymen. Charles VI. had assigned Silesia as a pledge to the English, Dutch and Brabant capitalists for moneys lent, and by the terms of the peace it was agreed that Prussia should satisfy the English and Dutch creditors, and Austria those of Brabant. This led to disputes, which have not been brought to a conclusion even till our own days, and of the nature of which we shall give more particular information in a note*.

Belleisle was the most of all deceived and put to shame by this peace, which he tried in vain to prevent, and for that purpose made a journey from Prague to the king of Prussia. Broglio had always formed a correct opinion of the king, and

* Charles VI. had entered into an agreement in London (1734) with some Dutch and English merchants for the advance of considerable sums of money, to be secured upon Silesia. The eighth article of the preliminaries contains the following sentence in reference to these claims:—*the king of Prussia shall undertake the payment of the capital*; but lord Hindfort only understood what was due to the English, but the Dutch also preferred their claim; and in the complete treaty agreed upon in Berlin, it is expressly stated that Prussia should undertake to pay the Dutch claimants also. A condition however was attached, that the king of Prussia might reckon as a set-off what was due to him by Holland. This mode of counter-reckoning led to difficulties; the Dutch were said to be indebted to the towns of Wesel, Orsoy, Büderich, Rees and Emmerich for quarters and supplies furnished in the years from 1629–68, one million of florins, which with the interest at this time amounted to four millions. The Dutch also added their interest to their capital, and when Prussia was obliged to borrow 20,000,000 in Holland in 1810, it could only obtain the money by taking 12,000,000 on the score of the old debt; the Dutch still claim the remainder. The English received 1,500,000 dollars from Prussia; the last 300,000 was kept back in the second Silesian war, because the English had seized upon some Prussian ships without a declaration of war. Vehement disputes were carried on between England and Prussia about this money, especially in 1754–55. Circumstances occurred in the seven years' war which caused the whole affair to be forgotten.

was continually differing with Belleisle respecting the course which the latter pursued. Belleisle in fact was the sacrifice of his own vanity, which the king knew well how to flatter, and by that means to realize his own views. At the time in which this peace was concluded with Frederick, the queen of Hungary had found a new enemy in the Spaniards in Italy.

§ III.

SWEDEN, RUSSIA, ENGLAND AND SPAIN TILL THE PEACE OF BRESLAU.

However unlike the circumstances of England and Russia are and were, the two powers at that time were similarly circumstanced: both were bound by their connexions and agreements to maintain the pragmatic sanction, although the one only aided the queen of Hungary by declarations and the other by contributing an inconsiderable sum of money. The governments of both countries were incessantly occupied with cabals, whilst the people of both nations were making more rapid progress than ever in the development of their various resources, each according to their own talents and opinions, customs and necessities. We shall first speak of the Russians, among whom internal revolutions, the extravagance of lovers and favourites, as well as the incapacity and immorality of the women who were called to the throne, appeared rather to promote than hinder the accomplishment of all those plans and designs which Peter the Great had begun. This was evident in Biron's administration under the empress Anna, and especially in the last years of her reign.

In a state where power ruled by the instrumentality of terror, no one could hope to perceive anything of morality, of a generally diffused feeling of the true and noble dignity of man, of a consciousness of the rights of a free and thinking being, or of legal freedom from every species of arbitrary dominion; but, on the contrary, all that was attractive, splendid and great was carried through and realized by discernment, knowledge and energetic application of force as well as by money; added to which, Biron had the continual aid and advice of a man like Münnich! This was the man who carried forward with zeal and knowledge all Peter's plans of cutting canals, making rivers navigable, con-

structing high roads, improving the whole system of engineering and the use of artillery, and of erecting the various schools and institutions which were necessary for the accomplishment of these ends. Münnich was aided in these operations by Frederick William of Prussia and by other states, who gave permission to many able and experienced men to enter into the Russian service, as well as by crowds of clever and dissolute adventurers, who, after they had violated all laws, human and divine, in the other countries of Europe, made their fortunes in Russia. During the last years of the Turkish war (1738–39), Münnich had infused a feeling of self-confidence and a consciousness of superiority into the Russian army, which had been newly trained under his direction; on these feelings victory almost wholly depends; and Biron, now duke of Courland, took all possible pains to introduce the manners and fashions of the European courts into Russia, because it is a well-known principle, that everything old is good and lawful, whilst everything new, however reasonable it may be, is hurtful and destructive.

The mixture of slavish customs and usages and the rudeness of ancient times, in combination with French fashions and German customs, which were partly forced upon the Russians and partly introduced by example, presented a most singular spectacle at the court of the empress Anna. According to Mannstein's testimony, there was no want of caricatures. French fashions became soon as prevailing in St. Petersburg as in Germany, so that French modists and dress-makers made their fortunes there in a few years. We shall quote some particulars under the text*, but it is obvious that this universal dominion

* Mannstein, 'Mémoires de Russie,' vol. ii. p. 63:—"J'ai dit en parlant du duc de Courlande qu'il étoit grand partisan du faste et de la magnificence; cela suffisoit pour inspirer à l'impératrice l'envie de rendre sa cour la plus brillante de toute l'Europe et d'y faire des dépenses excessives. Malgré cela, l'intention de S. M. ne fut pas remplie si tôt. L'habit le plus riche étoit souvent accompagné de la perruque la plus mal peignée, ou une très belle pièce d'étoffe se trouvoit gâtée par un tailleur mal adroit, ou si tout réussissoit dans l'habillement on manquoit par les équipages. Un homme superbement vêtu se trouvoit dans un méchant carosse traîné par des rosses. Le même goût régnoit dans l'ameublement et dans la propreté des maisons; d'un côté on voyoit l'or et l'argent entassé, de l'autre la plus grande malpropreté. L'habillement des dames répondoit à celui des hommes; pour une femme bien mise on y voyoit dix mal ajustées. Le sexe est pourtant généralement beau en Russie; on y trouve des visages très jolis, mais fort peu de tailles fines. Cette irrégularité étoit presque générale; il n'y avoit que peu de maisons, surtout dans les premières années, où tout fut dans un accord parfait; cependant peu à peu d'autres imitèrent l'exemple de ceux qui avoient du goût."

of French fashion, although it brought much money to France, was for that very reason destructive to morality. Parisian dealers in articles of fashion, dress-makers and fortune-hunters swarmed about every court, and were received with joy in every capital; actresses and dress-makers, players and adventurers, as well as all those who sold articles of luxury, returned with wealth to Paris; the books of the Parisian traders in literature, which were written for the amusement or pastime of the idle or dissipated, became profitable wares. But who gained by all this? precisely those very classes and descriptions of persons whose morality is universally suspicious and contemptible, because they become easily rich without labour; and those persons introduced among the French people the vices of the idle, the debauched and the extravagant of all nations, at whose expense they had become rich.

As to Russia, gross gluttony and drunkenness alone, from among all the barbarous vices of earlier times, had in some measure disappeared from the court; but dissipation of every kind, ruinous gambling and extravagance without measure were called the fashion and *ton*; yet in the midst of all this, neither the political nor the military affairs of the state suffered anything. Ostermann and Münnich were superior to all the ministers in Europe in knowledge, and whatever they willed was law! All the institutions for the promotion of industry and civilization were progressively improved; morality indeed remained as it had ever been, except that its sepulchres were painted and gilt. Traces of the rudest barbarism continually appeared along with the greatest splendour and immeasurable extravagance, and at the same time there was often a want of the simplest artificial necessities. Poverty, such as is to be found in the richest countries where manufactories abound, and which awakens the deepest compassion in the heart of every friend of humanity, is not to be found in Russia, because, as is well known, men are there provided for in the same manner and for the same reasons as, among us, an intelligent master of a household provides for his cattle. In the times of which we are now speaking, poverty and wealth were closer companions than they are now. The very first of the Russian magnates, without grievous suffering, passed from a state of the most luxurious and riotous living to the endurance of hardships and the severest privations, and he easily learned to disregard the inclemency of the season and the

greatest penury. It was this circumstance which made these frequent alterations of destiny, which were the results of political cabals and changes of government, less sensibly felt than they would otherwise have been, and which appeared to make the most cruel punishments a necessity.

The empress Anna wished to ensure to her beloved Biron the continuance of his oppressive influence ; she therefore appointed as her successor, not Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter the Great, or her niece Anna, but the son of the latter, Iwan, who was yet in his cradle. It soon appeared however that Biron, who had given her this advice, had miscalculated. Anna's sister had been married to the mad duke of Mecklenburg, and lived at a later period with her daughter in St. Petersburg. The empress married this daughter (July 1739) to Anthony Ulrich, duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg-Bevern, and adopted the son of this princess as soon as he was born, to whom she gave her father's name Iwan, and appointed him as her successor. This occurred at the same time in which uncertainty prevailed in Sweden as to the person to whom they would secure the succession upon the death of king Frederick, and when vehement contests were being carried on among the Swedish oligarchs, as to whether they should sell the country to England, to Russia, or to France. Frederick of Hesse Cassel, who reigned in Sweden, played a very miserable part ; the whole government was in the hands of the council, and its leading members were sometimes in the pay of the English, sometimes in that of Russia, and sometimes of France. There was no lack of the symbols of the prevailing passions,—party names. One party was called the *Hats* (Hüte), whilst the other was designated by the sobriquet of *Caps* (Mützen). The application of these names was merely accidental, and does not deserve notice or mention ; we may however remark, that the *Hats*, who were the party in the French interest and pay, were regarded as the most strenuous patriots ; whilst, on the contrary, the excessive prudence of the other party, who desired to maintain a good understanding with Russia, was ridiculed by the by-name of *Caps*. The latter party wished to offer no opposition or resistance to the brutal dominion of the Russian ambassador in Stockholm ; the former, in order to please the French, were eager to carry on the war against Russia in conjunction with the Turks, and to reconquer the lost Swedish provinces. We can have no better example of the enchantment

which mere titles, empty splendour, and the appearance of honour have upon the minds of weak fools, than that which is furnished by the conduct of Frederick, who despised the royal power of a landgrave in order to become the shadow of a king in Sweden. The Swedes were not clients of the same archangel to whom the Germans owe their name, for the latter suffered themselves to be sold by the landgrave like cattle, whilst Frederick was obliged to ask permission of the Swedes (1732) before he durst take a journey to his hereditary states. The landgrave Charles had died in 1730, and William VIII. carried on his trade in men with his obedient Hessians in the same manner as Frederick and all the landgraves of the eighteenth century did. The Swedes not only refused to suffer themselves to be sold, but they did not permit their shadow of a king to enjoy a bed of roses: he was preached at every Sunday on account of his amours, taken to task upon the subject by the clergy, blamed by the estates, and overwhelmed with vexation and annoyance, and yet he preferred being the shadow of a king in Sweden to a real and independent sovereignty in Hesse!

The Syllenborgs, Horns and Tessins were more powerful in Sweden than the king. Every diet brought forth new cabals, fresh bribery, fresh struggles, and greater oppression of the three lower estates. During both the years 1734 and 1735, alliances were onewhile made with France, and immediately afterwards with Russia, and the French ambassador ventured to meet the weak king, who was harassed by and on account of Miss Taube, with unheard-of audacity. This minister (Casteja) caused the papers which were prepared against Russia to be circulated through the country; and there can be no better proof of the miserable condition of the noble oligarchs of Sweden, than the parts which Casteja and the Russian minister Bestuscheff were allowed to play in Stockholm.

The scenes which occurred in that city during the war brought to light the manner in which people then sold themselves to foreigners. In June 1735 an agreement had been concluded with France, to the effect that Sweden should receive 300,000 marks banco for three years, on condition of not lending or selling troops to any power during the existing war without the consent of France. Notwithstanding this, the alliance with Russia was renewed in the following year, and the consequence was an extremely warm and unceremonious correspondence be-

tween the king and Casteja*. Frederick was extremely offended, but he was obliged to make numerous and earnest applications to the French court before he could succeed in inducing it to recall the ambassador, who was equally an object of hatred to himself and his party: when he was at length recalled, Severin was sent, who was, it is true, more courtly than his predecessor, but he did not the less zealously play the part of the former on that account. The English minister Finch also assumed a most insolent and overbearing tone, and in the never-ending game of cabals, the beauties of Stockholm belonging to both parties, around whom the nobility thronged, became no unimportant actors in the scene. Ribbons, cockades, all sorts of party emblems, pamphlets and vehement libels, cruel, unjust, legal and illegal conduct of the ruling against the oppressed party were not wanting.

The circumstances were peculiarly unfavourable to morality. The ruling parties sold themselves to the highest bidder, and had recourse to the most foolish expense; every meeting of the diet was a campaign of one party against the other; the kingdom was impoverished, all administration at an end, and the king, who was held in little estimation, was as deficient in merit as capacity. The army was in the very worst condition, nor was a general of any talents or reputation appointed to its command; whilst the whole income of the state was divided among the ruling families of the nobility and their creatures. It is difficult to imagine that any one could have thought of war under these circumstances; and yet this really took place, when the French party was victorious over the Russian in the diet of 1738.

Tessin, and not count Horn, was immediately elected land-marshal or president, and the king and his court were annoyed and offended by such a long series of dishonourable and unnecessary insults, that Frederick became ill from vexation, and then relinquished the government for a time altogether to his wife. The victorious party insisted that Sweden, in conjunction with the Turks, should commence a war with Russia, and concluded a subsidy-treaty with France. The servility of the anti-Russian party towards France went so far, that they persecuted

* The documents with respect to it are to be found in Schlözer's 'State Notices,' No. 46, pp. 170-172; and in the tenth part of Busching's Magazine, pp. 72-78.

Arkenholz, one of the most distinguished Swedish officials and historians, and removed him from his office because he had boldly and freely expressed his opinions against France and cardinal Fleury, in works written in Swedish in 1730, and therefore eight years before the period in question. The honest old Moser also, in his 'Autobiography,' furnishes us with an example of the servility of this Swedish oligarchy. He had been sent to Frankfort to Charles VII. by the estates of Würtemberg, because the emperor, by the advice and at the instance of the pope's nuntio and the Jesuits, desired to introduce a jesuitical clause into the deed confirmatory of the rights of the Würtemberg estates, which would have been directly in opposition to the peace of Westphalia and to the rights of the Protestants. Moser appealed to Sweden for support on the occasion, as one of the guarantees of the peace of Westphalia and as a German Protestant power; but the diplomatist of the egotists who were ruling in Sweden gave him this answer,— "*Sweden does not trouble itself about Germany:*" i.e. in other words, feels no interest in justice and truth, and their maintenance.

The history of major Sinclair's mission is a further proof of the results to which this government of the oligarchy led. The major had been sent, in the name of one of the parties, to Constantinople, in order to agree upon some common measures of operation with the Turks; the other party did not fail to make the Russians acquainted with the fact of his mission and its objects. The Russians in consequence fell upon him like robbers in the German territory, murdered him, and carried off his papers. On the perpetration of this enormity, the Russian empress showed a much better and more honourable spirit than the Austrian and Saxon governments, who were either silent, or countenanced the deed*; whereas the empress, who had pre-

* A complete account of this shocking history is to be found in the 8th part of Busching's Magazine, p. 311, &c., and in Schlözer's Correspondence, No. iv. p. 243. The major travelled in the company of a Frenchman, Couturier, and he is the author of the report. As to Saxony and its participation in political murders, Sulkowsky and Brühl were by far too good courtiers to be troubled with the scruples of an ordinary conscience. In Schlözer the account runs thus:—"The Russians conducted Couturier to Dresden; near the city they were met by a carriage drawn by six horses, which Couturier regarded as the carriage of the Russian ambassador. Within this (it continues) they placed the Frenchman with a lieutenant, and drove them through the city to a castle named Sonnenstein three miles from Dresden. Here the Frenchman was detained for eight weeks under close arrest. At last king Augustus released him, but he was threatened and obliged to swear that he would not think, much

viously known nothing of the plan, was no sooner made acquainted with the assassination, than she loudly and openly expressed her indignation and abhorrence of the event. That punishment was inflicted upon the Russian instruments in this affair, by the command of their empress, which should befall all the scum of officious sophists and mercenaries of arbitrary and despotic dominion,—they were sent to Siberia. As to Arkenholz, secretary of the chancery, whom we have mentioned above, the king of Sweden, being a mere puppet, was obliged to condemn him in 1738 for words which he had written in 1730, as soon as the so-called secret committee required it; and it is impossible not to express our astonishment, when we read the judgment and the grounds upon which it was founded, that people who so acted and wrote durst venture to place any confidence in freedom*.

The weak king conducted himself on this occasion as on all others. He therefore resumed on new year's day 1739 the shadow of government, which had been administered by his wife since the time of the last disputes, although his position and circumstances in this year had become still more intolerable and oppressive than before. Political affairs became continually more critical and parties more bitter, and a new cause of dispute was added to all the previous disagreements. The king was becoming old—he had no son—a successor must be chosen; and the originators of the revolution of 1718 used all their endeavours to exclude the house of Holstein-Gottorp, whose claims, on the other hand, were favoured and maintained by Russia.

Sinclair's murder and Bestuscheff's brutal behaviour in Stockholm, the open bribery which he practised, connected with the

less say to any one, that this deed with regard to Sinclair had been perpetrated with the knowledge of the court," etc.

* This judgment, which is to be found in Busching's Magazine, part xiii. p. 20, along with the reasons upon which it was founded, is not a little remarkable as a specimen of the justice of oligarchical cabinets. It runs thus: "No offence could be deduced from what Arkenholz had written with respect to different states for his own instruction, because he could not be charged with the intention of publishing those views, which had been committed to paper long before. However, because he was not prudent enough to conceal what he had written, and as he was thus guilty of publication, and besides had directed his audacious attacks against a great man and foreign minister, who had made complaints on the subject, *this suit could not be decided according to the common usages of the land*: S. M. (as the tool of the committee) therefore resolves that Arkenholz shall be removed from his office, that he shall humbly crave pardon from cardinal Fleury in writing, and that every copy of the work referred to shall be brought to the king's chancery and be destroyed."

intrigues of ladies, parties, committees and noblemen, the account of which we must leave to Swedish historians, had at length given the preponderance to the war party in July 1739: they were desirous to set an army on foot in Finland, and the French were willing to furnish subsidies for a war with Russia. The troops were despatched, notwithstanding the threats of Russia; but the oligarchical rulers divided the subsidies among themselves, and the soldiers in Finland were either starved, or deserted to the Russians because they were not paid. The hostile military demonstration on the frontiers of Finland was therefore merely a costly and dangerous threat. The treaty which had been concluded in December 1739 with the Turks against Russia, only served in a similar manner to excite the anger of Russia. The *Hats* however succeeded in securing the popular favour, and the storm of party-spirit raged more violently than ever in Stockholm. The people, according to their usual mode, took every opportunity of manifesting a most vehement and often unreasonable feeling of enmity against Russia and everything connected with it. Under these circumstances, there appeared very little prospect of the house of Holstein-Gottorp succeeding to the throne of Sweden. Charles Frederick, duke of Holstein-Gottorp, died in the year 1739, but had left behind him a son, Charles Peter Ulrich, still a minor, whose aunt, after two revolutions, became empress of Russia in the following year; and this circumstance at a later period delivered the kingdom of Sweden out of the danger into which the *Hats* had plunged it.

Prince Iwan of Russia was born in August 1740, and adopted by the empress Anna on the 18th of October of the same year, ten days after which she expired. Biron, instead of going to Courland and avoiding the bitter enmity of the Russians, which he had drawn upon himself, had obtained from the dying queen the administration of the government during the minority of the young emperor, although she herself perceived that this regency, without the consent and cooperation of the father and mother of the young emperor, would prove but a hurtful gift. During the last reign, the regent was said to have sent above 40,000 persons into Siberia: he had inflicted the most dreadful persecutions upon the family of Dolgorucki and every one connected with it. Shortly before the empress's death, he had treated the minister Walinsky and his friends in the severest manner, and immediately after he had undertaken the duties of the regency, even

insulted the general to whom the command of the army was entrusted; he could not therefore possibly maintain his position. Münnich had hoped, in Biron's name, to have the complete control of affairs; but he no sooner found himself deceived, than he came to an understanding with the duke of Brunswick and his wife, in her name caused Biron to be arrested, and transferred the regency to the duchess.

The fulfilment of this commission had little difficulty for Münnich, because he was sure of the generals, subalterns and soldiers; and Mannstein makes the very just remark in reference to the arrest of the regent, that the secret means by which it was effected during the night were altogether unnecessary, for he might just as safely have been publicly arrested in open day. This event took place on the 28th of November, precisely a month after the death of the empress. The duchess became regent and appointed Münnich prime minister, but soon withdrew her confidence from this very able but self-willed man, who was influenced by the most unlimited ambition and love of power, because he could neither agree with her nor her husband, nor with Ostermann. Anna had made her ignorant and insignificant husband generalissimo. Ostermann was offended with his colleague for desiring to conduct those affairs which belonged to his special department, and the regent had not understanding enough to perceive that Münnich, notwithstanding his unbounded ambition, was absolutely indispensable to her; besides, he seemed to follow a political system which was in direct contradiction to the opinions entertained both by herself and her husband, which were wholly favourable to Austria.

Since the peace of Belgrade, Münnich had become altogether averse to Austria, and had entered into friendly relations with Frederick. Immediately after his accession to the crown, the king of Prussia sent a relative and acquaintance of Münnich as his ambassador to St. Petersburg, who presented Münnich with estates, and induced him to make an agreement with Frederick, who had advanced into Silesia, by which the queen of Hungary lost all hope of Russian assistance. The marquis of Botta, the Austrian ambassador, who had brought about the marriage between the duke and the empress, immediately returned to St. Petersburg (at the end of 1740), and formed a union with the Saxon ambassador and with Ostermann against Münnich. The Saxon ambassador, the beautiful count Lynar,

had been dismissed by the empress Anna because he lived on terms of too great intimacy with her niece, but Brühl had sent him back to St. Petersburg at the close of the year (1740). Count Lynar renewed his intimacy with the regent, and induced her to enter into an agreement with Saxony and Austria, and to give force to her expressed opinions in favour of the queen of Hungary by raising an army. This was actually done by Ostermann without Münnich's knowledge, scarcely three weeks after the treaty which had been concluded with Prussia upon his recommendation. Münnich was so extremely indignant at this, that he refused to supply the army with the necessary marching equipments; but he soon saw that a combination had been formed against him in other affairs of importance also, and laid down his office on the 13th of March 1741.

Lynar (who for appearance sake was to be married to Mengden, one of the ladies of the regent's court), as Saxon ambassador, and the marquis of Botta strove to outwit each other; and the latter, in conjunction with Ostermann and Antony Ulrich of Brunswick, tried to effect the march of the Russian troops which Münnich had prevented. This gave occasion to an attempt on the part of the French ambassador, by means of money, to raise Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, to the throne. The marquis la Chetardie, who was now for the second time French ambassador in St. Petersburg, in order to bring about this new Russian revolution, lavished the money of his nation in the payment of enormous sums, and with as little responsibility as was done at the same time in Sweden and Bavaria.

In Stockholm the king's party was outvoted by French influence, and war was declared against Russia (August 1741), with a view of preventing that power from sending or being able to send any aid to the queen of Hungary. The king however, and many of the most distinguished men of the kingdom, still continued friendly to Russia, and the insignificant army which had been sent into Finland was neither provided with sufficient stores, nor was it commanded by a general who was skilful enough to compete with such men as Lascy and Keith, to whom it was opposed, and who had gained their experience on the battle-field and in a number of victorious campaigns. The military chest of the Swedish army in Finland was so empty, that the Russian generals no sooner advanced, than the soldiers deserted in crowds because they received no pay.

The use which the Swedish oligarchs were able to make on every occasion of the democratic assembly of the estates of Sweden, indisputably proves that a republican constitution in and of itself is neither a happiness to a country, nor if mere self-seeking men are at the helm of affairs, can it preserve the state from external dangers, or against the internal cabals which spring from the ambitious notions of selfish minds. At this very time they brought two dozen peasants into the so-called secret committee, which they would otherwise never have done, and they effected the appointment of a commission consisting of eleven members, to which all the rights of the estates in reference to the war with Russia were assigned, in which there were likewise peasants, who were wholly destitute of the necessary political knowledge and full of prejudices. In the demands which this commission ventured to make upon Russia, we recognise the faults both of the oligarchy and the democracy: they exhibited insolence, pride and ignorance, and adopted the most paltry and contemptible measures to support their demands by force of arms. The manifesto issued against Russia was extremely ridiculous*.

The first results of the war were such as corresponded with the measures which had been adopted and the leaders who have been named. Lasey sought out the Swedish army, which under Wrangel was encamped near Wilmanstrand, attacked and completely routed their forces (3rd Sept. 1741). In consequence of this defeat, Buddenbrock, and not Wrangel, was condemned to death, on the pretence or assumption that he had not advanced with his division to the assistance of Wrangel at the proper time, but in reality because they were enraged that the war which Buddenbrock had advised had taken such an unfortunate turn. Wilmanstrand was taken by the Russians without any considerable resistance. The war would have been brought to a

* The documents connected with these transactions are to be found at length in the second part of Busching's Magazine, pp. 323, &c., and extracts of sufficient extent in Schlözer's Political Notices, vol. xii. 1788. No. xlvi. p. 172. Both parties, in their declarations of war, directed their remarks only against the respective governments, and tried to bring them into bad repute with the nation. The Swedish declaration is composed as if Sweden felt herself bound to take up the cause of the Russian nation. It refers, it is true, to the murder of Sinclair, to the prohibition of the exportation of corn from Livonia into Sweden, but at the same time treats of the exclusion of the princess Elizabeth and the duke of Holstein from the Russian throne, and from the power of which strangers to Russia had deprived them and secured for themselves.

conclusion at that time, if the Russians had been able and willing to follow up their advantages in the winter season ; but they withdrew, and the Swedes were thereby furnished with an opportunity of getting a new army on foot, and of undertaking a second campaign, which proved still more unfortunate than the first. In the mean time the new revolution had been effected in Russia.

French money, and the complete unacquaintance of the regent with the nature of the Russian mode of government, brought the daughter of Peter I. to the throne, who up to this time had lived in the habitual indulgence of the grossest, most offensive and detestable sensuality. Anna preserved at least some respect for outward appearances and public decency, but Elizabeth outraged all propriety, openly carried on an improper intercourse with the under officers and privates of the guards, who, since the building of the barracks, were lodged close by the princess's dwelling, and passed their nights together without the oversight of their superior officers. The future empress had entirely won the favour of the regent, for she was good-hearted, as such people usually are, and by no means disinclined, like the guards themselves, to the drink of the Russians of former times. As long as the indolent princess was not disturbed in her inclinations, she never thought of seizing upon the management of affairs, which became afterwards wholly intolerable to her ; but she was cramped in her plans, beset with spies, often blamed for her conduct, and finally even threatened with what is most detestable to women from their nature and habits of life,—a husband whom she hated. Elizabeth was to marry the deformed and intolerable brother of the regent's husband, Antony Ulrich of Brunswick-Bevern, for whom a vain attempt was made to procure Biron's duchy of Courland ; she trusted the management of the conspiracy, to which she now became a party, to surgeon Lestocque, one of her most intimate friends. The marquis la Chetardie however still continued to be the soul of the whole affair, and also furnished the money. Lestocque himself, the son of a member of the French reformed church who had settled in Hanover, was a man wholly destitute of political qualities, without discretion and without connexions.

Had the regent not despised the advice of the English and Austrian ambassadors, Finch and Botta, and even of her own very acute and able minister Ostermann, she might still have

maintained her position on the 4th of December, by arresting the princess Elizabeth and her serjeant Grünstein, as well as Rasumowsky and Woronzow; but she was anticipated by an adventurous stroke on the 5th. Guards, soldiers, the whole miserable crowd of low men of all countries and neighbourhoods, who raised altars only for their own advantage, were wholly indifferent whether they obeyed the command of the daughter of their great emperor, or the heiress of his niece; they were quite as ready for pay to carry Elizabeth as Anna into Siberia or to prison; the only question was, who first bespoke their services. On this occasion Elizabeth was the first applicant; perhaps only because Lestocque compelled her from terror to make an effort which was quite foreign to her nature.

Accompanied by some hundreds of the guards with whom she had been previously acquainted, and who now seized upon the officer of the watch, Elizabeth went from the barracks, in the neighbourhood of which she dwelt, and required the officers and soldiers of the regent's guard to obey her (5th Dec. 1741) as the daughter of their great emperor. Other soldiers who had joined her on the way had been ordered in the mean time to arrest Münnich, Ostermann and Golofkin; whilst the regent, the duke-generalissimo, the young emperor and his sister, and all the persons of the former cabinet, were made prisoners by her own guard. This revolution, which had been effected during the night, was terminated by eight o'clock next morning; in the afternoon the whole of the troops did homage to Elizabeth, and she was proclaimed empress*. Count Lynar escaped the fate which would have befallen him, in consequence of his being at the moment absent in Saxony, whither he had gone to make arrangements for his marriage with Mengden, which would have made him an inmate of the palace with the regent. The regent and her husband were sent from one place of severe exile to another and kept in close confinement, and the unfortunate Iwan was brought up as an idiot in a miserable imprisonment. When twenty years old he was for a brief space treated with some kindness by Peter III., but when that prince was deprived of his throne and his life through his empress, Iwan was again

* Woronzow, groom of the chambers, Schwarz, who had been a musician, and Grünstein, a serjeant, brought Elizabeth to the throne; Rasumowsky, who was the son of a peasant, under the title of groom of the chambers, was formally recognised as the husband of the new empress.

cruelly incarcerated in Schlüsselburg, and at a later period, probably by command of the empress, who regarded him as a pretender, shot by the lieutenant of his guard. On this occasion it was falsely pretended that a rebellion had broken out in St. Petersburg in his favour. All the others, even Münnich and Ostermann, to whom the new empire owed so much, were banished to the most inhospitable regions.

The commencement of the new government appeared to establish a species of mob law. The ablest people, such as Ostermann and Münnich, were sent to Siberia, and all those who surrounded the new empress, if we except Woronzow, resembled a common rabble of the most dissolute men, who aimed at taking possession of the highest places; but their complete incapacity and ignorance kept them, happily, far removed from any interference with business. The ignorant and sensual friends of Elizabeth had neither inclination nor ambition to take the charge and guidance of public affairs; they were satisfied with money, titles, orders, the free indulgence of their vices and passions, and estates; and the direction of affairs again fell into the hands of able men, among whom Bestuscheff deserves to be particularly mentioned, however hateful his character was, and however much the favour shown him by Austria and England made him an object of suspicion.

With respect to the people whom Elizabeth introduced into the palace, Rasumowsky caused no uneasiness and gave no offence. The empress kept him apart from business from her attachment to his person, and afterwards, by a private solemnization of marriage, made him her husband. Woronzow, who was a man of estimable character, made himself acquainted with business, became vice-chancellor and finally high-chancellor, and maintained his position even after the death of the empress. The others, after having been unreasonably favoured, were deprived of their situations, emoluments and honours. All those grenadiers who had been favourites with the empress received the rank of officers, and formed the body-guard; of which the empress herself was captain; but by their insolence and brutality they at last became intolerable even to the Russians. Grünstein was first created adjutant and then major-general; Schwarz obtained estates; Lestocque was appointed physician to the empress and director of all the medical institutions, and received orders and estates; but unhappily for himself, notwithstanding

his frivolous talkative nature, he sometimes intermeddled with state affairs. All those people who were instrumental in raising Elizabeth to the throne ruined themselves*, and even France and Sweden altogether failed in the object for which they had effected the overthrow of Anna. From the 28th of December, the empress transferred the whole direction of affairs to the high-chancellor Tscherkaskoy and to the vice-chancellor Bestuscheff; but by the pardon and liberation of more than 20,000 banished and imprisoned persons, and by her refusal to sign any death-warrants, she raised great expectations of the mildness of her dominion.

The empress, it is true, made some splendid presents to the marquis la Chetardie; but Bestuscheff soon proved himself by far his superior in cabals, and even before the departure of her ambassador, France found herself wholly deceived respecting the advantages which had been expected. Sweden wished to satisfy Elizabeth's claims by a considerable sum of money, but the oligarchs desired the cession of some towns and their adjoining territory; this furnished the Russians with an opportunity of breaking the suspension of hostilities which had been concluded in the winter, and the war commenced anew in the spring (1742). The Swedes had on this occasion taken better measures for the campaign, equipped a considerable army, and provided a good commissariat; but the commander-in-chief was inefficient, and the government from whom he received his authority still more so. The necessary funds were wanting, for no one was willing to accept the loan or advance the money which the estates had decreed. The whole character of the oligarchy was that of proud but weak men, who were sometimes ridiculously insolent and overbearing and sometimes pusillanimous and dastardly.

About this time the king of Sweden had reached the extreme

* Grünstein was ultimately banished; Schwarz, who had been made a colonel, was sent to his estates; Lestocque was arrested in 1748 and afterwards banished; and what Mannstein relates of the grenadiers of the body guard who had received the rank of officers and been elevated to nobility, is very characteristic of a kingdom ruled wholly by force and totally destitute of moral principles. They frequented the common public-houses, became intoxicated, were often found drunk in the streets, went into the houses of the most distinguished persons, extorted money, and carried off whatever pleased their fancy. The most important is what he subjoins: *when their conduct became too bad for longer endurance, the worst subjects were selected from the body guard and distributed as officers among the regiments in service, in which many places had been made vacant.*

age of man, and after the death of his wife lost the little honour and regard which he had previously enjoyed, and was completely the slave of the council. The commander of the troops which were sent against the Russians was embarrassed and cramped in his operations at the very moment in which he had most need of unlimited power, by being obliged to adhere strictly to the resolutions and orders of the council of war; and such was the state of the country, that one party always rejoiced when the resolutions and plans of their opponents made shipwreck. The Russian army, on the contrary, which advanced to meet the ill-paid and still worse-commanded Swedes, was led by three men, who afterwards made themselves immortal in the service of three other European powers.

The chief command of the whole army was conferred upon field-marshal Lascy. The second in command was the Scotchman Keith, who became renowned as the friend and companion in arms of Frederick II., and Löwendal, who was afterwards made a marshal of France and esteemed one of the best generals in the French service, as Lascy was in that of Austria. As the Russians advanced, Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrock, who commanded the Swedes, had not even collected their forces, but sent messengers of peace to meet them, and sacrificed the fortress of Friederichshamm and all their stores and munitions of war, which in the existing condition of the Swedish finances it was quite impossible to replace. The Russians themselves were astonished when they found the passage of the Kymene, which might have been easily defended, wholly undisputed, and the Swedes rapidly retiring to Helsingfors, whither Lascy's army immediately pursued them.

In the camp at Helsingfors, the Swedes should have come to one of two resolutions, either to attack the Russians, or to retreat with all speed to Abo; they however did neither, but awaited the Russians in their camp. Regarding their position as inaccessible on account of the woods, the Swedes thought themselves secure in their camp, and there was no time to fell the trees; but one of the Finlanders, who were vehemently incensed against the Swedes, showed the Russians a path which had been cut by Peter I., but which was now completely overgrown with bushes; upon proceeding by this road, the Russians succeeded in surrounding and cutting off Lewenhaupt's army.

The Swedish troops had been blockaded for fourteen days,

when Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrock, relying upon their influence in the council and the strength of their party, hit upon a singular expedient for relieving themselves from their difficult position: they left the army, under pretence of being obliged to yield ready obedience to the demands of the diet; the command then devolved upon the oldest major-general Bousquet, who had no other course to pursue than to conclude a capitulation with Lascy. Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrock had however been deceived in their calculation, for in the diet which assembled in August, the peace party again had got the ascendancy; and the two generals, who had left the whole army in the hands of the enemy and relied upon the strength of their party for aid, were arrested before they reached Stockholm, and a prosecution was commenced against them, which terminated in their condemnation.

The army and the whole of Finland were now in the power of the Russians, and could only be preserved by endeavouring to win the favour of the empress of Russia, and by espousing the cause of her Holstein relation; and the peace party pressed for the adoption of this course. The Swedish army consisted of 10,000 Fins and 7000 Swedes. The former laid down their arms and retired to their homes, according to the terms of the capitulation, while the latter were sent back to Sweden: the artillery, ammunition and stores became the spoil of the victors. The easy conquest of Finland astonished the Russians themselves, and Mannstein endeavours to excuse the Swedish generals, in some measure, by proving, that under the then existing circumstances, even the best commanders must have been unsuccessful. After the death of the queen, the diet wished, according to Mannstein, to introduce the oligarchical principle into the army also. All colonels had a seat in the council of war, and Lewenhaupt had but one vote, like the other members; and the consequence was, the subjects of their deliberation were often obliged to be sent to Stockholm, to obtain the decision of the senate and the king. A general had but to entertain one opinion to lead another to take an opposite side; and when the diet was called upon to choose a successor to the throne, the officers immediately left the command of their respective divisions to give their votes, &c. &c.

Fortune at that time played a cruel game with the young duke of Holstein-Gottorp: she offered two crowns for his ac-

ceptance, and allured him to leave Holstein, where he would have been safe and contented, in order to make him unhappy and to devote him to a most cruel death in Russia. Charles Peter Ulrich, the son of the unfortunate Charles Frederick, was born in 1728, and succeeded his father in Holstein in 1739: his aunt Elizabeth was scarcely firmly seated on the throne when she sent for him to Russia (Feb. 1742). The empress named him as her successor in August, and the Swedes had at an earlier period offered him the crown, to induce the Russians not to insist upon the cession of Finland.

The negotiations for peace, which were opened at Abo in March, had not begun, when the empress declared her nephew (7th Nov.) her successor in Russia, he having first adopted the Greek religion. This was not yet known in Sweden, when three deputies of the Swedish diet (Bonde, Hamilton and Scheffer) were sent to Moscow to announce to the duke, that two days before his nomination to be crown prince of Russia, the estates of Sweden had elected him successor to king Frederick. His refusal to accept the proffered crown brought the Swedes into great difficulty, because Russia would only relinquish the conquests which she had made on condition that the election fell on a prince of the house of Holstein. Cabals, blind and powerless hatred against Russia, were now again awakened in Sweden, where parties were at desperate and deadly enmity with each other. Russia united with one party and demanded the election of the eldest son of the petty prince of Eutin, who bore the title of bishop of Lubeck; the opposite party favoured the choice of the crown prince of Norway, and the reunion of the three kingdoms of Scandinavia. The bishop of Eutin, Adolphus Frederick, who had now handed over his petty principality to his second brother, in expectation of being crown prince of Sweden, was nephew of the grandfather of the young grand duke, who had fallen at Clissow, and his father had been administrator of the whole of Holstein during Charles Frederick's minority in the time of the northern war. The crown prince of Denmark, as son of an absolute monarch, seemed not very well fitted to be the shadow of a king. The negotiations had commenced at Abo in March, but no conclusions were arrived at for many months, whilst the war continued both by sea and land. The dislike of the people to the Russians and their party in the mean time reached such a height, that the latter had come to

an understanding with their opponents, that if peace was not concluded before the 4th of July, they would unite with them in favour of the crown prince of Denmark.

The Russian party, assured of the protection of the empress against Denmark, and the furious people had agreed with the Russian ministry to effect the election of Adolphus Frederick before the appointed limit, and obtained reasonable conditions of peace. The preliminaries were signed at Abo six days before the appointed time, and the messenger who conveyed the tidings, in order to reach Stockholm within the time, entrusted his life to a leaky boat upon the open sea, and arrived precisely on the very day on which the Danish prince was to be elected. The estates were now obliged to fulfil their former promise, which councillor Cederström, and Nolleken, secretary of state, had given in their proposals at Abo, and Adolphus Frederick was elected.

The choice of the prince of Holstein served only to embitter the public feeling, tumults broke out in various places, and the Dalecarlians, by taking up arms and advancing on the capital, placed the government in a state of the greatest difficulty. Under the command of a major Wrangel they advanced towards Stockholm; the soldiers who were ordered out to oppose them declined the service, and the guards commanded to arrest their progress refused to treat their fellow-citizens and countrymen as enemies; and at last they were obliged to appeal to the Russians, who sent a fleet of gunboats into the immediate neighbourhood of Stockholm. Their assistance, however, was not required, because the crews of the galleys which had just returned from Finland were employed in proper time to put down the rebellion. The investigations which were instituted into the nature and grounds of this rebellion, and the execution of major Wrangel and other leaders, only served to increase the bitterness and violence of party enmity, as usually happens in cases of civil commotion. Lewenhaupt and Buddenbrock were also condemned and executed.

In order to profit by the weakness of the oligarchy and the miserable disputes of the nobles and the senate, Russia tried, by the most unscrupulous means, to maintain the miserable constitution, precisely in the same manner as was afterwards done in Poland. This took place eight years afterwards (1751), when even the nearest relation of the successor to the Russian throne had become king of Sweden; but in Russia the successor to the

throne was never consulted on state affairs, and the empress Elizabeth herself only sought information from time to time as to what was going on. The peace of Abo itself was by no means disadvantageous to the Swedes; they received back Finland and ceded only Kimengardslehn with all the branches and mouths of the river Kymene, Nyslot and the district around it, in the province of Sawolar*.

Immediately afterwards Lestocque, with his usual imprudence, conducted himself so improperly that he forfeited the favour of the court even as a physician; La Chetardie left Russia in October, Tscherkaskoy died in November, Bestuscheff became high-chancellor, and brought about a defensive alliance between England and Russia for fifteen years, which appeared highly advantageous to the cause of queen Maria Theresa.

The ministry in England under George I., and in like manner under George II. (from 1727), had been obliged to secure the favour of the king on the one hand and that of the parliament on the other, by a lavish use of the money of an industrious people. Labouring under a happy delusion, the Englishman boasted of his privileges, freedom and independence; and it very rarely occurred to the seaman, labourer, artisan or trader, to consider, that whilst he was employed in active labour, making discoveries, traversing land and sea, and heaping up wealth, that almost all the gain was played into the hands of the parliamentary majority. The treasury paid pensions and sinecures, the costs of war and subsidies, foreign embassies and journeys of the aristocracy, who did the plebeians the occasional honour of admitting a rich merchant or landowner, a lawyer, or the useful son of a newly-made family, among the barons of their exclusive society, which in England has the same kind of value that belongs in Germany to the poor courts of poor princes. The numerous alliances and counter-alliances into which they entered, the internal dissensions in England and Scotland, to

* Mannstein makes a remark, which is such an evidence of devilish politics, that we quote it only upon his authority and in his own words, 'Mémoires,' vol. ii. p. 300:—"Cependant, avant de quitter la Finlande, les troupes Russes en tirèrent toute la substance; l'intention de la Russie étoit de ruiner tellement cette province, qu'elle ne pût s'en relever de long-tems, et les généraux eurent ordre d'y tenir la main. L'impératrice feignant toutefois de vouloir rétablir la bonne harmonie avec ces voisins, fit distribuer quelques mille boisseaux de bled de ses magasins aux paysans Finlandois, pour qu'ils puissent ensemençer leurs terres."

which we have already referred, the subsidies to German princes, but particularly the continual and progressive increase in the number of places and amount of salaries in order to extend patronage, cost incredible sums of money. What immense sums were the people obliged to pay for corrupting those who were privileged to vote for members of parliament, and after the election to buy the members themselves! In every parliament the taxes were increased, keeping pace with the increase of prosperity, and the national debt grew with every succeeding year.

We have before stated that Robert Walpole, who again became prime minister under George II., had at one time disapproved of the obsequiousness of his colleagues, their support of royal plans and indulgence of kingly fancies, and had retired from the ministry because he was not supported in his efforts to promote greater economy; and he it was who, under George II., advised the adoption of all those measures which since that time have awakened an entirely new species of opposition. He it was who first called into activity the voice of the unrepresented masses, which somewhat more than ninety years afterwards completely prevailed. The lower classes in England, like those in Saxony and France, already began to feel the insolence of the higher, who insist upon an order of things which always makes the poor poorer and the rich richer: we are furnished with examples of this in the disputes respecting the charitable corporations and the first attempts at the introduction of excise. With respect to the former, it appears that £5,000,000, which had been left in trust by benevolent persons to commissions for charitable uses upon very moderate interest, had completely disappeared in the year 1731, by the clearly-proved dishonesty and frauds of persons of distinction to whom the moneys had been entrusted, and of others who were concerned in the care or management of the trusts. The close connexion of this with the moral condition of the higher classes, united in an alliance against the lower, may be deduced from the results of the inquiry instituted by parliament, on which it was shown that many of the most distinguished persons of the kingdom, whose names were suppressed, were well known to have been guilty of most scandalous frauds; and the parliament, in order in some measure to content the people, were obliged to condemn four of their own members.

In 1732 Sir Robert Walpole, firmly relying upon his majority

in parliament, which was composed of his well-paid partisans and those of the ruling Whigs, thought himself able to impose excise duties upon the people, notwithstanding the universal shout of opposition which was raised; but he was deceived. The people had even at that time begun to forbode their fate, but had not anticipated that poor-houses would be changed into prisons. The excise, as is well known, was afterwards introduced, and continues to this day its oppressive operation upon the middle classes. Even when the people rose in masses, the minister, who was regarded as the boldest and most inexhaustible in expedients of any man of his day, adhered firmly to his proposition. In conjunction with his parliament he despised the threats of the furious and enraged multitude, whose number and violence daily increased, because on this occasion the better classes of the poorer citizens, who are now deprived of many enjoyments by taxes which were then only threatened, joined the masses. The matter proceeded to such a length, that all government and legislation were obstructed, and the lives of the minister and his venal majority were threatened by the mad-dened populace, who crowded the streets and kept parliament in a state of close blockade, till at length the minister withdrew his bill.

The people gained a signal triumph, and celebrated it after their rude fashion by loud rejoicings and by burning the minister in effigy. Sir Robert conducted himself on this occasion quite in his clever and characteristic manner, by either laughing at the fools like a philosopher or an arrant cheat. In the disputes between king George, his wife and son, Frederick prince of Wales, he also attached very little importance to the voice of the nation. He and his parliament rejected Pulteney's motion for allowing the prince of Wales £100,000 per annum in order to please the king, who from personal dislike wished to limit his allowance to half that sum. If however Walpole's foreign policy be blamed, for having avoided or dreaded war, when he is accused of being alone to blame for having suffered France to get possession of Lorraine, Spain of Naples, and Russia to accomplish its views with respect to Poland in the last war, much may be said in his defence. He might be justified upon the allegation, that from the very moment of his accepting office, he had been strongly opposed to that policy which led England to mix up herself and her interests with con-

tinental affairs; and that on this ground he had retired from public office for some considerable time in the reign of George I., because he conceived that by such interference England had nothing to gain, and must necessarily vastly increase the amount of her national debt. It might further be added with justice, that England should have devoted her attention and energies to naval dominion, trade and manufactures alone; but it was precisely on this very point, and especially in reference to Spain, that Walpole was exposed to the most vehement accusations.

The Spaniards were very jealous of their trade, especially with their American colonies; the English however could be restrained by no law, intimidated by no coast-guards; and the former therefore exercised great severity, and had recourse to excessive cruelties as a retaliation against English traders, and as punishments of those traders or mariners who fell into the hands of their *guarda costas*. This roused the indignation of the English merchants, who raised an outcry against Sir Robert Walpole, because he had not by some means compelled the Spaniards to renew the treaty of 1715, by which hitherto all other nations except the English had been almost entirely excluded from the Spanish colonies, and for having cramped and fettered their trade with Spain by the imposition of heavy import and export duties. The minister indeed had gained so much by the treaty of Seville, that the English again demanded the privileges which had been withdrawn from them; but the Spaniards would not relinquish that system of limited intercourse with their colonies which was ruinous to the colonies themselves. Other subjects of difference and enmity were added to these: the Spaniards, for example, claimed the right of property in districts and coasts where they had no settlements, and where they had undertaken no measures to enable them to profit by the productions of the soil, the woods, or the mountains: this applied particularly to Campeachy bay, whence the English imported mahogany and dye-stuffs, and to the island of Tortuga, from which they brought salt. The English were not however, at least for some time, actually excluded from these places by force: the strife was still greater with respect to the system of smuggling which was carried on between the English West India islands and the Spanish colonies.

The English newspapers of that time were daily filled with reports of the plundering of English ships, of the arbitrary ill-

treatment of sailors and captains, and with shocking narratives of the inhumanity of the Spanish *guarda costas*; and the feelings of abhorrence which these descriptions raised in the minds of the people were strengthened by the repeated references which were made to the subject and the vehemence of the speeches which were delivered in parliament. The affecting narrative of captain Jenkins is universally known, which he gave at the bar of parliament, and which raised irresistible feelings of sympathy and indignation in the public mind *. The alarm at length became so great, that even Walpole's friends began to disapprove of his over-anxious endeavours to maintain peace with Spain. During the whole year 1737 he had protested in vain, negotiated in vain, and demanded satisfaction and compensation all to no purpose, and in 1738 he could no longer restrain parliament from agreeing to an address to the crown, which called for serious and if necessary hostile measures to be adopted against Spain. Walpole satisfied the parliament by promises; but it had no sooner been prorogued, than, contrary to the desire of the nation, he renewed negotiations in 1739. These negotiations led to a treaty, which was signed on the 14th of January at Pardo near Madrid, and hastily confirmed by the king by letter on the 15th, in order that the English minister might be able to lay the document before parliament, which was to reassemble in February.

Walpole was indeed right in maintaining that nothing was to be gained by war, and that sailors, merchants and smugglers, as well as the opponents of the ministry and the people, were all acting from the impulse of blind passion; but this pretence of a treaty at Pardo, this pitiful delusion, in whatever way the affair may be regarded, was a most contemptible subterfuge.

The agreement signed at Pardo does not contain a word respecting satisfaction; all the compensation which is there promised was a mere delusion, because there had been an admission of counter claims on the part of the Spaniards against the

* See 'Walpole's Memoirs,' chap. li. It is there stated, that all this was a mere ridiculous political farce, such as we have seen abundance of in our own times. The smuggler and ship-captain played his part, which he had learned by heart, to admiration: all the stories about ears being cut off and of the contemptuous expressions which had been used against king George and his ministers had occurred as long before as 1731, and were therefore long since forgotten. This means, in other words, that his opponents employed the same description of machinery which he also used for his puppet-shows; and it was no justification to him to prove that the people were blind and passionate.

South Sea Company; the negotiations with respect to the restoration of the trading privileges which the English had enjoyed at the end of the seventeenth century, to the navigation on the coast of South America, to the cutting of mahogany and dye-woods and the trade in salt, as well as those upon the slave trade (*assiento*), were referred to a new congress, whose duration being fixed at eight months, might equally as well have been for as many years. This treaty was approved by such a small majority in parliament, that the minister saw he should not be able to maintain peace, and he at length sent an English fleet to Gibraltar. The inefficient and ignorant duke of Newcastle, then secretary for foreign affairs, on this occasion played the part of braggart, and the prime minister that of mediator: the one wrote violent letters to Spain and made haughty demands, the other tried to give a friendly turn to the negotiations which had been commenced by the agreement of *El Pardo*. The latter plan was impossible, because the Spanish minister and the self-willed king, when they could be brought to give any answer at all, maintained the more obstinately their haughty attitude in proportion as the vehemence of the English nation increased, and as Walpole showed more anxiety to avoid the war, on which he was obliged ultimately to resolve. The war against Spain was first declared in October (1739). The English on this occasion also pursued that course of which they have always been accused, and which is the dishonourable practice of covetous sea-robbers only; that is, in order to enrich their sailors with booty, they caused their privateers to be in readiness long before the declaration of war was issued; and Walpole and his friends were not ashamed even to boast publicly in their parliamentary speeches of a piece of dishonourable conduct of which they had not been guilty. They alleged, viz. that they had agreed to the treaty of *El Pardo*, and had recourse to the subsequent negotiations only in order to gain time to make the necessary preparations for prosecuting the war with success. With the exception of the privateers and their owners, the chief advantage of this war fell to the share of Denmark and Hesse, which received £250,000 each for maintaining, as it was said, 6000 troops ready for the service of England, because George II., having some personal quarrels with Prussia, feared for Hanover; and that these troops were destined for Hanover alone, clearly

appears from the condition that they were not to be taken beyond sea.

Robert Walpole at this time acquired the highest reputation and that immortality which he still enjoys among diplomatists and in the world of high life, which contemplates man and his actions from a loftier point of view than that of the narrow-minded citizen. The whole great world was filled with wonder and admiration at the manner in which he maintained himself under the most difficult circumstances; for he never blushed at his conduct, and never scrupled to adopt any means which were necessary to his object. He was opposed in parliament by lord Carteret, a man of great talents and knowledge, and by Pelham, brother of the duke of Newcastle. Both were highly valued by the king, but Walpole could place no reliance upon the duke of Newcastle, whose brother possessed all those various capacities in which the duke was wholly deficient. The prince of Wales, who enjoyed the favour of the people, was opposed to Walpole, who shared in the hatred which George II. had drawn upon himself by his persecution of his son. The disputes between father and son had proceeded to such a length, that prince Frederick of Wales did not even give information to his father of the approaching confinement of his wife; and when this event suddenly and unexpectedly took place, the prince was commanded immediately to leave the palace. After the scandalous quarrels referring to the confinement of the princess, which we altogether pass over, the prince lived as a private gentleman and voted with the opposition. His father annoyed him in every possible way, and even caused a notice to be inserted in the court papers that no one would be admitted to St. James's who visited at the house of the prince. Prince Frederick was a genuine Englishman, delighted in fox-hunting and horse-racing, lived in a very domestic manner, and his pursuits and tastes were in all respects much more akin to the nature and habits of the people than those of his father, who was more Hanoverian than English. But what was more unfortunate than all for Walpole's courageous, or rather audacious struggle against public opinion, was, that the war in its commencement was followed by none of those important results which the people in their overbearing pride had expected.

The Spaniards, who obtained sailors and marines from France,

fitted out numerous privateers, captured many English ships, and thereby injured and disturbed their trade. Even admiral Vernon's splendid marauding expedition against Portobello did not compensate the English for the injuries which their trade sustained from the Spaniards, by the strict prohibition of English wares and of intercourse with England. Admiral Vernon's first undertaking against Portobello was completely successful. To the astonishment of the world and the great triumph of the English, whom he enriched by immense booty, he with a very few ships conquered, plundered and razed this city. This expedition and its success led to another, which cost immense sums, but which burst like a soap-bubble. Vernon was to take possession of the whole Isthmus of Darien; for this purpose a fleet was fitted out and an army put on board, such as England had never before sent beyond seas, and admiral Anson was ordered to sail into the Pacific, in order to support and aid his operations on the west coast. The Spaniards suffered great losses, whilst Anson gained the highest renown, enriched himself, the lords of the Admiralty and his crews; but the costly undertaking on which he had, properly speaking, been despatched, completely failed. Admiral Vernon first tried his fortune on the Isthmus, but proved unable to capture Carthagena as he had expected; and after having suffered great losses in his attempt in April (1741), he undertook an expedition against Cuba in July, with a view of at least saving his honour; but this proved equally unsuccessful. The millions which had been expended on this undertaking were quite thrown away, and the lives of more than 20,000 men fell a sacrifice. By his voyage round the world, Anson at least increased the glory of his nation, and their confidence in their courage and skill in navigation. He sailed round the southern extremity of America, which, however common it may be now, was then very difficult; whilst the Spanish fleet, which was despatched in pursuit of him, tried in vain to weather Cape Horn. Anson arrived in the Pacific, captured and pillaged the rich city of Panama, carried fire, sword and devastation along the coasts of Peru and Chili, but lost all his ships, except a single vessel, in these unknown seas. The voyage of this ship of war under Anson's command continued to be the wonder of the world, till captain Cook furnished it with a greater marvel of the same description. Anson first captured the celebrated Acapulco ship, the *Hermione*,

which was of enormous size, and loaded with all the treasure and goods which were transported from the Philippines to the coasts of Peru and Chili. By the capture of this one ship he realized a booty of more than 4,000,000 florins; he persevered in disregarding the difficulties of unknown seas and currents, as well as dangers by land, passed some time in the Ladrões, and returned to England after a voyage of three years, having doubled the Cape of Good Hope and successfully circumnavigated the earth. It may be added, that the author of the account of lord Anson's voyage, who represented the Ladrões as a paradise, and quite enchanted the good Rousseau, contributed not a little to make lord Anson's name known and admired by all the novel-readers of Europe.

These circumstances prevented Walpole from allowing England to interfere in the war respecting German affairs on the death of Charles VI., as his king had wished him to do. The outcry against Walpole and his cabinet became daily louder, and he had reason to fear not only for his honour but his life; and, moreover, the time was fast approaching when his parliament would have completed the period of its legal existence, and a new election would take place. King George, as elector of Hanover, wished to act in favour of the queen of Hungary, and the English minister supplied some money; but king George gave his vote in favour of Charles Albert, whilst the Spaniards would not suffer themselves to be restrained by the war with England from following out the plans of their queen by a campaign in Italy.

§ IV.

SPAIN, FRANCE, ENGLAND, AUSTRIA AND BAVARIA, TILL
THE DECLARATION OF WAR BY FRANCE AGAINST AU-
STRIA, ENGLAND AND HOLLAND.

The claim which was made by Spain on the whole monarchy of Charles VI. had no foundation whatever, either in descent, the popular will, or an appearance of right; we therefore take no further notice of this point; but the attempts of the Spaniards on Italy should have roused and kindled into a flame the enthusiasm of all the Italians, if their degenerate and selfish minds had possessed a spark of the love of freedom, country and inde-

pendence. When the queen of Spain sent an army into Italy, she declared that her second son, Don Philip, as a descendant of the duchess of Parma, was to found an Italian national kingdom in Lombardy, in the same manner as Don Carlos had done in the former war in Naples, and that his father would cede to him all his claims to the Spanish inheritance in Upper Italy. In order to attain this object, Spain concluded the treaty of Nymphenburg, and entered into an alliance with Prussia and Saxony. Unfortunately their real plans durst not be publicly announced in Italy, for fear of offending the king of Sardinia and detaching him from their interests.

Charles Emanuel, like all his predecessors, looked upon this war also as merely a means of obtaining sometimes money and sometimes an augmentation of territory, by a prudent change of parties and allies, as circumstances might suggest. The French and Spaniards therefore sought to gain his favour, by opening to him some views upon the Milanese; but he was too cunning for them both. He at first agreed to the proposals which were made him; but he no sooner discovered that they were insincere, that they wished to bring Don Philip to Milan, and that his possessions in Piedmont would then be placed in a very dangerous and critical position between the French and their protégé in Milan, than he lent an ear to the overtures of the English, accepted English money, and received a promise of a portion of the Milanese from Maria Theresa. The English as well as the French at first injured their cause by their hesitation and disinclination to engage in a war which proved to be unavoidable.

In the spring of 1741, the queen of Spain proposed to send an army of 15,000 men into Italy, which, in connexion with Sardinian and French troops, were to drive the Austrians out of that country. In order to facilitate the landing of these troops, the king of Naples had made himself master of the sea-coasts of Tuscany; but admiral Haddock watched the Spanish harbours so closely, that the ships could not take their departure till the autumn. The French had previously sent a fleet, in the year 1740, to cooperate with the Spaniards and to act against the English in the West Indies, in the autumn of 1741. They sent their Toulon fleet to sea, in order to form a junction with the Spanish ships destined for Italy; the English admiral did not venture to attack the combined fleet, probably because he was not permitted to break the peace, rather than from a fear that

he was not equal to cope with their forces. The transport-ships were thus conveyed to Italy and the Spanish troops were disembarked in the territory of Genoa.

The landing of the Spanish troops in Italy, however little their general, the old duke of Montemar, fulfilled the expectations which the queen had formed of him in consequence of his easily-won fame in the battle of Bitonto, but especially the retirement of admiral Haddock in presence of the combined fleets, deprived the minister of the votes of all those members of the newly-elected parliament who were anxious to secure for themselves places under the new government. The nation accused the minister either of weakness or cowardice, and loudly demanded that the government should adopt the cause of the queen of Hungary. The preceding parliament, at its last sitting in April, had voted £200,000 as a subsidy for Maria Theresa, a sum of £300,000 to be placed at the disposal of the king, and had also paid the Danish and Hessian troops, notwithstanding that Shippen, who by way of distinction was called *honest**, offered a vigorous opposition to these delusive measures; the dislike however became still stronger, as all those measures proved vain. The king, on his journey to Hanover, became alarmed at the power of the French and Prussians, and came to an understanding with them; so that the Danes and Hessians had received their money without any equivalent in return. The trifling subsidies which the ministry sent to the aid of the queen of Hungary did her cause little good, when compared with the injury it sustained by their suffering the Spaniards to land their troops in Italy, which afforded a complete triumph to the opponents of the ministry. The ministerial party had been already defeated in the contest respecting the disputed elections and made the greatest efforts to maintain their position, but in vain; the king without compunction caused the most splendid offers to be made to his son, if he would retire from the ranks of the opposition; as early as February (1742) Walpole perceived that he could not possibly maintain his ground, and therefore resigned.

The nation gained nothing by the change of government, for, according to the then constitution of elections, the duke of Newcastle and his dependents were indispensable, even though

* He was *honest*, the others honourable and right honourable.

they had formed a part of the late ministry. Carteret, who had always made himself acceptable to the king and been greatly favoured by him, under an unpretending title, led the new administration. The insignificant and self-willed duke had a place of honour; his brother Pelham, although he possessed neither great genius nor much information (he neither understood French nor German), was a man of sound understanding and great prudence; as skilful as Walpole, and much more refined. As long as Carteret had Pelham for his friend, and shared his influence with him, the complaints of the people and their rage against his measures were altogether vain. Walpole, under the title of earl of Orford, was made a member of the upper house, and the attempt to call him to a public account completely failed, because among all people, under all constitutions and at all times, wholesale treachery and fraud, when practised against the paying, labouring and suffering classes, have ever been and are always sure of impunity; whilst the same offences upon the smallest scale, when committed against the rich and the powerful, are always punished with severity.

Walpole, earl of Orford, died in March 1745, without leaving behind so great a fortune as might have been expected from a man in his position; he had not enriched himself, but conferred wealth on his friends and protégés. On a formal inquiry into the last ten years of Walpole's administration, abundance of legal proofs were furnished of an entirely irresponsible administration of the public moneys. Without going into particulars we shall merely remark, that more than 16,000,000 of florins (£1,340,000) had been devoted to secret services*, of which the higher officials in the treasury could give no account to the com-

* A great part of the money was no doubt applied to negotiations, which were fruitless and without result. We shall illustrate this by a few examples from the '*Etat Politique de l'Europe*,' vol. ix. p. 205, and show, in consequence of the system pursued by Walpole and other ministers, who like him were anxious for the maintenance of peace, what treaties originated from the peace of Utrecht and how they ultimately led to war. First the treaty of 1716, from which sprung the quadruple alliance, 1718, and from this the special treaty of 1721; from this agreement the congress of Cambray, 1722, which produced the first peace of Vienna, 1725; from the treaty of Vienna came the agreement in Hanover, 1725; from the Hanoverian treaty the preliminaries of 1727, and from these preliminaries the congress of Soissons. The congress of Soissons produced the convention of El Pardo, which last gave rise to the provisional treaty, and this provisional treaty again led to that of Seville, 1729, which was followed by the second treaty of Vienna, 1730. This second treaty of Vienna gave rise to the convention of 1738, which originated the war.

mittee of parliament. The elder Pitt, although he owed his seat in the house to the duke of Newcastle, distinguished himself above all others by his eloquence and noble zeal in the debates upon the reckless and fraudulent waste of the public money. He had already laid the foundation of his great reputation throughout Europe by his eloquent and overwhelming reply to the minister who reproached him with his youth, on which occasion he reminded Walpole, that a man who had grown gray in the shameless disregard of every social virtue, and who from early youth till advanced age, with unblushing front, had set at naught every principle of morality, had no right to reproach any man with his youth.

The new ministry were far from being united in their views; the Pelhams were jealous of Carteret, who enjoyed the favour of the king, by promoting all his plans upon the continent. It was only a month after Walpole's removal that the king of Sardinia renounced the alliance with Spain and France against Austria, and in March 1742 he publicly declared, that under the influence of England he had given up his union with Spain, in order to attach himself to the cause of Maria Theresa. Immediately afterwards (April 1742) the queen of Hungary, for the second time, received subsidies from England, and on this occasion £500,000, whilst the parliament voted further sums for the payment of Hanoverian, Danish and Hessian troops. These troops were to form an army in Flanders, and at the same time, and in the manner already related, the king of Prussia was induced to agree to the peace of Breslau, upon the English guarantee for the possession of Silesia.

At the moment in which Prussia withdrew from the contest, and England endeavoured to promote the Austrian cause by subsidies and friendly services of every description (summer 1742), the new emperor and all his allies were reduced to a most critical condition. On the one hand, the naval powers appeared to be quite in earnest in their resolves to maintain the pragmatic sanction and the conditions of the peace of Utrecht; and on the other, circumstances in Bavaria were very unfavourable to the French.

The English collected an auxiliary army in the Austrian Netherlands, which was placed under the command of lord Stair, who went immediately to the Hague, to induce the states-general to assist him with troops in like manner; this necessarily

detained Maillebois in Westphalia, and Harcourt alone was unequal to encounter the Austrians in Bavaria. The Austrians had now taken possession of Munich for the second time (in May 1742), and Khevenhüller's army was scattered about over the whole of Lower Bavaria, when Frederick made an incursion into Bohemia. When Austria was obliged to direct the whole of her forces against Prussia, the troops were withdrawn from Bavaria; but the peace of Breslau was no sooner concluded than the army returned, which had been strongly reinforced in the mean time. The main army of the Austrians had continued before Prague, which was occupied by the French.

As early as June, Pisek and the magazines of the French had been taken; in July the Austrian army beleaguered Prague, and the French offered to evacuate that city and Bohemia in general if they were permitted to retire with their artillery and baggage. In the circumstances in which they were placed, the Austrians refused to accede to the conditions; the negotiations were therefore broken off, and the consequences of the want of vigorous conduct on the part of the French government were very conspicuous on this occasion, although the blockaded army made a most noble and glorious defence. The three commanders, each of whom confided in his influence at court, acted in accordance with his own notions of expediency or right, and were continually counteracting one another. Broglio and Belleisle carried on constant disputes in Prague; Harcourt twice received couriers from Paris, directing him immediately to march with his army from Bavaria into Bohemia; he paid no regard however even to the last and most imperative command, but assembled a council of war, and excused his disobedience by their opinion. He refused to attack the Austrian army in Bavaria under Khevenhüller, as the Bavarians were desirous that he should do; and as Harcourt would not venture to take any step, Bavaria remained even till the autumn exposed to the wasting and predatory incursions of the Pandours and Croats.

The attention of the whole of Europe was directed at this time to the siege of Prague; for long before its commencement the French had been in want of the most necessary means of resistance, and Belleisle offered a second time to capitulate, if he were permitted to retire unmolested. But not only were Broglio and Belleisle disunited; and Harcourt not only refused obedience to the commands of his government, which ordered him

to march, but the aged cardinal himself declared that the politics of the court were entirely opposed to those of the cabinet, and that Belleisle had greater influence in Versailles than he himself possessed*. He made this remarkable declaration in a friendly letter which he wrote to the president of the Austrian council of war, in order to facilitate the negotiations for an evacuation of the city, which Belleisle had commenced. Maria Theresa, from female obstinacy, despised the repeated proposals of the French; and when circumstances afterwards compelled her to desire that which she had previously declined, her proposal in its turn was rejected by her enemies.

The negotiations were long protracted which the English ambassador was carrying on in the Hague, in reference to the Dutch troops which were to unite with the auxiliary army assembled at Brussels. Maillebois could be dispensed with on the Lower Rhine, and Belleisle used all his influence in Paris to persuade the government to send the army of the Lower Rhine into Bohemia to his aid. The old cardinal indeed refused to expose this army also in such a hazardous game; but the marchioness de Mailly, who represented to the king himself the wants of the French in Prague, their long-continued and heroic struggles with the enemy, with hunger and want, prevailed upon him to adopt their cause in the council of state. As soon as the king himself had espoused their party, Fleury was overruled, and Maillebois received a command to march into Bohemia; still the cardinal succeeded in preventing this new army from being placed at the disposal of the Bavarians, as Charles VII. had wished it to be, or from being placed under his command. Maillebois marched with the army, which, after being joined by Harcourt's division, was between 40,000 and 50,000 strong, through Franconia towards Eger. The Austrians now began to repent that they had not accepted the conditions offered by the French, and suffered them to depart.

* Belleisle not only negotiated twice concerning the retirement of his army, but Fleury himself wrote upon the subject. Belleisle did not hesitate to bring a letter of Fleury's to Königseck, with a view to facilitate the negotiations, in which he himself is accused as the originator of the war. Maria Theresa caused this letter to be printed, and the cardinal had no other resource than to deny it. It runs thus: "Bien des gens savent, combien j'ai été opposé aux résolutions que nous avons prises, et que j'ai été en quelque façon forcé d'y consentir. Votre Excellence est trop instruite de tout ce qui se passe, pour ne pas deviner celui qui mit tout en œuvre pour déterminer le roi à entrer dans une ligue qui étoit si contraire à mon goût et à mes principes."

The Austrians were obliged to change the siege of Prague into a blockade; great sums of money had been already expended in the undertaking and many thousand men had been lost, and Khevenhüller was sent for from Bavaria to come to their aid. The prince of Lorraine had scarcely moved away from Prague with the army to march against Maillebois, when Broglio followed close upon his steps, in order to seize any favourable opportunity of forming a junction with the liberating army. Charles VII. in the mean time appointed field-marshal Seckendorf, who had taken his leave of Austria, to be commander-in-chief of his army. Fortune seemed at first very favourable to his plans, and in his own biography he boasts not a little of his achievements; but it very soon appeared, that at this time in Bavaria there were as few laurels to be won as he had gathered under Charles VI. in the Turkish war. Bärenklau (Pereklö) having retired from Munich, Seckendorf again took possession of Bavaria, and the emperor returned to Munich; but their joy was of short duration, for Maillebois had committed a gross blunder in Bohemia: he steadfastly refused to push forward far into the country, because he alleged that no supplies were to be found in Bohemia, and that he had already lost 12,000 men on his march from the banks of the Rhine to the frontiers by storms, bad roads, and a deficiency of all sorts of necessaries for the sustenance of his troops. Both the marshals certainly suffered more severely from want of money and means of transport than from the enemy, which therefore readily furnished Maillebois with a pretence to justify his sudden retreat*. The Austrians were in the circle of Saaz; Broglio, near Leutmeritz, with 12,000 men; Maillebois had pushed forward by way of Carlsbad as far as Klösterlin and Cadan, when he suddenly recalled count Maurice of Saxony from Cadan on the 19th of October, on the 22nd again returned to Eger, and from thence marched into the Upper Palatinate. Belleisle's army in Bohemia was now left to its fate.

The undertakings of the French and their allies in Italy were not more successful than those in Germany; for although the Spanish troops were partly disembarked on the coasts of Genoa

* He pretended that the position of the Austrians in the circle of Saaz rendered his further advance impossible, because he had reason to fear a total want of supplies, the army having brought with them only fourteen days' provisions from Eger, and no means of transport from Saxony were possible.

and partly on those of Tuscany, and had been reinforced by Neapolitans, yet the Sardinians had already declared for Maria Theresa, and Montemar exhibited in his command more than the usual Spanish indifference. He allowed several months to elapse before he assembled his army and put it in motion; and on arriving at Bologna with his troops, who perhaps may have amounted to 40,000 men, he employed himself in bringing out operas and giving fêtes; and when he at last advanced, he took such measures as made it impossible to attribute his conduct to anything else but treachery, cowardice, or utter incapacity. He left the duke of Modena to his fate, whom he ought to have protected against the Sardinians and Austrians, and did not venture to make an attack upon the enemy, to whom he was far superior in numbers, but marched back to Rimini, as if he intended to choose some other position for a battle, and thence departed to Fano and Pesaro. The Neapolitans, who since the middle ages have always been regarded as unserviceable and faithless soldiers, it is true, deserted him in crowds; but in attempting to defend his conduct by the desertion of the Neapolitan division, Montemar could not exonerate himself, for this event did not take place till after he had twice retreated. The Neapolitan army was recalled in the midst of peace, in consequence of the brutal threats of an English admiral; and what is singular enough, this same admiral is praised for this very affair in all the histories of his countrymen, and held up as a man whose behaviour is worthy of imitation and who did honour to his country. His conduct was an imitation of that of Popilius Lænas, who was his equal in insolence and brutality; with his watch in his hand, by threats of cannonading his capital, he compelled the king, within a fixed number of minutes, to issue orders for the recal of his army. This had at least the advantage of securing for the city of Naples some new fortifications, to serve as a protection against any future instances of such Turkish treatment. This forced neutrality of Naples, which was therefore of short continuance, was announced on the 20th of August (1742).

Montemar's conduct as commander of the Spaniards excited the displeasure of the queen; he was immediately recalled, and his successor count de Gages received the most express and positive commands to seek out the enemy and to offer them battle. De Gages, when he advanced in October as far as Bologna, did

not fail to take advantage of the circumstances of the Austrians, and to attack them at a moment when they had least reason to reckon on the assistance of the brave Sardinians. With the aid and support of the English admiral Matthews, Charles Emanuel had been successfully engaged during the whole summer in preventing the Spaniards, reinforced by the French, whom Don Philip intended to send into Italy, from passing the Alps out of Provence into Modena, and at this very time he was engaged in harassing that town; in September he was obliged to hasten from the frontiers of the states of the Church into Savoy, the French and Don Philip having suddenly made a descent in that country and reduced Chamberry. The king, disregarding the snow and ice of those mountainous districts, drove the enemy out of Italy, who were however immediately reinforced; and in December the greater part of the Sardinian army was again driven back into Piedmont, and exposed to want with all the inconveniences of severe weather and bad roads, because at this time no regular passes traversed Mount Cenis.

De Gages did not fail to avail himself of this favourable moment, and having received repeated commands to miss no opportunity of attacking the enemy, he made his first bold attempt in the February of the following year (1743), at Panaro. This was done more with a view to satisfy the court in Madrid than perhaps with the hope of any splendid result. The Austrians were commanded by Traun, who had taken up his position in Carpi and awaited the attack; the Spaniards caused the gates of Bologna to be carefully guarded and the greatest secrecy to be observed; but a friend of the Austrians found means, at the risk of his life, to give warning to Traun, and the latter immediately called some Sardinian troops to his aid and maintained his position at Campo Santo against the enemy.

About this time the French were also driven out of Bohemia. Maillebois had no sooner retreated than Lobkowitz with the besieging army appeared before Prague, whilst Broglio marched by way of Dresden into Bavaria, in order to take the command of the army there, from which Maillebois had been recalled. Belleisle alone now remained in Prague, and fell into greater perplexities than ever, especially since Leutmeritz also had capitulated: however, the unskilfulness and neglect of his enemies furnished him with an opportunity, by means of a forced march, of avoiding at least the disgrace of a surrender. His nation and

their historians, in accordance with their usual nationality, excuse him on this occasion for having made an unnecessary sacrifice of his soldiers, because he threw a momentary splendour over a time of almost universal misfortune and loss of renown. The last hopes and resources of the army in Prague were exhausted by the capitulation of Leutmeritz, their distress and privations continued to increase, and it being impossible to obtain honourable conditions of surrender, Belleisle resolved in the severity of the winter to undertake a march, which his countrymen, and especially Voltaire, have most rashly and absurdly compared to the retreat of the ten thousand from the centre of Asia over pathless countries and mountains and through the midst of savage nations to the shores of the Black Sea, under the command of Xenophon.

Belleisle left Prague on the 17th of December (1742), put to shame the watchfulness of his drowsy enemies, gained full two marches in advance, and leaving the whole way strewn with the dead, weary, hungry and wounded, reached Eger with the remains of his troops. The marshal was obliged to divide his army in order to reach the German soil more quickly by different routes; he was however surrounded on all sides by light troops, the cold was intense in these rude mountains, the country impracticable, and the paths often led over rocks and through ravines, and it is very uncertain how many of the French survived to reach Eger. The number has been stated at 14,000; but the most of those who were saved carried with them the seeds of dissolution; they were therefore ordered back to France, and replaced by fresh troops in Bavaria. This however did not lessen the splendour of the enterprise, and the Austrians before Prague were so struck with the ability and courage of the retreat, that they granted much more favourable conditions to the small remainder of the garrison which held out for ten days longer, than those which they had refused to the marshal. In the following spring (1743) Maria Theresa was crowned in Prague, where she introduced many very salutary improvements, although she so severely persecuted the Bohemian Jews, who had shown themselves favourable to foreign dominion, that the English and Dutch were obliged to intercede in order to induce her to recal her sentence of banishment pronounced against the whole body of that people. In the mean time Francis Stephen occupied himself with his various affairs of

finance and trade, and even after the Spaniards had landed and marched through his grand duchy of Tuscany, declared himself neutral. The private treasures of the house of Medici were in the same year brought into Austria, because the daughter of the grand-duke Cosmo III., the widow of John William of the palatinate, had made an arrangement on the subject in favour of Francis Stephen.

In the year 1743, the war appeared to take a turn altogether favourable to Austria, and the king of Sardinia became alarmed at the advantages which the Austrians had gained near Campo Santo on the Panaro: he therefore sought, according to his usual mode, to enter into an agreement with Spain and France, because he feared Austria might not be true to her promise when she had no longer need of his services. In this way the war in Italy was delayed until the autumn, when England induced Maria Theresa, by the treaty of Worms, to promise him some cities in the Milanese. In the beginning of the year, cardinal Fleury, who had nearly reached ninety years of age, died in France; the so-called pragmatic army in the Netherlands had at length been put in motion; and in Bavaria, Seckendorf, who commanded the imperial army, and had always been known as an impracticable man, lived in a state of constant disagreement with Broglio. The Bavarian peasants made as loud complaints against the French as against the Pandours and Croats, or Menzel's freebooters: Broglio could not be induced to risk a battle or to break into Austria with the whole of the army, although Seckendorf had taken Munich anew in April 1743. The emperor once more returned to his capital, but he was soon after again driven away.

Broglio continued firm in his refusal to attack Khevenhüller, but he lost more men by sickness during the winter than a battle would have cost him; in spring he and Seckendorf were attacked from two different quarters, on the one side by Lobkowitz and on the other by prince Charles, who served under Khevenhüller. Lobkowitz left a division of his army before Eger, where the French defended themselves with courage till October of the year 1743, and marched into Bavaria, whilst Khevenhüller opposed the Bavarians and French in the neighbourhood of Braunau. When there was every reason to expect a momentary attack from the Austrians, 20,000 French suddenly separated from the Bavarians; Khevenhüller attacked

the latter, who alone were unable to withstand him, in the neighbourhood of Braunau, defeated them, and then turned his arms against the French, who in the course of the following weeks lost 10,000 men from sickness, accidents, and skirmishes with the enemy. The main body of the Austrians now passed the Isar, and the emperor again fled to Frankfort; Lobkowitz continued to push forward from the east, and Broglio, threatened by the army of prince Charles, which had taken possession of Munich, durst not remain in Ingolstadt, and therefore resolved to retreat to the Rhine. The French, who had now set on foot a new army under marshal Noailles, marched towards the Maine, in order to intercept and engage the troops which had been sent from the Netherlands to the aid of the queen of Hungary. Some thousands of this army had been sent into Swabia to facilitate Broglio's retreat to the Rhine.

At this moment the attention of all Europe was directed towards the English and French, who, without having declared war against each other, were now about to come into collision with two powerful armies in the very centre of Germany. The French troops were commanded by Noailles, the English by lord Stair. Marshal Noailles had been brought back to the management of state affairs through the influence of a new favourite of the king. Mailly was superseded in the king's favour by her sister, whom he had created duchess of Chateauroux, and the latter endeavoured to rouse the king to some activity in public affairs. In 1742 Noailles succeeded in having Maillebois sent into Bohemia and a French army assembled in Flanders. The Dutch in the mean time had sent some troops to join the army of Hessians, Hanoverians and English, who, under lord Stair, were to march to Bavaria. They had promised besides to send another 6000 men to assist the Austrians in the defence of the Low Countries, in order that the Hessians who had been left behind in the Low Countries might again join the army of lord Stair*.

Immediately after Fleury's death, Noailles became a member of the cabinet. He had already, in April (1743), received the command of the army, which was stationed on the Upper

* In reference to the Hessian trade in men during the whole of the eighteenth century, but especially in the North American war, we must observe, that 6000 Hessians served under George, whilst the emperor had also 6000 in his pay; they might therefore, with precisely equal forces, have been called upon to meet and fight with one another on the battle-field.

Rhine, but he was nevertheless detained in his march by the order of the higher authorities, in the same manner as lord Stair was in his. The latter delayed long in the Lower Rhine, and at length proceeded very slowly by way of Mayence to the Maine; Noailles lingered on the Neckar, covered Broglio's retreat from Bavaria, and appeared on the Maine just as the pragmatic army had marched from Frankfort towards Aschaffenburg: this was in May. In June George II. and his favourite son, the duke of Cumberland, joined the army, which had been placed in a very critical position by the precipitation of its commander, when it came in presence of the enemy in the direction of Franconia.

The whole English army advanced to Aschaffenburg, and 12,000 Hessians had been left behind in Hanau, where were the magazines. Noailles, who had watched their movements, made arrangements to prevent the transport of any stores to Aschaffenburg to the army of the Upper Maine, and then took measures from Seligenstadt to cut off the communication of the main army with Hanau. The young duke of Cumberland had come to learn the art of war under the experienced lord Stair, who was one of Marlborough's school; but Stair was much dissatisfied with the arrival and interference of the king, to whose orders he attributed the error which compelled him to retreat in the presence of the enemy, in order not to be cut off from his stores. The king and the prince had scarcely entered Aschaffenburg on the 19th of June, when orders for a retreat were given, which made an engagement unavoidable; for Noailles, who had also advanced from Seligenstadt, had taken admirable measures on both banks of the Maine, in order to make sure of a victory.

According to the description which Noailles himself gives of his army and its discipline, he must have trusted especially to his admirably-served artillery at Dettingen, on the 26th of June, for in his arrangements for the battle he had calculated chiefly on this branch of his army; but his nephew ruined all his plans by wishing to exhibit the mad courage of a duellist. With the exception of the guards, Noailles had only new recruits, and very few well-trained soldiers to oppose the old, practised and steady mercenaries of the English and German princes: he himself admits that there was no discipline among the common soldiers, and no obedience among the distinguished nobles and

princes, who, as officers, conducted themselves in the same manner as if they had been on a hunting-party, and that their knightly courage, practised in single combat, was often more injurious to the army than cowardice would have been. This however did not prevent the marshal from giving a most important command to one of the proudest and boldest of these young nobles, the duke of Grammont, his vain and frivolous nephew. The duke was ordered to remain with the élite of the troops on one side of a brook near the village of Dettingen, till the enemy had reached the heights on the other side of the stream, when they would be exposed to the destructive fire of the marshal's artillery, which he had planted on the left bank of the Maine : the duke however, eager to signalize his courage, passed the brook, appeared upon the heights, and thereby rendered the batteries erected on the opposite side of the river entirely useless.

The marshal was compelled, by Grammont's precipitation and error, to change his plans at the moment when his enemies were advancing, to pass the Maine, and to fight in a most unfavourable position between Klein-Ostheim and Dettingen. The artillery of the pragmatic army was admirably served ; that of the French could not be used to advantage, and Noailles was obliged to recross the Maine, and many of the French perished in the river : the communication with Hanau was thus opened. At this time Bavaria was in the power of the Austrians ; the pragmatic army therefore marched onward to the Rhine, in order there to await that of the queen of Hungary.

Seckendorf and Broglio had separated at enmity with one another, and their disputes were extremely disadvantageous to the affairs of the unfortunate emperor. Marshal Broglio had set out (on the 12th of June) with the 20,000 French whom he had collected at Ingolstadt, and had formally stated to the emperor that he intended to return to France. This gave rise to a very sharp correspondence between the weak Charles Albert and Broglio, who, as we have often shown, might have thrown many well-grounded reproaches upon the emperor. It was in vain that the latter begged and entreated the marshal not to leave Bavaria, and threatened him with the disfavour of his king. Broglio sent such an insulting reply to the last, very urgent, and somewhat indignant letter of the emperor, that the latter demanded formal satisfaction from the French court, which, that

it might not injure the feelings or offend the dignity of its ally, sent Broglio for a time to his estate, as Belleisle also shortly before had been banished to his.

Seckendorf continued well-disposed towards Austria, and appeared sometimes deservedly, and sometimes undeservedly in a very equivocal light. On the very day of the battle of Dettingen, the 27th of June, he had held a meeting with Khevenhüller in the monastery of Nieder-Schönfeld, and there concluded a species of truce, upon condition of its confirmation by prince Charles. By this agreement all Bavaria and the whole of the strong places were delivered to the Austrians. The Bavarian army was obliged to confine itself to the territory of Anspach, near Wembding, and was there exposed to all sorts of privations. Ingolstadt and Eger alone defended themselves till the autumn, because they had French garrisons. The emperor found himself in such a melancholy condition in Frankfort, that, as old Moser relates in his 'Autobiography,' he was not only frequently exposed to personal insults, and obliged to listen to the opinions formed of him by the world, but was also compelled to accept a considerable sum from Noailles as a private individual, when he visited him, in order to retain him in the alliance with France. In order to give a colouring to this personal support from a foreign general, it was said that the German emperor accepted the marshal's money only as an advance of a portion of future subsidies, which were not at that time even promised.

The French army, under Noailles, now found itself threatened in the rear, as the Austrians, under prince Charles, were advancing from the Lech to the Rhine; Noailles was therefore obliged to retreat, and the pragmatic army had time to amuse the people of Frankfort and Hanau with frequent reviews, which very often took place, with splendid fêtes, amusements, and entertainments, whilst prince Charles was advancing to Hanau to meet lord Carteret, in order to come to an understanding respecting future operations in the field. The Austrian army attempted the passage of the river on the Upper Rhine; the English marched through Mayence and Oppenheim into the plain near Worms. The English and French lay encamped opposite each other, whilst Menzel and Trenk with their barbarian hordes penetrated far into Lorraine, without producing any declaration of war; and the Bavarians, on whose account

all these armies had taken the field, remained quietly at Wembding, but exposed to the greatest privations.

The French cabinet was at this time very ill-advised; it gave time to the Dutch, who had long delayed, to send off the 20,000 men which had been importunately required by the English, and these troops reinforced the English and Hanoverian army under lord Stair, which was encamped between Worms and Spires. The latter desired to occupy Lower Alsace with his powerful army of from 80,000 to 100,000 men, and prince Charles was to seize upon Upper Alsace; but he now experienced the consequence of a commander-in-chief being dependent on a minister, a king and his princes, on diplomatists and the jarring interests of the various powers which constituted the alliance. He found it impossible by advice or consultation to carry out his plans, felt himself aggrieved, left the army, and in his own defence published a very remarkable statement, in which he explained the reasons of his great dissatisfaction with the king and his councillors, during the whole of the campaign. As soon as the general retired, the whole of this immense army of the allies which had been collected in autumn, on the Rhine, disappeared; for every member of the alliance ordered his troops to take up their winter quarters in his own country.

Whilst the eager expectations of the enemies of France were thus bitterly disappointed, negotiations were carried on with greater activity, and diplomacy was more busy than ever. Frederick II. began to be anxious lest he might again lose Silesia, because he knew George II's personal dislike to him, was aware of Brühl's intercourse with Austria, and must necessarily have feared that Maria Theresa might seek compensation from him for the cessions which she was obliged to make to Sardinia. The king of Prussia besides had need of the friendship of the emperor on account of his views on East Friesland, because his claims upon this province must necessarily produce a rupture between him and Hanover*. It by no means escaped the at-

* The particulars of this affair must be sought for in some of our numerous German and legal histories. The essential points are as follows:—Soon after the elevation of the noble house of Greetsyl to the dignity of counts, and in 1654 to princes of the empire, these lords, who afterwards became masters of the whole of East Friesland, carried on a series of expensive suits with the cities and estates of the country, and the Dutch maintained the cause of the city of Embden against the imperial decrees. It was thought advisable to send the troops of the circle of Westphalia into the territory: the Brandenburgers were chosen for this purpose, and 300 men were stationed at Greetsyl.

tention of the English, that the French had not given the Spanish army in Provence any very zealous support in its incursion into Sardinia, because they thought they had made such progress in their negotiations, that Charles Emanuel's declaration in their favour was to be daily expected; they therefore practised a masterpiece of diplomatic skill: they induced Maria Theresa to make concessions, and in this way brought about the treaty of Worms (13th Sept. 1743) with the Sardinians at the very moment in which France was calculating upon the defection of Charles Emanuel from Austria; this excited great indignation and animosity in the minds of the French.

By the treaty of Worms, the former defensive alliance was changed into a close union, not merely for defence but for offence among the powers—Sardinia, England and Austria—who were parties to the treaty: England supplied the money. Charles Emanuel guaranteed the queen of Hungary the undivided possession of her inheritance, undertook in common with her the defence of Italy, and Sardinia on its part was to receive an extension of its territory to the Lago Maggiore on the one side, and to Placentia on the other. The treaty which thus guaranteed the undivided possession of her inheritance to Maria Theresa caused great uneasiness in Prussia, and inflicted injustice upon Genoa. The emperor Charles VI. had sold the marquisate of Finale for a small sum to the Genoese, upon condition of re-purchase: this marquisate was now ceded to the Sardinians. It is true the condition was annexed that their money should be repaid to the Genoese*. The last point was a

Prussia received a promise of the reversion of East Friesland, as a compensation for costs, because the emperor had engaged to give the Prussians a recompense on account of the Swedish war. The province was divided in 1694, with the consent of the empire, and this division was confirmed by Joseph I. in 1706, and by Charles VI. in 1715. The latter however protested against it when Frederick William assumed the title and arms of East Friesland, just at the time when the last descendant of the reigning house, Charles Edward, was ill. Charles VII. acknowledged Prussia as possessor; and his son, as vicar of the empire, invested Prussia with East Friesland on the 16th of September 1745. Hanover and Wied-Runkel now instituted a suit, which lasted as long as the empire. The king of Prussia removed the suit from the courts to the diet, which again referred the case to the courts in 1753, and it thus was never decided.

* The treaty was kept very secret; for in this treaty Carteret not only wronged the Genoese, the German empire and the English people, but also violated the former agreements which the English cabinet had concluded. When Genoa acceded to the quadruple alliance, the possession of Finale was expressly stipulated for and guaranteed by its fourth article. The composition of the treaty is a masterpiece of art and of diplomatic ambiguity, which Car-

pretext of the English minister, who caused a much larger sum (£300,000) to be paid to Sardinia than was claimed by the Genoese, and promised besides a yearly subsidy of 280,000 gulden. The king of Sardinia on his part was to raise an army of 40,000 men. In this way, the English nation was not only obliged to pay 16,000 Hanoverians, and thereby to enrich the nobles and ruling aristocracy, but to buy Hesse also, to equip the Sardinians, and to pay subsidies to Austria: Saxony alone remained unprovided for, and Brühl did not fail to stretch out his hands also, when those of others were so richly filled: he looked with envy upon the growing power of Prussia, and opened negotiations which Bestuscheff through his creatures promoted*. The activity of the English soon brought about a treaty between Saxony and Austria (20th Dec. 1743), whose obscurely expressed and indefinite secret articles were grounds of suspicion and danger to Prussia. The negotiations with England continued longer, although in a secret article of the treaty with Austria, mention is made of a possible union of Saxony with England in the prosecution of the war. The English ministry were obliged to discover some means of concealing from the nation the payments to Saxony. This alliance between England and Saxony, which prepared the way for the treaty of Warsaw in the following year, was concluded on the 13th of March, and therefore precisely at the time in which England and Austria expected a declaration of war on the part of France.

teret understood as well as Talleyrand or Thiers. Everything is so equivocally expressed, that in case of necessity the whole could be differently interpreted or withdrawn; the payment is promised, without the English being specially referred to, whose parliament had not been consulted. The same is the case with all the other points, but it is no part of our object here to speak of treaties or diplomatists. The treaties themselves to which we refer are to be found in Wenck, 'Codex Juris Gentium recentissimi'; but in his work, as well as in the 'Collection of all the Treaties of Great Britain,' vol. ii., the precise agreements about the payment of the money which was so burthensome to England, and which remained secret, are wanting.

* He did more; he himself concluded a treaty with Saxony (Feb. 4, 1744), by which the parties bound themselves to make common cause in case of an attack; but which, like the treaty with Austria, had quite a different aim from what was expressed. The treaty is to be found in Marten's 'Recueil,' Supplement, vol. iii. p. 15.

§ V.

PRUSSIA, FRANCE, ENGLAND, SPAIN, AUSTRIA, HOLLAND,
TILL THE PEACE OF AIX LA CHAPELLE.

Two circumstances prompted Frederick II. to interfere anew in the war against Austria: first, fear of being sacrificed by his old allies in peace, France having declared war against England on the 15th of May 1744, and against Austria on the 26th of April; and secondly, because he thought that England, as a guarantee of the peace of Breslau, and the all-powerful prime minister of Saxony were no longer trustworthy friends, since a highly suspicious treaty had been concluded between England, Saxony and Austria. With respect to the latter point, Frederick himself attempts to prove at some length, in the ninth chapter of his ‘History of the Silesian War,’ that the main object of this treaty was to deprive him of his possessions. He could readily avail himself of a pretence for commencing the war, by declaring that he wished to protect the head of the empire; and with the more reason, as the signature and seal of the emperor were to confirm him in the possession of East Friesland, where his army, in the character of troops of the circle, had now been long stationed, for the protection of the weak prince.

Ever since the battle of Dettingen and the appearance of the Austrians on the Rhine, Frederick had resolved to adopt the cause of the emperor, and he therefore had a personal interview with Seckendorf, who still lay inactive at Wemding, four miles from Anspach. He sought this interview on his journey to Franconia (Sept. 1743), but he did not publicly announce his intentions till May 1744. He then formed what was called the Frankfort union with Hesse, Sweden and the emperor, apparently for the maintenance of quiet in the empire, and for the protection of the rights of Germany and its head. The conditions of this union were so ingeniously drawn up, that Frederick was thereby furnished with a pretence for recommencing the war at any moment, and that too without entering into a close alliance with the French, who had already declared war*. The immediate

* The secret articles with respect to acquiring Bohemia for Charles, and the partition of the country with Prussia, as well as those which refer to Upper Silesia, are to be found in Wenck’s ‘Codex,’ &c., vol. ii. p. 170. All the

advantage which Frederick derived from this union was, that when the prince of East Friesland died in May 1744, he was allowed to remain in possession of the country. Hanover and Wied-Runkel, whose claims were much better founded, were obliged to commence an imperial suit, which, according to the nature of the law, forms, procedures, tribunals, judges, and lawyers of the courts of the empire might have continued for centuries.

After the conclusion of the Frankfort union, at a moment when the Austrians were again on the Rhine, Seckendorf (26th May, 1744) declared the convention of Nieder-Schönfeld, which indeed had never been formally acknowledged, to be annulled, and assumed the command of the army, which, after having been scattered about during the winter in the most remote parts of Germany, was again united at Philippsburg. About the same time, the Spanish minister Montijo brought about a new alliance between the emperor, Spain and France; the war however was not a whit more successfully prosecuted.

The Austrians not only prevented the Spaniards, under De Gages, from any undertakings in the states of the Church, but they might also have taken possession of Naples if the English had not been indisposed to this measure, and a general of distinguished rank had not arrived instead of one of very great abilities. Traun was recalled, Lobkowitz came in his stead; and neither made more rapid movements with his army, nor adopted better measures than he had previously done in Bohemia and before Prague. The English, it is true, were dissatisfied that admiral Mathews did not gain a complete victory in his attack upon the combined Spanish and French fleets at the islands of Hieres, in February 1744, probably on account of a difference in opinion between him and his second in command; nevertheless, by the advantages which he gained, he very much facilitated to the Sardinians the defence of the passes of the Var. The French were at this time so serious in their support of Don states of the empire were invited to become members of the union, which was founded upon,—

1. The maintenance of peace in Germany.
2. A union to compel the queen of Hungary to acknowledge the emperor.
3. The reference of the question of the succession to the diet of the empire; and a suspension of arms in Germany.
4. A mutual guarantee among all the states to secure each other's possessions without exception, and a promise of assistance if any member of the union should be attacked.

Philipp, that the combined forces have been stated at 60,000 men; but they were as little able as in the previous year to force their way into Italy. Don Philipp had advanced as far as Coni, when he was repulsed with loss.

The king of France himself at that time appeared to be aroused from his slumber of sensuality, and to desire to take some share in a war which up till this time had been carried on with such small success. Chateauroux endeavoured to make a hero of her lover, and she succeeded in having Amelot removed from the management of foreign affairs, because Frederick II. would not negotiate with him*; and she was supported in her endeavours by the new minister of war, D'Argenson, by Noailles, and by the celebrated Richelieu, more infamous as the king's pimp, as a prodigal and debauchee, than renowned for his hectoring courage. Three armies were now equipped; two against the Austrian Netherlands, and one under Belleisle on the Moselle, in order to form a junction with Seckendorf, who had advanced with his Bavarians to the Rhine, and was now at Philippsburg, and afterwards to push forward into Germany.

The two northern armies of the French, the one under Noailles, the other under Maurice of Saxony, were very superior in numbers to the Dutch, English and Austrians; Louis XV. therefore, according to traditionary custom, was praised as a hero and a conqueror, although his presence with the army merely embarrassed their operations, and made this expensive and useless war still more oppressive to the French people. A numerous court with all its appendages accompanied the king, which not only materially interfered with proper attention to the substantial necessities of the army, but furnished an opportunity for indulgence in those luxuries which daily augmented the misfortunes of the tax-paying people, and the insolence of those

* Millot's 'Extracts from the Papers of Marshal Noailles,' published ten years before the Revolution, contain the following passage with respect to the whole condition of foreign affairs, vol. v. p. 324 :—"Le maréchal de Noailles voyoit avec une douleur extrême dans toutes les parties de l'administration une sorte d'engourdissement, d'indolence, d'insensibilité, présage de la décadence des empires. Les affaires étrangères surtout se trouvoient dans un état pitoyable. La plupart des ambassadeurs, soit incapacité, soit défaut de zèle, ne convenoient nullement à des fonctions si importantes. Depuis longtemps la brigue et la faveur procuroient les places plutôt que les talens et le mérite, et l'on y cherchoit moins à bien faire qu'à faire sa fortune. L'émulation étoit presque éteinte, l'attachement au prince et à la patrie étoit presque regardé comme une chimère."

who were favoured by the court. The duchess of Chateauroux travelled like a queen, with a royal retinue: it was thought that some respect for public decency would be preserved, by her travelling alone and residing in a separate house; but notwithstanding this, she was everywhere received with the greatest outward demonstrations of respect, and before the king came, the magistracy of the respective towns where they took up temporary residence were obliged openly to break through or otherwise construct communications between the buildings occupied by the king and his mistress.

Whilst the king began his operations in the Netherlands, count Traun in reality made an admirable campaign on the Rhine, and prince Charles also, at least according to the newspapers and histories of those times, whose peculiar vocation and purpose it was to flatter their rulers. Traun had been recalled from Italy, where he had gathered his laurels at Campo Santo, and sent as an assistant to prince Charles, who knew much better how to help himself at table and to the bottle than in the field. Frederick II. remarks, with great justice, that Austria treated Traun very ungratefully on this occasion. Not the slightest mention had hitherto been made of him in the public reports, Lobkowitz was sent to Italy to gather the laurels which he had really won, and he was only sent back into Italy after he had commanded in two admirably well-conducted campaigns on the Rhine and in Bohemia (in 1744 and 1745), on which occasion also no public notice whatever was taken of his services. Even the Austrian official historian, who gives an account of every year of this war in a thick octavo volume, composed in the most repulsive chancery style, ventures gently to hint, that the court party in the year 1744 had behaved with great injustice to the valiant Traun*. Moreover the French wished this year to make their chief attack upon the Netherlands, whilst the army on the Moselle and the Bavarians were only to prevent the Austrians from passing over the Rhine.

* ‘History and Deeds of the most illustrious and potent Princess and Lady Maria Theresa,’ &c., part iii. 1745, p. 159:—“There was a general expectation that the house of Austria had found in this valiant general some compensation for the loss of Khevenhüller. Even the queen acted as *if she placed her whole reliance on him*. Ich weiss dahero nicht, woher es gekommen seyn mag, dass man nachher so wenig mehr von diesem braven Herrn gehört hat. Seiner ist in denen Nachrichten von der Armee fast gar nicht gedacht worden, daher auch einige vermuthet,” &c. &c.

Louis himself was to command in the Netherlands, and the French, who have in general such a lively perception of the ridiculous, were not sensible how ridiculous their king and general made himself, by causing his armour to be proved by twenty musket-shots, and by requiring only 159 mules for the transport of his baggage, which was reduced, as it was said, to the smallest possible quantity. It was owing to no appreciation of his merit that Maurice of Saxony received the command of the army; Maurice, it is true, had proved in Bohemia and Bavaria that he alone of all the French generals knew how to cheer and animate the men, and was, in fact, born to be a commander; but he was not indebted to his military but to his courtly talents for his command, and to his being as great an adept in iniquity as the king himself. And withal it cost Chateauroux and marshal Noailles no small efforts to persuade the king, who was extraordinarily superstitious and brought up in the most slavish priestly principles, to entrust the chief command to the count, whom he despised as a Huguenot, although he was a Lutheran. Maurice first served under Noailles, but afterwards he held the command alone, and in a short time, under the eyes of the king, he reduced all those towns which are called the barriers of Flanders.

Warneton, Meenen, Ypers, the fort of Knokke, and Fürnes were taken, and the way was paved for the conquest of the whole Netherlands, when Louis was all at once compelled to send the greater part of the Netherlands' army to the Rhine, and to go thither himself, the Austrians having made an incursion into Alsace. The passage of the Rhine by the Austrians in the sight of the French and imperial armies is related as among the most splendid exploits of the war, and is usually ascribed to prince Charles, who, however, was completely innocent of the whole affair. Seckendorf is accused, not without some appearance of truth, of not exhibiting that degree of watchfulness and activity which was expected from him, partly because he had a great dislike to the French and a constant leaning towards the Austrians, partly because he did not feel much concern about the injuries which might be inflicted on the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine, knowing that the attack of the king of Prussia upon Bohemia would soon compel prince Charles to withdraw his army, and that without any trouble or risk on the part of the Bavarians. This actually took place; but Seckendorf and the leaders of the French army, especially Coigny, showed

themselves still more negligent and unskilful on the retreat of the Austrians than they had done on their passage over the Rhine.

The French had at that time assembled a considerable army on the frontiers of Alsace, and the king travelled through Lorraine to put himself at its head, but became ill and was confined to his bed with a severe illness for a long time at Metz. In consequence of this unfortunate event, all his plans were, properly speaking, disturbed, yet the admirable and veteran troops which Louis had brought with him from the Netherlands were not on that account less serviceable against the Austrians. The latter were now in Alsace, and were about to make an incursion into Lorraine, when they received the news that the king of Prussia had commenced hostilities in Bohemia and was marching against Prague; the French also were acquainted with this fact, yet they allowed the Austrians to recross the Rhine in August (1744) without any considerable loss.

Notwithstanding the declarations which Prussia put forth in its manifesto, that the war was undertaken from attachment to the emperor and to preserve the empire, every one knew that all these long negotiations and this expedition into Bohemia had in reality no other object than to obtain the guarantee of France for the possession of Silesia, and a document from the emperor confirming the Prussian claims to East Friesland. All magnanimity in politics was unknown and regarded as folly. It is also at the same time established, that a man who calculated with so much coolness and correctness as Frederick II. could not hope for new conquests, and that, as is usual in such treaties, neither the one party nor the other was serious, when they discussed a new partition of the hereditary dominions of the queen of Hungary*. By the Frankfort union (22nd May, 1744), Hesse renounced its connexion with England, from which it had drawn incredible sums in times of peace, under the pretence that, by the assistance of England, Austria might become too powerful in Germany. In taking this step, Hesse reckoned on being subsidized by France; and when disappointed in this expectation it remained wholly

* It is impossible to express this more openly and simply than Frederick himself has done; he says, 'Œuvres Posthumes,' vol. ii. : "L'article des conquêtes n'étoit ajouté à ce projet qu'à tout hasard, au cas que la fortune favorisât cette entreprise. Il étoit prudent de s'accorder d'avance sur un partage qui dans la suite auroit pu brouiller les alliés."

quiet, as Cologne, the Palatinate, Würtemberg and Bamberg, which had in like manner joined the union, also did. In June an article referring to subsidies was added to the apparently purely patriotic draft of the Frankfort union. In this new article it was determined that France should accede to this union with Prussia, the Palatinate and Hesse in favour of the emperor, and this accession really took place on the same day (6th June). The agreement of the emperor with king Frederick was entered into eighteen days afterwards, in which the latter engaged to conquer Bohemia for Charles VII., and on this occasion an eventual partition of the spoil was agreed upon.

Frederick immediately afterwards broke through the territory of Saxony into Bohemia, without any regard to the professed neutrality of Saxony, and as an ally of the emperor had already commenced the siege of Prague in December, without having made a declaration of war. In this course he reckoned upon the aid of the French. King Louis, who indulged immoderately in drinking and was wholly given up to the pleasures of the table and sensuality, it is true, lay seriously ill in Metz (August); but Noailles, who had accompanied him from Flanders and was to command the now reinforced army in conjunction with Seckendorf, should have either checked or followed prince Charles. Noailles, however, did neither; and Seckendorf never coincided in his views with the French generals. The united French and imperial army, which afterwards in great force occupied a position on the Rhine from Breisach to Mayence, not only suffered the Austrians to recross the Rhine without being attacked, but did not attempt to follow them in their retreat through Swabia and Bavaria. They first awaited the king's restoration to health, and then this numerous army, under the immediate command of the king assisted by four field-marschals, entered upon no greater exploit than the conquest of the Breisgau and a marauding inroad into Voralberg. The French suffered all sorts of privation and misery, and lost 12,000 men before Freiburg, which they ultimately reduced; the king was present at the siege, and the army afterwards took up their comfortable winter quarters on the Rhine and in Swabia, and left it to Seckendorf to drive the Austrians out of Bavaria. Seckendorf indeed brought his master, the emperor, again back to Munich; but no one confided in him: he was thoroughly hated by the French, and as a canting protestant and zealot he was betrayed

and sold by the Bavarians; when therefore fortune once more turned against him, the unfortunate Charles VII. was obliged to dismiss him from his command; but even after that, the weak emperor still continued to bestow his unlimited confidence upon him.

Brühl at that time brought new misery upon Saxony: in order to obtain English money, he gave up the country, stripped of defenders, to the Prussians, and by his folly or avarice afterwards caused the whole tide of war to be turned upon Saxony, which was equally ill-treated by friends and enemies. Under the pretence that Saxony was bound by the treaty of March (1744) to furnish assistance to the queen of Hungary, in case she should be attacked*, 18,000 to 20,000 men were sent into Bohemia under the command of the duke of Saxe-Weissenfels, who was to form a junction with prince Charles's army as soon as the latter reached Bohemia. However singular the agreement respecting the alternation of the command might be, the Saxons and Austrians made a glorious campaign from October till December (1744), and the king of Prussia became convinced of the impossibility of maintaining Prague. In this city he was at the same time hard-pressed by the enemy, hated by the inhabitants as a heretic, badly furnished with supplies by the peasants, who were influenced by the priests from patriotism and religious hatred, and was not able to obtain any intelligence respecting the enemy from the obstinate Bohemians, who were unfavourable to the Germans.

Prince Charles, or more properly speaking Traun, took all possible pains to avoid an engagement, but by his movements he compelled the king of Prussia, even in winter, to evacuate Bohemia; and Brühl, who was as full of empty hopes in times of success, as cowardly in misfortune, now thought he might at length venture to throw off the mask. Holland and England understood how to secure his whole interest on behalf of Austria. The treaty of Warsaw, ratified in March, had been concluded as

* The declaration issued by Saxony on the march of the duke of Weissenfels runs as follows: "Wie Sr. Königlichen Majestät von Polen nicht allein vor Dero Person die Freundschaft mit Ihrer Kaiserl. Majestät und Ihrer Königl. Majestät in Preussen, ingleichen mit andern derselben Alliirten unverrückt fortsetzen, nicht minder ratione dero Chur- und Erblande die exacteste Neutralität, massen sie sonst an dem Kriege keinen Antheil nähmen, beobachten lassen, sondern auch niemahlen in etwas, so der Wahl und Würde Ihrer Kaiserl. Majestät nachtheilig, eingehen, vielmehr," &c.

early as January (1745), and Saxony by this treaty had bound itself to raise and bring into the field 30,000 men for the miserable sum of 100,000*l.*, and as soon as these troops should be no longer necessary against Prussia, for a further sum of money to send 10,000 men into the Netherlands. A secret article of this treaty, which refers to the possibility of Poland taking part in the alliance, although at the end of the same article the violation of the Polish constitution is again expressly disavowed, appears very suspicious*. The partition of the conquests to be made from Prussia was so concealed under general phrases in the eighth article, that Brühl complained on the 15th of March, when the ratifications of the treaties were exchanged, that nothing had yet been expressly decided upon as to his master's share in the partition of the conquests which were to be expected as the result of the alliance†.

They did not fail to satisfy the vain man by specious pretexts. On the 18th of May a new agreement was concluded in Leipzig, by which the possession of Silesia and Glatz was confirmed to the queen of Hungary, in case they should be successful against the king of Prussia, and the elector of Saxony was to receive not only the duchy of Magdeburg, but other portions of the Prussian territories.

The splendid hopes of the allies speedily disappeared, for the Austrians and Saxons, as they advanced into Silesia, managed their affairs so much according to the rules of the methodical art of war, which was the fashion at that time, that the king of Prussia, who had joined his army in March, had abundance of time till June to make all the necessary preparations for a battle. Frederick surprised the united army on the 3rd of June (1745) at Hohenfriedberg, between Schweidnitz and Striegau, and compelled them to come to an engagement on the 4th. This battle was most glorious for the Prussians, because the number of the united forces was double theirs, and their loss was stated at 12,000 men. If Frederick did not follow up this victory as energetically as might have been expected from him, and if he did not immediately push forward into the heart of Bohemia, he

* The third secret article runs as follows :—" Pour mettre le royaume de Pologne plus en état d'être utile à la cause publique, sa majesté Britannique et sa majesté la reine de Hongrie et de Bohême promettent d'aider sa majesté Polonoise dans ses vues salutaires à cet égard, d'autant qu'elles le pourront faire sans porter atteinte aux loix et constitutions du dit royaume."

† Marten's Supplément, vol. iii. p. 24.

was influenced in his decision partly by military and partly by political reasons, to the latter of which we shall only refer for the sake of historical connexion. Whilst Carteret was in Hanover with George II., Frederick had opened negotiations in London with lord Harrington, who was then secretary for foreign affairs; these negotiations were in such an advanced state of progress in July, that the confirmation of king George was alone wanting for their completion. This new treaty was finally concluded in Hanover at the end of August, by virtue of which England became a new guarantee for the possession of Silesia, and bound itself also to induce Austria and Saxony to agree to a peace. In connexion with this point we should know, not only that the emperor was dead, as we shall afterwards state in detail, and therefore the grounds upon which Prussia had pretended to commence the war were at an end, but also that Bavaria itself, in whose favour the war had been carried on, had already concluded a peace.

However much Maria Theresa wished to get rid of Frederick's protest against the election of her husband as emperor, which eventually took place, she was as little inclined as Saxony to renounce all her splendid hopes without at least making another decisive effort. This attempt was to be made by the army in Bohemia, which was under the leading of three generals, but none of them able commanders. Traun, who continued to lend his assistance, without ever being named had accompanied the good Francis to the Rhine, and in the mean time two distinguished nobles, Aremberg and Lobkowitz, the one an old and incapable officer, and the other a passionate and very mediocre commander, were at the head of the army, which was nominally commanded by prince Charles. The king of Prussia with great justice ridicules these three princely commanders, who ventured, and yet can scarcely be said to have ventured, to take the field against him. He laughs at their numerous councils and consultations at the head of an army far superior to his, and at their reconnoitring with telescopes. But even if we do not regard the language of the scoffing and ironical king, but listen to the Austrian historians who wrote in 1746, and were as humble as they were prolix and tiresome, the praise of these generals becomes unwittingly and unintentionally satire in the mouths of these servile scribes. They relate, that after the king of Prussia, who remained in the Bohemian provinces during the months of

July and August, had intentionally exhausted all the magazines and provisions to the borders of Silesia, in order that the enemy might not be able to follow him when he retired from Bohemia to Silesia in the autumn, and after the two generals of the army, which had been greatly increased since the last battle with the king, had not ventured to attack him during all this time, Lobkowitz was at last sent as the *Camillus of Bohemia*. There were at that time only about 6000 Saxons in Bohemia, and the Bohemian *Camillus*, who was systematic after the genuine German fashion, drew up a very formal plan of the manner in which he and his two princely companions were to surprise and beat the king; but the latter was not simple or good-natured enough to wait till they had made all their arrangements and taken all their measures for executing their plans; Frederick anticipated his enemies, drew up his army on the 30th of September near Trautenau, not far from Sorr, under the cannon of the enemy, and compelled them to fight according to a plan which they had not previously studied. Frederick kept possession of the field, although his baggage was plundered, for the hordes of marauding Hungarians got possession of his camp, and his military chest as well as his baggage fell into their hands. The loss was inconsiderable on either side; Frederick's chief gain consisted in being now able, without fear of being followed by a very superior force, to lead back his army through pathless mountains and fearful passes to Silesia.

England then demanded the accession of Austria and Saxony to the Hanoverian treaty; Frederick also was anxious for this, because he had long been in a critical position with France, and knew right well that Louis XV. felt a deadly hatred against him as the head of the infidel party, and also as the hero whom they honoured; but Brühl prevented the reconciliation. Brühl hated the king of Prussia for the same reasons as Louis XV. did, because by his life, conduct and government he put him and his indolent ruler to shame; and Frederick, in his cutting and bitter irony, spared Brühl as little as he did the king of France. Frederick caused a report to be circulated that Brühl's wife had received a Bohemian lordship from Maria Theresa, and he himself money from England, to ruin Saxony by means of war, which was almost in a state of bankruptcy even in peace. The unscrupulous valet of the court, the infamous Hennike, had just then begun his career, and the weak Augustus loaded his

prime minister with presents, although everything which he undertook was really injurious to the country*. This is especially true of the expedition which Brühl and Rutowsky caused to be undertaken against Brandenburg, when they declined the proposal of England in favour of peace. The plan was this: the Saxons, in conjunction with the Austrians under count Grüne, were on the one hand to march directly upon Berlin, and on the other, prince Charles was to form a junction with Rutowsky in Lusatia, and transfer the whole war from Bohemia and Silesia to the mark of Brandenburg. If this plan against Berlin was to have any success, it ought to have been kept perfectly secret; but Brühl could not restrain himself from mentioning the subject in conversation, and one of Frederick's numerous admirers in Dresden gave him a hint of what was intended. Upon this the king collected an army at Halle under the old prince of Dessau, in order to meet and oppose Grüne and the Saxons. He himself marched from Silesia into Lusatia, in order to prevent the junction of prince Charles with Rutowsky. Prince Leopold of Dessau having become acquainted with the projects of the enemy from some reports which prince Charles had put in circulation, had the troops quite ready for the march before Frederick's arrival, and the latter was therefore able, immediately on his reaching the army, to march against the Saxons before the Austrians had joined them. On the 23rd of November (1745) Frederick was in Lusatia, attacked the Saxons by catholic Hengersdorf, took four regiments prisoners, and then turned to meet the Austrians who were advancing from Bohemia. Prince Charles retreated in all haste to Bohemia; general Grüne, who had set out on his march to Berlin, was obliged to return, in

* The author of 'Brühl's Life,' part i. p. 187, speaks of these events in the following somewhat negligent style:—"They say, it may be, that his majesty of Poland has presented all these astonishing sums to count Brühl as much with a view to support his great expenditure as well as to purchase the indescribable estates which this minister possesses.....But (he says ironically) there is not the slightest shadow of probability that his majesty would have done this at a time when he was obliged continually to impose new taxes, when the credit of the treasury had fallen into disrepute, when the most extraordinary measures were resorted to for its support by seizing the deposits which were made in reliance upon the honour and good faith of the country, when they were obliged to pledge a portion of their states to Hanover, and when nothing could prevent the decline of the treasury," &c. &c. But let us admit that his majesty of Poland had really bestowed all those millions which he needed for his immense expenditure and estates; what scandalous misrepresentations must he have made to this monarch, or how must he have blinded his eyes, in order to induce him to make these presents!

order to protect Dresden, for the safety of which they were now greatly alarmed. Grüne formed a junction with Rutowsky, and took up a position before Dresden in order to cover the capital; but the king of Poland and Brühl began to despair of their own preparations as early as the beginning of December, when they fled to Prague, and forsook Dresden without having even attempted its defence.

Frederick himself wished to watch the Austrians, and therefore commanded the old prince of Dessau, whose army was no longer necessary on the Elbe, to march with all possible haste through Leipzig against Dresden, whilst he sent a division of his army by Meissen to cooperate with the prince and completely to hem in the Saxons. On this occasion the king complained bitterly, that the prince from mere obstinacy advanced with inconceivable slowness; but notwithstanding this, the latter took his measures so admirably, that the Saxons were deprived of all hope of escape from the position at Kesselsdorf, which was generally considered impregnable. General Grüne and Rutowsky, as well as prince Charles, who was watched by Frederick, who had come from Bohemia into the plain of Plauen, are accused of having been unwilling to expose their own troops in order to relieve the Saxons. The Saxons were completely beaten at Kesselsdorf on the 15th of December, and lost 10,000 men. On the day after the battle, Frederick formed a junction with his victorious army, and compelled prince Charles to retire into Bohemia. He now levied the most oppressive contributions from the Saxons, however much courtliness he exhibited towards the royal family, whom he found in Dresden, when he arrived there on the 18th. The country was laid under exorbitant contributions, and Brühl now thankfully accepted the mediation of England, which he had previously refused, in order to deliver his master quickly from his perplexity and despair, and left the country to pay the penalty of his sins. On the 25th of December 1745 a treaty was signed in Dresden, which was equally advantageous to Prussia and Austria. Prussia acknowledged Francis I. as emperor, Austria confirmed the peace of Breslau, and consequently also the possession of Silesia and Glatz; Saxony alone was obliged to pay dear for the folly of its minister. The city of Leipzig and the estates of the country were constrained to promise, and the government to guarantee the performance, that not only all the contributions which were in arrears should

be paid up, but a million of dollars in addition at the next Easter fair. The Saxons, who were driven by force into service, were obliged to remain under Prussian colours, and all disputes concerning tolls or duties were decided in favour of Prussia. The elector-palatine, who had remained in alliance with Prussia, was included in the treaty.

The war was thus completely brought to a close in Germany, and Frederick obtained all the glory of having taken arms for one emperor, and as soon as circumstances permitted, of having concluded peace with another; king Louis, however, whose correspondence with him had already become somewhat bitter, was still more enraged against him in consequence of the peace. After the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Kaunitz knew well how to avail himself of this for the promotion of his views. As we have already remarked, the war in Bavaria had been brought to a close at the end of the preceding year; to this event the widowed empress and Seckendorf had not a little contributed. Charles VII., at the end of the previous year, had indeed returned to Munich; but Bärenklau, who was immediately afterwards reinforced from Bohemia, continued always to push forward into the Upper Palatinate, and the sick emperor was again in danger of being driven from his capital. The same count Törring was placed at the head of the Bavarian army who had always so zealously promoted the war, but who had never been fortunate in any of his warlike expeditions; he now used all possible means to prevail upon the young elector, even after the death of his father the emperor (on the 20th January 1745), to adhere to the alliance against Austria. The French, whose cause Törring so warmly supported, took great pains to win the favour of the young elector, by furnishing him with pecuniary assistance, as he was extremely embarrassed in his finances; they gave him immediately half a million of livres, and promised monthly contributions, as well as that the troops of the Palatinate and a French division should be sent to Bavaria. The Austrian forces were so considerably reinforced, that their number has been stated at 40,000 men, and general Brown, who was their commander, was one of the most distinguished officers of the century, which could by no means be said of Törring. The French made such weak efforts on behalf of Bavaria, that the young elector was obliged to leave Munich as early as the 15th of April (1745) and to fly to Augsburg.

Maximilian Joseph, who now promised to give his electoral vote in favour of the archduke Francis, left Ingolstadt, Schär-
ding, Braunau and Straubingen in the hands of the Austrians
till the election was completed, removed the troops of his former
allies from this country, and renounced all claims upon the in-
heritance of Charles VI. The naval powers relieved the wants
of the electoral court by payments, the burthen of which was
imposed upon the good Dutch and English, who furnished the
money upon a very ingenious pretence. The yearly contribu-
tions, which were of no real advantage to the poor Bavarians,
amounted in all to somewhat about 8,000,000 gulden. As Prussia
and the Palatinate were still in alliance with France, the war con-
tinued till the peace of Dresden; the French even promised the
king of Prussia to prevent the election of an emperor, and to
send an army under Maillebois to Hanover. The French also
remained in the Breisgau and on the Rhine, imposed heavy bur-
thens upon the country, and oppressed both citizens and pea-
sants. Our jurists, publicists and diplomatists did not fail to
prepare abundance of long and well-founded representations,
according to their custom; but the French laughed at the
wisdom and the chancery style of these pedants and gave them
very polite replies, but at the same time reinforced their army
both on the Rhine and the Maine. Maillebois was recalled
from the army on the Maine, which was placed under prince
Conti, who had previously held the chief command in Italy.
The army on the Maine was intended to prevent the election of
an emperor, and advanced as far as Aschaffenburg. At this
moment a new force appeared under Traun, who, as we have
remarked above, commanded in the name of the archduke
Francis. A junction was formed between this force and the
Austrian army on the Kinz, which, under Batthiany, had
brought the war in Bavaria to a conclusion. Traun's campaign
has always received high commendation, because he compelled
the French to retire behind the Rhine by well-planned marches
and the choice of his positions alone. Political reasons prevented
him from following the French, because Austria was dependent
on its allies. The head-quarters of this army were now removed
to Heidelberg, Francis was elected in September and crowned
in October, and Maria Theresa herself came to Heidelberg in
order to witness and share the triumph of her husband.

The French were more fortunate in the Netherlands than in Bavaria or on the Rhine, and the rebellion in Scotland prevented the English from supporting their allies on the continent with effect. We have already observed that Don Philipp had made two unsuccessful attempts to force his way into Italy, first from Savoy through the valley of Aosta, and secondly from Provence over Coni. De Gages and Lobkowitz were opposed to one another at the end of the year 1744 and the commencement of the following one in the states of the Church; in the spring of 1745 Lobkowitz was driven to the neighbourhood of Modena, but the accession of the Genoese republic to the Spanish-French alliance gave quite a new turn to the whole war. The Genoese had no sooner heard of the treaty of Worms and of the cession of their marquisate of Finale to the king of Sardinia, than they entered into negotiations. As early as the 1st of May they concluded an alliance and subsidy-treaty with Spain at Aranjuez, the secret articles of which we do not think it necessary to quote, because they were never carried into effect, and it is most probable that the Spaniards never intended they should be so; their contents were about the very reverse of those which Sardinia had secured for its advantage in the treaty of Worms. De Gages in the mean time had advanced rapidly from Modena against Lucca and Massa and reached the territory of Genoa. The Genoese had quickly recruited an army of Corsicans and people from all countries, and Maillebois undertook the command of the French in the Spanish army instead of Conti, almost at the same time as Lobkowitz was called from Italy to Bohemia.

De Gages marched over Sestri di Levante to Genoa, whither the French, supported by the Genoese, had arrived, by Nice and Villa Franca; 7000 or 8000 Genoese troops had united with the French army; but no inconsiderable time elapsed before the Spaniards, under the marquis Castellar and De Gages, the Italians under the duke of Modena, and the French under Maillebois, had formed a complete junction with all their forces. When at length the whole were united under the Infant Don Philipp, the combined army was estimated at 70,000 strong; but it did not commence operations in Lombardy till the end of the month of July.

The Austrians and Sardinians could not oppose in the field a

force so superior to their own, and as early as September, the whole plain from Parma and Placentia to Alessandria, and even Pavia, was in the power of the Spaniards; in November they took Alessandria and Asti also, except the citadels; in December De Gages occupied Milan, so that in the beginning of the year 1746 nothing remained to the Austrians, of all their possessions in Upper Italy, except the citadel of Milan and the fortress of Mantua.

In the year 1744, Louis XV. had made a successful campaign in the Netherlands; he had wished however to lead a great part of his victorious northern army to the Rhine, and to Swabia and Bavaria, but was prevented from fulfilling this intention by his illness in Metz, and afterwards by the siege of Freiburg, from returning back to Belgium. In the following year (1745) Maurice of Saxony was strongly reinforced, because the king wished again to try the fortune of war in the Netherlands, where the duke of Cumberland had a heterogeneous army under his command, consisting of English, Hanoverians, and mercenary Hessians, as well as Austrians and Dutch. The Dutch troops, which had been considerably augmented, were under the special command of the prince of Waldeck, and Königseck was at the head of the Austrians. None of the three was distinguished for mind, talents, or a quick perception of military movements, and in this campaign, therefore, Maurice of Saxony led the French from one victory to another. Exhausted by dissipation of all kinds, Maurice left Paris in ill-health, but as early as the month of April he undertook the siege of Doornick. King Louis and his court now again joined the army and were engaged in balls and entertainments in Douay, when the allies adopted the unfortunate resolution of attacking the besiegers in their camp at Doornick. This led to an engagement, in which the marshal reckoned with such certainty on the victory, that he sent a formal invitation to the king to be present at the battle. The engagement took place on the 11th, and received its name from the village of Fontenay. Voltaire, as is well known, has taken great pains to assign a great share in the victory to king Louis and his friend Richelieu, although he knew right well, that the presence of the king and the companion of his love-adventures had only served to embarrass the commander-in-chief. The newspaper writers of these times were not conscious of the absurdity of the scenes

between the French and English guards, which may be read in the work of Voltaire; and the flattering historians who follow their authority edify the public with the affecting speeches which they put into the mouth of the king as he and the Dauphin rode round the battle-field after the victory. In the accounts of these flattering sophists, a man without any sense of honour and shame like Louis, who commenced two bloody wars without any justifiable reason, who did despite to all principles of morality by his scandalous life and ruined the kingdom by his extravagance, is represented as a christian philosopher! In this way the multitude are always edified!!

The conquest of Ghent and Bruges, of Ostend, Dendermonde, and the whole of West Flanders, followed the victory of Fontenay. The army of the allies was considerably weakened in the following year when the duke of Cumberland was recalled to England, where a mad undertaking of the younger son of the Pretender plunged all the adherents of the house of Stuart into destruction and gave rise to great judicial cruelties.

This rebellion of the faithful but misled and prejudiced adherents of the house of Stuart in England was closely connected with the conduct of the Whig aristocracy, who at that time ruled England and divided the money and the places of the state among themselves. The same sort of people in England, who are sometimes called government, sometimes parliament, and sometimes ministry, laugh at the unwearying people who traverse sea and land for the benefit of the families of their rulers, and ransack the bowels of the earth to procure money and comforts by industry, arts and inventions. Walpole had fallen, and Carteret was become secretary of state, but still the duke of Newcastle was indispensable, and the Pelhams and their creatures filled the cabinet and its places. The earl of Harrington, who was president of the council, and as such only filled a post of honour, now began to play an important part along with the ministers, and Carteret was anxiously watched by Newcastle. He tried to counteract the influence of the Pelhams by a close alliance with the king and the promotion of the private views and interests of George II., by which he excited the animosity of the duke of Newcastle, who was as obstinate and domineering as he was distrustful and ignorant. As early as the year 1743, loud complaints were uttered against the extra-

vagance with which Carteret distributed money on the continent, and the elder Pitt came forward in parliament and most eloquently opposed and denounced everything which Carteret had done when he accompanied the king to the continent (1743). He denounced his negotiations with Charles VII. in Hanau, the treaty of Worms, and above all, the folly which he had exhibited in spending English money upon the Saxons and Sardinians. Although Carteret undoubtedly yielded more to the personal wishes of the king than was either justifiable or right, the Pelhams often injured and annoyed him by their opposition. When, for example, admiral Mathews attacked the combined French and Spanish fleets near the Hieres, and accused his second in command of failing in his duty, and thereby mar- ring a complete victory, the Pelhams took part against Mathews, although he had gained the victory and the king was favourable to him. Mathews was tried by court-martial and declared incapable of further service: the king was just as little able to assist the admiral as to protect Carteret against the envy of the Pelhams. In November 1744, Carteret and his friends and clients were obliged to retire from the ministry; he still however retained a certain influence, and we shall find him playing a most important part nineteen years afterwards as earl Granville.

Pelham, brother of the duke of Newcastle, as chancellor of the exchequer, now undertook the direction of the government, and lord Harrington was appointed secretary for foreign affairs. The king would not at first consent to Pitt's receiving an appointment, but as a coalition ministry* was for once to be formed, and as its members were not ashamed to sacrifice their reputation and consistency of character for the love of dominion and money, the king was also obliged to give way†.

The time now appeared very favourable to the French and to the adherents of the house of Stuart to attempt, on their part, to form a union between the English Tories and the Jacobites, and especially to promote a rebellion in Scotland. The Stuart

* The "broad bottom" ministry.

† In order that those who are acquainted with English history may fully perceive our meaning, we may observe, that we have in our eye the very surprising conduct of Sir John Hynde Cotton and Sir John Philipps, who accepted places, and then completely altered their politics and language. The one received a place at court, the other a sinecure connected with the board of trade; he however soon after retired again.

party in Scotland had been rather increased than diminished by the cruelty and injustice with which the English Whigs had punished those who were concerned in the rebellion of 1715, by executions, confiscation of estates, and the abolition of many old constitutional and national rights. The refugees and outlaws, even men like the two Keiths, the lord-marshal and his brother, still closely adhered to the cause of the Stuarts, however strongly they were convinced of the incapacity and worthlessness of James III. and of his two sons by the Polish princess, of their total want of principle and of all talents for government. The Jacobites who had remained in Scotland had partly sold themselves to George I., but from natural cunning and a contemptible love of money, they often held with both parties. This miserable set kept up the communication of the refugees with the Highlands in order to draw money from France and Rome. Among all these, Simon Frazer, lord Lovat, chief of the Highland clan Frazer, was most worthy of the nickname (*canny Scot*) which the English were and are accustomed to bestow upon the Scotch, who are remarkable for being peculiarly alive to the promotion of their worldly interests. He simulated fidelity and drew a yearly income from England; and yet the war with Spain had no sooner began, than he, the earl of Traquair, Sir James Campbell of Auchinbreck, Cameron the younger of Lochiel, John Stuart, lord Traquair's brother, the earl of Perth and lord John Drummond, entered into an agreement with France, and promised to raise 20,000 men in Scotland provided France would send an army to join and assist them.

In 1741 cardinal Fleury had lent a favourable ear to the proposals of the Scots, Drummond remained in Paris, and shortly before the declaration of war against England, at the end of the year 1742 and the beginning of 1743, the execution of the project began to be seriously entertained. According to the plan agreed upon in the time of cardinal Fleury, Keith, earl-marshal of Scotland, was to be conveyed to the Highlands in a French fleet with an army of 3000 men, where the opponents of the house of Hanover had promised to make a general rising; at the same time marshal de Saxe, with 12,000 men, was to march to the coasts of Flanders and France, and from thence pass over into Kent. Fleury died in the beginning of the year and the plan was relinquished; cardinal de Tencin however, who

had been created a cardinal through the influence of the Pretender, succeeded in setting on foot a new plan of an expedition, which was to sail from Dunkirk and run into the Thames. The expedition was given up, as it was said, on account of the storms, but it was probably never seriously intended. It was not till all this had taken place and the affair had been made public, that the thoughtless Charles Edward, second son of the aged James III., proceeded in the following year (1744) from Rome to France.

The movements and journeys of the partisans of the house of Stuart, and the manner in which they were favoured by France, were very acceptable to the English ministers, who immediately raised the usual and hackneyed cry of papists and popery, and succeeded in rousing a general apprehension of the designs of the Scottish Jacobites. Parliament then employed money in abundance, the *habeas corpus* act was suspended, and lord Stair, who had previously been in disgrace, received the command of the army which was raised, in order to show that all personal enmities were at an end in this time of general danger. The French availed themselves of prince Charles Edward in the most unscrupulous manner, in order to keep the English in a constant state of alarm for fear of a landing; and the game was even pushed so far, that the prince was once allowed to embark with a number of troops, which it was pretended were equipped for his service, and the fleet was to leave the harbour without any serious idea of carrying out the pretended intention. After this unpardonable deception he returned to Paris, and remained there in lingering hope from May 1744 till May 1745. At this time in England all correspondence with the prince was declared to be high treason, and the chancellor Hardwicke brought a bill into parliament which would have awakened abhorrence in the most despotic states of Asia. By this bill, which was passed by parliament into a law, the punishment of treasonable correspondence was extended even to the innocent children and grandchildren of the condemned.

Charles Edward was a foolish, ignorant, obstinate young man, and during his sojourn in Paris so much of the weakness of his character became known, that all thought was relinquished of venturing either much money or any considerable number of troops in the support of his cause; he finally resolved at his own risk to make an attempt, whilst George II. and Harrington

were in Hanover, and the English troops on the continent*. Both the Keiths, his partisans in Scotland, lord Lovat and other secret friends, were terrified at this mad resolution, recommended him to desist from the undertaking, and declared that they would have nothing to do with its commencement; but all was in vain. When all representations were found unavailing, France contributed a small sum of money, furnished arms, and allowed the Irish and Scotch officers who were in the French service to take part in the adventure; Charles Edward therefore sailed in a small frigate for Scotland in June 1745. This frigate only reached its destination by an accident, because an English ship of war was so seriously disabled in an engagement with a French ship of 64 guns which was to accompany the frigate, that it could not continue the pursuit. The French ship was so much injured that it was obliged to put back to Brest. The prince reached Scotland, but his cause made little progress till August; the part, however, which was played by lord Lovat deserves to be mentioned; he himself remained perfectly quiet and was a faithful partisan of the house of Hanover, whilst he equipped his young son and placed him at the head of the clan, without regard to the disinclination of the young man to share in an undertaking to which he fell a sacrifice. The regency which George had left in London in the mean time adopted bad measures to suppress the rebellion: Sir John Cope, who was stationed in Scotland with a very small number of English troops, advanced to Inverness, and afterwards retreated; the rebellion became more considerable; the outlaws of 1715 returned, called their vassals and clansmen to arms, and these responded to the call. The clans of Macdonald and Cameron collected; they were joined by the duke of Perth, by lords Elcho and Murray, and the marquis of Tullibardine, who had lost the dukedom of Athol in consequence of the sentence of outlawry which had been pronounced against him; so that Charles Edward, even before he took possession of Perth, and therefore before he was joined by lords Balmerino, Kilmarnock and Cromarty, saw himself at the head of about 5000 men. These irregular forces

* The most complete account of this expedition is to be found in Browne's 'History of the Highlands and Highland Clans,' Glasgow, 1836. The Appendix to the second part contains the miserable letters of Charles Edward, under the title of the 'Stuart Papers,' and from these an opinion may be formed of the weakness and littleness of his character.

were all badly armed, notwithstanding which they took possession of the whole country without difficulty or resistance. On the 26th of September the chevalier St. George was proclaimed king of Great Britain in Edinburgh, and Charles Edward caused a manifesto, written in his father's name, to be publicly read and published, in which he himself was declared to be his viceroy and representative. Sir John Cope contributed to increase the reputation and power of the prince by his imprudence: he foolishly despised the very sensible advice of a Scottish colonel, thought himself able, with 3000 regular troops, to disperse the ill-trained and ill-armed bands of the rebels, most imprudently approached Edinburgh, and was attacked at Preston Pans on the 1st of October, in a manner which was quite new both to himself and his soldiers. Four thousand Highlanders, without artillery or guns, and with the regent at their head, claymore in hand, rushed like madmen upon the English troops and gained a complete victory. The success at Preston Pans not only gave some renown to the undertaking, and a degree of consequence which it by no means deserved, but it was the means of gaining some pieces of artillery; some money was derived from the plunder of the enemy, and means of extorting more from their opponents was furnished. All Scotland was now in their power, but that was of little avail whilst the strong places and forts remained in the hands of the English government, and no thought could be entertained of a siege.

The news of the rebellion in Scotland had in the mean time recalled the king to England; the Dutch were called upon to send the 6000 men which they had engaged to furnish on such an emergency; the Scottish lords who continued faithful to the house of Hanover assembled their vassals and adherents, and in several places formed a considerable force. The French, it is true, continued to send small sums of money, arms and soldiers, by trading vessels which were sometimes fortunate enough to escape the English; the richer and more numerous part of the inhabitants of the Lowlands and the citizens of the Highland towns were, however, vehemently opposed to the king and his religion. About this time two armies were collected in England, consisting of regulars and militia. Wade advanced with one small division to Newcastle, whilst another was assembling in Staffordshire under lord Ligonier. Charles Edward was then in daily expectation of the landing of the French in the south

of England; he continued adventurously to follow up his good fortune, took possession of Carlisle and pressed forward into England, because he hoped to receive large accessions from the numerous adherents of his house among the English, of whom indeed there was no lack. Neither the undertaking of the prince nor his person inspired any confidence in those who were attached to or would have aided his cause; he found few supporters in Manchester, but still he advanced till he arrived within a few days' march of London. When he reached Derby he began to be alarmed at his position, his courage failed, and he retreated with as much rapidity towards Scotland as he had advanced. The mismanagement and imprudence of the undertaking appeared in the retreat as well as in the advance, and all Europe learned with astonishment, that the prince, although he had left in his rear the English garrisons in Scotland, the regular troops which they contained, though indeed few in number, and the forces which had been raised among the Scotch Whigs, was yet still in a condition to push forward to within less than 150 miles of the metropolis. He scarcely remained a month in England and retreated without having been attacked, and was still at the head of about 5000 badly-armed Scots, who had not been much reinforced by accessions.

The duke of Cumberland was now recalled from the army in the Netherlands to take the command of that assembled in England, the Dutch embarked 6000 veteran troops, and Wade made preparations in Newcastle to support the duke of Cumberland. The duke followed close upon the footsteps of the small Scottish army, whose discipline and abstinence from plunder were worthy of admiration, took Carlisle on the last day of the year 1745, pushed forward to Edinburgh, and presently advanced farther northwards. In the mean time fortune had once more been favourable to the Scots on the 17th of January 1746. General Hawley tried to raise the siege of Falkirk; the Scots however anticipated his attack, fell upon him, and by their well-directed fire threw his dragoons into such confusion, that he was completely beaten and routed. This was the last glimmering of success, of which the contemptible and absurd prince, who plunged so many brave men and the country itself into misfortune, was wholly unworthy.

Cumberland continually advanced farther and farther towards the north, the Scots were obliged to relinquish the siege of Stir-

ling, and Charles Edward completely lost all firmness of mind; he first foolishly ordered a precipitate flight, and then again, in despair, had recourse to a decisive engagement. This battle was fought in April (1746), and the duke of Cumberland, who marched from Aberdeen on the 23rd and forded the Spey in the sight of the enemy, learned to his great astonishment in Nairne, that the prince had suddenly marched from Inverness to Culloden to offer him battle. On the 27th, at Culloden, the Scots attempted the same bold manœuvre which had succeeded so well at Preston Pans; they rushed upon the enemy with their claymores and Lochaber axes, but they were this time opposed by a totally different army, by a superior force and a well-served artillery; they themselves only possessed a few ill-mounted field-pieces. The regular and well-directed fire of the English ended the battle in half an hour, and the cavalry, of which the Scots were wholly destitute, completed the victory, which was, properly speaking, won by German soldiers. Those troops, which were called Dutch in Cumberland's army, consisted in reality of brave Hessians, who at that time were sold and farmed out by their masters to the highest bidder, and were compelled to enter into service, not to gain glory and honour for themselves or their native land, but to shed their blood upon the battle-field in the service of strangers, in all places and countries, in order to bring money to their rulers. The grand sultan durst not have sold the blood of his janissaries to strangers!

The sending of these 6000 Hessians gave rise to a quarrel between the Dutch and the French. These troops had composed a part of the garrisons of Tournay and Oudenarde, and although the Dutch sent auxiliary troops into the Austrian Netherlands, which, as a part of the army of the pragmatic sanction, were employed in the field against the French, yet they did not wish to go to war with them. The French alleged that these troops had been previously liberated by them only on the condition of not again serving in the field against France; but Scotch, Irish, and some French companies in the name and under the colours of the king of France, had appeared in the battle of Culloden, and consequently the Dutch were alleged to have broken their solemn pledge and violated the peace.

After the battle the Scots' army was either cut down or scattered, and the most cruel punishments and persecutions followed,

inflicted upon the partisans of the ancient royal line by the friends of freedom so called, that is, in other words, by the new aristocracy of the Whigs and their allies, the rich merchants and skilful pettifoggers of England. Every man who was suspected was taken prisoner, and all the prisons from Edinburgh to London were filled; all these were prosecuted according to the terms and tenor of laws which were passed to suit the occasion. Charles Edward himself escaped by a flight of such an adventurous nature, that the circumstances connected with it, the young lady who was engaged in its promotion, and the numerous dangers and hair-breadth escapes which he had, during the course of his flight, combined with the manners of the country in which the events took place, have furnished materials for many a volume. The narration of the particular adventures of a man, who was altogether unworthy of the noble friends whom he found, would be quite foreign to the nature of our work and object; but in order to justify the severity of that judgement which we have pronounced upon him, we shall hereafter return to the subject of his character and dwell for a moment upon the course of his conduct in Paris. We moreover in this place pass by many points, upon which we shall hereafter make some observations, when we come to speak more at length of the life and customs of this period. Among these points we may mention the unheard-of cruelty of the conquerors, the fury of the English and of the Scots who bore arms in favour of the existing government, the vengeance, the horrors, and the executions, which are as disgraceful to the memory of George II. as the scenes of 1717 are to that of his father. When we hereafter return to the history of these points, we shall also refer to the sums which the English parliament paid for foreign, but especially German troops, to Sardinia, to the German princes, even to Mayence, to Russia and to Austria; and on this occasion also, we shall bear in mind the unsuccessful attempt which Carteret, or as he was called, after his secession from the ministry, lord Granville, made, in connexion with the king, to get possession again of the helm of the state. We must also return once more to Germany, were it only to point out, in connexion with the coronation of the emperor in September 1745, with what miserable trash they entertained the good German people of those times in the newspapers, and how they now begin to play the same game. Every one was entertained with the recital of the pomp and solemnities

which were exhibited and observed during the presence of Maria Theresa in Heidelberg; all the newspapers and histories give detailed accounts of the astonishment, reverence and admiration which was excited at the number of outriders and postillions with horns who preceded the landgrave of Darmstadt when he brought the news of the emperor's election to Heidelberg. This was all that our good countrymen learned of their native land, and the participation of the Germans in public affairs was limited to such events!

After the peace of Dresden, the war in Germany was at an end, and 30,000 fresh Austrian troops appeared in Italy in 1746. These troops were again unhappily placed under the command of two noble generals, the prince of Lichtenstein and the marquis Antoniotto Botta Adorno, and the two experienced and able commanders who were seconds in authority. Brown and Bärenklau (Pereklo) were obliged to allow these distinguished and noble generals to proceed methodically and slowly, according to traditionary usage. The haughty queen of Spain rejected the prudent counsel of De Gages; her son Don Philipp, with too great precipitation and in the winter season, had taken possession at the same time of Parma, Milan and Alessandria without being in a condition to attack the citadels, and although Mantua was still in the possession of the enemy, he had scattered his army over the whole of Lombardy. In March 1746 he found himself attacked on three sides. The king of Sardinia attacked Asti, Bärenklau marched upon Milan, Brown drove Castellar into Parma, and blockaded him so closely, that Don Philipp and De Gages, who had been encamped for some time near Pavia, were obliged to march to Placentia, in order to relieve Castellar. The latter indeed fortunately escaped from the Austrians by a march over the mountains into the territory of Genoa, but before he was able to reach the main army by this difficult way, he lost the half of his men; he was obliged to surrender Parma to the Austrians. From that time the two armies encamped opposite to one another in the neighbourhood of Placentia, whilst Maillebois with his French took up a position at Novi, to maintain a communication with the Genoese and to watch the movements of the king of Sardinia. The Austrians in the mean time had entrenched themselves in their position, and finally the allies adopted the resolution of attacking them in their fortifications. For this purpose Maillebois was ordered to

Placentia, where he appeared on the 16th of June, but the attack of the Spaniards and the French was repulsed at every point. This unsuccessful attempt is known under the name of the battle of Cossolegno; according to the opinions of military judges, each party must have committed great faults, and the loss of life on both sides was nearly equal.

From this time the Spaniards and Austrians with equal listlessness remained for a whole month encamped in the neighbourhood of each other, and lost many more men in murderous skirmishes, from the oppressive heat, the influence of the climate and from want, than a battle would have cost them. The death of Philipp V. of Spain, by which Elizabeth lost all her influence, and the accession of Ferdinand VI. on the 9th of July 1746, changed at once the whole condition of affairs in Italy. The new king could not endure the French. Don Philipp was so devotedly attached to France and to French customs and manners, that he even preferred their language to the Spanish, which he spoke badly. To please the French he had given up his position near Placentia, marched to Tortona with great loss, and, contrary to the advice of De Gages, pitched his camp at Voghera. In consequence of this movement, the communication between the army and Genoa by Novi was for a time completely cut off. The French afterwards sent the marquis of Mirepoix, who occupied Novi and Gavi with 8000 men, and restored the communication with Genoa, and 6000 Spaniards were expected; but precisely at this very moment, Ferdinand, after his accession, deprived his step-brother of that great distinction which he had hitherto enjoyed in the army.

The new king of Spain recalled Castellar and De Gages; and the marquis Las Minas, a man full of Spanish pride and Spanish prejudices, who was thoroughly averse to the French, received the chief command; Don Philipp it is true remained with the army, but he lost the deciding voice in the council of war. The 6000 Spaniards which had been promised, and were actually upon the march, were recalled. Las Minas, deaf to all the representations of the French, marched into the territories of Genoa on the 20th of August, and the French were obliged to follow him. The Spaniards and French no sooner commenced their march into Provence by way of Nice, than the Genoese oligarchs, who formed the government of the senate, were placed in a situation of great perplexity, which they had brought upon

themselves by their treacherous cowardice. The senate, on the one hand, declared that they were not at war with Austria and with the new emperor Francis, and sent an ambassador to Vienna; on the other, they lent their best assistance to the Spaniards and French on their incursion into Lombardy, and recruited an army with a view to reinforce them. As for many reasons, we must enter at some length, in the next section, into the history of the Genoese republic, we shall only here briefly allude to the chief points in order to explain the connexion of the various events of the war. The Genoese people, whose minds had been stimulated by secret intelligence, succeeded in driving the Austrians out of their city: the whole territory was cleared of the enemy, and the city defended itself with courage, patriotism and at great sacrifices for eighteen months; but after the lapse of this time the people were shamefully deprived of all the advantages of their efforts by their own nobility and by the French courtiers. The consequences of the Genoese rebellion frustrated all the plans of the allies, which were made at the end of the year 1746, to attack the French in their own country. The Austrians and Sardinians would have rather turned their forces against Naples, but the English were disinclined to such an undertaking, because Maria Theresa once in possession of Naples, it would be very difficult to persuade her to conclude a peace.

With respect to the expedition against France, the king of Sardinia had taken possession of Savona and Finale after the departure of the Spaniards and French; Brown, with the Austrians and Sardinians of his army, advanced by way of Nice into Provence and waited for the arrival of his heavy artillery from Genoa, in order, with the assistance of the English, first to attack Antibes, and then to reduce Toulon: but the Austrians as usual failed in keeping a careful check upon the paymasters, contractors and masters of ordnance connected with their army; and to this was added a disease among the cattle. The allies lost a third of their troops and the greatest part of their horses from the inclemency of the weather, from privation and disease; and after Botta's expulsion from Genoa, they were even in danger of being wholly annihilated or cut off, if the French and Spaniards had not at the same time been exposed to similar privations. The former were unable quickly to follow the enemy, because they were suffering want in their own country; and besides, the two commanders, Maillebois and Las Minas, were con-

tinually at variance. Las Minas, it is true, received orders from his court to treat the French with greater consideration, and Belleisle received the command of the latter, as he appeared to combine the talents of a diplomatist with the qualities of a general; but their mutual harmony was not thereby much improved. Don Philipp and the duke of Modena were obliged to exert all their powers in Dauphiné to ward off the attacks of the king of Sardinia. The Spaniards and French afterwards pursued Brown (Feb. 1747), when the latter retreated from Provence; but they quarreled with each other, and the marshal allowed his brother to undertake a totally absurd and madly conceived expedition, in order to obtain a marshal's staff at the expense of his courageous soldiers. His brother had no sooner conquered Ventimiglia and surmounted the difficulties of the Cottian Alps, than the chevalier Belleisle pushed rapidly forward to attack the Piedmontese, who had shortly before been reinforced by the Austrians, in the fortress of Col di Sietta, and to attempt to take a precipitous rock by storm. His best officers declared the project to be absurd and impracticable; he nevertheless commanded the rocks and fortifications to be stormed and sacrificed the bravest of his troops. Fifteen thousand French and the chevalier himself paid the penalty of this desperate enterprise with their lives. After this loss of their choicest troops, Las Minas and marshal Belleisle were obliged to rest contented with maintaining possession of the county of Nice.

In the Netherlands, the French, under marshal de Saxe, proved in this war also, as they had done in every other, in which their general knew how to avail himself of their national peculiarities, that their activity and self-sufficiency, their warlike ambition, and their quick and practical understanding, admirably qualified them for military exploits and heroic deeds. During the absence of the duke of Cumberland and the troops which he took with him, the French, by military preparations and marching troops to their coasts, appeared as if they designed to send an expedition against England and Scotland, although even the earl-marshal Keith, who was then in Paris, strongly dissuaded them from such an attempt. The duke of Richelieu was this time apparently destined to receive the chief command of this pretended army of invasion, which was boastingly stated at 30,000 strong. The matter was pushed so far, that troops were in reality embarked; and Voltaire, the unprincipled and clever

friend of Richelieu, was ordered to draw up a manifesto to be published on landing, although all this was really intended merely as a mask for the operations which were designed to be prosecuted in the Netherlands. Brussels was attacked as early as January (1746), and when the French approached the United Provinces, after the capture of Brussels, Holland was in a state of universal commotion. At this moment of imminent danger, the country was distracted by the violence and enmity of two parties; the one was furious, and vehemently insisted upon immediate and vigorous preparations for war: this was the party which sent troops into England and to the Austrian army in the Netherlands, under pretence of being bound by the peace of Utrecht and the pragmatic sanction, and which threw itself completely into the arms of the English ministry. The other sought by all means to bring about negotiations with the French, in order to rid themselves of their stadtholder and captain-general of the house of Orange, with whom they were threatened by their opponents, and especially by the common people.

In May, Louis XV. himself appeared with his army in the Netherlands, and on this occasion he was accompanied by his new mistress (Pompadour), who in the former year had preserved a species of incognito, but now showed herself in royal magnificence and accompanied by a splendid retinue. Some slight attention was however paid to decency and morality, for they did not suffer the wife of the dauphin, a Saxon princess, to whom he had been married in the preceding year, to be introduced into the corruption of a scandalous court, to which the duke of Richelieu and such profligates gave the tone. For the sake of propriety, the dauphin on this occasion remained at home. As early as the end of May, Antwerp with its citadel was captured; and although the allied armies received repeated reinforcements during the succeeding months, Namur, Mons, and other towns were reduced, so that in September, Limburg and Luxemburg alone, of all their possessions in the Netherlands, remained in the hands of the Austrians. The French had been strongly reinforced, and the allied army no longer found itself strong enough to resist them in the field: it had taken up its position on the Meuse, where it awaited reinforcements which did not for some time arrive. In consequence of the peace, the army on the Upper Rhine was no longer needed in Germany, and therefore 20,000 Austrians, in July, marched

from the camp near Heilbronn into the Netherlands ; but, alas ! along with them came prince Charles of Lorraine as commander-in-chief. These were speedily followed by 10,000 Hanoverians, and the 6000 Hessians returned from Scotland. In September the English again made their appearance in the Netherlands : prince Charles, as commander-in-chief, inspired not the slightest confidence either in the Dutch or English. The duke of Cumberland remained in England, and the Dutch refused to place their army, which was commanded by the prince of Waldeck, under the orders of prince Charles ; so that the latter saw rather with pleasure than regret, the loss which the prince of Waldeck sustained in the battle which was fought at the very close of the campaign. Marshal de Saxe had been relieved from the burthensome presence of the king, his mistresses and the court mob in June ; Louis, accompanied by his Pompadour, travelled from one country-house to another, whilst his army in the Netherlands took one fortress after another, and frustrated all attempts of the allies to save them. Prince Charles was almost universally blamed on account of this campaign, and especially on account of the position which he took up on the 11th of October, between Maestricht and Liege. Marshal de Saxe regarded the position as so badly chosen, that he ordered the allies to be attacked in their trenches, and with certainty predicted the victory which he won at the village of Raucoux. On this occasion the left wing, under the prince of Waldeck, suffered so severely, that the king of Prussia alleged that prince Charles had intentionally avoided sending them any aid, but had satisfied himself with covering the prince of Waldeck's retreat by Louis of Brunswick, and that his defeat had given him satisfaction. The allied army after the battle withdrew with but small loss, and took shelter under the cannon of Maestricht.

In the following year the French committed a fault in the Netherlands similar to that of the Austrians in Italy against Genoa. By the brutality of their general, the marquis Botta, the Austrians had driven the Genoese to despair, and provoked an insurrection, which frustrated the attack of the English, Sardinians and Austrians upon Provence, compelled Genoa to receive a French garrison, and to defend itself to the uttermost ; in the same manner the French compelled the Dutch to throw themselves completely into the arms of the English. The immediate consequence of their incursion into the seven united

provinces was, that the son-in-law of the king of England was created hereditary stadtholder, and that thereby Holland soon afterwards became wholly dependent upon England. The French had indeed without doubt foreboded this event, and had therefore previously opened negotiations in Breda, and offered a separate peace to the Dutch; and when these negotiations were interrupted by the English, they thought to compel the Dutch to conclude a peace by making a second incursion into their provinces, because an attack upon those east of the Meuse might have given offence to Prussia and the empire, and provoked their hostility.

On the death of William III., the aristocratic party in Holland and Zealand, notwithstanding the decree or advice of the late general stadtholder, refused to acknowledge his heir, John William Friso, as his successor in this dignity; and when the latter was unhappily drowned in 1711, they tried by all possible means to prevent his son William IV. from again becoming head of the whole republic. William however was chosen stadtholder of Friesland, Gröningen and Gueldres, married the English princess Anne, and his friends, the deputies of Friesland in particular, as early as the year 1744, eagerly sought to procure his nomination as commander of the infantry of the states-general; but they had only four voices in their favour. In the beginning of the year 1747, the Orange party wished to have him appointed to the command of the army instead of the prince of Waldeck; but they were again unsuccessful, till the French formally declared war in April 1747 and invaded Holland. The adherents of the house of Orange took advantage of the favourable moment to raise a popular clamour, as had been done in 1672, whilst the rulers hesitated, and the states-general were engaged in consultations.

This popular feeling showed itself publicly in Zealand, especially in Vliessingen and Vere. The people collected in masses, raised a popular clamour, adopted the colours and ribbons of the Orange party, threatened their magistrates, and without asking their advice or opinion proclaimed William IV. as their stadtholder. The other towns in Zealand followed their example, and the aristocratic governments of Holland and Zealand were the more alarmed, because they had before formally refused to recognize the heritable rights of the prince to the property which his family possessed in Vere and Vliessingen. The inhabitants

of Holland did not hesitate to follow the example of the Zealanders. At the end of April an insurrection took place in Rotterdam, and soon afterwards in several other towns. The authorities were universally threatened, till at length the aristocratic magistrates, mindful of the fate of their predecessors in 1672, became frightened, and yielded.

On the 2nd of May 1747, William was first proclaimed in Holland, then in Overijssel and Utrecht, captain-general and stadtholder of their provinces, and was afterwards nominated high-admiral and captain-general by the states-general; immediately afterwards, privileges and places were one after another transferred to him. In the following year he obtained the dignity of hereditary stadtholder, and according to a singular and surprising resolution, which was brought forward by the equestrian order in October 1747, the right of succession was extended even to female descendants. William IV. was an amiable, mild and intelligent man; the ruling families, called patriots, had shamefully neglected all military preparations and even the army, regarded the appointment of officers and other official men as their property, and distributed them as marks of their favour.

Before this revolution took place in Holland, the naval powers had been importunate for the recall of the prince of Lorraine from the command of the army in the Netherlands, and when he returned to Vienna he was received with rejoicings and fêtes, as if he had gained immortal victories, notwithstanding all the grievous faults which he had committed. It now became the turn of the duke of Cumberland to fall into error, in order to facilitate the conquest of Holland by marshal de Saxe. The duke had gained an easily-won glory in England by his expedition into Scotland and the victory at Culloden. The Whig aristocracy, who were thus secured in their dominion, procured him as his reward an annuity from the nation of the amount of £54,000, which was to descend to his posterity; but he was not able to maintain his military reputation when placed in opposition to marshal de Saxe. The French were long in uncertainty in what direction they would employ their army: they had sent one of the main divisions of this army into Dutch Flanders, and threatened Bergenopzoom, whilst the allies remained in a very advantageous position between the two Netes till June. The French court, and along with it all its cabals

and intrigues, had again returned to the army. Frederick II. alleges that the daily consumption of the court equalled the rations of 10,000 men, and hence there arose all sorts of difficulties in providing for the troops. In June marshal de Saxe first advanced against Maestricht, and marshal Löwendal against Bergenopzoom and Breda. In consequence of the marshal's march, the main armies approached so close to the Meuse, that in the beginning of July, in the neighbourhood of Maestricht, a battle became unavoidable. This engagement was fought on the 2d of July near the village of Val or Laffeld, and was won by the French, like all the rest which up to this time had been fought in the Netherlands. If the duke of Cumberland deserves no credit on account of his preparations for the battle, his conduct during the time of action, and the execution of his retreat, on the other hand, are worthy of commendation. The French strongly blamed Clermont Tonnère for having facilitated the retreat of the allies by not yielding obedience to the repeated commands which he received to charge the enemy with his cavalry: whilst the duke of Cumberland encamped on the further side of Maestricht, to prevent the siege of the town, and tried to keep the French army in a state of inactivity, marshal Löwendal on his part began the siege of Bergenopzoom.

At this time the whole politics of Russia were completely in the venal hands of Bestuscheff; he was however occasionally obstructed in carrying out his plans by the empress or one of her favourites. He remained firm in his enmity to Prussia, and had kept an army together in the Baltic provinces since 1744. His measures and threats had become so seriously alarming in the year 1745, that Frederick, in order to prevent a hostile declaration on the part of Russia, entered into negotiations in Hanover with England, and afterwards turned aside the storm by means of the peace of Dresden. Austria in the mean time was unwearied in her exertions; she was secretly at work in Russia and Saxony, and the treaty with Russia was concluded as early as 1746, the most secret article of which gave occasion, ten years afterwards, to the combination of Russia and France against Prussia. Both powers apparently renewed the treaty which they had concluded in 1726; but Maria Theresa's efforts in the preceding year to procure the recognition of the Russian imperial title from the emperor of Germany and the empire had not been altogether unrewarded; for it was promised in an article, which according

to special agreement was to be kept peculiarly secret, that aid was to be furnished to the empress to enable her to repossess herself of the provinces which had been lost to Prussia*. In another article of the same treaty, threats were held out against Denmark. By virtue of this article, Austria constituted herself a protector of the claims of the grand-duke in Holstein and Sleswick. After this treaty had been signed, on the 2nd of June 1746, an event occurred which was singular enough, but in the genuine style of diplomacy; another treaty was concluded with Denmark on the 10th, in which a friendly meeting was promised to discuss and settle the claims of the grand-duke on Sleswick. About the same time an attempt was made to obtain Russian auxiliary troops in the Netherlands for money. The Dutch ambassador De Dieu endeavoured to conclude a treaty of commerce in St. Petersburg, and when he failed in this design, he entered into negotiations with the high-chancellor (May 1746) respecting Russian troops. He received a promise that 30,000 men should be held in readiness as soon as they might be required, or the water was open; but it was long before they could come to an agreement as to the sum which was to be paid for their services. England it is true had acceded to the treaty between Russia and Holland, with the exception of the secret article; but the English ministers did not venture to spend money upon Russia until after the suppression of the rebellion in Scotland. On the 23rd of June 1747 a treaty was signed in St. Petersburg, by which England promised to pay £100,000 as subsidies for the use of from 30,000 to 50,000 troops, which were to serve in the Netherlands and to be maintained at the cost of the allies†.

The attention of all Europe was now directed to the siege of Bergenopzoom, which was carried on under the command of Löwendal, originally a Swede, but at that time a French marshal; whilst the defence of the town was entrusted by the Dutch government to another Swede, Cronström, who was now eighty years of age. Although this general was both stupid and deaf from age, he was nevertheless to command the army which was sent for the defence of the fortress. The prince of Waldeck had

* Marten's 'Supplément au Recueil des Traités,' vol. ii. no. 50. p. 272. The 22nd of May there mentioned is to be reckoned old style.

† The small portion of the agreement which they thought it advisable to make public will be found in 'Wenck,' vol. ii. p. 244.

retired from the army in disgust*. After his departure Schwarzenberg took his place as second in authority under Cronström, and received the command of the army appointed to relieve the town, but proved himself as incapable as the former. The only man of ability and activity in the fortress, the prince of Hesse-Philippsthal, became ill, and the fortress, which was regarded as impregnable, was taken by storm on the 16th of September (1747) like ordinary trenches, in consequence of the incapacity of its commander. The aged Cronström, instead of rushing to meet the enemy on their having effected an entrance into the fortress and venturing his life in its defence, in order to save the honour of his troops, made a hasty escape, and left fortress and troops to their fate: he lost his places, and survived his disgrace four years.

The loud rejoicing in France respecting victories, conquests and glory in the Netherlands however deceived no one as to the embarrassments of the government, which were increasing with every year, as well as the privations and oppression which fell exclusively upon the labouring classes. During this year, nay, almost every month, France and Spain lost men, ships, possessions and money in India, and upon every sea. France bore the burthen of the war between the English and Spain; she was obliged to assist Genoa with money and troops, and to maintain the duke of Modena; and the presence of the king with the army increased the expenditure of the campaign, whilst the horrible extortions which were practised in the enemies' territories brought no money into the treasury. It was not easy with propriety to put a stop to these royal journeys to the army, and yet they were extremely burthensome, and very inconvenient to Pompadour. There had therefore long been a desire to conclude a peace.

Among the papers of the duke of Richelieu which are in the French archives, there are some long and ostentatious reports of his activity at this time, in which he dwells at length upon his anxiety and endeavours to bring about a peace; we shall merely refer to one of these manuscript notices. Richelieu alleges, that as early as August 1747 he had regarded the con-

* The prince of Waldeck was sent with a division of 10,000 men from the army on the Meuse for the reinforcement of the troops which were to interrupt or obstruct the siege of Bergenopzoom, and learned that these, as well as the whole army employed in that service, were to be placed under the command of Cronström; thereupon he quarreled with the new Dutch government, took a sudden departure and was dismissed.

clusion of a peace as so certain, that for this reason he had at first declined accepting the command in Genoa, which was offered him.

The French boast of the magnanimity of their king in consequence of the favourable proposals of peace which he made, when he was almost certain of the conquest of Maestricht, Breda and Herzogenbusch. It would be ridiculous to speak of magnanimity in politics; it is true, however, that after the states-general had been obliged to decline the proposal which was made to please the French party, viz. that Holland should observe a complete neutrality, king Louis himself, not by his minister, but through the English general Ligonier, who was taken prisoner in the battle of Laffeld, made proposals of peace, which were listened to in London.

In October (1747) an agreement was made to enter into negotiations for peace at Aix la Chapelle. The empress named the count von Kaunitz-Rittberg as her representative and plenipotentiary at the congress which was to be held in that city. Kaunitz, with high rank and great property, combined a degree of diplomatic skill which has made him immortal, and in addition to this he possessed qualities which are rarely to be found among courtiers. The negotiations were indisputably promoted by the fact, that Russia, besides the army which was kept in a state of readiness in the Baltic provinces, had caused 37,000 men to march through Poland, Upper Silesia, Moravia and Bohemia to Germany, the first divisions of which had reached the Rhine before the peace was concluded. At this time the naval powers had all these princes in their pay. In their perplexity and danger they paid for the blood of the poor Russians and Germans, who were sold by their princes, and finally they even negotiated with the nobles and lords of Berne, who at that time had also subjects, and who were solicitous to sell them to any one willing to pay for their service; the price of their blood however was not at least curtailed by these human brokers, as it was by the Germans. Among these, Hessian, Hanoverian, Bavarian and Gotha troops were really hired for the new campaign, and negotiations for the same purpose were carried on with Wolfenbüttel, Darmstadt, Durlach and Schwarzburg. The able Zwier van Haaren, who had been the chief promoter of the Dutch revolution and of the renewal of the hereditary dignity of stadtholder, went to Berne, in order to raise

an army of 12,000 or 13,000 men among the Protestant cantons. This however could not be effected even by the splendid speeches which the learned and able Herr van Haaren made at that time in Berne, in consequence of the well-known connexion of the Swiss aristocracy with France, and because in Paris they understood well whom it was expedient to bribe.

During the negotiations in Aix la Chapelle, the war was carried on without interruption in the field; but the results in the year 1748 bore no comparison to the cost and to the great preparations which had been made. In January (1748) it had been agreed in the Hague to bring 192,000 men into the field, without reckoning the garrisons of the several towns. Each of the naval powers was to maintain 66,000, Austria 60,000 in the Netherlands and as many in Italy, and the king of Sardinia, who also obtained the chief command over the whole army in Italy, half that number. The naval powers besides treated Austria and Sardinia as customers and their troops as wares; they promised indeed £300,000 to Sardinia and £400,000 to Austria, but made it a condition, that reductions were to be made in these sums respectively if they failed in sending into the field the specified number of troops.

Marshal de Saxe, at the head of the army of a single nation, which was guided wholly by his will, frustrated all the long consultations of the allies, and in April (1748) performed that celebrated march to the siege of Maestricht, which is regarded as the masterpiece of his warlike exploits. The preliminaries between England, Holland and France were signed as early as the end of April; but warlike operations still continued to be carried on according to express agreement, because France wished to conquer Maestricht before the conclusion of the peace, and England was not averse to the conquest, in order that Holland and Austria might be compelled to conclude the treaty on the conditions which England desired. The French, who were to be consoled by the glory of some splendid deed of arms for the immense fruitless expenditure of men and money which they had made in that war, took Maestricht on the 11th of May, and then a suspension of hostilities took place. The preliminaries of the peace astonished the world, because the French agreed to relinquish all their conquests, which in the scandalous history of the private life of Louis XV. is attributed to court cabals, the wish of Pompadour, and the impatience of the king alone. Suf-

ficient reasons however for purchasing peace upon any conditions, which did not involve the honour of the nation, may be found in the complete exhaustion of their finances and the ruin of their marine and trade. The maintenance of their conquests in the Netherlands besides must have been attended with increasing difficulties in consequence of their extent, because England and Holland could and must continue the war, whilst France was wholly exhausted, and above all, because marshal de Saxe had then apparently but a short time to live.

The preliminary conditions of the peace of Aix la Chapelle, on which Holland, England and France first secretly agreed, then afterwards signed, and to the acceptance of which they were if necessary to compel their allies, were as follows:—All the conquests during the war to be restored; Dunkirk to remain fortified on the land side, but to be open seaward. In order not to embitter the Spaniards, France insisted that Maria Theresa should cede Guastalla, Parma and Placentia to Don Philipp, on condition however, that if he died without heirs, or his brother became king of Spain, these duchies should revert to Austria. Modena and Genoa were to be placed in their old position, and the king of Sardinia to retain what had been conceded to him by the treaty of Worms. The Spaniards were again to buy their slaves from England (*i.e.* the Assiento-treaty was to be renewed); and, finally, Silesia and Glatz were to be guaranteed to the king of Prussia. We omit all notice of other less important articles; but we must not neglect remarking, that France was obliged to bind itself not only to give no farther assistance or support to the family of the Stuarts, but not even to suffer any member of it to remain in their dominions.

From the delay of the empress in accepting the conditions, and from her formal protest against them, the reason was afterwards seen why the three powers had thought it advisable to take Maestricht and hold it as a pledge. In fact the empress not only lost Parma and Placentia, but also a considerable portion of the Milanese, which was ceded to Sardinia. The conclusion of the treaty first took place in October, and although it had been agreed that the fortified towns on the French frontiers should again receive Dutch garrisons, the works still remained in a state of ruin, and the garrisons returned after the seven years' war. It had been conceded to the French, that they were to be allowed to remain in the Netherlands till Austria had ful-

filled certain conditions in favour of Modena, Genoa and Don Philipp, and had released the abbot of St. Hubert. The French finally withdrew in the year 1749.

CHAPTER II.

INTERNAL HISTORY OF THE STATES OF EUROPE IN REFERENCE TO LIFE, MORALS AND ADMINISTRATION TILL 1755.

§ I.

ITALY.

DURING this period attempts were made to introduce some of the ideas of the new age into life; but such only as were hostile to the hierarchy and feudal aristocracy and favourable to monarchy, and therefore hated by the people. We shall therefore most appropriately commence our review of the condition of the Italian states with Naples, because the attempts at improvement which were then made by Charles IV. and his minister Tanucci are the most celebrated. Charles IV., like Louis XV. and Ferdinand of Spain, was under the influence of the besetting and hereditary infirmity of the house of Bourbon,—an inordinate passion for the chase,—and not only published the most severe game-laws, but harassed the country by the extraordinarily rigid measures which he took for their observance; on the other hand, he was tolerably free from ecclesiastical prejudices. His minister Bernard Tanucci, formerly an advocate and professor of law in Pisa, endeavoured to set some limits to the power and numbers of the clergy, as far as it was possible to be done without exciting the populace or offending that class of persons which is called the church. The middle ages and its customs were more and more disappearing from life, and every intelligent man strongly felt the urgent necessity of accommodating their institutions to the modern age. Some idea of the necessity at this time in Naples may be formed from the number of idle and for the most part ignorant ecclesiastical persons who met Charles IV. on his arrival: this number amounted to 112,000 heads; among these were 22 archbishops, 116 bishops, 56,500

priests, 31,800 monks, and 23,600 nuns. Of every four thousand inhabitants of this little kingdom, twenty-eight were always ecclesiastics. Tanucci concluded a concordat with the pope, with a view to effect a diminution of the number of the clergy, and for the abolition of many of the privileges of the churches, convents and ecclesiastical corporations, which were adverse to a wise and useful administration of the state. He was not however satisfied even with that*. The pope found it advisable to consent to a considerable reduction of the number of holidays, and the government were well pleased to observe the resistance which the people (1740) offered to the introduction of the inquisition; they even banished those ecclesiastics who had been actively instrumental in its introduction, and compelled the pope to declare that the ancient usage should remain undisturbed, and that, in particular cases, the inquisition should resign the suit to the secular tribunals.

In the same way as Tanucci opposed new laws to the abuses of the middle ages in ecclesiastical affairs, he also altered other institutions in the spirit of the new age. We do not refer to his new method of taxation, of increased duties upon imports, or new survey, for all this was merely advantageous to the royal treasury; we speak of questions connected with feudality. Up till the time of the peace of Aix la Chapelle, no one durst offer any offence to the barons in Naples, but after this event they were obliged to relinquish one privilege after another; but, alas! Tanucci and the king were reformers only in order to gain more power and influence for the royal officials, and every abuse which was not an obstruction to the exercise of their authority or power

* Colletta has given an admirable and condensed view of the twelve articles of the 'Concordat,' vol. i. p. 57, as follows: "The estates possessed by the church before the concordat were in future to pay the half of the usual taxes, and all that they should in future become possessed of their full proportion of the public burthens. The treasury of the state was to have power to separate all lay estates which erroneously or with evil intention had become mixed up with ecclesiastical possessions; all immunities were to be reduced, and the customary *graces* (*i favori d'uso*) to be abolished; the right of asylum was to be confined to churches, and only to be available in a few, and those light offences. It was to be definitely determined what persons were to be reckoned as ecclesiastics, and their personal privileges distinctly fixed. Bishops' courts were to be limited in their jurisdiction, and that of the secular courts increased; the difficulty of obtaining consecration and the strictness of the moral discipline of the priests were to be increased, in order to diminish the number of the clergy, and a mixed court (of laymen and clergy) was to decide all disputes which might arise out of the concordat."

was carefully maintained. Like Louis XIV., they drew all the high nobility from their estates in the country to the court, where they ruined themselves by splendour and expense, whilst at the same time they were kept at an immense distance from their rulers by the Spanish etiquette, which was then first introduced. This extraordinary etiquette and its absurdities were exhibited in a surprising manner on occasion of the visit of the prince elector, Frederick Christian of Saxony, who although accustomed to the stiff ceremonial of the Saxon court, and being a son of king Frederick Augustus of Poland, was offended at the strictness of the Neapolitan court. The prince arrived at Naples in 1738, to visit his sister the queen, and according to Spanish etiquette, during the several months which he spent in Naples, he was not allowed once to dine at the table with his own sister.

In every history we read of the great architectural works which were promoted or carried on by the king,—of the castle of Caserta, the immense theatre in Naples, the excavations in Pompeii and Herculaneum, the collections of works of art, all which have furnished opportunities to flattering historians to sound the most magnificent and pompous praises of his love for the arts. We shall be best able to form an opinion of the credit due to such eulogists by adverting to the manner and circumstances in which he acquired the reputation of a hero. After he had been compelled to neutrality by the brutal conduct of admiral Martin, and had thus saved his capital from bombardment, he led an army against Lobkowitz and gained some very inconsiderable advantages at Velletri, which were absurdly magnified and extolled by the Neapolitans, and were remarkable only as being the sole laurels which the Neapolitans earned in the whole course of the eighteenth century. Notwithstanding this victory at Velletri, on the new incursion of the Austrians into Italy, Naples was saved merely by the desire, on the part of the English, to show favour to the Spaniards.

Rome at this time felt herself quite firm in her ecclesiastical dominion, and showed no care or anxiety with respect to the enlightenment which originated in France and was diffused from Paris as a centre over all the countries of Europe, and regarded as the fashion amongst the higher classes of society. If some occasional concessions appeared to be made to the demands of the secular governments, and some progress with the spirit of the age gave evidence of its existence, upon the whole, all the

abuses of the middle ages were easily maintained and regarded as holy traditions. Clement XII., as well as his successor Benedict XIV., treated public opinion with contempt, and the latter, who desired to pass for an enlightened, mild and intelligent man, conducted himself in German affairs as if he wished to renew the pretensions of a Hildebrand. A hasty glance at the course of conduct pursued by Clement XII. and Benedict XIV. will fully explain the nature of the papal government. Clement XII. was nearly eighty years of age when he suffered cardinal Alberoni, in his name, again to pursue the same course of conduct on a small scale, with respect to the republic of San Marino, which he had played on a great one against the four great powers of Europe. Alberoni had been appointed governor, or in Roman language legate of Ravenna, and as such had made a very advantageous use of his diplomatic skill during the war; after the peace he kept his arts in practice by an experiment on the small republic of San Marino. This opportunity for the exercise of his diplomatic talents for cabals and intrigues was furnished by the oligarchical oppressions which the reigning aristocracy in San Marino inflicted upon the small number of their fellow-citizens. Alberoni found means to persuade a number of the citizens to prefer a request to him, to incorporate their small state with the papal territory; the aged pope (Clement XII.) suffered him to do this, it is true, but upon an express condition, which Alberoni was careful not to observe, that he should first reckon the votes of the people, and clearly ascertain whether it was really their wish to relinquish their freedom. Alberoni proceeded from Ravenna to San Marino accompanied by 200 soldiers and a whole corps of bailiffs, took forcible possession of the town, compelled the inhabitants to do homage to the pope, and returned in triumph to Ravenna.

This conduct excited unusual attention in Italy, and the pope was overwhelmed with representations from all quarters, and found himself obliged to name a commissioner who should investigate the case more fully in San Marino itself. This commissioner by his report induced the pope to annul Alberoni's proceedings, and not long before his death the republic was restored. Alberoni thereupon published a species of manifesto, composed quite in a diplomatic style, in which he justified his own conduct, and pointed out all sorts of diplomatic errors in that of the secretary of state. After Clement's death, the spirit

of enlightenment which then spread from Paris over the whole distinguished world of Europe appeared to have reached even the successor of St. Peter. Cardinal Lambertini, who was chosen as successor to Clement under the name of Benedict XIV., was descended from a good family, had shone in Paris along with Montesquieu in the house of the celebrated and infamous Madame de Tencin, and was also acquainted with Voltaire; he began his government with an attempt to bring about some reforms in the education of the clergy, and to introduce the dawning light of improved administration into the states of the church. He established four universities in Rome, tried to stem the tide of luxury, and made some wise regulations which were everywhere spoken of, but in the end all remained as it ever had been, or even became more disgraceful. The same proved to be the case with his institutions for the improvement of the church. Pope Benedict abolished many holidays in Spain, as soon as he was requested so to do; and in a pastoral letter declared that he found it necessary to do in Naples also what he had done in Spain. In this way, by the abolition of religious holidays, he sought to set some limits to the idleness of the people and to their habits of beggary, and granted concordats to several other Italian princes, such as he had given to Naples. We might quote many other examples of the mildness and conciliatory spirit of the correspondent of Madame de Tencin; but it would be a great mistake to believe that he knew and discriminated between what was essential and what was non-essential in ecclesiastical affairs, or at all corresponded to the demands of his age. Cardinals Gonzaga and Aquaviva, who under him were all-powerful in the government, took good care that his conduct should not be entitled to such commendation. Had he been a truly enlightened and intelligent man, he could not possibly have indulged in that extraordinary correspondence which he carried on, or have sought to gain a reputation thereby; and besides he gave proofs enough that he was not in earnest with his apparently conciliatory spirit, and had no idea of relinquishing any of the substantial pretensions of the papal power.

Charles Albert of Bavaria, who was led by jesuits and surrounded by priests, had not only announced his election as emperor to the pope, but begged for his formal approval of the choice. Benedict, or rather his cardinals, made a similar demand in the case of Francis I.; but although both he and his wife were

pious and devoted to the church, they understood the spirit of their age better than Benedict, who entered into a long controversy and correspondence with them on the subject, but all to no purpose, and in the end only made himself ridiculous. The same remark may be made with respect to his renewed protest against the Brunswick-Lüneburg electoral dignity, against the conditions of the election, and even against the peace of Westphalia. The derision excited among the Protestants by the hope which he exhibited of a return of the times of Hildebrand, did not, however, prevent him from protesting against the peace of Aix la Chapelle also. This fanatical step, however, must be attributed to his cardinals, to whom he relinquished the business of the church; he himself wrote thick books, enriched the church with cardinals, peopled Heaven with new saints, and largely augmented the Romish collections of holy bones.

This last circumstance was intimately connected with the pope's writings. He not only wrote four thick volumes on beatification and canonization (*de servorum dei beatificatione et de sanctorum canonisatione*), but also on the discipline of the church, and therefore thought himself well able to form an opinion of the importance of cardinals for the maintenance of the church of Christ upon earth. In the midst of the war he created twenty-seven cardinals at once, and when three died in 1747, he did not avoid filling up their places by seven new ones. Because he said so much good of the saints and their bones in the work just mentioned, which we and others cannot perceive, he began to fear that the numerous reliques which he yearly presented might go far to exhaust the Romish treasury of holy bones; he therefore gave occasion to a regular exhumation of martyrs.

As soon as people became aware of the pope's tastes and wishes, a vault was speedily found in the territory of Avignano, which contained thirty graves of nothing but martyrs; and thus they gained an ampler store of bones. With respect to the saints which Benedict himself created, in May of the same year (1746) in which he found this fortunate treasury of bones, he announced a splendid ceremony of canonization. Strangers came in crowds from all parts of Italy to Rome, in order to be present at these pompous solemnities. Five saints were canonized at the same time, among whom were two ladies and father Fidelis, a Capuchin friar of Sigmaringen. The orders of monks,

the source of saints in the church, were also increased by the foundation of that of the Barefoot Brothers of the Sufferings of Christ.

In Upper Italy the duchies of Parma and Placentia came by the peace of Aix la Chapelle to the Spanish prince Don Philipp, who would rather have been taken for a Frenchman than a Spaniard. As duke of Parma, Don Philipp was and continued altogether alien to his time and to its spirit; he introduced Spanish etiquette into Parma, and added Spanish superstition to the Italian. The people rejoiced at seeing a descendant of the Farnese in Parma, and his step-brother was happy in having removed him to a distance from Spain. When his brother Charles became king of Spain in 1759, Philipp should have ascended the throne of Naples; but Charles had immediately protested against this point in the peace of Aix la Chapelle; he therefore left Naples to his third son; and Maria Theresa, during the seven years' war, could not make good the rights which were secured to her by the peace of Aix la Chapelle, and Don Philipp therefore remained duke of Parma.

In Milan the spirit of the century worked beneficially: Maria Theresa caused numerous and great improvements to be introduced; and the better and milder principles of modern times with respect to criminal law and prosecutions, political administration and domestic economy, were then first learned and practised.

We do not mention the new kingdom of Sardinia in order not to be obliged to enumerate a mere catalogue of cabals and intrigues, of treachery to friends, and of secret negotiations with enemies. Among all the states of Upper Italy, Genoa alone exhibited a degree of vigour and perseverance, which had been worthy of a better reward than that which the French prepared for the Genoese. The old government had almost reduced the state to destruction, the people delivered it, and rendered France most important services by their perseverance; but by the terms of the peace this noble and brave people were afterwards handed over to the power of the oligarchs, who had done nothing for their country!!

The few families who at that time ruled with despotic sway in Genoa and Corsica had already driven the Corsicans to despair by their pride and severity, before the commencement of the Austrian war of succession. The inhabitants of this island, and

particularly the mountaineers, are at all times ready, as is well known, for any deed of violence and murder, and are of a vehement, irritable and savage disposition. The common people were embittered by the augmentation of many of their taxes, and especially by that of the price of salt; whilst the nobler-minded were deeply offended by the small estimation in which they were held, or the contempt with which they were treated as subjects of the proud nobles of Genoa, who even regarded their own fellow-citizens as immensely their inferiors. This mode of treatment on the one hand, and these feelings on the other, had caused a systematic war to be carried on (since 1726) between the Genoese senate and the Corsicans who were subject to their rule.

The peasants and mountaineers of Corsica can scarcely yet, and that only in some places, be restrained from having recourse to self-revenge and club-law, or brought to acknowledge the power of constituted authorities: at the period to which we refer, being driven to despair, they commenced hostilities. They broke open or demolished the arsenals, seized upon the arms which they contained, and without aid carried on war with success for four years against the mercenaries of the Genoese nobles and their miserable leaders, till at length a great number of native families of distinction joined the movement. The armed bands issued from the mountains and besieged Bastia. The capital was indeed saved by well-timed and conciliatory negotiations, but at the time in which the rebels besieged Bastia and handed in the catalogue of their grievances, of which they demanded redress, they had 20,000 men under arms.

At this moment the Genoese senator Girolamo Veneroso, who knew Corsica and the Corsicans, and had made himself generally beloved during his administration, recommended the adoption of kind and peaceful means; but the pride of the Genoese nobles, who held fast by their privileges, and the tumultuary proceedings of the rebels, which required to be opposed with energy, and of which we now see examples in almost every nation, frightened all those who were disposed to recommend peace and concession. Genoa thereupon sent 5000 mercenary troops to Corsica; but these were wholly unable to prevent the siege of Bastia, which was now renewed, and the senate were obliged to have recourse to Charles VI., who was always in

need of money, and to hire 8000 Austrians. This first division of 8000 men, whom the Genoese people were obliged to pay in order to prevent a diminution of the incomes of that part of the aristocracy which constituted the George Society, and to whom the greatest part of the island belonged, were under the command of colonel Wachtendonk, who brought over only half of the troops, but nevertheless relieved Bastia with his 4000 men. In the guerilla warfare which was carried on, in which the Corsicans as well as the Spaniards excel, the colonel soon lost so many of his people that he was obliged to send for the other half of his forces. In September (1731) it is true he gained a victory, but as soon as he ventured in October to carry the war against the Corsicans into the mountains, he was allured into neighbourhoods where he might be attacked with advantage. Many of his soldiers, who had been partly recruited in Italy, Istria and Dalmatia, deserted to the enemy; he even lost a thousand men upon the field of battle, and finally the expedition proved to be a complete failure. Money however was anew paid to the Austrians, and Charles VI. sent (1732) prince Louis of Wirtemberg with no inconsiderable force into the island. The prince received express commands neither to lend his assistance for the purpose of avenging the Genoese nobility upon the Corsican people or land, who wished both to be shamefully treated, nor to promote the covetous views and oppressive designs of the gentlemen who were called the Society of St. George, but to endeavour, by a course of mild and benevolent conduct, to win the affections of the Corsican people.

Prince Louis attempted to mediate: he proclaimed an amnesty, and succeeded in inducing the Genoese to make concessions to the malcontents, and the leaders and heads of families among the Corsicans to accept them; and finally, he persuaded the emperor to become guarantee for the safety of those who had been previously persecuted, and for the redress or easement of their complaints, which the Corsicans were to lay before the Genoese senate. Quiet was restored, deputies of the Corsican nobility went to Genoa to excuse themselves, and to discuss and come to an agreement on the new measures; the German troops and the prince left the island; but the headstrong young aristocrats persevered in maintaining their conservative claims and superiority. After a vehement debate in the Genoese senate, the younger and more violent party prevailed over the older and

more prudent; the Corsicans who had come to Genoa were arrested, which gave much offence to the emperor. Those who had been thus seized upon were finally released upon the emperor's urgent and at last threatening application; but several months were first allowed to elapse, and the seeds of deadly enmity were implanted in the implacable and revengeful minds of the Corsicans. This seed brought forth its natural fruits two years afterwards (1734), and war again broke out.

On this occasion there was not merely a popular tumult, but a formal attempt, on the part of two of the most influential leaders, to deliver the whole island from Genoese dominion. The Genoese were abundantly provided with money and arms, of which the poor islanders were almost wholly destitute, as long as they had no reason to hope for support from Holland or England. An adventurer, who boasted of his great connexions, which indeed he possessed, understood how to avail himself of this hope in order to promote his own personal views, although he brought some cannon and military stores to Corsica in the year 1736. He induced the Corsicans to proclaim him as their king, under the specious pretence that they could only hope for protection and support from the naval powers by declaring themselves independent.

This adventurer was baron Theodore Anthony von Neuhof, who played the part of king of Corsica from April till November 1736. He was born in the county of Mark in Westphalia, became page to the immoral regent of France, where he was trained in the best possible school for an adventurer, which character he fully and brilliantly sustained under Alberoni and Ripperda: he was first appointed an officer in the French regiment of Alsace, then entered the service of cardinal Alberoni, and afterwards that of baron Ripperda in Spain, married a Spanish lady of the court, but afterwards forsook her in order to return to France: from thence he travelled to Holland and England, where he pushed his fortune for some time, and then once again took up his abode and carried on his adventures in Paris. At the time in which the Corsican deputies were in Genoa, he went from Paris to Italy, formed an acquaintance with the Corsicans who had been principals in the rebellion, and found means to deceive and overreach the speculating merchants of England and Holland. Supported by money which he obtained by his ingenious representations, he came from Tunis to Corsica in an

English ship with cannon and stores, which he had purchased with the money of those whom he had deceived.

The part of the baron was however soon played out ; and after only eight months of kingly rule he found it advisable to desert his subjects, because the Genoese had applied to France for assistance and obtained some French troops. The Corsicans nevertheless carried on the war, even against the French, with varying success ; and their courage and perseverance excited universal admiration, because the Genoese abounded in wealth, the French troops which were sent against them were incomparably better equipped than themselves, and their number was very small, for the population of the whole island at that time amounted to no more than 120,000 souls. King Theodore was ingenious enough once more to deceive the merchants who had been previously his dupes ; he succeeded in inducing some English and Dutch Jews to raise several millions, and with this supply he fitted out five ships, with which he again appeared in Corsica in September 1738. On this occasion he scarcely remained a month, for by the end of October he was again upon his travels. The Austrian war of succession, which removed the French from the island, appeared in the mean time to open new views for Theodore.

After the outbreak of the war of succession and the removal of the French, whose general, Maillebois, was to command their main force in Germany and Lombardy, the Genoese again attempted to bring about a reconciliation ; but the Corsicans, who had been previously reconciled to them, were soon provoked by new and oppressive demands, whereupon the latter again flew to arms. In this new war the English secretly supported the Corsican nobles in their struggle, long before they declared war against France, and they were at that time accused of endeavouring to obtain the sovereignty of the island for the Sardinians : on this occasion (1743), king Theodore appeared on their coast in an English ship : he published a ridiculous manifesto to his pretended subjects, but they had become acquainted with his character, and his manifesto was treated as a jest. The English began openly to support the revolutionary party in Corsica, when the Genoese, who were deeply offended by the treaty of Worms, declared themselves in favour of the Franco-Spanish party in Italy. At the same time as the Austrians were besieging Genoa (1746), the fortifications of Bastia were destroyed by the fire of an En-

glish ship, and the insurgents immediately afterwards mastered the city without resistance.

As we have already stated, the Genoese senate was placed in a situation of great difficulty by the retreat of Don Philipp in 1746; their policy made them desirous of avoiding all offence to the emperor on the one hand, and on the other to conclude a friendly treaty with France and Spain, and the people did not think it advisable to take up arms for their own government as long as it was only threatened. The senate tried in vain to induce the marquis Botta, the Austrian commander, to adopt mild measures; he proved himself implacably severe, although he was himself a citizen of Genoa, and his nearest relations were members of the senate: he demanded the immediate surrender of the town, the fortifications, and the whole territory, and required them to send a deputation to Vienna, consisting of the doge and six senators, to beg for pardon and favour. Four senators were to be taken to Milan as hostages, and to remain in imprisonment till the payment of the millions which were demanded was completed. He did not venture to announce the sum which the city was to pay, but they were merely informed that Chotek, the commissioner-at-war, would at a suitable time make known the amount which was to be paid. The oligarchs, who were anxious about their country-houses and estates, surrendered a city in a most cowardly and precipitate manner, which was in all respects well provided and strongly fortified, and which, being furnished with a considerable garrison of regular troops, might have been defended for a long time; and this surrender was made on conditions which they would undoubtedly have obtained at the moment in which their walls were about to be stormed.

All the magazines, and along with them immense stores, were surrendered to the Austrians, who then demanded a contribution of three millions of genovines (9,000,000 florins = £750,000). In order to provide means for the payment of the first third of the required sum, they were obliged to lay hands upon the sacred deposit of the bank of St. George, the support of the Genoese credit; but when the heavy masses of this treasure began to be conveyed away in wagons and galleys, symptoms of commotion appeared among the Genoese people. The fermentation in the public mind daily increased, till even the common rabble were reduced to despair by the oppressions

practised by Botta and his generals, by their extortions and continually renewed and increasingly severe demands. When Brown, together with the English and Sardinians, made an incursion into Provence and besieged Antibes, Botta and Choteck remained behind in Genoa; and although it had been previously intimated, and the empress had given express assurance to the pope, that if the first two millions of the contribution were quickly paid, the remaining one would not be insisted on, they were nevertheless compelled to pay it. In addition to this sum, Choteck demanded 600,000 genovines for the cost of winter-quarters and as a compensation for not having suffered the troops to plunder the city; and finally, a sum of 200,000 florins was imposed in order to meet the expense of maintaining the Genoese troops, who were taken prisoners, and for whose sustenance provision must necessarily be made.

The cowardly senate at length offered some resistance to these demands when it was too late, and Botta began to carry away the stores in the arsenal in order to furnish the allies in Provence with Genoese cannon and mortars*. The people at length became convinced, that the very worst national government was to be preferred to the arbitrary and relentless tyranny of foreigners. There were increasing threats of plunder, and finally some of the lower classes were incensed and stimulated to resistance by the infliction of corporal punishment. The Austrians at that time were in possession of only one gate, and were not numerous in the city; they wished to remove a mortar, and when the common people refused to lend their aid, they began, according to German fashion, to employ the corporal's staff; this gave rise to a formal insurrection. The first struggles in the narrow streets were disadvantageous to the Austrians; and when they were forced to retire to the gate, the whole mass

* Muratori, who may be here regarded as an authority, as he was a contemporary, gives the following excellent description of the state of affairs: "Questo era il deplorabile stato di Genova, cagione, che già molti nobili, e ricchi mercatanti aveano cangiato cielo, non sofferendo loro il cuore di mirare i mali presenti della patria, con paventarne ancora de' peggiori in avvenire. La troppo disgustosa voce del minacciato sacco, vera o falsa che fosse, disseminata oramai frà quel numeroso popolo accrebbe di troppo il già prodotto fermento d'odio, di rabbia, di disperazione. E tanto più crebbe, perchè lamentandosi alcun del aspro trattamento, che provavano, scappò detto ad un ufficiale Italiano nelle truppe Cesaree (this was the marquis Botta himself) che si meritavano di peggio. Poi soggiunse: *E vi spoglieremo di tutto, lasciandovi solamente gli occhi per poter piangere.*"

of the people rose in arms, the narrow streets of Genoa were barricaded, and a committee of the people organized as a government *ad interim*. The people were in arms, the oligarchs played their usual faithless game, the interim government was to run all the danger of the result, and that of the oligarchy, which was still apparently retained, was to reap the fruits of their success. They lent their aid and approbation in secret, but publicly disapproved, obstructed and impeded in every possible way the temporary government organized by the people, which was to prepare and lead the opposition to the few Austrians who were in the city, whilst the senate humbly excused itself and flattered its enemies.

Although the Spanish and French ministers remained in the city, and supported the people with the whole of their influence and with money, and although the nobility must eventually reap all the advantage from the enthusiasm of the people, yet their cold, selfish, calculating prudence so predominated in their minds, that no single noble showed himself among the people till the struggle had been decided on the 10th of December (1746). The contest was no sooner ended than the nobili came forward to reap the fruits of that danger and labour from which they had carefully guarded themselves. The people, without rule, order, or leader, had fought with the Austrians in the streets of the city from the 5th till the 8th, and for the first time on the 8th some engineers and officers began to mix with the combatants and to organize the struggle. They superintended the placing of cannon upon the highest points and best positions, and at the same time directed them in such a manner on the 10th, that Botta thought it advisable wholly to withdraw his troops from the town and its immediate neighbourhood in order to take possession of Bocchetta by force, before the brave inhabitants of the valleys of the whole territory, who had been hitherto with difficulty restrained by the oligarchy, should rise *en masse*. Botta did not even venture to remain in Bocchetta, but marched towards Novi, and left the scattered and single posts of his army to their fate. The small garrisons, posts and sentinels of the Austrians, which were scattered about in various directions, and have been stated at 4000 men (probably exaggerated), were all taken prisoners by the Genoese.

In the mean time the nobles in Genoa forgot or neglected

none of their usual arts; they forthwith endeavoured to wrest the government from the hands of the committee, who had been chosen from and by the people, and again to resume the whole power. In this case the tradespeople and artisans were the most dangerous to their success, for they could have readily accomplished their designs with the mere rabble. With a view to their own ends, the nobili endured and indeed promoted all sorts of disorder, tumults and lawless disturbances among the multitude, in order that the want of their own superintendence and control might be sensibly felt by the citizens. In this way they contrived, by judicial prosecutions, easily to get rid of the most vigorous leaders, and even those who had been most active in their resistance to the Austrians, because the populace itself no sooner became reasonable after a tumult, than it not only approved of the punishment of its own originators, but even demanded it. The clients of the senators were thus progressively thrust into all places of trust and authority, and a very distinguished senator was sent to Paris, in order to prevent the committee appointed by the people from being recognised in France. With a view to this end, it was intimated to the French court nobles how easily the citizens, who had had the whole merit of liberating the city, might make good their claims in opposition to the nobility, who had contributed nothing to their success. All this was carried on secretly, because in this time of danger the services of the people were still necessary; the mixed council, consisting of forty persons, which held its sittings in a large building in the Strada Balbi, at first maintained all its distinction and authority, because the people could be inspired by this body alone to offer a vigorous and desperate resistance to a powerful enemy, who was every moment threatening to return and take vengeance upon the city.

There was, moreover, no lack of opportunities in which the old senate acted very differently from the new council of the Strada Balbi. Whilst the latter, for example, entered into friendly alliance with the Corsicans, the oligarchs began the war anew in the very same year, and even sent over 600 French. The Corsicans had not only taken Bastia by the aid of the English, but also Calvi, San Fiorenzo and other places; they had even formed an assembly composed of the heads of the people (*capi dei pievi*), established a government and proclaimed a democracy.

Belleisle supported the resistance of the Genoese as well as he could, gave them 12,000 louis d'ors, and sent 6000 auxiliaries, of which 2000 were fortunate enough to make their way through the passes, to avoid the enemy, and to reach their destination. The French government even promised 1,200,000 livres immediately and 250,000 monthly. When the Austrians threatened them with a serious attack, Boufflers, one of the most distinguished French generals, was sent to conduct the defence of the city against the besieging army of Austria. The Genoese besides would never have been able to resist the overwhelming force of the Austrians, if the latter had not adopted measures in every respect of the most inefficient description. In their blind rage, they had before had recourse to measures which must necessarily be destructive to the Austrian government, and were soon recognised as such and recalled. They had resorted to the confiscation, not merely of all the capital in money, but of all the estates which belonged to the Genoese in the hereditary dominions of Austria. The military operations which were undertaken in the first months of the year (1747) against Genoa were in no respects better advised or more reasonable.

The Austrian army appointed to act against Genoa was to be reinforced by the Sardinians, but the king of Sardinia refused to send his troops, because Austria had not shared with him the plunder of Genoa in the previous year. Schulenberg received the command of the army; the consequence was that Brown, who considered himself overlooked, refused to serve under him. A considerable time was lost during these negotiations about the chief command, but at length it was determined that Brown was to be the commanding general in Lombardy, and Schulenberg to take Botta's place as leader of the army destined for the siege of Genoa, and the king of Sardinia suffered himself to be persuaded to send troops. Schulenberg neglected the most ordinary precautions in this campaign against the Genoese, who, compelled to a desperate defence by the circumstances, had made very great preparations and raised new works of defence; is it therefore to be wondered at that the expedition was unsuccessful? In April (1747) he advanced from Novi to Bocchetta; but his army was suffering from want of provisions, military stores, and especially horses and mules. The siege lasted two months; the Genoese maintained their city, although they were several times on the point of capitulation, in order to

escape the immense efforts and sacrifices which they were obliged to make. They were vigorously supported by the French and Spaniards till Schulenberg raised the siege in June, under the pretence that there was reason to fear that the Spaniards might push forward over Savona.

The raising of the siege caused great dissatisfaction in Vienna, and Brown was commanded to march against Genoa; but before he had made the necessary preparations, news arrived of the signing of the peace of Aix la Chapelle. The duke of Richelieu, one of Voltaire's heroes, at a later period boasted of the defence of Genoa, which has been eulogized by Voltaire; the duke had succeeded Boufflers in command of the French engaged on this service; but he arrived only in October (1747), when the greatest danger was long past. From his manuscript letters in the French archives, we perceive that he took all possible pains to justify his extravagance and the petty frauds which he had practised on the French treasury, and to give great importance to his own services; he appears however at last to admit, that his warlike deeds in Genoa alone could scarcely have entitled him to the dignity of a marshal which he received as their reward*.

The citizens of Genoa were still left for some time longer in

* We shall occasionally communicate some notices from the official reports of the duke of Richelieu, in which he boasts of his own services in the years 1747-48. This report is to be found in the 'Archives du Royaume de France,' Carton K. 150, in the same roll with other reports given by the duke. We have paid no attention to the report on the battle of Fontenoy, because its contents are already sufficiently known through Voltaire, and the whole appears like a piece of stupid rhodomontade; but we present our readers with that upon his services in Genoa, because he magnifies them at least in an elegant newspaper style. After some things which we omit, he proceeds as follows: "Le duc de Richelieu devant croire alors par le compte qu'il a rendu des négociations dont il avoit été chargé que la paix alloit être conclue refusa le commandement qui lui étoit offert. Mais M. d'Argenson insista si vivement pour le lui faire accepter de même, que le maréchal de Noailles qui étoit informé des motifs de son refus qu'il se décida enfin et consentit à aller commander l'armée. Le plaisir de retourner en Italie et de voir Rome entra pour quelque chose dans la résolution qu'il prenoit. Il partit donc pour Gènes. Aussitôt qu'il y fut arrivé il prit connaissance des troupes Françaises. Celui qui les commandoit par interim avoit fait un très-gros détachement qui étoit très-exposé, le duc de Richelieu tenta tout ce qui fut possible pour le faire revenir mais il n'étoit plus tems. Celui qui commandoit ce détachement arriva avec cinq hommes seulement, le reste avoit été tué ou fait prisonnier. Le duc de Richelieu se vit alors avec une armée fort inférieure à celle des ennemis obligé de se défendre et de garder une très-grande étendue de pays et malgré la supériorité des ennemis, il n'eut pas le plus petit échec et fit assez de prisonniers pour pouvoir échanger ceux qu'ils nous avoient fait et avec eux M. Montal, lieutenant-général en Piémont, qu'ils retenoient. Il eut même deux avantages considérables; le premier fut contre M. de Nadasti, qui étoit venu pour surprendre et attaquer Voltri. Les officiers généraux qui y commandoient étoient venus à Gènes il

possession of that share in the administration which they had obtained, because their sacrifices and efforts were still necessary to success; but as soon as the case came into the hands of the diplomatists, the courts and the nobility, who were then exclusively predominant, friends and foes were unanimously of opinion that the conservative principles should be maintained in Europe until all should be in a blaze. The citizens were now deprived of all share in the administration of the state, which they had saved by heroic sacrifices and exertions; the nobles obtained the restoration of a portion of their money, and at the same time unlimited dominion, in a country which they had nearly betrayed and forsaken. But in the time of peace they found it much more difficult to bring the poor Corsicans than the rich Genoese under their oppressive yoke.

The rebellion in Corsica had been supported and increased by the aid of the neighbouring Sardinians and the English; but even when the French, who had been sent by the republic, had again conquered the coasts, and no more assistance was rendered by the Sardinians and English, the Corsicans refused to lay down their arms. The dominion of the Genoese nobility or the senate became now perfectly intolerable to them, and they afterwards besought France to receive them into its immediate protection; and did homage to Louis XV. The king indeed could not promise them this protection; but the French general who remained in the island received commands from Paris, on the one hand to keep the Corsicans in awe, but to take care on the other, that the Genoese nobles did not attempt to renew their former oppressions. From this there arose a very singular connexion between the government and their subjects, and the dogs which were to keep watch, were placed as it were between the shepherds and their flock. We shall refer, in the next volume, to the new rebellion in Corsica, because the assault of the French upon the island, and the conduct of Paoli by whom they were resisted, attracted the attention of the whole of Europe.

n'y restoit que le marquis de Monty avec son régiment, celui de Bavière et quelques autres troupes. M. de Monty, qui étoit le plus ancien, commanda," &c. The remainder may easily be imagined; he concludes: "Peu après le duc de Richelieu prit le ton offensif, il s'empara d'un bataillon tout entier dans Varagio. Cette guerre défensive n'eut pas l'éclat des grandes actions, mais elle pouvoit être plus difficile et l'objet en étoit bien important. Le sort de la république en dépendoit à tous momens. On fut si content du duc de Richelieu qu'on le fit maréchal de France et il peut assurer qu'il ne l'avoit demandé ni directement ni indirectement."

§ II.

SPAIN.—PORTUGAL.—FRANCE.

Spain and Portugal, as is well known, have still much more which is oriental in their usages and in the life of the people than Italy. In these countries we cannot speak of any alteration, or change, or influence exercised by the court upon morals; and their religion as well as their poetry is so widely separated from the whole moral system of our northern social condition, that persons of high rank and men of genius alone among us can properly estimate their influence upon life; we shall therefore confine our remarks to an account of the court and government of the two states. It would be quite unpardonable to give a history of the court alone, because it is impossible to separate the history of the court and the private connexions and relations of the ruling powers in Spain and Portugal from that of public affairs, as may be done in Russia, or to allege that there is always more life, activity and movement to be observed in the latter in proportion as the conduct and manners of the former are scandalous and contemptible. On the contrary, it will be seen that the bad health and melancholy of the rulers have continually obstructed every species of advancement among the Spanish and Portuguese people. This is the more apparent in Spain, as Alberoni and Ripperda, during the short period of their respective administrations, had clearly shown the latent vigour of the country, and how easily the nation could be awakened to a new life.

After Elizabeth of Parma had succeeded by great assiduity in inducing her hypochondriac husband again to undertake the government, she used all her endeavours, first through Ripperda and then by Villarias, to promote the interests of her sons. The Spanish treasures were expended in Vienna, and afterwards wasted in a war for the promotion of the queen's private ends. She not only assisted Don Carlos, whom she had placed upon the throne of Naples, to maintain his position, but, by means of Spanish money which should have been applied for the benefit of the Spanish people, enabled him at a later period to uphold the splendour of the throne, and to squander immense sums upon himself and his projects. Such is the account given not only by Spanish

historians, but by Neapolitans also, whose country was enriched by the money.

In Spain, government and legislation proceeded entirely from the king, whose signature was indispensable to give due and legal form to all documents connected with important public affairs; no such person was recognised in Spain as a prime minister, such as Richelieu, Mazarin or Brühl, although Philip was in a condition from 1730 till 1740, in which the relations of any private man would have felt themselves called upon to have him placed under the direction of legal guardianship. As early as the time above-mentioned, he spent his days in bed, suffered his hair and nails to grow, preserved an obstinate silence, and rose only for a short time at night to take food, nor could he be persuaded to be present when his wife gave audience, or even to sign his name. He could only be roused from his melancholy lethargy to the exercise of reason by the influence of music, and especially of singing; his wife from time to time availed herself of this influence to entice him from his bed and induce him to attend to public affairs; and for this purpose she invited the celebrated Italian vocalist Farinelli to Madrid. Farinelli was a Neapolitan by birth, and excited universal admiration in England in the years 1734–35; he realized a considerable fortune as an opera-singer, and was afterwards invited to France, whence Elizabeth had him brought to Madrid. In 1737 he sang for the first time in a royal chamber adjoining that in which Philip was in bed; the effect of his voice upon the king was at first so great, that it induced him to rise, dress himself, and take part in public affairs.

From this time forward Farinelli was quite indispensable to the queen and to the Spanish government and administration; it is however a matter of just commendation, that a prudent and, on the whole, a beneficent use was made of his influence by the Italian. Charles VII. was dead, and Frederick II. had concluded a peace; hostilities were prolonged in the Netherlands only on account of Spain, and there would have been no difficulty in ending the war had it not been for the affairs of Don Philipp, and consequently the whole of Europe was kept in a state of commotion by a man of weak understanding, a woman of the narrowest views and full of prejudices in favour of her sons, and an Italian opera-singer. Even the marquis Ensenada, the councillor of the infant Don Philipp, a person of remarkably

weak understanding and consequently easily guided, had obtained favour through Farinelli, and after his return from Italy played the chief part in the following reign under king Ferdinand.

No advantage could accrue to Spain from the French purchasing with their blood and at immense cost, a kingdom for one son of Elizabeth and a duchy for another; on the contrary, everything that Alberoni and Ripperda had done to promote trade, industry and knowledge was materially affected and injured by the war. The fleets were annihilated, prosperity declined, and the last and melancholy resource of Spain, the American mines, often fell into the hands of enemies. The Spanish national debt continually increased under the government of Philip till it reached 45,000,000 of Spanish piastres, and he by his will withdrew from the state a portion of the most productive income of the kingdom, and appropriated it to his widow. This fell the heavier upon the impoverished country, as 200,000 ducats were already allocated for the yearly pension of the widowed queen, according to the usual practice; in addition to which she received, besides the payment of her debts, the noble residence of St. Ildefonso, together with a yearly income of 70,000 piastres.

Ferdinand VI. and his wife, the Portuguese princess Barbara, were often both affected with the same melancholy as that from which Philip had previously suffered; music and singing produced the same effect upon them as upon their predecessor, and as in olden times it did upon king Saul; Farinelli was therefore quite as indispensable under the new government as he had been under the former. Ferdinand understood nothing, was conscious of his ignorance and acknowledged it; he loved music and the chase alone. Under the former government, Farinelli, notwithstanding the influence which he possessed and the presents he received, was never publicly acknowledged, but he now became a regular part of the state establishment; he still however remained within the limits of his own department and left the business of the state to others. As director of the opera, he made it the most splendid institution of the kind in Europe; singers, dancers and machinists were invited from all parts of Europe to Madrid, and whoever wished to obtain any favour in Spain, though he were a noble of the highest class, was obliged to flatter Farinelli; even Maria

Theresa, when she found it necessary to write to Pompadour, consoled herself with the reflection that she too must write to Farinelli. The ministers of foreign courts flattered and transacted their affairs with this singular man, the minister Ensenada being his creature.

The government was in some measure conducted by good luck, and foreign powers sought to obtain their objects through Farinelli or some one of the ministers. Ensenada continued favourable to the French; Farinelli retained his former preference for England, and at the same time favoured Austria; Carvajal alone was renowned for his firmness and blunt integrity, and he undoubtedly aimed at the general good. He maintained his influence by means of the jesuit Ravago, who as confessor daily spent an hour with the king.

Queen Barbara was far less suited to play the part which devolved upon her under Ferdinand than Elizabeth had been, although the latter was by no means distinguished for her talents. Circumstances however compelled even Ferdinand and his wife to consent to measures which had become necessary in consequence of the altered circumstances of the times. Even in Spain thoughts were entertained of paying the debts of the nation, of bringing about a restoration of trade, and diminishing the expenditure of the court. No great success however was gained; a saving of a million of dollars yearly was effected in the expenditure of the court, and hopes began to be entertained, that the humble and poor retainers and servants, who had been left unpaid during the whole war, would now receive some regular remuneration for their services. Manufactures and arts received new encouragement; and Carvajal, in spite of all the conditions of peace, endeavoured in every possible way to obstruct and check the English trade in South America, because he remained true to the old and ill-advised policy of his country towards the colonies. The same dispute which had given rise to the war in 1739 was now renewed with greater vehemence after the peace, and the indignation of the Spaniards was raised to the highest pitch by the wish of the English to establish a colony in the Falkland Isles*.

* In the following volume we must refer to the dispute which arose in consequence of the disturbance of the English settlement. In this place we shall merely observe, that there is at the present time an English establishment in the islands for hunting seals. For an account of the settlement and islands in general, see the 'Times' of December 1836.

We must now mention the dispute between Spain and Portugal with respect to San Sacramento on the La Plata, which originated in a threat on the part of the Portuguese and the English under their sufferance to establish a place of trade at the mouth of the La Plata. This point is chiefly important as bearing upon the history of the banishment of the jesuits, with which it is closely connected. After a long contest the Portuguese at length obtained a harbour on the Brazilian bank of the La Plata, which was secured to them by the conditions of the peace of Utrecht, although the Spaniards laid claim to dominion over both sides of the river: this harbour was San Sacramento. The Spaniards on their part had allowed the jesuits to found a separate ecclesiastical state in Uruguay, which the Portuguese regarded as a part of Brazil. By the consent of Spain, the constitution of this ecclesiastico-temporal state excluded all Spaniards and Portuguese, who did not belong to the order of jesuits, from that part of Paraguay which was called the State of the Seven Missions. This exclusion was founded upon good and intelligible reasons; and it cannot be denied, that the Indians, who were not governed in the same manner as Europeans, but watched over and guarded like sheep, lived contented and happy under the rule of the jesuits. This religious order therefore had good reason to complain, that the reconciliation of Spain and Portugal was purchased by the fall of their power, the ruin of the poor people who were their subjects, and the annihilation of their constitution. In order to put an end to their long negotiations with the Portuguese, and to remove them altogether from San Sacramento, where they were too near the city and province of Buenos Ayres, the Spaniards agreed to cede to them the district of Tuy in Gallicia and the Seven Missions in Paraguay as a compensation for San Sacramento, which was to be given up to the Spaniards.

The agreement respecting the cession of San Sacramento and of the Missions in Paraguay was concluded in the same year (1750) as the long-protracted disputes with the English on the subject of the slave-trade and the ships which had been seized in the South Seas; the jesuits alone were opposed to the treaty, and rested their opposition on the conditions upon which they had formerly undertaken the conversion, direction and government of the Indians. This powerful order put in motion every possible means of influence in Spain to support their views; and

even Ensenada, who was not usually favourable to their pretensions, united with the king's confessor on this occasion in upholding the cause of the jesuits. The king of Naples, who was successor to the Spanish throne, espoused their party; and their faithful flocks, the Indians of the Missions themselves, would not acknowledge the Portuguese dominion.

Were we to regard the jesuits only as a spiritual order, and to remember that as preachers of Christianity they put arms into the hands of their subjects to maintain the temporal dominion of their order, we might be disposed to approve of those severe measures which were resorted to in the war to which they gave occasion in Paraguay; the question however must be considered from another point of view. If we regard the origin and progress of the English and Dutch dominion in India, the despotism of Mehemet Ali, the much-lauded favourite of the French liberals, in Egypt, the manner in which the Spaniards and Portuguese at that time conducted themselves towards the Americans, and the behaviour of the North Americans with respect to negroes and mulattoes, we are compelled to form a milder judgement. It may be truly said, that the treaty between the Spaniards and Portuguese disturbed the peace of a family, which was quiet and contented because it knew nothing better, in order to withdraw its members from a strict but fatherly protection, and to give up the faithfully watched sheep as a prey to rapacious wolves. The jesuits did not deserve the execration of mankind in America, where they conferred happiness and peace; but in Europe, where they obstructed all progress, were accessory to every species of criminality, and excused and pardoned every offence which was useful to their order, or calculated to increase their power, they cannot be too severely consured.

Resistance was carried so far, that the jesuits at length caused their subjects to take the field, and gave battle to the combined Spanish and Portuguese troops. The ecclesiastical Indian army met with a bloody defeat; the jesuits however continued to place their confidence upon the king of Portugal, till that monarch was most unexpectedly removed by death. We here break off the history of these transactions, because the death of John V. of Portugal led to such dreadful times for the jesuits, that we must necessarily devote an entire section to the history of these events in the following volume. It is impossible for any honourable man to mention the persecutions of the jesuits in

Portugal under (Joseph) the successor of John with other feelings than those of dislike and abhorrence; but we must have some knowledge of the nature of the government of John V., in order to be convinced that nothing but such measures of cruelty and terror as no good man could or would recommend, were sufficient to deliver the country and people from the clutches of priestcraft. This will be obvious from a brief review of the history of John V. Pope Benedict XIV., with great solemnity and after a long and eulogistic discourse, conferred upon this monarch the title of *fidelissimus*; his contemporaries named him *simplicissimus*. The following notice of the silly projects which he designed or promoted may serve to prove that the latter name was well founded; and at the same time an explanation will thus be furnished of the grounds upon which the cruel persecutions of the noblest, most learned and distinguished jesuits under the reign of king Joseph, appeared less hateful and less deserving of abhorrence than they really were; in fact, the stupidity and folly of John V., which led him so completely to surrender his small kingdom into the hands of the clergy, was wholly to be ascribed to the power and influence of the jesuits.

From the time in which Portugal had emancipated itself from the power of the Spaniards in the seventeenth century, it had been ruled by kings without capacity or vigour, in the same manner as Spain from the time of Philip II. John IV., the first king of the house of Braganza, was wholly under the guidance of his wife, who was a daughter of the duke of Medina Sidonia. He was succeeded by an imbecile son, and after his death, in 1656, his widow continued to carry on the government under the name of her son Alphonso VI., till the nation protested against the government of a woman under the name of a weak-minded prince. The government was now seized upon by Don Pedro, the brother of the unfortunate king, who was allowed to marry the princess of Nemours, who had been separated from his brother. The weak-minded king was afterwards imprisoned in the Azores, and died there as a lunatic in 1683. Pedro also soon fell into a state of melancholy, and for long intervals of time was not master of his reason. He was finally succeeded by John V., who in the middle ages would undoubtedly have received a place among the saints, but in the eighteenth century was regarded as a simpleton, notwithstanding the praise

and honour bestowed upon him by monks and jesuits, the pope and the populace.

Whilst efforts were being made in all other European countries to increase the external well-being and comforts of the people, and to abolish the indolence, degradation, rudeness, superstition and feticism of the middle ages, king John was labouring to multiply those very portions of the ecclesiastical ceremonies, of which the most firmly-believing Catholics least approved.

Ever since the thirteenth century Portugal had been filled with monks and convents, and yet John erected a building for the accommodation of hundreds of monks in connexion with his new palace. This building might be compared to the Escorial in extent, and in consequence of the union of a convent with the royal palace, it had the appearance of a monastery. There was a superabundance of bishops and chapters in Portugal, the pomp and ceremonies of worship swallowed up immense sums of money, and yet John, in 1716, purchased from Clement XI. the permission for further ecclesiastical expenditure. The pope granted the king the privilege of a peculiar dress for all the ecclesiastics of the court chapel, as well as ecclesiastical titles and spiritual rank ; but the poor Portuguese paid very dear for these privileges and honours, by which the king wished to raise his capital to the dignity of a miniature Rome. In order to raise money for the king's projects, the pope, who drew large sums from the weak king in return for his concessions, granted him for ten years the right of applying the tenth part of the collective income of the clergy for the promotion of his strange fancies.

Clement XI. was succeeded by Benedict XIII., who was as completely under the influence and dominion of monks as king John himself ; this pope, nevertheless, entered into such a vehement dispute with the king, that all intercourse between Portugal and Rome was for some considerable time completely broken off. Clement XII., however, and Benedict XIV. had worldly prudence enough not to injure or offend so faithful and true a friend of ecclesiastical ceremonies as king John. The poor king was indignant with the pope, because the latter, in return for Portuguese money, would not declare the patriarch to be an hereditary cardinal of the Romish church, nor allow the king to distribute and confer his church livings and endow-

ments in the same manner as other monarchs did their orders. John would not suffer the inquisition to be introduced into his kingdom, and quarreled with the pope on the subject, who, as is well known, was involved in similar disputes with the Neapolitans. The king refused this concession, not from any feeling of compassion for heretics, or any conviction of the rights of reasonable beings to think for themselves, but because he wished to retain the merit and privilege of burning the believers or heretics for himself. Clement XII. and Benedict XIV. had no sooner yielded to the king's wishes on this point than he held a rigid court of inquisition, and in order to give pleasure to the spiritual heads of the church in November 1742, he caused no inconsiderable number of heretics to be burned, and performed a solemn *auto da fé*. The king had had three attacks of paralysis since the year 1740, and had been consequently rendered incapable of attending to any serious matters of business; he nevertheless attended the sittings of this solemn tribunal, which was publicly presided over by the patriarch. Twenty-three persons, accused of holding erroneous opinions, were arraigned before the court, of whom eight were burned.

The king's illness, and that debility which rendered him as incapable of thinking as he had long been of acting, as is usually the case, strengthened his capacity of believing, and his zeal for the church exhibited itself more and more, in the celebration of costly solemnities, and in pompous exercises of devotion. We shall adduce a few examples to enable us to show more clearly, in the following volume, why Pombal thought himself obliged despotically and violently to root out and destroy all that John had superstitiously and foolishly established.

The Portuguese Escorial, which has been already mentioned, or the royal convent of Mafra, did not cost less than forty-five millions of crusadoes, which amount to something more than the same number of millions of florins. This was the most singular and splendid building for praying sluggards that it had ever entered the burning brain of an Indian or Egyptian fanatic to plan, and was built in Europe in the eighteenth century!! Three hundred dirty Franciscans, lodged in royal splendour, inhabited one wing of the palace, in the centre of which was their church. This wing contained all the conventual courts, gardens, chambers and other necessary apartments and offices, as well as a splendid hospital for the care and restoration of such of the

monks as were ill. The other wing of this immense building constituted the dwelling of the king and his court!

Such a king was well deserving of the sympathies of the whole Catholic church, and, as might have been naturally expected, relics were sent from churches and convents in all corners of the earth, in order to try their efficacy upon the monarch in his sickness; but nevertheless the oppressed Portuguese were obliged in the end to pay heavily for all these miraculous means of cure. Every convent and church which sent relics to Lisbon received two hundred dollars, and two hundred thousand were paid by the nation for this attempt at miraculous healing. From the year 1743 the king had been earnestly engaged in endeavouring to dignify his new patriarchate. He caused a new patriarchal residence to be built, and sought to obtain the dignity of cardinals for the chapter of the patriarch. At the end of the year 1741 he caused at least a hundred houses to be pulled down in Lisbon, in order to make room for the new patriarchal church and the palace of the patriarch. He was not however contented with even this, and no sooner recovered from his first attack of illness, than he built in addition a magnificent church dedicated to the Virgin, the helper of those who are in need (*das necessitades*).

In the year 1743 the king's health appeared to be in some measure restored, and he thought that the best means of showing his thankfulness to God for his favour was by bestowing immense sums upon the higher clergy, who were already living in pomp and luxury. In March 1744 he caused the twenty-four members of the chapter which he had founded and endowed to be summoned to court, and handed to each of them a barrette, violet-coloured stockings, red shoes, a golden hat-band and staff, such as were worn by the cardinals in Rome. He wished, besides, to confer upon each of them the dignity of a duke, added two thousand crusadoes to their respective incomes, and enjoyed the pleasure of seeing them appear in the church on the very next day, which was a holiday, arrayed in all the splendour of their new apparel.

It was natural to expect that the whole government of the state, under such a king, should devolve upon ecclesiastics, and such was really the case. Public affairs were at first under the direction of a cardinal, and the reins of government were afterwards held by fathers Gutzmann and Gaspard, who gave the form

of laws to the most singular things. Among these may be reckoned especially the extraordinary law which they promulgated in favour of various species of industry which had no existence in the nation. Every kind of valuable work in gold, silver, silk, or fine wool, which was not executed in the country, was all at once strictly prohibited, with the characteristic exception of such articles and ornaments as were made for the use of churches, or to be employed in the public services of religion. Whilst the lay population was in this manner compelled by stringent police regulations to favour home manufactures, or to refrain from the use of articles of luxury or ornament, king John was maintaining a number of foreign artisans in Rome, who were engaged in preparing for him a wonderful work of art, made of pure silver. Their labour and ingenuity were employed in the construction of a silver chapel, which was brought by sea from Rome to Portugal in the year 1747, and which, according to Muratori's report, cost five hundred thousand scudi in Rome.

There was at that time no country in Europe which yielded a larger income to Rome than the small kingdom of Portugal, because the king, from the period of his accession, was constantly seeking for honours, privileges and distinctions from the holy see, and it is well known that nothing is or was to be obtained from that quarter without some adequate return. The pope was first of all richly remunerated for the dignity and privileges of the patriarchate in India; secondly, for the rights of the chapter attached to this patriarchate; afterwards for the distinctions and privileges of the Portuguese patriarchate; and finally, for the comedy of the cardinals, which constituted a part of its dignity. In addition to all this, pope Benedict XIV., who had great pleasure in making cardinals and saints, by a formal brief conferred a spiritual title upon king John a year before his death, and on this occasion, as far as is known, without any pecuniary return. In the same manner as his predecessors had conferred upon the French king the title of *Most Christian*, and upon the king of Spain that of *Most Catholic*, he wished to attach some Romish predicate to the name of the sovereign of Portugal, but was at first greatly embarrassed in its selection. John probably felt some scruples about accepting or allowing the renewal of the title which had been bestowed upon the unfortunate Sebastian, that of *Most Obedient*, and Benedict XIV. therefore digni-

fied him with the appellation of *Fidelissimus*, *Most Faithful*, which was capable of being as easily applied to his fidelity to the pope as to his firm adherence to the cause of Christ.

We conclude with the remark, that in Spain and Portugal at that time, the life, usages, opinions and prejudices of the court were in complete unison with those of all classes of the people, even those of the lowest rank, whereas in France they exhibited a strong and prominent contrast. The majority of the French people were still ignorant and superstitious, completely devoted to the monarchy, the hierarchy, and the darkest prejudices, and the king was honoured by them as an idol. The educated classes, on the other hand, and particularly the Parisian world, progressively threw off not only the fetters of the middle ages, but, from feelings of dislike and contempt, despised and ridiculed the abuses of the church, as well as its profitable Christian faith and benevolent institutions, which moderate human passions by offering something to engage the feelings and employ the imaginations of men. The court and that part of the nobility which remained true to their faith were obstinately blind to every ray of new light, and confidently relying upon their privileges, endeavoured to maintain the hierarchy, ecclesiastical dominion, religious observances, and the old and cruel judicial administration of the parliament against the Huguenots; and by the indiscretion of their conduct, their contempt for all feelings of propriety and shame, and the reckless immorality in which they gloried, they made themselves objects of offence to the whole nation.

The king and his courtiers regarded it as an honour to be ignorant and to lead a dissolute life; the court nobility alleged, as some still maintain, such as the author of the ‘Evening Entertainments of Charles X.,’ that the privileges of birth and court life alone constitute the essence and charm of social training, tone, manner and expression, and that every other condition and relation of life was affected by that mean and vulgar cast and impression (*βάνανσον*), which, according to Plato, is characteristic of the mechanic. These select circles consisted partly of princes, such as Soubise and others, and partly of peers and nobles, such as Richelieu, Aiguillon and their friends. From the time which we have already mentioned, these and such as these assembled around the openly declared favourites of the king and constituted the model of high society. In these circles war and peace were concluded, all political and other ap-

pointments were made, and from these circles came forth those men who exhausted and dissipated all the resources of the nation, that they themselves might be in a condition to play distinguished parts in life. We shall hereafter see, that in consequence of such conduct, the parliament was emboldened to seize upon and appropriate the rights of the estates of the kingdom, and in order to give importance to itself, presented some strong remonstrances to the king, which induced the court to have recourse to arbitrary proceedings, and which, in their turn, led to open strife and vehement disputes between the highest judicial court of the kingdom and the government.

Belleisle, whose extravagant expenditure excited so much wonder in Germany, was brought forward and elevated to his high position by one of the king's mistresses. He lived in a state of continual strife with Broglio, and his vain and empty character has been admirably sketched by the king of Prussia in a very few words. This protégé of the duchess of Chateauroux was however unquestionably very superior to those who were afterwards brought into notice and recommended by Pompadour. Marshal Belleisle's reception in England, after he had been arrested in Germany in opposition to the laws of the empire, furnishes an illustration of the condition and mischievous arts of the aristocracy: his seizure and the surrender of him to England prove in what a contemptible condition the German empire and German nationality at that time were!

We leave undetermined what many contemporary writers allege, that the seizure of the marshal was to be attributed to some of those miserable diplomatic tricks and crafty artifices which embarrass and involve the simplest affairs instead of promoting their solution. We do not inquire whether Belleisle had arranged the whole matter with the English or not, but shall merely describe the manner in which the English and Hanoverian ministers behaved, and the degradation to which Germany and its proud princes submitted. Belleisle, after having for a short time fallen under the displeasure of his sovereign, regained his former station and influence in the year 1743. He was soon after commissioned to concert measures with the king of Prussia for the campaign of 1744, or as others allege, under the pretence of concerting such measures, he travelled through Germany, in order partly to make a personal examination of the military weak points of Hanover, and partly to afford to the

officers in his service opportunities of ascertaining the means of defence or points of easy access, with a view to facilitate the march of the French into Hanover. How contemptible on this occasion does the German government, in the hands of nobles and officials, and the narrow-souled egotism of their so-called practical training, appear! In order to please the English government, the Hanoverian ministry first laid a plan for entrapping and seizing upon the marshal, and causing him to be sent to England; a high Hanoverian official next takes the whole responsibility of the affair upon himself, in order to please the ministry of his own country; and the very same man, whose duty it was to watch over the faithful observance of the law, and who had taken a solemn oath to administer it in justice, openly violates the law of nations in the very heart of the German empire, which was then at peace and on terms of friendship with France. Belleisle was travelling as the ambassador of that power which alone was the stay and support of the emperor of Germany, and under its commission was prosecuting his journey to Cassel and Berlin. In addition to this, he had been raised to the dignity of a prince of the empire by Charles VII., as a reward for the important services which he had rendered him. The suspicion that the marshal was arrested to forward some political views, appears to be confirmed by the fact of his neglecting the repeated warnings of Frederick, and despising the advice which was given him in Cassel, to avoid the Hanoverian territory in his journey to Berlin, because the Hanoverian police had received orders to arrest him on his way. By his splendour and magnificence, and his lavish expenditure, Belleisle again excited the wonder and admiration of the Germans in Cassel, from which, in company with his brother, he continued his journey through Elbingerode to Berlin. He no sooner reached the former place than he was arrested by the mayor, and there is the stronger reason to suppose that the whole was a diplomatic trick, because the marshal himself and the French court protested much less earnestly against this breach of the law of nations than the emperor and the king of Prussia. In any case the Hanoverians could have arrested the marshal only as a dangerous traveller; and yet, when they delivered him to the English as a prisoner of war, that nation, which manifests such a cosmopolite zeal for rights and law, received the intelligence with joy, lauded the conduct of the mayor

of Elbingerode, approved of his being given up by the Hanoverian ministry, and contemplated with pleasure Belleisle's being brought to England, because it was flattering to their vanity!

When Belleisle had so far arranged this affair with the English as to be able to enter upon negotiations, these proved as costly and fruitless as all the rest had hitherto done in which the marshal had been engaged. He was ransomed, acted anew, in Dauphiny and Provence, a splendid part at the cost of France, and suffered his brother to sacrifice 5000 chosen Frenchmen in a mad undertaking.

In the times of the first two mistresses, the duke of Richelieu had been elevated to place and influence along with Belleisle; but the former continued always to be an object of suspicion to Pompadour in consequence of his great skill in intrigues, and especially of his adroitness as a pimp. One can scarcely avoid believing, that the court, the nobility and the clergy had all intentionally combined to destroy every lingering feeling of respect for the social order of former times, for the clergy and the ministrations and doctrines of religion, by their scandalous lives, their open contempt for all decency and for all the principles of morality, and by their blind fanaticism combined with the grossest ignorance. On the occasion of the king's illness at Metz, the French clergy gave a striking example of their ignorant and foolish zeal for things of no real importance, and of their indifference to what was essential. Under the appearance of requiring a full and public satisfaction for the king's sins, the priests took every possible means of exposing and aggravating them, and by the exposure of the king's dissolute course of life, they inflicted a most serious injury upon the cause of public morality and religion. On this ground alone the circumstances are deserving of notice and remark.

Chateauroux, and D'Argenson, minister of war, urged the king to join the army in Flanders (1744), notwithstanding the expressed opinions and remonstrances of Noailles and other intelligent men who endeavoured to dissuade him, knowing that his presence would only embarrass and retard the operations of the army. The king's mistress, accompanied by three princesses of the blood and the whole court, first followed the king to Flanders, and then attended him to Metz, where he became seriously and dangerously ill. This gave rise to a species of mixed temporal and spiritual tragi-comedy around the sick bed of the mo-

narch, and to a noisy dispute between the duke of Richelieu as high-chamberlain, and the pious duke of Chartres, in the king's anti-chamber. The latter determined to enter the king's chamber by force and deliver the soul of the dying man from the torments of the future world. The duke of Chartres and the bishop of Soissons at length forced their way to the king's bedside, roused the conscience and awakened the fears of the weak patient, and drove away Chateauroux, who, up to this time, had continued to tend the sick king with patience and affection. The bishop would administer the last sacraments only on condition of Chateauroux's expulsion from court and the recal of the queen. The timid mind of the king was subdued, the dread of future torments, with which he was threatened, proved too powerful, and he consented to the expulsion of his mistress; but he was scarcely recovered when he became ashamed of his cowardice, recalled Chateauroux, and took every means of showing his gratitude and attachment to the duke of Richelieu for having attempted to guard the privacy of his chamber from the violent intrusion of his zealous and raving religious tormentors.

The manner in which Chateauroux was banished from the court, and the indignation of the people raised against her, is a proof of the utter worthlessness and degradation of a generation which was under the leading and influence of courtiers and priests. It is difficult to determine which exhibited themselves, on this occasion, in the most contemptible point of view: D'Argenson, the minister of war, who had hitherto been the most devoted friend of Chateauroux, and who now announced to her her dismissal in the harshest manner; or the people of all ranks and classes, who had hitherto idolized her, and who now, stimulated by fanatics, rose up against her in the most furious manner, and more than once, during her journey, placed the life of a weak and defenceless woman in danger. In order to make these scandalous affairs still worse, the neglected queen, who was obliged to borrow 1000 louis'd'ors for the journey, was sent for from Paris to Metz, and this circumstance afterwards led the king to give a public example of contempt for all human and divine laws. The queen was sent back to her former obscurity, her priests and her devotions; the duke of Richelieu triumphed; the bishop of Soissons, who had threatened the king with the torments of hell, was dismissed in disgrace from the court;

Chateauroux returned to her former place and splendour, and the disgrace and scandal of her dismissal were increased twofold by the manner of her restoration to favour. She was allowed to hand in a list of all those whom she reckoned amongst the number of her enemies, and these were all banished and fell under the king's displeasure.

The duchess died almost immediately after her return, which, under the then existing circumstances, was a public misfortune for the poor French; for at a time when, among ladies of fashion, it was regarded as an honour to be dishonoured by the duke of Richelieu, marchionesses and duchesses emulated and rivalled each other in their efforts to obtain and fill the vacancy caused by the death of Chateauroux. We leave it to such of our readers as choose to pursue this subject to seek out in other books the names of the various ladies whom their respective friends or patrons wished to introduce, or the account of the balls which were given and the other means which were employed to extinguish all remains of shame in the breast of the king. Advantage was even taken of the celebration of the marriage between the virtuous dauphin and his first wife, who was a very young Spanish princess, to introduce and bring to the immediate notice of the king some of the shameless wooers of his favour, who desired to replace the duchess of Chateauroux. The historians of that period, who hunted after anecdotes of every description, do not fail to give the most detailed narratives of the masked balls and royal hunting parties, at one of which the king at length openly declared his selection of a woman who had obtruded herself upon his notice with the conviction that her charms would prove attractive to the degraded and sensual monarch. In fact, the splendid suite of apartments which were devoted to the king's favourite in Versailles, and which joined the royal chambers, were immediately prepared for her reception and appropriated to her use; and from this moment the new mistress and her contemptible favourites obtained the exclusive possession and direction of the government.

The new object of the king's choice was the wife of a Mons. d'Etioles; she was created, it is true, marchioness de Pompadour, but everybody knew that by birth, education, training and morals she did not belong to the respectable class of citizens, to say nothing of the exclusive circle of the high nobility, from which all the king's former favourites had been selected. Ac-

cording to the prejudices of the age, this made the unlimited dominion of the favourite and the royal choice doubly hateful. During the war of succession, she made a modest and prudent use of her distinction and influence; nevertheless her whole education and character, the society which she favoured and the tone of her circle, were very much worse than they had been under Chateauroux. The abbé Bernis, a man of family, had previously written the letters of Madame d'Etioles to the king; he afterwards accompanied her to Versailles, and when all the measures had been taken for the seven years' war, played an important political part under the guidance and favour of Pompadour.

With a view to illustrate the morals of the time and in reference to the character of the man, we must here refer to some of those individuals who were conspicuous at the court. The duke of Richelieu is no doubt entitled to the first place among those who appeared on the public stage in France after the time of the regency. In order to delineate his character, little more is necessary than to mention that he was surrounded by a complete court; that even in Saxony, when in his fiftieth year, he was notorious* as a well-known destroyer of domestic peace, and that afterwards in Genoa he most shamefully misapplied the moneys entrusted to him, and was created a marshal for his scandalous prodigality and waste of the public money. The records of his private life, and of the morals of the innumerable ladies who coveted his favour and were honoured by his attentions, were of such a description as to render them wholly inadmissible in this place.

The only star in this dark and dishonourable age, the much-lauded hero of the war of succession, the dissolute son of the gallant king Augustus, Maurice of Saxony, stood no higher in the scale of morality than Richelieu himself. He could read with some difficulty, but had never learned to write correctly. Like the knights of the middle ages and the distinguished per-

* On the occasion of the second marriage of the dauphin with a princess of Saxony, he appeared in Dresden surrounded by all the splendour of a court, and as a universal conqueror among the ladies. Poor Saxony yet bleeds from the wounds then inflicted, which were rather torn open than healed by the peace of Dresden; the German newspapers, however, boasted and compelled the citizens, who were drained of their last farthing, to rejoice in the celebration of the marriage in Saxony (1747) with *operas, comedies, operettas, masquerades, running at the ring, night races, races by ladies, shooting parties by night, entertainments, fairs, illuminations and fire-works*. Such was the language of the newspapers of the day.

sons of his own, Maurice regarded ignorance as the privilege of his rank, but he was possessed of sound common sense enough to decline the ridiculous honours which the Academy offered to confer upon him. Those who looked upon themselves as standing at the very head of civilization, thought to confer an honour on themselves and him by electing him a member of their body, although he could neither write correctly nor read without difficulty. The marshal's ignorance injured no one; but the example which he set and his immoralities must, for many reasons, have produced the very worst effects, because the king lived in the same manner that he did, and because the laws and the usages of that time allowed both to employ the unlimited power of the police entrusted to the government for the gratification of their meanest passions.

The king and Pompadour, as is well known, filled the state-prisons with persons whose only fault was the having written, repeated, read or circulated verses or pasquinades directed against their persons or mode of life, and whoever failed in the slightest degree in any outward observance of respect towards any of those dissolute gentlemen by whom the king was surrounded, was cast into prison without hesitation and without trial. Even the flattering Marmontel, who had been lavish in his praises of Pompadour, did not escape this fate, having repeated in society some verses which were written against the duke d'Aumale, and refusing to betray their author. Marmontel in his memoirs gives such a full and detailed account of the circumstances, that the melancholy condition of the morals of the higher classes and of the government may be clearly deduced from his writings alone. Count Maurepas, an old fop, who was afterwards unfortunately appointed mentor to Louis XVI., was at that time minister of marine and conducted the business of his department with ability; he was dismissed from court, sent to his estates, and an incapable minister appointed in his stead, because he was suspected of having been the author of some verses which were found under Pompadour's plate. Marshal de Saxe, who possessed unlimited power, adopted the most arbitrary measures to gratify his resentments against those favourites who proved faithless to him, whose number was far from small, and against those who supplanted him in the favour of the mistresses who wished or endeavoured to escape from his importunities. In the Low Countries the marshal ventured to practise extortions, which

exceeded all bounds and excited the indignation of everyone. This went so far that Noailles had great difficulty in restraining him from fitting up privateers at his own cost, to be employed against Holland, and from turning a regular pirate, when war had not even been declared against the Dutch. Loaded with presents, and enriched in every way, he was nevertheless continually in difficulties for want of money, and what he so cruelly and scandalously extorted from those who fell into his power, he most lavishly spent in the gratification of the lowest and most degrading passions. When we examine more closely the social and inward life of many of the English aristocracy of what was called the fashionable world, or the lives of marshal de Saxe, Richelieu and Louis XV., we can well comprehend the cruelties and enormities of the Revolution, of which the masses were the mere instruments, while the real originators were adepts in that distinguished wisdom which lord Byron preached.

The French, who were still at that time observers at least of the forms of religion, regarded it as a thing quite national and befitting, that at the command of marshal de Saxe, women and houses of bad reputation, now called *maisons de tolérance*, should form an accompaniment to the army. The whole public was in a state of ecstasy, and thought it an admirable device, when the actress *de Metz*, in the character of the goddess of victory, placed a crown of laurels on the head of the victorious hero, in his box in the theatre, upon his return to Paris from his successful and glorious campaign! All was mere empty appearance; life was a comedy for the nobles and a tragedy for the people. The public voice applauded the erection of a Parisian stage in the camp, and considered the idea of causing balls, dancing, operas and plays to be mixed up and to alternate with bloody scenes of strife, as incomparable and delightful; whilst the degraded flatterers of the press conducted the king and the dauphin around the battle-field, strewn with the bodies of the slain, in affecting conversation. French historians are not ashamed even at the present day to record and boast of a contemptible witticism of marshal de Saxe, which one could scarcely pardon in a common mountebank. An actress named Favart, who was especially favoured by the marshal, when she came forward to announce the subject of the next representation on the evening before the battle of Raucoux, was obliged to use the following disgraceful language, which was then regarded and is yet recorded as a piece

of admirable wit : “ Tomorrow there will be no representation on account of the battle, but on the day after tomorrow we shall have the honour to represent,” &c. &c. This, indeed, might be excused as a national means of exciting a sensitive people and rousing them to action, by the example of other generals and even by that of Napoleon ; but the total and absolute depravity and recklessness of the ruling castes at that time had reached such an excess in every respect, that they thought themselves raised beyond the necessity of even the smallest restraints.

For the illustration of this point, we may refer to what Marmontel relates of the history of Mademoiselle Navarres, of Berrières and other favourites of the marshal, and the mean and vulgar answer which he gave to Pompadour, who reproached him with degrading himself by the frequent visits which he condescended to pay to La Poplinière, the former general. We shall not quote the discreditable expressions ; their sense was, that the latter lent him money which he never meant to repay. He committed a gross act of violence against the same La Poplinière by compelling him to receive back his wife into his house after she had been faithless to him, and in compliance with the fashion among the ladies of that day, had been amongst the favourites of the duke of Richelieu. No actress who attempted to escape him was safe from immediate and arbitrary arrest. A most notorious and detestable example of his conduct in this respect occurred very shortly before his death, when his health was ruined by his excesses, and he was confined to bed dangerously ill in his castle of Chambord, which has again been made remarkable by its recent history and possessor ; he wished by all means to have the society of Madame de Chantilly, a Parisian actress, although she perseveringly refused to accede to his requests or to leave Paris. The marshal thereupon wrote to the king, and Berruyer, a lieutenant of police, provided with a royal *lettre de cachet*, was commissioned and obliged to conduct Chantilly, in the most courtly and convenient manner it is true, but still by force, from Paris to the castle of Chambord.

The old marshal de Noailles saw, indeed, that everything was going wrong and did not hesitate to express his opinion, for which he was removed from office and power ; but he also was restored to his former station only by the influence of Chateauroux. He was more of a courtier than a statesman, countenanced every description of abuse, demanded offices of profit and honour

for his relations to the third and fourth degree, and continued to engage in incessant intrigues, whilst in his letters to the king he was constantly playing the mentor and complaining of cabals. The king himself was distrustful of his ministers, and listened with much greater attention and eagerness to those family anecdotes and scandal which were daily reported to him by his lieutenant of police, and which were the fruits of letters secretly opened, than to the most important matters of business. Louis listened to the advice sometimes of one and sometimes of another of his courtiers, kept secret diplomatic agents in every place, whose business it often was to foil and counteract the purposes of those who were publicly recognised as the ambassadors of his government. In despite, however, of the police and prisons, the influence of public opinion became every day more obvious and important. The most intelligent and at the same time the most absolute monarchs in Denmark and Prussia, and Catharine of Russia, prudently made terms with the French organs of the prevailing opinions, whilst the court of Versailles alone despised them. The contempt in which public opinion was held was shown in the unscrupulous and cruel treatment of the unfortunate Charles Edward for the sake of pleasing the English. By their severity the government awakened a degree of general sympathy for him and his cause which he by no means deserved.

Charles Edward's adventures in Scotland had completely exhausted all the resources of the unfortunate Stuarts; even the family jewels were sacrificed. The pope was obliged to lend his aid, and whilst Charles Edward was still following up his projects and endeavouring to gain friends to his cause in Spain and France, he raised his brother Henry, called duke of York, to the dignity of a cardinal, in order that he might render him assistance by livings and ecclesiastical endowments. When this dignity was conferred upon Henry, he was only twenty-three years of age. The English government had set a price of more than 300,000 florins upon the head of Charles Edward, who interested all the friends of romance in his favour by his wonderful adventures in the Highlands of Scotland and the Western Isles, and by the manner in which he was aided by Flora Macdonald. From July to September 1746, he succeeded in defeating all the endeavours of the English to capture his person, and endured more in the caves and fastnesses of the Western Highlands than his

grandfather's brother (Charles II.) had formerly suffered. The romantic Parisians therefore pardoned him for living among them in a low and unworthy manner, and were incensed against their government for having wholly neglected his interests and sacrificed his cause in the peace of Aix la Chapelle. It soon appeared however that the Stuarts were as incapable of any improvement, as the Bourbons have since proved themselves to be. Charles Edward, instead of immediately withdrawing from Paris upon the first hint of the government, or living in quiet retirement, indulged in every species of show and extravagance, hired a palace, contracted large debts, abused the liberality of Louis XV., and not only resisted the demands of the French ministers, when they required him to leave Paris, but despised the repeated commands of his father, and the most importunate requests of the pope's nuntio. Relying confidently upon the protection of the people, by whom he was favoured, he went about continually armed with loaded pistols, and in spite of the government and in defiance of their commands, frequented the opera, the theatres, and all places of public resort. There is notwithstanding no doubt, that no circumstance contributed more to ruin the popularity of the king of France, and to deprive him of every remnant of respect, and that no act led to the publication of more satirical pasquinades against his government, than the arrest of the unfortunate prince at the theatre by soldiers and the police. The Pretender was first conveyed as a prisoner to Vincennes, and was afterwards banished into Italy, where he made himself completely contemptible*. It will be clearly seen, from some account of the manner in which public affairs were carried on, that neither Noailles nor the parliament had even in those days any need of prophetic gifts to enable them to foretel the dissolution of the kingdom and its constitution, with a degree of certainty which would astonish the reader, were we to quote their words.

First, by the influence of Chateauroux, the minister of foreign affairs (Amelot) was dismissed from his office, precisely at the

* He there, as is well known, married the princess Stolberg, who led a most unhappy life under the name of duchess of Albany, and paid a heavy penalty for having more regard to the shadow of greatness than to the peaceful happiness of private life. She is best known from her intimate friendship with Alfieri. After the popes had deprived him of royal honours and withdrawn his pension, Charles Edward himself lived in Florence upon an income of between 30,000 and 40,000 florins.

very moment (1744) when he should have been engaged in carrying on the most important negotiations. After Amelot had been driven from court in consequence of his falling under the displeasure of the king's mistress, a most singular method of conducting the public business was introduced, because she wished to favour and promote Noailles. The latter was at that time in command of the army, conducted a portion of the business from a distance, a subordinate minister (*premier commis*) another part, and Chavigni a third; unity of design and action was wholly wanting. When D'Argenson afterwards received Amelot's place, he conducted public affairs, as his brother the minister of war and all the other ministers had previously done, without any common purpose or mutual co-operation. Each minister followed his own path, and the king pursued his, which often not only deviated from that of his ministers, but ran frequently in an entirely opposite direction. Noailles furnishes us with a remarkable example of this contrariety. When he was on a mission as ambassador at Madrid (1746), the minister thought it advisable to send him merely extracts from certain documents; the king, on the other hand, secretly sent him the whole of the papers themselves, and concealed them in cases, that they might escape the notice of his minister.

In military affairs marshal de Saxe alone was independent, because he enjoyed the favour of the king as much in consequence of his rank, his respect for his mistresses, his morals, and the gross sensuality of his mind, as from his military merits. Belleisle and Broglio, Coigny and Maillebois lived at constant enmity; Conti and Don Philip were obliged to be separated; Belleisle and Las Minas agreed with each other no better; and Noailles, after he had overthrown D'Argenson, wished to ruin Belleisle also. We see from the manuscript correspondence of Noailles' nephew, the duke of Grammont, whose name is well known in connexion with the loss of the battle of Dettingen, that he also was in immediate correspondence with the king, whose autograph answers are preserved along with the letters in the royal archives, and that their correspondence was to be carefully concealed from the minister of war*.

* In the 'Archives du Royaume de France,' there is a bundle of papers in Carton K. with the superscription 'Papiers trouvés chez Madame d'Ossun.' This parcel contains a number of letters and reports from the duke to the king, and his autograph answers. They run from the year 1743 till 1746, and afterwards in peace until 1756. Louis writes to the duke at Worms in July

Grammont commanded the French guards, and with an insolent reliance upon the privileges of the guards and their captain, alleged that he was bound to give an account of the performance of his duties and the management of his troops to the king alone; and that not merely in peace but also in time of war, he was not under the control of the commander-in-chief or the minister of war. On the Rhine and in Germany, as well as afterwards in Flanders, he corresponded with the king, as may be seen from the letters, not merely respecting the internal economy and regulation of his regiment, but steadfastly maintains, that it belongs to him alone to make proposals and send recommendations to the king about the appointments of general officers and the distribution of decorations, so that the minister could do nothing but signify his acquiescence. The king's answers to these shameless demands prove that he foresaw very clearly to what results such privileged irregularities would lead, and yet he yields the substantial part of the claim*.

1743 as follows :—" Comme j'ai passé dix jours à Choisy, vous serez peut-être impatient de ne point recevoir de mes réponses, pour y remédier quand il y aura quelque chose de pressé dans vos paquets, mandez à l'aide-major de me l'aller porter où je serai, si non, il attendra mon retour comme il a fait cette fois ci."

* The duke sent the king a long memoir on the history of the ' Gardes Françaises,' at whose head the marshal de Feuillade had first been, then marshal Boufflers; the latter was succeeded by his father, who received the command in 1704. He had maintained a severe struggle with the minister of war, but after the king's death had quietly obtained the privilege. His father was succeeded by his brother, to whom he was the successor. He sent the forgotten decree with respect to the privileges of the colonel of the guards to the king, and demanded its confirmation. We shall merely quote a single passage from the king's answer, from which it will be seen how far these demands went, and how completely the king was the tool of his courtiers :—" Il n'est pas douteux (he writes), que le colonel de mes gardes soit seul chargé de tout le détail du régiment et de ce qu'il y a part et je le maintiendrai toujours dans ces droits, mais je ne pense pas, que les promotions d'officiers généraux, gouvernemens, ou cordons de St. Louis à donner soient dans le cas de l'ordonnance. Je veux bien, que le colonel me propose ce qu'il croira juste que j'accorde au régiment même, qu'il s'y prenne d'avance afin que je le prévienne sur ce que je voudrois faire; mais en fait de promotion d'officiers généraux, elles ne doivent pas être séparées des autres, et par conséquent doivent être soumis au ministériat de la guerre, parceque cela n'a nul rapport avec la manutention du régiment. Les gouvernemens et croix de St. Louis ne sont pas tout-à-fait dans le même cas et ont plus de rapport avec le gouvernement du régiment, mais cependant comme il n'y a rien de fixe pour eux, ni ne doit y avoir, je ne puis rien donner sans savoir par le ministre de la guerre les autres personnes de mes troupes qui sont susceptibles de ces grâces." After a variety of other less important matters he concludes :—" Ma réponse doit être aussi secrète que votre mémoire, ainsi je vous prie de ne la communiquer à plus de monde que j'ai fait votre mémoire, personne que moi ne l'ayant lu."

The weakness of a government which was apparently all-powerful and absolute, not only appeared in these collisions with the privileged nobility, courtiers and attendants of the king, but still more so in its disputes with the parliament, which we do not propose especially to relate, because they would lead us into a labyrinth from which we should find it very difficult to extricate ourselves, and again to enter upon the path of general history. These disputes related sometimes to the registry of the royal decrees, and sometimes to things which certain professors and governments in our own days would again desire to bring forward as an apple of discord, if that were possible; but all reasonable and intelligent men merely smile in quiet at the unprofitable alarm which they create. There arose an important and vehement dispute on the subject of the bull *unigenitus*. At one moment the jansenists and jesuits contended with one another for life and death; at another the pope wielded his cold thunderbolts in favour of the jesuits; and the half-theological half-judicial parliaments on the other hand issued decrees in favour of the jansenist scheme of personal arrest (*prise de corps*) against all those who obeyed the commands of the pope. The jansenists worked miracles as evidences of the favour of their merciless Byzantine-Aristotelian god, in which the parliament believed; the jesuits and the court theologians on the other hand persecuted the miracle-mongers, and the court forbade all miracles which did not proceed from the true church. The parliament on its part defended itself, and judicially persecuted such of the bishops and clergy as refused the last sacraments even upon their death-beds to the narrow-minded devotees of the Romish church, if they did not previously express their approbation of the merciless excommunication of the pope, and when dying pronounce a condemnation and curse upon certain extraordinary doctrines in which they had believed during the whole of their lives. The whole tumult had its origin in a dispute respecting the doctrine of grace, as defined by the dogmatists; and both parties admitted, that no one, not even the apostles themselves, knew, or could know, what properly speaking was the actual state of the case!!

As early as October 1747, the destitution of that portion of the people who at that time bore all the burthens of the state had become insupportable. The farmers of the public taxes had paid several years in advance; every private person who was un-

willing to send his gold or silver plate to the mint, or wished to lay up hard cash, was obliged to have his plate or precious metals stamped by the proper authorities, and to pay a heavy tax for the privilege. Such a tax as this, as well as the impost which was laid upon jewels, could at least affect the rich only; but taxes and duties were speedily laid upon all the necessities of life. All sorts of goods and provisions which were brought into Paris were in future to pay a sixth part more than they had previously done (four sous a pound), and the duke of Orleans, by his earnest representations of the evil consequences, had great difficulty in persuading them to except bread and flour from this increased taxation. All these methods of raising money however proved insufficient; the court was in want of supplies; their diplomatic efforts were checked and limited, whilst the war continued, and trade was completely paralysed; recourse was then had to the most disgraceful means:—one million two hundred thousand livres were raised by the sale of annuities: next to a lottery, in order to bring 30,000,000 livres into the treasury; and the East India Company, who at that time farmed the royal monopoly of tobacco, was obliged to advance ten millions. When the expenditure of the court, and the payments which were made to Swedish nobles and men in power and to German princes, or the vast expenditure of their various embassies, are compared with the small sums which could be borrowed or extorted by such means, it will readily be seen, that Noailles was right when he conjured the king in 1745 not to suffer himself to be deceived by the appearance of prosperity and abundance among certain classes of the people, but to be persuaded that the misery of the mass of the nation was beyond expression*. The only persons in power who assumed the appearance of advocating the cause of the people, was the parliament; but this body, in the mode and spirit of their representations in opposition to the royal decrees of 1748, showed very

* We shall quote the words, which briefly and forcibly express all that we could say in the text:—"La situation du royaume est plus déplorable qu'elle ne l'étoit en 1704, après la bataille de Hochstet. Il a fallu continuer la guerre depuis 1704 jusqu'en 1714, et on n'a pu la soutenir que par des moyens forcés. Depuis la paix on n'a pris aucunes mesures pour diminuer le fardeau des dettes; on n'a eu aucune prévoyance pour se préparer des fonds en cas d'une guerre nouvelle. La guerre présente a déjà coûté des sommes exorbitantes, dont une partie très-considérable a passé dans le pays étranger et ne pourra de long-tems rentrer dans l'état. Enfin, on supporte encore le fardeau de la dernière guerre; il s'est augmenté par la guerre actuelle; et malheureusement loin que l'on puisse espérer d'en voir bientôt la fin," &c. &c.

clearly what sort of protection the people were to expect from an assembly of opulent lawyers and nobles.

In order to bring money into the treasury, and to extricate himself from the perplexities with which he was surrounded without injuring the privileged classes, it occurred to the minister of finance in March 1748, to lay a tax upon certain kinds of real estates, and to deduct a per-centage from all chattels which were transferred as presents, or bequeathed by collateral relations or strangers in blood ; in addition to this, he endeavoured to increase the duty upon bills of exchange and articles of merchandize, and to lay a new tax upon powder, wax, silk and paper. The parliament protested very vigorously against these threatened impositions, and took the part of those upon whom it was intended they should be laid ; but at the same time they protested no less vehemently against another royal decree, which was intended to protect the interests of the frugal and industrious citizens against the extravagant nobility, who were overwhelmed with debts, and who conducted themselves with insolence, relying upon the inalienability of their estates. The government published a decree, that if a man possessed of real estates contracted and failed to pay his debts, his estates should be sold, and be transferred with all the rights and privileges thereto belonging to the purchaser. The parliament complained much more vehemently against this meditated change than against the imposition of the new taxes, which, notwithstanding all their complaints, were actually laid upon the people. Extravagance however increased rather than diminished ; immense sums were lavished upon foreign courtiers and princes, as we shall show in the history of the seven years' war. Accounts of the expenditure of the court, and of the sums which were squandered by Belleisle, are to be found in all the numerous memoirs of that period ; in this place we shall merely subjoin some examples of the behaviour of the generals and men in power selected from papers in the state archives.

It clearly appears from the autograph correspondence carried on between the two ministers of foreign affairs, D'Argenson and his successor Puysieux and Richelieu, that the last-mentioned was rewarded with the dignity of a marshal in return for the grossest deceptions. The Spaniards did nothing for Genoa, the French paid immense sums* ; but the shameless favourite of

* The official correspondence, which consists of original letters alone, is to be found in the ' Archives du Royaume de France,' Carton K. 161. In No-

the king, without any scruple or self-reproach, used the money for his own personal ends. The affairs of the army were entirely neglected, and disorder prevailed: Humada, the commander of the Spanish troops in Genoa, would not submit to serve under Richelieu, and did not understand a word of French; the French officers conducted themselves as they had previously done in Bavaria under Broglio; they left the army in crowds during the winter and betook themselves to Paris, without any permission from the commander-in-chief. Richelieu, under the then existing constitution, found it impossible to prevent this practice; but again, the minister, with good reason, reproaches him with a lavish expenditure of the public money, which had proceeded to an extent no longer tolerable. The minister writes, that, in such a climate as that of Genoa, such immense sums were expended for fire-wood, that a *maréchal-de-camp* received sixteen livres for that article alone, and all the other officers in proportion. He further observes, that the marshal was in the habit of bringing all sorts of people and their remuneration into account, and of paying services which were wholly personal from the French treasury; among these may be mentioned his Italian physician, whom he had never alluded to; and he had given a place in the engineer corps to one Debusti, who knew nothing of artillery, and who had also played the flatterer to Belleisle. It may be proved indeed from the marshal's own letters, that he made the most shameful use of the large subsidies which were entrusted to his control; and from the minister's correspondence with the marshal, a correct idea may be formed of the extent to which the court and ministry at that time were in the power of the nobles, favourites and officials of the king, and of the manner in which they were obliged to fawn and cringe, if they wished to retain their servile appointments.

The minister of foreign affairs excuses his own interference, and remarks on these points, by humbly pleading that the mi-

venber 1747, Puysieux writes to the Spanish minister, the duke of Huescar, that universal dissatisfaction prevailed in Paris, because the Spaniards made no efforts to deliver Genoa. Among other points he observes:—"Le roi aura bientôt donné cinq millions de livres de subsides à la république, indépendamment des dépenses extraordinaires pour les troupes Françaises qui sont à Gènes, lesquelles montent par mois à des sommes considérables au-delà de leur solde, et cependant on assure que si cette république n'est pas aidée très-promptement de quelques subsides extraordinaires elle est prête à succomber. J'en suis en effet persuadé," &c. &c.

nister of finance (contrôleur-général) made heavy complaints of the immense amount of the extraordinary and secret expenditure of the army in Genoa, and in order not to lose the favour of this most gracious favourite, he is contemptible enough in an *official* letter to appeal to the king's mistress*. The same minister afterwards threatens a M. Farconet with perpetual imprisonment, for attempting, by means of Richelieu, to negotiate a marriage between the king's sister and the king of Sardinia, and denounces him for daring to interfere with affairs that belonged to his ministerial department alone†. To judge from his letters, Puitsieux seems to rejoice at the embarrassments of his colleague the minister of finance, but admits indeed that he had already sent 6,000,000 livres, and afterwards three bills for 632,500 livres to Genoa, and that notwithstanding all this, the treasury then was completely exhausted‡.

In order to form some opinion not only of the indifference but of the contempt with which public opinion was at that time treated by the court, it is necessary only to recall to the minds of our readers, the incredible expense of the king and his court. At the very time in which the precious metals were taken from the people at large by force, and the hoarded farthings of the citizens were extorted by the imposition of a stamp-duty, the expenditure of the royal silver chambers and of *Menus plaisirs*, under the administration of a Richelieu, D'Aumont, and Gesvres,

* Puitsieux is mean enough to employ the following language:—"Je ne vous pardonne pas, d'imaginer qu'on ait pu faire certaines comparaisons. Je viens d'en parler à Madame la Marquise de Pompadour, j'espère qu'elle vous aura guéri de vos scrupules."

† On the 16th of September (1748) he writes as follows:—"J'avoue, Monsieur, que je n'ai pas été moins surpris que vous de voir traiter le mariage d'un des Mesdames entre les Srs. de St. Oyen et Farconet. Je crois pouvoir assurer que cela ne plaira pas du tout au roi. Il faut, que le premier soit non seulement un étourdi, mais un impertinent du premier ordre pour s'aviser de traiter de son chef une affaire aussi respectable et de vous mettre en jeu sans que vous y ayez donné occasion. Si le Sieur Farconet s'avisait de répondre à la lettre, un cachot éternel seroit sa récompense!!" &c.

‡ On the 20th of February 1748, Puitsieux writes to Richelieu:—"Ce que vous demandez est très-important et vous l'appuyez d'arguments si solides qu'il n'y a d'autre réponse à y faire que celle d'une impuissance absolue. Les dépenses de cette année sont monstrueuses et je plains véritablement M. le Contrôleur-général. Cependant je viens de le solliciter avec la même vivacité que si j'avois ignoré son embarras, mais il ne m'a donné aucune réponse précise sur toutes les instances que je lui ai faites de vous envoyer des fonds. Il prétend qu'il n'y peut avoir dans la caisse militaire un vide aussi considérable que vous lui marquez et il croit que les trésoriers ou les commissaires des guerres se sont trompés."

amounted yearly to many millions. This will be most clearly shown by the documents referred to in the note*.

§ III.

ENGLAND, HOLLAND, RUSSIA, SWEDEN, AND DENMARK.

Were we to judge of the excellency of government and legislation from the wealth, the progress of industry, the growth and development of power by sea and by land, and the vast increase of influence in political affairs, the first three rulers of the house of Hanover would be deserving of the highest commendation, and their ministers entitled to be regarded as masters of their art and patterns of wisdom; but in a free country the people rapidly and irresistibly advance, whilst government and legislation are quietly laying the foundations of future misery. This receives a full confirmation from the course of English history from the year 1743 till 1753, when compared with the condition of the millions of poor in Ireland and England in our own times.

In the time of Walpole, the family of the duke of Newcastle and their creatures had seized upon all the situations in the cabinet, till at length there arose a universal feeling against the lavish expenditure and bribery of Walpole, and he was forcibly driven from the ministry. Carteret, who was his successor, followed the same course, and squandered the money of the nation to promote the Hanoverian interests of the king: he enriched the German princes and European rulers with English money, as had been the uniform practice since the government of George I., and continued to bribe the parliament with as much boldness as if bribery had never been spoken of as a crime, and without any reference to the fact, that the preceding government had been overthrown in consequence of its having had

* Among other papers contained in a bundle in Carton K. 150. of the 'Archives du Royaume,' there is one upon the "Etats de la dépense d'argenterie et menus plaisirs" of the years 1745, 46, 47, and 48. It is there stated, that under Richelieu, in the year 1745, it amounted to the enormous sum of 2,842,097 livres!! the "campagne du roi" inclusive. In the year 1746, under the duc d'Aumont, it reached 1,992,801; but it is added, "It was moins fortes than in 1745, on account of the dauphin's marriage." Then in 1747, under the duc de Gesvres, 2,809,523; and finally, in the year 1748, it only amounted to 1,327,099.

recourse to such practices. Moreover the very same men, with few exceptions, who had formed the old ministry, had also places in the new. The elder Pitt alone at that time spoke against the prevailing system of dishonesty and diplomatic treachery, and gained a name and reputation for himself as a defender of the rights of the people. The Pelhams however still maintained their distinction and pre-eminence. The influence of the duke of Newcastle was so firmly based upon the English aristocratic and plutocratic constitution, that the king himself was unable to maintain Carteret in his position, as soon as the latter roused the envy and jealousy of the duke of Newcastle. In November 1744, Carteret was obliged to retire from the ministry, and was elevated to the peerage under the title of earl Grenville.

The duke of Newcastle himself was quite incapable of holding the reins of government, and for that reason his brother Pelham was placed at the head of the new administration, to conduct the affairs of the state: but even Pelham himself lived in a continual strife with his envious, jealous and fanciful brother. The new minister possessed neither genius nor acquired knowledge, however loudly his praises have been trumpeted forth by Coxe, the well-known collector of historical trifles, which have no attraction but for the English, in the two thick volumes which he has written concerning Pelham's ministry: he no doubt however possessed many qualities in which his brother was totally deficient, particularly prudence and a sound and discriminating tact. Influenced by public opinion, he included Pitt, Chesterfield and Bedford in the new administration; but the people gained nothing by the change, because the old plans were still pursued on the continent, and no session of parliament was allowed to pass in which large sums were not demanded and voted for the public service, and the national debt considerably augmented.

In England at that time everything was progressive; all Europe looked on with astonishment, but no one perceived that the people properly so called were ever more and more becoming the slaves of the wealthy, and sinking to the condition of day labourers, without any property of their own, or to that of subordinate clerks and agents. This vast increase of wealth excited universal envy and admiration, without any thought of the consequences which were to follow. The rich traders and ma-

nufacturers of England, and the middle classes in general, then became possessed of, and accustomed to, all those comforts and conventional necessities which were known only at courts on the continent, or among the very highest nobility. It never occurred to any one that the grandsons, or perhaps even the sons of those who were then revelling in luxuries, and living in all the splendour of wealthy society, were destined to suffer shipwreck upon the rocks of that wealth and splendour which were the objects of such eager acquisition. It might easily be shown from the records of the pension list, that the hereditary aristocracy were enriched by the earnings of the industrious people, that the sons and daughters of great families were quartered upon the nation, and that all the numerous ecclesiastical and temporal appointments were almost exclusively bestowed upon the younger branches of the aristocracy; the church, the army and navy were filled with scions of nobility, and it was only those who had interest at court or with the government who could hope for rapid promotion. If occasionally an office of distinction or profit was bestowed upon a man of merit, the whole world trumpeted forth the praises of the government, and every one willingly believed that promotions through favour merely constituted the exception, whereas in reality they formed the rule, although the principle was never recognized as a law as it has been amongst us in Germany. The possession of the administration and the guidance of the opposition in parliament were treated for as mere articles of commerce. The king, for example, could not endure the domineering spirit of the duke of Newcastle, and on the 10th of February 1746 he appointed his friend Granville minister, but not more than eight days had elapsed when he was obliged to retire from the office. On this occasion the king and the ministry treated and negotiated concerning the appointment, as if it had been a mere matter of trade, and at length agreed that Granville should receive compensation for the loss of his position by an office of honour, which was not accompanied by a seat in the cabinet. He was accordingly appointed president of the privy council, a station which he continued to fill for many years afterwards.

About this time a complete change took place, not only in England but also in Scotland: industry made rapid advances, and ancient simplicity departed; the relation of the nobility to the peasantry underwent a change, and agriculture improved;

the family bonds which connected the lords of the soil with their vassals were torn asunder; commerce was triumphant; and comforts or conventional necessities were substituted for those pure enjoyments which noble and free minds alone seek for and esteem*.

As to the government of the Whigs, and their course of conduct during the rebellion in England and Scotland, they brought an indelible disgrace upon the government of George II. and upon the legislative aristocracy of England.

It is impossible to relate without feelings of disgust and abhorrence the events of that period, and it is scarcely to be believed that English laws and the English constitution were capable of being so perverted as to give occasion to barbarities which it would have been impossible to perpetrate in any other kingdom of Europe, with the exception of Russia, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and Italy. We pass over the brutal cruelties which the duke of Cumberland, supported by martial law, caused to be exercised in Scotland; nor do we mention the judicial commission which was appointed to try the unfortunate men who were brought in crowds from Scotland to England; we have no wish to state how great the number was of those who were condemned to death by the mere letter of the law, but who in reality fell victims to the party rage of lawyers and juries; but we cannot overlook the fact, that in England, as well as in France during the reign of terror, the members of the legislature were transformed into rabid tigers.

The upper house took the lead in this wild spirit of party rage, and carried its powers to the very utmost extremity which the law allowed: in the cases of Balmerino, Cromarty and Kilmarnock, recourse was had to those obsolete laws and to that line of conduct which had made the governments of queen Mary and Henry VIII., and the parliaments which suffered themselves to be their tools, the abhorrence of all Europe. It was declared that the crime of which these lords had been guilty

* Non possidentem multa vocaveris
 Recte beatum; rectius occupat
 Nomen beati, qui Deorum
 Muneribus sapienter uti,
 Duramque callet pauperiem pati,
 Pejusque leto flagitium timet:
 Non ille pro caris amicis
 Aut patria timidus perire.

Hor. Carm. iv. 9.

was a capital offence, and that they should be brought to execution without further trial. The lower house next arraigned lord Lovat, now eighty years of age, with a view to his condemnation by the lords. We shall return to the history of this prosecution and refer to it at greater length, when we have first alluded to the number of bloody tragedies which were daily presented to the people. What an impression must it have made upon mobs of sailors, boxers and fox-hunters, already too much inclined to the grossest brutalities, to see the cannibal cruelties carried really and fully into execution, which, in conformity with the barbarous laws of the middle ages, constituted a part of the sentence pronounced against high treason, but which by tacit consent were never exercised!

Party rage impelled those in power not only to be accessory to, but to command the perpetration of gross and horrible cruelties, which it would disgrace our pen to describe, and that too against men of station and education, who had no doubt exposed themselves to the penalty of death, but who in many respects were more estimable than their persecutors. In the notes we present our readers with an extract from the sentence pronounced, in the language of the judge*, quoted from the thick octavo volume which contains the records of the prosecutions. It will be seen that this dragging to the place of execution, and the cruelties and butchery which were practised upon the condemned, were such as have only been heard of amongst the Chinese, or the most savage of the Indian tribes; and it must be expressly added, that all these enormities were perpe-

* State Trials, vol. xviii. p. 351. Lond. 1813. The following is an extract from the sentence of the judge, pronounced against seventeen persons, among whom Townley was one: "Let the several prisoners above named return to the gaol of the county of Surrey from whence they came, and from thence let them be drawn to the place of execution and severally hanged by the neck, but *not till they are dead, for they must be cut down alive, then their bowels must be taken out and burnt before their faces,*" &c. In order that it may be seen that this was no empty threat, uttered in compliance with the formalities of an ancient law, but a cruelty greater than those perpetrated by Africans or Indians, we shall subjoin the account of Townley's execution: "After he had hung six minutes he was cut down, and having life in him as he lay upon the block to be quartered, the executioner gave him several blows upon the breast, which not having the effect designed he immediately cut his throat; after which he took his head off, then ripped him open, took out his bowels and heart and threw them into a fire, which consumed them; then he divided his four quarters and put them with the head into a coffin," &c.

trated upon colonel Townley and other brave men, who might more properly be named French officers than Scotch rebels. We shall notice only a few of these executions: seventeen took place in London, and others in other cities and towns, an account of which will be found in the state trials; nine of those who were condemned were drawn and quartered in Carlisle, six in Brompton, seven in Penrith and eleven in York, many of whom were treated as inhumanly as Townley and his friends. In addition to the multitudes of those who were found guilty and put to death, many were condemned to transportation, to perpetual labour in irons, and sent to the West Indies, according to the discretion of their judges or the wishes of their prosecutors, the government. We refer only to lord Lovat's destiny in particular, because the perverse judgements of men have awarded him a degree of glory in death which he never deserved in life.

Lord Lovat was a master in that cold prudence which knows how to make use of everything which can be turned to profitable account, in the art of changing principles, parties and association, and in all that political subserviency which in our days is regarded as the highest wisdom of life, and commended as poetical and diplomatic perfection. If anything was to be gained, he was ready to betray friend or foe: with a degree of cowardly and cold-hearted selfishness which is almost incredible, he pushed forward his son into the ranks of that party which was exposed to dangers from which he himself shrunk. In this way he contrived long to remain secure, whatever might be the issue of the struggle, and enjoyed a pension from king George, whilst he was seeking the honour of a dukedom from James III. Lord Lovat possessed a deep knowledge of human nature, but was a man of a bad and corrupt mind, who used men for his own purposes, and obtained many advantages in life, and even a degree of renown in death, which virtue is seldom able to realize: so uncertain is the opinion of the world, and so miserable its commendation!

In spite of his cunning, lord Lovat found himself at length unmasked; but he saw also that the bloodthirstiness of the Whigs had embittered the people; and when he perceived his own cause to be utterly lost, he profited by the circumstance to awaken a general sympathy in the public mind, and to expose king George and his ministers to the hatred which they justly deserved.

When he appeared at the bar of the upper house, as a venerable man adorned with the snow of eighty winters, and stood as a criminal, arraigned by the commons and prosecuted by the court, in the spirit of meek resignation he appealed to his advanced years, to his unfavourable situation as arraigned by enemies before judges who were his bitterest foes, to his defect in hearing, and to his inability, from weakness of voice, to speak in so large a building and before such an assembly. We must bear in mind that the method of verbal interrogation which was pursued in this tribunal, the forms of proceeding, and the long continuance of the cause, were sufficient to tax the energies and exhaust the strength even of the youngest and most vigorous men. The length and wearisome nature of the proceedings had already turned the current of public opinion in favour of Lovat, and the execution of the sentence pronounced against him by his peers aroused the indignation of the people to the highest pitch against his persecutors. Hitherto he had taken every step in life upon a close calculation of the external advantages which he might possibly derive from it*, and the cunning Scot remained true to himself to the end, and calculated upon the effects which his behaviour might produce in his last days and at his execution. Lord Lovat's death is a striking proof how much easier it is to die with courage and magnanimity, than to live an honourable and virtuous life. Of the three other peers who were condemned to death, Cromarty alone was spared; the earl of Derwentwater had been previously condemned in 1716, and was now merely brought before the court in order that he might be identified as the same individual who had been sentenced to death thirty years before.

The power and the wealth of England now increased with every year; the whole system of manufactures and commerce, everything which produces money and is produced by it, eminently prospered, and travellers were never weary in expressing their wonder and admiration; but they saw only the surface, which was covered with gilding. In the midst of splendid build-

* Hogarth's print of lord Lovat conveys an incomparable delineation of a character distinguished for these qualities; but the illustrator of the print has overlooked the striking feature which it presents, as he sits, shortly before his death, and calculates upon his fingers what course was likely to prove the most advantageous.

ings, galleries, and the entertainments of the rich and the noble, the misery and destitution of the millions in Ireland were utterly overlooked or forgotten; the tears of the Scotch who were driven from the homes of their youth and the abodes of their ancestors by speculating farmers flowed unobserved; the miseries, the sorrows and the labours of thousands of factory women and children went unremarked, because the palaces of the mill-owners and the long lists of exportations dazzled the eyes of the covetous and gain-seeking multitude. The conveniences and comforts of life and real wealth were at that time more widely extended among the middle classes than they are even at the present day; but these middle classes at the same time became accustomed to the use and enjoyment of imaginary, artificial and conventional necessities, and the imitators and slaves of the rich. The public burthens increased with increasing wealth, and the discoverers of all machines at length discovered a machine for taxation which sooner or later in all countries will bring every species of property into the hands of a few men of wealth, usurers and speculators, of the government and its creatures.

Immense effects were produced and great projects accomplished both by the state and private individuals, but everything was paid for at a high price. The national debt was increased by a greater amount, from the years 1739 to 1748, than during the whole war of the succession in Spain; taxes were imposed in the same proportion, and soon became intolerably oppressive to the middle classes, whilst those who abounded in wealth suffered but little. In the years 1746-47 alone eleven millions were added to the debt, and during the time of the Austrian war of succession it rose from fifty to seventy-eight millions (£78,293,313). The changes also which took place in consequence of the rebellion in Scotland must be considered in two points of view: on the one hand, all the friends of improvement and those who delighted in the conveniences and comforts of life rejoiced in its issue; whilst on the other hand, the admirers of the ancient patriarchal usages mourned over their abolition or decay.

Scotland now became closely united with England: its most dreary wastes were brought into cultivation; great capital was expended in improvements, in order, according to the new

system and the principles of an entirely new science, to turn to profitable account lands which had never hitherto been tilled, or at least only after the old usages of the country. English civilization speedily spread over all Scotland; in every corner of the land, the conveniences and comforts of life took the place of that poverty and destitution by which it had been previously oppressed. Travellers wondered at the changed condition of the heaths and moors; prosperity, cleanliness and enjoyment everywhere met the eye; and on their return to their own country they announced the progress and success of manufactures and trade. The wealth, splendour and hospitality of the English nobility and squires became proverbial, and a rich, magnanimous and liberal Englishman was the idol of every novel; but the contemplative and solitary student lamented over the very things at which the traveller and the multitude rejoiced, and sorrowed that all the poetry and simplicity of life was obliged to yield to the base love and the mean enjoyments of money. The vassals of the great landlords, who had been formerly happy in their stations and homes, were now obliged, after a very few years, to relinquish their native and beloved soil to new and more industrious farmers, and with sorrow in their hearts to leave the graves of their fathers and the pleasing memorials of bygone days, to seek in America for freedom without a history, and fortune unaccompanied by the poetry of life. Even the religion of the Scots was rigid and judaical, like that of the English or the Pietists, and like those too, it was an empty form, a dead faith. All sense of the noble and the heroic disappeared with the patriarchal and the rude, and the life of poverty and nature was nowhere to be found: money became the goal of universal ambition and the prompting motive to every exertion; and now money reigns supreme from the banks of the Tiber to the remotest Thule, and the lucre of commerce is everywhere in the ascendant.

This great change was effected in Scotland by the laws of the English parliament, by which the bond between the vassals and their feudal lords in Scotland was violently torn asunder, and pecuniary advantages were secured to the high nobility, whether they adhered to the house of Hanover or were partisans of that of the Stuarts, instead of the honour of dominion and of the paternal or patriarchal rights which they

had hitherto exercised. The heads of the great families of the people were rewarded, in fact, for forsaking their dependents and leaving them to their fate. The high nobility and extensive landlords were not only enriched by the money of the English with which they were bribed, but they were no longer compelled to regard their vassals, the inhabitants of their territory, as members of their family, and they made no delay in letting whole estates and single farms to the highest bidders. All who would not consent to become mere day labourers might emigrate. The sum which, as a compensation for their rights, was paid to those place-hunting nobles and landlords, who for the most part lived afterwards in London, amounted to more than £500,000. The pitiless stewards and agents of the nobility afterwards took good care to draw the largest possible returns from the estates of their employers, and multitudes of small proprietors sold their lands to eager purchasers, who were desirous of employing their capital for the attainment of great results. And such indeed was the case: the world was astonished at their success, but the dull eye of the gaping wonderer alone can overlook the consequences of a system which do not escape the notice of more penetrating observers!

We now pass on to the Low Countries, in which aristocratic abuses brought about a revolution. In England there was as yet not the slightest appearance of a democratic movement; a new aristocracy had merely triumphed over an old one, driven them from their position, and effectually secured the possession of their dominion by their victory in the struggle with the exiled Stuarts; in Holland the masses of the people had no doubt been engaged in the changes which were effected in the constitution, but they were in reality merely used as tools by the old adherents of the house of Nassau. When the dignity and office of hereditary stadtholder were raised as it were to those of a king in 1747, some attention was no doubt paid to the rights of the people, and in one place even its sovereignty was proclaimed; but in the main, just as little could be accomplished as in 1830 in France. It was quite impossible, without the dissolution of all the bonds of government, to lighten the aggravated burthens of the oppressed people, and to restore to them the comforts and conveniences of life which they had formerly enjoyed. It was impossible to remove or even materially diminish the taxes which

were imposed upon all the necessities and business of life, without relinquishing the obligations into which the nation had entered. The farming of the revenues was however abolished, by which the patriots, that is the ruling families, were accustomed to enrich their clients; receivers were appointed; and offices and places conferred upon persons who at least appeared capable of discharging their duties, instead of being as hitherto merely bestowed upon the servants and creatures of men in power, who were now likewise removed.

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